Pauper litigant; forum shopping; contempt

May I share a recent case decided by the Supreme Court, which our law firm handled, for purposes of legal research of the readers visiting this blog.

We represented the respondents in the recent case of TOKIO MARINE MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY INCORPORATED, ALMA PEÑALOSA, KIMIO HOSAKA, SUMITOMI NISHIDA, TERESITA H. QUIAMBAO and ANTONIO B. LAPID vs. JORGE VALDEZ, G.R. No. 150107, January 28, 2008; and companion case: TOKIO MARINE MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY INCORPORATED and TERESITA H. QUIAMBAO vs. JORGE VALDEZ, G.R. No. 150108, January 28, 2008.

In finding for the respondents, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for review on certiorari of Tokio Marine Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. and its management executives.

The petitioners contended that the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in denying their motion to dismiss respondent’s complaint in Civil Case No. 98-91356 for nonpayment of docket fees; (2) for not finding that respondent engaged in forum shopping; and (3) in not declaring that he is guilty of contempt of court.

Inter alia, in the said case, the Supreme Court made the following pronouncements:

On the first issue, it is hornbook law that courts acquire jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee. As we held in Magaspi v. Ramolete, the correct docket fees must be paid before courts can act on a petition or complaint.

The exception to the rule on payment of docket fees is provided in Section 21, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

The guidelines for determining whether a party qualifies as an indigent litigant are provided for in Section 19, Rule 141, of the Revised Rules of Court.

For purposes of a suit in forma pauperis, an indigent litigant is not really a pauper, but is properly a person who is an indigent although not a public charge, meaning that he has no property or income sufficient for his support aside from his labor, even if he is self-supporting when able to work and in employment. The term “immediate family” includes those members of the same household who are bound together by ties of relationship but does not include those who are living apart from the particular household of which the individual is a member.

In the instant cases, petitioners maintain that respondent’s ex parte motion to litigate as an indigent is defective since it was not accompanied or supported by the affidavits of his children, the immediate members of his family. The argument lacks merit. Section 19 clearly states that it is the litigant alone who shall execute the affidavit. The Rule does not require that all members of the litigant’s immediate family must likewise execute sworn statements in support of the petition. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

Petitioners argued that respondent’s ex parte motion is not supported by sufficient evidence to show his indigent status. Suffice it to state that this Court is, first and foremost, a court of law. It is not its function to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of factual determination. Thus, petitioners cannot now ask us to review the evidence anew.
Anent the second issue, petitioners insist that respondent committed forum shopping when he failed to report to the trial court that he filed criminal cases against petitioners with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City.

Gatmaytan v. Court of Appeals describes forum shopping as the act of a litigant who “repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in, or already resolved adversely by some other court…to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another.” Differently put, it is “the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment.”

The rationale against forum shopping is that a party should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in two different courts as it constitutes abuse of court processes, which tends to degrade the administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts (Sec. 5, Rule 7).
Respondent’s Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping attached to the
complaint in Civil Case No. 98-91356 reads:

FURTHER, that he has not heretofore commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, except the criminal case for SWINDLING (ESTAFA) under Art. 315, paragraph 1 (b) and for FALSIFICATION BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS OF PRIVATE DOCUMENTS under Art. 172, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code to be filed before the Makati Prosecutor’s Office, criminal case for violation of the Insurance Code of the Philippines to be filed before the Makati Prosecutor’s Office, and the administrative case for violation of the Insurance Code Commission; that to the best of his knowledge no such other action is pending in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the foregoing certification is a substantial compliance with Section 5 of Rule 7. Moreover, it should be recalled that respondent manifested before the trial court on December 16, 1998 that he actually filed criminal cases against petitioners with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City.

On the final issue, petitioners claim that the deposition of respondent taken on December 14, 1999 violated the injunction issued by the Court of Appeals on October 15, 1999. Such act, petitioners assert, is tantamount to indirect contempt of court.

Contempt of court is “a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court: such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigants or their witnesses during litigation.” Succinctly, it is the despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of the court. Rule 71 provides for two forms of contumacious acts – direct and indirect.

Indirect contempt refers to contumacious acts perpetrated outside of the sitting of the court and may include misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions, disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or a judge, any abuse or any unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt, or any improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice. It is governed by Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

Before one may be convicted of indirect contempt, there must be compliance with the following requisites: (a) a charge in writing to be filed; (b) an opportunity for respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court; and (c) an opportunity to be heard by himself or by counsel. Records show that these requirements were complied with.
The Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 56579, dismissed the charge for indirect contempt, holding that respondent’s deposition was done in good faith, thus:

It should be emphasized that what triggered the holding of private respondent’s deposition last December 14, 1999 was the use by the petitioners of the June 09 and 28, 1999 depositions when at that time no orders were issued by Us enjoining any proceedings below. The use of the petitioners of June 09 and 28 depositions have been vigorously objected to by the private respondent, contending that there was a misunderstanding created when the private respondent was cross-examined by the counsel for the petitioners, and in his honest belief to clarify such misunderstanding in the previous depositions, the December 14, 1999 deposition was taken.

We see no reason to depart from the foregoing findings by the appellate court. Moreover, the taking of respondent’s deposition is not a part of the court proceedings in Civil Case No. 98-91356, hence, not covered by the writ of injunction issued by the Court of Appeals. Let it be stressed at this point that we have always abided by the dogma that courts must exercise their contempt powers sparingly.

The full txt of the said case is reproduced hereinbelow.

TOKIO MARINE MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY INCORPORATED, ALMA PEÑALOSA, KIMIO HOSAKA, SUMITOMI NISHIDA, TERESITA H. QUIAMBAO and ANTONIO B. LAPID vs. JORGE VALDEZ, G.R. No. 150107, January 28, 2008; and companion case: TOKIO MARINE MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY INCORPORATED and TERESITA H. QUIAMBAO vs. JORGE VALDEZ, G.R. No. 150108, January 28, 2008.

For our resolution are two (2) consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 13, 2001 in the consolidated cases CA-G.R. SP No. 52914 and CA-G.R. SP No. 56579.

Tokio Marine Malayan Insurance Company Incorporated (Tokio Marine), petitioner in these cases, is a domestic corporation engaged in the insurance business. The individual petitioners are its corporate officers, except Antonio B. Lapid, one of Tokio Marine’s consultants.

Jorge Valdez, respondent in these cases, was a former unit manager of Tokio Marine pursuant to a Unit Management Contract entered into between them on August 16, 1977.

