Friday, June 20, 2008

Overstaying prisoners; caused by turf technicalities

The case of CITY WARDEN OF THE MANILA CITY JAIL, petitioner, vs. RAYMOND S. ESTRELLA, et. al., G.R. No. 141211, August 31, 2001 involves a petition for habeas corpus filed by detention prisoners at the Manila City Jail and the proper interpretation of Art. 99 of the Revised Penal Code which can grants “time allowances for good conduct” to prisoners.

In celebration of Law Day on September 18, 1999, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) initiated a jail visitation program in the City Jail of Manila, where it found thirty-four (34) prisoners whom they believed were entitled to be released after deducting time allowances for good conduct in the service of their respective sentences.

Respondents asked petitioner Rosendo M. Dial, City Warden of the Manila City Jail, to effect their release on the ground that they had already served their sentences, less time allowances for good conduct. Respondents invoked Arts. 97 and 99 of the Revised Penal Code which provide:

Art. 97. Allowance for good conduct. - The good conduct of any prisoner in any penal institution shall entitle him to the following deduction from the period of his sentence:

1. During the first two years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of five days for each month of good behavior;

2. During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of eight days for each month of good behavior;

3. During the following years until the tenth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of ten days for each month of good behavior; and

4. During the eleventh and successive years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of fifteen days for each month of good behavior.

Art. 99. Who grants time allowances. - Whenever lawfully justified, the Director of Prisons shall grant allowances for good conduct. Such allowances once granted shall not be revoked.

However, petitioner City Warden denied respondents’ request on the ground that only the Director of the Bureau of Corrections can grant them allowances for good conduct under Art. 99 of the Revised Penal Code. Nonetheless, on October 11, 1999, petitioner City Warden issued certifications of good behavior to respondents stating that had respondents been credited time allowances for good conduct, they should have been released on the following dates indicated opposite their names.

On October 15, 1999, respondents, represented by the IBP National Committee on Legal Aid, filed in the Supreme Court a petition for habeas corpus.

In the resolution of November 15, 1999, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus which it made returnable to the Regional Trial Court, Manila. The case was eventually raffled to Branch 52 of that court. In his return,] petitioner City Warden, through the Solicitor General, opposed the release of respondents, arguing that while the Director of the Bureau of Corrections no longer exercises authority over city and municipal prisoners, he remains the sole authority under Art. 99 of the Revised Penal Code who can grant time allowances for good conduct to prisoners.

The trial court held that (1) the Director of the Bureau of Corrections no longer has jurisdiction over city and municipal jails, and it is thus legally impossible for him to grant time allowances for good conduct to herein respondents who are inmates of the Manila City Jail; (2) respondents had been denied the equal protection of the laws because “national prisoners, who are still under the authority of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, may be dispensed benefits by him under Art. 97, whereas local prisoners, over whom he lost authority, control, and supervision, are left with no one to dispense benefits under Art. 97”; and (3) that the certifications issued by petitioner City Warden constituted sufficient basis to grant respondents’ release under Art. 97. It held that in the exercise of its “equity jurisdiction” under Art. 9 of the Civil Code, it could fill in “the hiatus or gap [in the law] on who is to grant local prisoners good conduct time allowance under Art. 97.”

The Solicitor General appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that the trial court erred IN RULING THAT CITY WARDENS MAY GRANT GOOD CONDUCT TIME ALLOWANCE UNDER ARTICLES 97 AND 99 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.

The Solicitor General contends that despite changes in the organizational structure of the prison system, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections remains the exclusive authority for granting good conduct time allowances and, therefore, it was error for the lower court to order the release of respondents on the basis of certifications issued by the City Warden as to time allowances for good conduct that respondents are entitled to.

The trial court held that the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, now the Bureau of Corrections, no longer had the authority to grant good conduct time allowances to inmates in the provincial, city, and municipal jails in view of the enactment of R.A. No. 6975, otherwise known as the Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990, which places provincial, city, and municipal jails under the supervision and control of the Bureau of Jail Management.

The Supreme Court rejected the said conclusion because it assumed that the authority to grant good conduct time allowances flows from the grant of the power of supervision and control, so that only those vested with this power can grant good conduct time allowances to prisoners. But this is not so. Under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila (R.A. No. 409), the Director of Prisons did not have control and supervision of the city jails of Manila. It was the Chief of Police of Manila who under §34 of the Charter “shall exercise supervision, administration, and control over the city jail and municipal prisoners.” And yet, the Director of Prisons was acknowledged as the authority for granting good conduct time allowances to all prisoners regardless of their place of detention.