On October 15, 1998, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, Manila a complaint for damages against petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-91356. He alleged therein that petitioners violated the terms of the Unit Management Contract by refusing to pay him, among others, his “commissions,” and bonuses. Respondent prayed for the following reliefs: a) actual damages in the total amount of P71,866,205.67 and the corresponding interests; b) moral damages of P10,000,000.00; c) exemplary damages amounting to P10,000,000.00; d) attorney’s fees corresponding to 30% of the said amounts; and e) costs of the suit.

Eventually, respondent filed with the trial court an “Urgent Ex Parte Motion For Authority To Litigate As Indigent Plaintiff.”

On October 28, 1998, the trial court issued an Order, the pertinent portions of which read:

The Court hereby allows the plaintiff to litigate as pauper there being sufficient showing that he is an indigent. He does not own any real property in the City of Manila or elsewhere.
The Court therefore directs the Clerk of Court to accept the complaint for filing without payment of filing fees computed as SIX HUNDRED FIFTEEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO AND EIGHTY-THREE CENTAVOS (P615,672.83) which amount, however, shall constitute a lien upon any judgment to be rendered in favor of the plaintiff.

On December 11, 1998, petitioners filed their separate motions to dismiss the complaint.

On December 17, 1998, respondent manifested before the trial court that he filed various criminal complaints against petitioners with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City.

On January 20, 1999, the trial court issued an Order denying petitioners’ motions to dismiss. They then filed motions for reconsideration, but they were likewise denied.

On March 12, 1999, petitioners filed their “Answer Ad Cautelam” in Civil Case No. 98-91356.

On May 24, 1999, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals assailing the Order of the trial court dated January 20, 1999 denying their motions to dismiss, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52914.

On October 15, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the trial court from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 98-91356 during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 52914.


Then on December 7, 1999, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals an “Urgent Notice of Taking of Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Private Respondent Jorge Valdez For Purposes of the Above-Captioned Pending Case And For Such Other Legal Purposes As May Be Warranted By Existing Law and Jurisprudence.” It appears that respondent was already 75 years old and sickly.

On December 13, 1999, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition to cite respondent in contempt of court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 56579. Petitioners alleged therein that in filing with the appellate court an urgent notice of taking his deposition, respondent violated the preliminary injunction issued by the said court.

Subsequently, CA-G.R. SP No. 56579 was consolidated with CA-G.R. SP No. 52914.

On December 14, 1999, the deposition of respondent was taken by Atty. Alberto A. Aguja, a Notary Public for Manila. On the same date, he filed with the Court of Appeals respondent’s deposition.

On September 13, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision in the consolidated cases CA-G.R. SP No. 52914 and CA-G.R. SP No. 56579 dismissing the petitions and lifting and dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued, thus:

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the consolidated petitions filed by the petitioners are hereby DISMISSED. The writ of preliminary injunction dated October 18, 1999 issued by this Court enjoining further proceedings in Civil Case No. 98-91356, pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 35 is hereby LIFTED and DISSOLVED.

SO ORDERED.


Hence, the instant consolidated petitions.

Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in denying their motion to dismiss respondent’s complaint in Civil Case No. 98-91356 for nonpayment of docket fees; (2) for not finding that respondent engaged in forum shopping; and (3) in not declaring that he is guilty of contempt of court.

On the first issue, it is hornbook law that courts acquire jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee. As we held in Magaspi v. Ramolete, the correct docket fees must be paid before courts can act on a petition or complaint. The exception to the rule on payment of docket fees is provided in Section 21, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, thus:

SEC. 21. Indigent party. – A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as an indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family.
Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees and of transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished him. The amount of the docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides.

Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court. If the court should determine after hearing that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue or the payment thereof, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose.


The guidelines for determining whether a party qualifies as an indigent litigant are provided for in Section 19, Rule 141, of the Revised Rules of Court, which reads:

SEC. 19. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legal fees. – INDIGENT LITIGANT (A) WHOSE GROSS INCOME AND THAT OF THEIR IMMEDIATE FAMILY DO NOT EXCEED AN AMOUNT DOUBLE THE MONTHLY MINIMUM WAGE OF AN EMPLOYEE AND (B) WHO DO NOT OWN REAL PROPERTY WITH A FAIR MARKET VALUE AS STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OF MORE THAN THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00) SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM THE PAYMENT OF LEGAL FEES.
The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent unless the court otherwise provides.

To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit that he and his immediate family do not earn a gross income abovementioned nor they own any real property with the fair value aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of the litigant’s affidavit. The current tax declaration, if any, shall be attached to the litigant’s affidavit.

Any falsity in the affidavit of the litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to
dismiss the complaint or action or to strike out the pleading of that party, without prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have been incurred.

For purposes of a suit in forma pauperis, an indigent litigant is not really a pauper, but is properly a person who is an indigent although not a public charge, meaning that he has no property or income sufficient for his support aside from his labor, even if he is self-supporting when able to work and in employment. The term “immediate family” includes those members of the same household who are bound together by ties of relationship but does not include those who are living apart from the particular household of which the individual is a member.

In the instant cases, petitioners maintain that respondent’s ex parte motion to litigate as an indigent is defective since it was not accompanied or supported by the affidavits of his children, the immediate members of his family. The argument lacks merit. Section 19 clearly states that it is the litigant alone who shall execute the affidavit. The Rule does not require that all members of the litigant’s immediate family must likewise execute sworn statements in support of the petition. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

Petitioners next argue that respondent’s ex parte motion is not supported by sufficient evidence to show his indigent status. Suffice it to state that this Court is, first and foremost, a court of law. It is not its function to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of factual determination. Thus, petitioners cannot now ask us to review the evidence anew.

Anent the second issue, petitioners insist that respondent committed forum shopping when he failed to report to the trial court that he filed criminal cases against petitioners with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City.

Gatmaytan v. Court of Appeals describes forum shopping as the act of a litigant who “repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in, or already resolved adversely by some other court…to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another.” Differently put, it is “the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment.”

The rationale against forum shopping is that a party should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in two different courts as it constitutes abuse of court processes, which tends to degrade the administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.

Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:

SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. – The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal, or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirement shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.


Respondent’s Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping attached to the
complaint in Civil Case No. 98-91356 reads:

FURTHER, that he has not heretofore commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, except the criminal case for SWINDLING (ESTAFA) under Art. 315, paragraph 1 (b) and for FALSIFICATION BY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS OF PRIVATE DOCUMENTS under Art. 172, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code to be filed before the Makati Prosecutor’s Office, criminal case for violation of the Insurance Code of the Philippines to be filed before the Makati Prosecutor’s Office, and the administrative case for violation of the Insurance Code Commission; that to the best of his knowledge no such other action is pending in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals.


We agree with the Court of Appeals that the foregoing certification is a substantial compliance with Section 5 of Rule 7. Moreover, it should be recalled that respondent manifested before the trial court on December 16, 1998 that he actually filed criminal cases against petitioners with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City.

On the final issue, petitioners claim that the deposition of respondent taken on December 14, 1999 violated the injunction issued by the Court of Appeals on October 15, 1999. Such act, petitioners assert, is tantamount to indirect contempt of court.

Contempt of court is “a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court: such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigants or their witnesses during litigation.” Succinctly, it is the despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of the court. Rule 71 provides for two forms of contumacious acts – direct and indirect.

Indirect contempt refers to contumacious acts perpetrated outside of the sitting of the court and may include misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions, disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or a judge, any abuse or any unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt, or any improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice. It is governed by Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides:

SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – After a charge in writing has been filed and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or by counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
Misbehavior of an officer of court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions;

Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or rejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;

Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the process or proceeding of a court not constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of this Rule;
Any improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;

Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court and acting as such without authority;
Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

The rescue, or attempted rescue, of any person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.

But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings.


Before one may be convicted of indirect contempt, there must be compliance with the following requisites: (a) a charge in writing to be filed; (b) an opportunity for respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court; and (c) an opportunity to be heard by himself or by counsel. Records show that these requirements were complied with.

The Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 56579, dismissed the charge for indirect contempt, holding that respondent’s deposition was done in good faith, thus:

It should be emphasized that what triggered the holding of private respondent’s deposition last December 14, 1999 was the use by the petitioners of the June 09 and 28, 1999 depositions when at that time no orders were issued by Us enjoining any proceedings below. The use of the petitioners of June 09 and 28 depositions have been vigorously objected to by the private respondent, contending that there was a misunderstanding created when the private respondent was cross-examined by the counsel for the petitioners, and in his honest belief to clarify such misunderstanding in the previous depositions, the December 14, 1999 deposition was taken.


We see no reason to depart from the foregoing findings by the appellate court. Moreover, the taking of respondent’s deposition is not a part of the court proceedings in Civil Case No. 98-91356, hence, not covered by the writ of injunction issued by the Court of Appeals. Let it be stressed at this point that we have always abided by the dogma that courts must exercise their contempt powers sparingly.

In sum, we rule that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petitions in CA-G.R. SP No. 52914 and CA-G.R. SP No. 56579.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitions. The challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52914 and CA-G.R. SP No. 56579
is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.


Sgd.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice


WE CONCUR:

Sgd.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson


Sgd.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice Sgd.
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice



Sgd.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice



CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

Sgd.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice



Notes:

Rollo, pp. 839-855. Per Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona and concurred in by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria and Associate Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr. (all retired).
Id., pp. 150-153.
Manchester Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 75919, May 7, 1987, 149 SCRA 562; Sun Insurance Office Ltd., (SIOL) v. Asuncion, G.R. Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989, 170 SCRA 274; Tacay v. Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao del Norte, G.R. Nos. 88075-77, December 20, 1989, 180 SCRA 433.
G.R. No. 34840, July 20, 1982, 115 SCRA 193, reiterating the doctrine in Lazaro v. Endencia, 57 Phil. 552 (1932), Lee v. Republic, G.R. No. 15027, January 31, 1964, 10 SCRA 65, Malimit v. Degamo, G.R. Nos. 17850-51, November 28, 1964, 12 SCRA 454.
As amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04 SC, which took effect on August 16, 2004.
REGALADO, 1 REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM (1997 ed.) 103.
MORENO, PHILIPPINE LAW DICTIONARY (3rd ed. 1988) 447.
Under Section 16.D of OCA Circular No. 67-2007, the clients of the Public Attorney’s Office shall be exempt from payment of docket and other fees incidental to instituting an action in court. However, such exemption shall be subject to the conditions prescribed under Section 19, Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Abacus Real Estate Development Corp. v. Manila Banking Corp., G.R. No. 162270, April 6, 2005, 455 SCRA 97, 106, citing PT & T v. Court of Appeals, 412 SCRA 263 (2003).
G.R. No. 123332, February 3, 1997, 267 SCRA 487.
Mondragon Leisure and Resorts Corp. v. United Coconut Planters Bank, G.R. No. 154187, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 585, 590, citing T’Boli Agro-Industrial Development, Inc. (TADI) v. Solidapsi, 394 SCRA 269 (2002).
Wee v. Galvez, G.R. No. 147394, August 11, 2004, 436 SCRA 96, 108-109, citing Zebra Security Agency v. National Labor Relations Commission, 337 Phil. 200 (1997); Nacuray v. National Labor Relations Commission, 336 Phil. 749 (1997).
Heirs of Trinidad De Leon Vda. de Roxas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138660, February 5, 2004, 422 SCRA 101, 114, citing Halili v. CIR, 220 Phil. 507 (1985).
Villavencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778, 809 (1919).
Patricio v. Suplico, G.R. No. 76562, April 22, 1991, 196 SCRA 140, 146.
Lumabas v. Banzon, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1221, August 18, 2005, 467 SCRA 257, 267; Barredo-Fuentes v. Albarracin, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1587, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 120, 131, citing Soriano v. Court of Appeals, 431 SCRA 1 (2004).

Support Lozada

LAS PINAS CITY BAR ASSOCIATION

Unit 15, Star Arcade, C.V. Starr Avenue, Philamlife Village

Las Pinas City 1743 Philippines

Tel/Fax: 8742539 & 8725443; Mobile: 09267192859

lcmlaw@gmail.com; lcmlaw@yahoo.com

http://groups.msn.com/laspinascitybarassociation

February 15, 2008

R e : Statement of Support to Mr. Jun Lozada

In behalf of the local Bar and the law practitioners of Las Pinas City, and in line with the position taken by the national leadership of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), we hereby express our full support to the act of heroism and patriotism of Mr. Jun Lozada by coming out as a vital witness in the ongoing Senate inquiry on the corruption-infested ZTE-NBN contract of the immoral and illegitimate GMA Administration and its selfish and parasitic business cronies.

We congratulate the Las Salle brothers and the nuns from various religious orders, as well as the Philippine Senate, led by Senate President Manuel Villar (a supporter of the Las Pinas City Bar Association), who have done their best to insure the personal safety of Mr. Lozada and the collective safety of his family and who have exerted all efforts to expose the truth on the said controversy for the appropriate action of the Filipino people.