There is no inconsistency between Art. 99 and R.A. No. 6975. Repeals by implication are not favored. To the contrary, every statute must be so interpreted and brought in accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. For there to be an implied repeal, there must be a clear showing of repugnance. The language used in the later statute must be such as to render it irreconcilable with what has been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not suffice.

There is no basis for the conclusion of the trial court that it could rely on the certifications issued by the City Warden as to the good conduct time allowances of respondents because the Director of the Bureau of Corrections would also have to depend on the same anyway as respondents are not under his control and supervision. The question here is who has authority to grant good conduct time allowances, not on what basis such allowances should be made.

Citing past cases, the Court held that the trial court had no power to grant the petitioner time allowances for good conduct because in accordance with Article 99 of the Revised Penal Code it is the Director of the Prisons who shall grant allowances for good conduct if such good conduct has been observed by the prisoner concerned. A provincial warden cannot grant credit for good conduct to a prisoner and order his release because Art. 99 of the Revised Penal Code vests the authority to grant prisoners good conduct time allowances exclusively in the Director and in no one else.

Moreover, there are good reasons for holding in this case that the trial court could not rely on the certifications issued by the City Warden in crediting respondents with time allowances for good conduct. In the first place, the certifications issued by the City Warden lacked data on the dates when respondents started serving sentence.] Such data are important because, as has been observed, good conduct time allowances under Art. 97 may only be earned by prisoners while serving their sentence. While Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code provides that time spent in preventive imprisonment shall be credited in full or four-fifths in service of sentence, it does not say that the prisoners shall earn the credit for good behavior under Art. 97 during such period of preventive detention.

Needless to say, the writ of habeas corpus remains available as a remedy against any abuse of the authority granted by Art. 99 of the Revised Penal Code to the Director of Prisons, but that is altogether a different kettle of fish from the question posed in this case. Here, the question is whether a court may rely on the certification of the City Warden as to good conduct time allowances in ordering the release of prisoners by writ of habeas corpus. We hold that it cannot, in view of Art. 99 of the Revised Penal Code vesting the authority to grant good conduct time allowances solely in the Director of Prisons.

In view of the foregoing, the Court ordered the re-arrest of all of respondents. Itr held that it could be done without placing them in double jeopardy of being punished for the same offense because their re-incarceration was merely a continuation of the penalties that they had not completely served due to the invalid crediting of good conduct time allowances in their favor.

Philippine legal education: Magsalin lecture

In his paper entitled MEETING THE CHALLENGES: PHILIPPINE LEGAL EDUCATION
IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT (March 14, 2004), Arellano Law Foundation College of Law Dean Mariano F. Magsalin Jr., cited “the need for a paradigm shift to force schools to embrace and implement major reforms to address the need to be, and remain, competitive”. This would include “structured innovations in the law curriculum and teaching methods” necessary for a law school to “relevant in the evolving global economy”.

He regretted that “in the Philippines, even as law schools realize the need to “get connected” and “globalize,” there are significant constraints posed by financial considerations, resistance to change and the parochial mindset”. Further, “the country’s civil law system entails the study of so many subjects covered by the bar examinations and has inhibited the introduction of “international” legal courses”.

He traced the seeds of legal education in the Philippines which were sown during the Spanish regime when, in 1734, the University of Santo Tomas (UST) established its Faculty of Civil Law. In 1911, the American civil government set up the first state law school at the University of the Philippines (UP). At present, according to the Commission on Higher Education (CHED), there are 104 law schools operating in the country.

“Around 80% of the average law school population are working students who study at night being taught by mostly part time faculty, while the rest are enrolled in day or weekend classes”, Magsalin stated.

Most Philippine law schools subscribe to the “American law school teaching model”. English is the medium of instruction. Class attendance is compulsory. The “question and answer method and the case study system” are the most widely used.

He added: “The Commission on Higher Education (CHED) supervises law schools in the country. Graduates earn a Bachelor of Laws (LL.B.) or Juris Doctor (J.D.) degree. Under CHED Resolution No. 038-2001 dated February 19, 2001, the degree of bachelor of laws with bar eligibility is equivalent to a relevant master’s degree”.