Mr. Lozada has followed the Light and has sought the Truth to attain Enlightenment of the Spirit and to achieve Liberation from Spiritual Corruption and Mental Sufferings. For such a selfless act¸ the Filipino people, especially Filipino lawyers who have taken an oath to fight for the rule of law, justice and freedom, will forever be grateful to him. History will always remember him.

May he be blessed and safe always. May he continue his courageous struggle for truth and justice for the sake of our abused and hopeless people.

For the Local Bar:

Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr.

Founder/Past Pres., Las Pinas City Bar Assn, 2001

Board Consultant, Las Pinas City Bar Assn, 2007-08

Past Vice Pres., IBP PPLM Chapter, 2005-07

Professor of Law, FEU, 1985-2006 (retired)

LAS PIÑAS CITY BAR ASSOCIATION (LPBA), INC.

c/o Atty. Melvyn R. Lagasca , , Blk 2, Lot 1 Marcos Alvarez Ave. Talon V,

Las Pinas City , Metro Manila, Philippines . Email: melvynlagasca @ yahoo.com

Website : http : group.msn.com/laspinascitybarassociation

Tel/Fax No. 800-7594

STATEMENT OF SUPPORT TO

FIGHT CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT

In behalf of the lawyers of Las Piñas City, we fully support Mr. Jun Lozada in his fight to expose the culture of corruption in the GMA Administration. Like a good servant of the Lord , Mr. Lozada has followed the dictates of his conscience. His heroism and legacy will forever remain in the minds of the Filipino people.

We appeal to the Administration to put a stop on all acts of harassment against Mr. Jun Lozada and his family .

We call on the Philippine Senate to insure the personal safety of Mr. Jun Lozada , who came out to expose the scandalously overpriced NBN-ZTE deal brokered by immoral and greedy government officials and their cohorts .

We call on the armed component of the society to support the rule of law and the Constitution and not to be used by those who masquerade as protector of the people but in truth violate the law with impunity to serve their selfish motives.

Lastly, we call on the people to be more vigilant and demand transparency and accountability in public governance.

May Mr. Jun Lozada remain steadfast in his struggle for truth and justice .

Las Piñas City . February 15, 2008.

Atty. MELVYN R. LAGASCA

President , 2007-2008

Las Piñas City Bar Association, Inc.

Libel

RULE OF PREFERENCE IN PENALTIES FOR LIBEL

By:

Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr.

LCM Law, Las Pinas City, Philippines

Tel/Fax 8742530

lcmlaw@gmail.com

February 8, 2008

In ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR No. 08-2008, issued on January 25, 2008 (GUIDELINES IN THE OBSERVANCE OF A RULE OF PREFERENCE IN THE IMPOSITION OF PENALTIES IN LIBEL CASES), and which took effect on the same date, the Philippine Supreme Court urged all courts and judges to take note of the rule of preference on the matter of the imposition of penalties for the crime of libel, i.e., fine instead of imprisonment, bearing in mind the following principles:

1. The administrative circular “does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for the crime libel” under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code;

2. The Judges concerned may, “in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case”, determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the “interests of justice” or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would “depreciate the seriousness of the offense, “work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperative of justice”;

3. Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provision on “subsidiary imprisonment”.

4. Under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, the penalty for libel is “prision correctional in its minimum and medium periods or fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party”.

In the following cases, the Supreme Court opted to impose only a fine on the person convicted of the crime of libel:

1. In Fernando Sazon v. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, 325 Phil. 1053, 1068 (1996), the Court modified the penalty imposed upon petitioner, an officer of a homeowners’ association, for the crime of libel from imprisonment and fine in the amount of P200.00, to fine only of P3,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, for the reason that he wrote the libelous article merely to defend his honor against the malicious messages that earlier circulated around the subdivision, which he thought was the handiwork of the private complainant.

2. In Quirico Mari v. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, 388 Phil. 269, 279 (2000), where the crime involved is slander by deed, the Court modified the penalty imposed on the petitioner, an ordinary government employee, from imprisonment to fine of P1,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, on the ground that the latter committed the offense in the heat of anger and in reaction to a perceived provocation.

3. In Roberto Brillante v. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 480, the Court deleted the penalty of imprisonment imposed upon petitioner, a local politician, but maintained the penalty of fine of P4,0000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, in each of the (5) cases of libel, on the ground that the intensely feverish passions evoked during the election period in 1988 must have agitated petitioner into writing his open letter; and that incomplete privileged communication should be appreciated in favor of petitioner, especially considering the wide latitude traditionally given to defamatory utterances against public officials in connection with or relevant to their performance of official duties or against public figures in relation to matters of public interest involving them.

4. In Jose Alemania Buatis, Jr. v. People of the Philippines and Atty. Jose Pieraz, G.R. No. 142509, March 24, 2006, 485 SCRA 275, the Court opted to impose upon petitioner, a lawyer, the penalty of fine only for the crime of libel considering that it was his first offense and he was motivated purely by his belief that he was merely exercising a civic or moral duty to his client when wrote the defamatory letter to private complainant.

A summary of the above-cited cases is presented below, for purposes of legal research on the felony of libel and related crimes.

Fernando Sazon v. Court of Appeals

and People of the Philippines,

325 Phil. 1053, 1068 (1996)

Petitioner Fernando Sazon and private complainant Abdon Reyes were both residents of the PML Homes in East Drive, Parang Marikina, Metro Manila. They were likewise members of the PML-Parang Bagong Lipunan Community Association, Inc. (PML-BLCA), an association of homeowners of PML Homes. The association had a monthly newsletter, the PML-Homemaker, of which the petitioner was the editor.

On December 11, 1983, the PML-BLCA held an election for the members of its board of directors. Among those who ran in the election were the private complainant and the petitioner. The petitioner was elected as a director. He was likewise elected by the new board as president of the homeowners’ association. The private complainant lost in said election.

Unable to accept defeat, the private complainant, on January 16, 1984, wrote a letter to the Estate Management Office of the Home Financing Corporation (EMO-HFC) protesting the election of the petitioner as a director and president of the homeowners’ association. He alleged that the election was a nullity because of: (1) the lack of authority of the petitioner to call for such an election; (2) the absence of a quorum; and (3) lack of the required notice to the homeowners.

On January 18, 1984, the private complainant wrote his co-homeowners explaining to them his election protest and urging them not to recognize the petitioner and the other members who won in the election.

Meanwhile, in response to the election protest, the EMO-HFC ordered the PML-BLCA to conduct a referendum to be supervised by the EMO-HFC. The private complainant then notified his co-homeowners about this development and requested them to attend a general meeting with the representatives of the EMO-HFC which was to be held before the referendum.

Soon after the general meeting, several copies of a leaflet called the “PML Scoop” were received by the homeowners. The leaflet was entitled “Supalpal si Sazon,” obviously referring to the affirmative action taken by the EMO-HFC in connection with the private respondent’s election protest. At about the same time, the phrase “Sazon, nasaan ang pondo ng simbahan?” was seen boldly written on the walls near the entrance gate of the subdivision. There was no proof, however, as to who was responsible for these writings.

Thinking that only private complainant was capable of these acts, petitioner Sazon started writing, publishing, and circulating newsletters to his co-homeowners, culminating in the appearance in the February 10, 1984 issue of the PML-Homemakers of the following article:

“USAPAN NG BOARD v. ABDON NAG-COLLAPSE SA ESTATE MANAGEMENT OFFICE

Dala ng mahigpit na pakiusap ng Estate Management Office (EMO) na gawin ang lahat na nararapat upang magkaroon ng katahimikan at pagkakaisa ang mga tiga PML Homes, ang Board Secretary, Mr. Pacis at President F.R. Sazon ay nagpaunlak na pagbigyan ang kahilingan ng ating kasama na si Abdon Reyes.

Ang kahilingan: Anyayahan ang EMO-HFC na magconduct ng Plebiscite or Referendum para sa possibility ng isa pang halalan ng Board of Directors.

Sa meeting na dinaluhan ni Abdon Reyes na nagdala ng isang cameraman at may kasamang pagyayabang at kaunting panggolpe de gulat (na tila baga puro tanga yata ang akala niya sa mga kausap), ipinipilit pa rin nitong ang Board sa PML Parang ay binubuo pa rin nuong mga taong inilukluk ng developer na nag 1-2-3.

Halos pag-pupukpukin ng bag ng mga kababaihang nagsisama sa miting ang ating pobreng super kulit na walang pakialam sa mga taga atin.

Ang mga nagsipagbigay suporta sa Pangulo at Board Secretary ay sina Gng. Cavarosa, Gng. Triffie Ladisla, Gng. Nitz Rodriguez at Dra. Sazon.

Kung di dahil sa pakiusap nina Messr’rs. ABNER PACAIGUE at HOMER AGNOTE, kasama na ng Board Secretary at Pangulo, malamang ay nagulpi sana ang mandurugas.

Dahil sa patuloy na kabulastugan ni Abdon, ang meeting na ginaganap sa EMO kaninang umaga ay nag-collapse nang malaman na may ikinalat na liham ang mandurugas, na nagsasabing di umano ay hindi tutoo ang ibinabalita ng ‘Homemaker’ na siya ay turned-down sa HFC.

Matagal na po tayong niloloko ng magkasamang Abdon at Evangeline Lopez. Dahil sa tagal ay alam na tuloy natin kung papaanong maipapatigil ang kanilang kabulastugan.

Sila rin ang mastermind sa paninirang pun sa Pangulo sa pamamagitan ng pag-susulat ng panira sa mga pader natin. Diumano’y itinatanong daw nila kung saan dinala ang pondo ng simbahan. Bakit hindi sila tumungo sa kinauukulan: Treasurer, Auditor, at iba pang officials.

UPHELD PO ANG ATING BOARD, ITO AY MABUBUWAG LANG KUNG INYONG NANAISIN.

Mag-iingat po tayo sa panlilinlang ng mga taong gaya ni Abdon at Vangie.

UNITED WE STAND DIVIDED WE FALL LET’S UNITE AND FIGHT EVIL!!!

F. R. SAZON - Editor”

Aggrieved by the aforequoted article, the private complainant initiated the necessary complaint against the petitioner, and on May 25, 1984, an Information was filed before the trial court charging the petitioner with libel.

On March 18, 1992, the trial court rendered its decision finding the petitioner guilty of the crime charged, and accordingly sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of FOUR (4) months and ONE (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum to TWO (2) years, FOUR (4) months and ONE (1) day of prision correccional as maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay a fine of P200.00 in accordance with Art. 353, in relation to Art. 355 of the Revised Penal Code.

The petitioner appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals. On June 19, 1995, the appellate court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court.

In his petition for review before the Supreme Court, the principal issue posited was whether or not the questioned article written by the petitioner is libelous. The Court ruled in the affirmative. It thus affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals “with the modification that, in lieu of imprisonment and fine, the penalty to be imposed upon the petitioner shall be a fine of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) PESOS with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency”.

Under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, libel is “a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, on to blacken the memory of one who is dead.” For an imputation then to be libelous, the following requisites must concur: “(a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable.”

The Court rejected the arguments of the petitioner (a) that the word “mandurugas” and other words and phrases used in the questioned article did not impute to private complainant any crime, vice or defect which would be injurious or damaging to his name and reputation and (b) that the descriptive words and phrases used should be considered as mere epithets which are a form of “non-actionable opinion”, because while they may express petitioner’s strong emotional feelings of dislike, they do not mean to reflect adversely on private complainant’s reputation.

The Court held that in libel cases, the question is “not what the writer of an alleged libel means, but what the words used by him mean”. The defamatory character of the words used by the petitioner were shown by the very recitals thereof in the questioned article: “mandurugas,” “mag-ingat sa panlilinlang,” “matagal na tayong niloloko,” “may kasamang pagyayabang,” “ang ating pobreng super kulit,” “patuloy na kabulastugan,” “mastermind sa paninirang puri,” etc.

The Court stated that “words calculated to induce suspicion are sometimes more effective to destroy reputation than false charges directly made. Ironical and metaphorical language is a favored vehicle for slander”. A charge is sufficient if the words are calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and understand that the person or persons against whom they were uttered were guilty of certain offenses, or are sufficient to impeach their honesty, virtue, or reputation, or to hold the person or persons up to public ridicule”.

Branding private complainant Reyes “mandurugas,” et al. most certainly exposed him to public contempt and ridicule, because it imputed upon the private complainant “a condition that is dishonorable and shameful, since they tend to describe him as a swindler and/or a deceiver.”

Further, the Court was not persuaded by the argument of the petitioner that there was no malice in this case, that the prosecution had failed to present evidence demonstrating that the accused was prompted by personal ill-will or spite or that he did not act in response to duty but acted merely to cause harm to private complainant, and that the prosecution had failed to discharge its burden of proving malice on the part of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt.