He described the Philippine bar examinations as a “much-heralded and touted academic gauntlet with which … the entire populace (is) held in thrall and the results of which continue to generate inordinate interest and importance”. They are held annually covering eight (8) subject areas required by the Supreme Court. Over the past ten years, “around 26% of the applicants have passed the annual bar examination and applying this gauge, a little over 15% of law schools are performing above par”, he stated.

The law schools that do well in the bar examinations “remain to be producers of higher percentages of passing rates and they share similar policies such as rigid admission/screening process, maintenance of high level of academic performance in their law subjects, adoption of a Quotient Point Index (QPI) to remain in the law school, hiring of Deans with pro-active hands-on management style, and infusion of financial resources to the law library to better equip the faculty and students with the mass of legal knowledge, data and materials to enhance their skills and aptitude in the field of law”, he added.

The study recommended that “the law curriculum/program be improved and developed so as to produce competent world-class lawyers with proper sense of ethical values in exercising their profession” and that “new policy standards on the law program take into account several major developments in the field of law during the past decade and the trend towards globalization of the practice of the profession”.

Magsalin was particularly proud of its Lawphil legal databse, developed by Arellano University School of Law (AUSL), “the only Philippine law school with a comprehensive legal database which is available for free on the Internet”.

He stressed that “course offerings should capture the interrelationships among the different disciplines”. He added: “As the saying goes, law does not exist in a vacuum. These other areas of study provide the tools to better understand how the law works in the real world. As may be necessary, the study of other disciplines may be included as a particular topic may require. For example, in the study of paternity in civil law or evidence, the subject of DNA testing may have to be integrated. Ergo, the re-shaping of the law curriculum is a foregone conclusion and the introduction of course offerings that will blend the other disciplines is inevitable”.

Lawyers and judges disciplined: data as of 2004

The state of legal and judicial ethics in a country may be tested by the number of lawyers and judges that are disciplined therein.
Here is the record of the Philippine Bar and the Philippine Judiciary from 1999 to 2004, based on the records of the Philippine Supreme Court:

NUMBER OF LAWYERS DISCIPLINED BY THE SUPREME COURT

For the period 1999-2004

PENALTY IMPOSED

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

TOTAL

DISBARRED

3

2

-

2

6

10

23

SUSPENDED

14

15

12

15

42

40

138

SUSPENDED NOTARIAL COMMISSION

-

3

-

2

6

3

14

REPRIMANDED

6

6

7

17

11

10

57

ADMONISHED

16

3

7

8

10

6

50

CENSURED

1

-

-

-

3

-

4

WARNED

1

1

-

3

3

2

10

FINED

15

25

23

20

36

36

155

ORDERED ARRESTED

3

-

2

-

2

5

12

TOTAL

59

55

51

67

119

112

463

The number is broken down as follows:

12 ordered arrested,

155 fined,

10 warned,

4 censured,

50 admonished,

57 reprimanded,

14 notarial commissions suspended,

138 suspended, and 23 disbarred.

(Figures supplied by the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines).

Latest statistics from the Docket and Clearance Division, Office of the Court

Administrator (OCA), and the Program Management Office.

RTC JUDGES

PENALTY

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

TOTAL

Admonished

23

8

1

12

8

2

54

Benefits Forfeited

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

Censured

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

Dismissed from the service

1

3

4

5

4

4

21

Fined

22

43

30

23

37

41

196

Reprimanded

3

6

7

8

7

5

36

Suspended

2

5

4

1

1

4

17

TOTAL

51

65

47

50

57

56

326

METC, MTCC, MTC & MCTC JUDGES

PENALTY

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

TOTAL

Admonished

8

11

4

6

3

2

34

Benefits Forfeited

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

Censured

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Dismissed from the service

7

5

3

2

7

3

27

Fined

16

45

33

31

45

35

205

Reprimanded

7

10

10

9

5

6

47

Suspended

0

6

2

3

1

3

15

TOTAL

38

78

52

51

61

49

329

See:

Chief Justice ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN, “A TRANSFORMED JUDICIARY”, Chapter 1, JUDICIAL RENAISSANCE, Manila, Supreme Court, NOVEMBER 2005.

By:

Atty. MANUEL J. LASERNA JR.