The Court stated that the general rule laid down in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code provides that “every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown ”. Prescinding from this provision, when the imputation is defamatory, as in this case, “the prosecution need not prove malice on the part of the defendant (malice in fact), for the law already presumes that the defendant’s imputation is malicious (malice in law)”. The burden is on the side of the defendant “to show good intention and justifiable motive in order to overcome the legal inference of malice”. Unfortunately, petitioner miserably failed to discharge this burden, the Court said.

The petitioner invoked the defense of “privileged communication” under Article 354: (a) “a private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty”; and, (b) a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.”

Petitioner averred that he wrote the article not to malign the private complainant, but merely to correct the misinformation being circulated by Reyes and some quarters within the community about the petitioner and the association he heads. He did it therefore, in response to some moral, social or civic duty as he was at that time the President of their homeowners’ association and editor of its newsletter. Hence, the article falls under the first exception of Article 354.

In rejecting the aforesaid argument, the Court held that although as a rule, it is the right and duty of a citizen to make a complaint of any misconduct on the pant of public officials, which comes to his notice, to those charged with supervision over them, “such complaints should be addressed solely to some official having jurisdiction to inquire into the charges, or power to redress the grievance or has some duty to perform or interest in connection therewith.” In the instant case, none of the homeowners for whom the newsletter was published was vested with the power of supervision over the private complainant or the authority to investigate the charges made against the latter. Moreover, a written letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified as privileged when it is published and circulated among the public, as what the petitioner did in this case.

The Court further held that “defamatory remarks and comments on the conduct or acts of public officers which are related to the discharge of their official duties will not constitute libel if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation”. But “any attack upon the private character of the public officer on matters which are not related to the discharge of their official functions may constitute libel”, citing exception number two (2) of Article 354 which refers to “any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.” The Court held that the petitioner’s article had no reference whatsoever to the performance of private complainant’s position as a public relations consultant in the Department of Trade and Industry. The article attacked solely the private character of the complainant and delved on matters completely unrelated to his official functions. It cannot therefore fall under the protective coverage of privileged communication.

According to the Court, even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that petitioner’s article qualifies under the category of privileged communication, this does not still negate the presence of malice in the instant case. The existence of malice in fact may be “shown by extrinsic evidence that the defendant bore a grudge against the offended party, or that there was rivalry or ill-feeling between them which existed at the date of the publication of the defamatory imputation or that the defendant had an intention to injure the reputation of the offended party as shown by the words used and the circumstances attending the publication of the defamatory imputation”. The circumstances under which the subject article was published by the petitioner buttressed the inference that petitioner was animated solely by revenge towards the private complainant on account of the leaflet entitled “Supalpal si Sazon,’ earlier circulated among the homeowners as well as the writings near the entrance gate of the subdivision, all of which petitioner believed to be the handiwork of the private complainant. Furthermore, the words used in the questioned article were mostly uncalled for, strongly sending the message that petitioner’s objective was merely to malign and injure the reputation of the private complainant. This was certainly indicative of malice in fact on the part of the petitioner.

Quirico Mari v. Court of Appeals

and People of the Philippines,

388 Phil. 269, 279 (2000),

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals convicting the petitioner Quirico Mari for the offense of serious slander by deed and imposing a modified penalty of one (1) month and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correctional, as maximum.

The Supreme Court found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of serious slander by deed defined under Article 359 of the Revised Penal Code but instead sentenced him to pay a fine of P1,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

The facts of the case showed that complainant Norma Capintoy and petitioner Quirico Mari were co-employees in the Department of Agriculture, with office at Digos, Davao del Sur, although complainant occupied a higher position. On December 6, 1991, petitioner borrowed from complainant the records of his 201 file. However, when he returned the same three days later, complainant noticed that several papers were missing which included official communications from the Civil Service Commission and Regional Office, Department of Agriculture, and a copy of the complaint by the Rural Bank of Digos against petitioner. Upon instruction of her superior officer, Honorio Lumain, complainant sent a memorandum to petitioner asking him to explain why his 201 file was returned with missing documents. Instead of acknowledging receipt of the memorandum, petitioner confronted complainant and angrily shouted at her: "Putang ina, bullshit, bugo." He banged a chair in front of complainant and choked her. With the intervention of the security guard, petitioner was prevailed upon to desist from further injuring complainant.

On January 7, 1992, complainant filed with the Municipal Trial Court, Digos, Davao del Sur a criminal complaint against petitioner for slander by deed. After trial, on September 22, 1994, the Municipal Trial Court, Digos, Davao del Sur rendered decision finding the accused guilty of the offense charged and sentenced the accused to five (5) months and eleven (11) days to two (2) years, eleven (11) months and eleven (11) days and to pay private complainant the amount of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS as moral damages, FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS attorney’s fees and to reimburse her the cost of suit.

In due time, petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court. After due proceedings, on December 1, 1995, the Regional Trial Court, Davao del Sur, Digos, rendered decision adopting the trial court's findings of fact, and affirming the appealed decision in toto. On June 18, 1996, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review. On December 9, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered decision affirming the judgment a quo convicting petitioner of serious slander by deed, but modifying the penalty to an indeterminate sentence of one (1) month and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as maximum.

At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the conviction of petitioner for serious slander. The petitioner assailed the trial court's finding that petitioner shouted invectives at complainant in the presence of several persons and then choked her. Petitioner submitted that the prosecution had failed to prove that he choked the complainant; that the choking was an after-thought as shown by inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.

To these arguments, the Supreme Court, offhand, held that the issue raised was factual, which would bar it from reviewing the same in an appeal via certiorari, citing Maglaque vs. Planters Development Bank, 307 SCRA 156, 161 [1999], citing Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals, 285 SCRA 670 [1998]; Rongavilla vs. Court of Appeals, 294 SCRA 289 [1998]; Cristobal vs. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 122 [1998]; Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 656 [1998]. It held that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals supported by substantial evidence are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls under any of the exceptions to the rule, such as diverse factual findings of the lower courts, or unless the findings are entirely grounded on speculations, citing Atillo III vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 596 [1997]; Don Orestes Romualdez Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 128389, November 25, 1999] Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc. vs. William Lines, Inc., 306 SCRA 762, 774-775 [1999]; Fuentes vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 703 [1997], Yobido vs. Court of Appeals, 281 SCRA 1 [1997], Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 462 [1997].] Rivera vs. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 734, 743 [1998].]

The Court took the opportunity to discuss the errors of the lower courts in the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, citing People vs. Ducosin, 59 Phil. 109 [1933]; Bacar vs. de Guzman, 271 SCRA 328, 340 [1997]; People vs. Feloteo, 290 SCRA 627, 636-637 [1998], Barrameda vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 96428, September 2, 1999; People vs. Gabres, 335 Phil. 242, 256-257 [1997]; People vs. Cesar, 131 Phil. 121, 125-126 [1968]; Jacobo vs. Court of Appeals, 337 Phil. 7, 23 [1997]; de la Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 299 [1996]; Quinto vs. People, G. R. No. 126712, April 14, 1999]; People vs. Onate, 78 SCRA 43 [1977]; People vs. Ducosin, 59 Phil. 109, 116-118 [1933]; People vs. Gonzales, 73 Phil. 549, 552 [1942].

At any rate, the Court held that it would serve the ends of justice better if the petitioner were sentenced to pay a fine instead of imprisonment. The offense while considered serious slander by deed was “done in the heat of anger” [Pader vs. People, G. R. No. 139157, February 8, 2000.] and was “in reaction to a perceived provocation”. The penalty for serious slander by deed may be either imprisonment or a fine [Article 359, Revised Penal Code.]. The Court opted to impose a fine.

Roberto Brillante v. Court of Appeals

and People of the Philippines,

G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571,

November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 480

This treats of the Motion for Reconsideration dated November 25, 2004 filed by Roberto Brillante (Brillante) assailing the Decision of the Court dated October 19, 2004 which affirmed his conviction for the crime of libel but reduced the amount of moral damages he was liable to pay.

Brillante averred that his conviction, without the corresponding conviction of the writers, editors and owners of the newspapers on which the libelous materials were published, violates his right to equal protection. He also claimed that he should have been convicted only of one count of libel because private respondents were not defamed separately as each publication was impelled by a single criminal intent. Finally, he claimed that there was a “semblance of truth” to the accusations he had hurled at private respondents citing several instances of alleged violent acts committed by the latter against his person.

Private respondent (Makati City Mayor) Jejomar Binay filed a Comment dated March 3, 2005, maintaining that the equal protection clause does not apply because there are substantial distinctions between Brillante and his co-accused warranting dissimilar treatment. Moreover, contrary to Brillante’s claim that he should have been convicted only of one count of libel, Binay asserted that there can be as many convictions for libel as there are persons defamed. Besides, this matter should have been raised at the time the separate complaints were filed against him and not in this motion.

As correctly noted by the OSG, the basic issues raised in the instant motion have already been thoroughly discussed and passed upon by the Court in its Decision. For this reason, the Court no longer dwelt on them.

The Court, however, believed that the penalty of imprisonment imposed against Brillante should be re-examined and reconsidered. According to the Court, although this matter was “neither raised” in Brillante’s petition nor in the instant motion, it adverted to the well-established rule that “an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review of all its aspects, including those not raised by the parties”.

The Court deleted the penalty of imprisonment and retained the penalty of fine against Brillante, citing Mari v. Court of Appeals,388 Phil. 269, 279 (2000), where the petitioner therein was found guilty of slander by deed penalized under Art. 359 of the Revised Penal Code (Penal Code). Under the said provision, the penalty was either imprisonment or fine. In the said case, in view of the fact that the offense was “done in the heat of anger and in reaction to a perceived provocation”, the Court opted to impose the penalty of fine instead of imprisonment.

In this case, Brillante claims that on January 6, 1988, his friend’s house was bombed resulting in the death of three people. This incident allegedly impelled him, out of moral and social duty, to call a press conference on January 7, 1988 with the intention of exposing what he believed were terrorist acts committed by private respondents against the electorate of Makati City.

The Court held that the circumstances surrounding the writing of the open letter on which the libelous publications were based similarly warranted the imposition of the penalty of fine only, instead of both imprisonment and fine, in accordance with Art. 355 of the Penal Code. “The intensely feverish passions evoked during the election period in 1988 must have agitated petitioner into writing his open letter”, the Court added.

The Court further held that while petitioner had failed to prove all the elements of qualified privileged communication under par. 1, Art. 354 of the Penal Code, “incomplete privilege should be appreciated” in his favor, especially considering the “wide latitude traditionally given to defamatory utterances against public officials in connection with or relevant to their performance of official duties or against public figures in relation to matters of public interest involving them”.

Jose Alemania Buatis, Jr. v. People of the Philippines

and Atty. Jose Pieraz, G.R. No. 142509, March 24, 2006,

485 SCRA 275

Jose Alemania Buatis, Jr. (petitioner) sought to set aside the Decision dated January 18, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, convicting him of the crime of libel.

The trial court sentenced Buatis “to Four (4) Months and One (1) Day, as minimum, to Two (2) Years, Eleven (11) Months and Ten (10) Days, as maximum; to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P20,000.00, by way of compensatory damages; the amount of P10,000.00, as and for moral damages, and another amount of P10,000.00, for exemplary damages; to suffer all accessory penalties provided for by law; and, to pay the costs”.

The Supreme Court affirmed, with modifications, the decision of the trial court and the Court of Appeals by imposing a fine of P6,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and deleting the award of compensatory damages.

The facts of the case are summarized below.

On August 18, 1995, the wife of private-complainant Atty. Jose J. Pieraz retrieved a letter from their mailbox addressed to her husband. The letter was “open, not contained in an envelope”, and Atty. Pieraz’ wife put it on her husband’s desk. On that same day, Atty. Pieraz came upon the letter and made out its content:

DON HERMOGENES RODRIGUEZ Y REYES ESTATE

Office of the Asst. Court Administrator

No. 1063 Kamias St., Bgy. Manggahan, Pasig City,

Metro Manila

August 18, 1995

ATTY. JOSE J. PIERAZ

Counsel for Benjamin A. Monroy

#8 Quirino St., Life Homes Subdivision

Rosario , Pasig City, Metro Manila

Subject: Anent your letter dated August 18, 1995

addressed to one Mrs. Teresita Quingco

Atty. Pieraz:

This has reference to your lousy but inutile threatening letter dated August 18, 1995, addressed to our client; using carabao English.

May we remind you that any attempt on your part to continue harassing the person of Mrs. Teresita Quingco of No. 1582 Mngo St., Bgy. Manggahan, Pasig City, Metro Manila---undersigned much to his regrets shall be constrained/compelled to file the necessary complaint for disbarment against you.

You may proceed then with your stupidity and suffer the full consequence of the law. Needless for you to cite specific provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as the same is irrelevant to the present case. As a matter of fact, the same shall be used by no other than the person of Mrs. Quingco in filing administrative charge against you and all persons behind these nefarious activities.

Finally, it is a welcome opportunity for the undersigned to face you squarely in any courts of justice, so as we can prove “who is who” once and for all.

Trusting that you are properly inform (sic) regarding these matters, I remain.

Yours in Satan name;

(Signed)

JOSE ALEMANIA BUATIS, JR.

Atty-in- Fact of the present

Court Administrator of the entire

Intestate Estate of Don Hermogenes

Rodriguez Y. Reyes.

Copy furnished: All concerned.

Not personally knowing who the sender was, Atty. Pieraz, nevertheless, responded and sent a communication by registered mail to said Buatis, Jr., accused-appellant. In reply, Buatis, Jr. dispatched a second letter dated August 24, 1995 to Atty. Pieraz.

Reacting to the insulting words used by Buatis, Jr., particularly: “Satan, senile, stupid, [E]nglish carabao,” Atty. Pieraz filed a complaint for libel against accused-appellant. Subject letter and its contents came to the knowledge not only of his wife but of his children as well and they all chided him telling him: “Ginagawa ka lang gago dito.” Aside from the monetary expenses he incurred as a result of the filing of the instant case, Atty Pieraz’ frail health was likewise affected and aggravated by the letter of accused-appellant.

As preliminary points, the court cited Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code which defines libel as “a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead”. The Court added that for an imputation to be libelous, “the following requisites must concur: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable”.

In libel, “publication” means making the defamatory matter, after it is written, known to someone other than the person against whom it has been written. Petitioner’s subject letter-reply itself states that the same was copy furnished to all concerned. Also, petitioner had dictated the letter to his secretary. “It is enough that the author of the libel complained of has communicated it to a third person”, the Court stated. Furthermore, the letter, when found in the mailbox, “was open, not contained in an envelope thus, open to public.”

The victim of the libelous letter was identifiable as the subject letter-reply was addressed to respondent himself.

The Court ruled that in determining whether a statement is defamatory, “the words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense”. Citing Tawney vs. Simonson, Whitcomb & Hurley Co. (109 Minn., 341), the Court held that: “In determining whether the specified matter is libelous per se, two rules of construction are conspicuously applicable: (1) That construction must be adopted which will give to the matter such a meaning as is natural and obvious in the plain and ordinary sense in which the public would naturally understand what was uttered. (2) The published matter alleged to be libelous must be construed as a whole.”

Gauging from the above–mentioned tests, the words used in the letter dated August 18, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent is defamatory. In using words such as “lousy”, “inutile”, “carabao English”, “stupidity”, and “satan”, the letter, as it was written, casts aspersion on the character, integrity and reputation of respondent as a lawyer which exposed him to ridicule. No evidence aliunde need be adduced to prove it. As the CA said, these very words of petitioner have caused respondent to public ridicule as even his own family have told him: “Ginagawa ka lang gago dito.”

Any of the imputations covered by Article 353 is defamatory; and, under the general rule laid down in Article 354, “every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown”. Thus, when the imputation is defamatory, “the prosecution need not prove malice on the part of petitioner (malice in fact), for the law already presumes that petitioner’s imputation is malicious (malice in law)”.

The Court was not persuaded by the argument of the petitioner that his letter was a private communication made in the performance of his “moral and social duty as the attorney-in-fact of the administrator of the Rodriguez estate” where Mrs. Quingco is a recognized tenant and to whom respondent had written the demand letter to vacate, thus in the nature of a privileged communication and not libelous.

Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code provides “every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown”, except in the following cases: “(1) a private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral, or social duty; and (2) a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions”.

The presumption of malice is done away with when the defamatory imputation is a qualified privileged communication. The Court stated that in order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a qualified privileged communication under Article 354, No. 1, as claimed by petitioner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either be his own or of the one to whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought; and (3) the statements in the communication are made in good faith and without malice.

The Court stated that while it would appear that the letter was written by petitioner out of his social duty to a member of the association which he heads, and was written to respondent as a reply to the latter’s demand letter sent to a member, however, a reading of the subject letter-reply addressed to respondent does not show any explanation concerning the status of Mrs. Quingco and why she is entitled to the premises as against the claim of respondent’s client. The letter merely contained insulting words, i.e, “lousy” and “inutile letter using carabao English”, “stupidity”, and “satan”, which are totally irrelevant to his defense of Mrs. Quingco’s right over the premises. The words as written had only the effect of maligning respondent’s integrity as a lawyer, a lawyer who had served as legal officer in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources for so many years until his retirement and afterwards as consultant of the same agency and also a notary public. The letter was crafted in an injurious way than what is necessary in answering a demand letter which exposed respondent to public ridicule thus negating good faith and showing malicious intent on petitioner’s part.

Moreover, the Court said, the law requires that for a defamatory imputation made out of a legal, moral or social duty to be privileged, “such statement must be communicated only to the person or persons who have some interest or duty in the matter alleged, and who have the power to furnish the protection sought by the author of the statement”. A written letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified as privileged “when it is published and circulated among the public”, the Court added. In this case, petitioner admitted that he dictated the letter to one of her secretaries who typed the same and made a print out of the computer. While petitioner addressed the reply-letter to respondent, the same letter showed that it was copy furnished to all concerned. His lack of selectivity is indicative of malice and is anathema to his claim of privileged communication. Such publication had already created upon the minds of the readers a circumstance which brought discredit and shame to respondent’s reputation.

The Court held that since the letter is not a privileged communication, “malice is presumed” under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code. The presumption was not successfully rebutted by petitioner as discussed above.

The courts are given the discretion to choose whether to impose a single penalty or conjunctive penalties; that is, whether to impose a penalty of fine, or a penalty of imprisonment only, or a penalty of both fine and imprisonment.

Applying by analogy the provisions of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 and Administrative Circular 13-2001 which modified Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, which laid down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. 22, in favor of a fine in lieu of imprisonment, the Court, in the instant case, noted that this was petitioner’s first offense of this nature. He never knew respondent prior to the demand letter sent by the latter to Mrs. Quingco who then sought his assistance thereto. He appealed from the decision of the RTC and the CA in his belief that he was merely exercising a civil or moral duty in writing the letter to private complainant. In fact, petitioner could have applied for probation to evade prison term but he did not do so believing that he did not commit a crime thus, he appealed his case. We believe that the State is concerned not only in the imperative necessity of protecting the social organization against the criminal acts of destructive individuals but also in “redeeming the individual for economic usefulness and other social ends”. Consequently, he Court deleted the prison sentence imposed on petitioner and instead imposed a fine of six thousand pesos.