Tuesday, November 29, 2011

Corona Court damaged badly | BusinessWorld Online Edition

"x x x.

Opinion

Posted on November 28, 2011 10:50:26 PM

Corona Court damaged badly

To Take A Stand
By Oscar P. Lagman, Jr.

Sen. Joker Arroyo assailed Justice Secretary Leila de Lima for openly defying the Supreme Court’s temporary restraining order (TRO). He said that GMA’s right to travel was merely incidental when compared to the executive branch’s move to emasculate and damage the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court under the leadership of Renato Corona has long been emasculated and damaged before Secretary De Lima ignored the court’s order. It is so by its own doing.

In the eyes of legal eagles and political pundits, Secretary de Lima’s defiance of the court’s order was wrong. But civil society groups, party lists, and even employee associations like the Philippine Airlines flight attendants, ever the first to denounce transgressions of the law, not only hailed De Lima’s defiance of the court, they mobilized themselves to prevent the Arroyos from departing. To these politicized citizens, the Corona Court has lost its moral authority to enforce the provisions of the Constitution for it has itself violated the Constitution, not once but several times.

Renato Corona’s midnight appointment as chief justice was itself in violation of the provisions of the Constitution. His associates in the court, all appointees of GMA, affirming the legality of his appointment as chief justice was in defiance of the Constitution.

The Corona Court set aside the Constitution so that Dato Arroyo, son of GMA, can have a district to represent. The representative of the old 2nd District of Camarines Sur previous to Dato wanted to be back in Congress as the district’s representative. The GMA subservient Congress broke up the district into two, one for Dato and the other for the former representative, a true son of the district.

That act of Congress was questioned before the Supreme Court as there would be disproportionate representation of Camarines Sur in Congress in contravention of the provision of the Constitution on equal representation. However, the Supreme Court upheld Congress. So, now the district formerly represented in Congress by one congressman is now represented by two whereas the two larger districts are represented by only one each.

The older son of GMA, Mikey, has to have a seat in Congress too. The sycophants of Gloria Arroyo in the COMELEC allowed him Mikey to represent “Ang Galing Pinoy,” the party list of tricycle drivers and security guards in Congress. The Supreme Court quickly dismissed the disqualification complaint against Mikey citing that the case was outside its jurisdiction.

But the Supreme Court moved swiftly to stop impeachment proceedings against Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez following her petition for certiorari and prohibition, when impeachment is well within the province of the House of Representatives. Gutierrez also claimed that the two impeachment complaints against her violated the constitutional provision that allowed only one case a year. But instead of stopping the proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and allowing the first one filed to be heard, the Corona Court issued an indefinite order for a serious status quo ante on both complaints. The order shielded Gutierrez from any adverse move against her for five months, which in turn prevented any graft charges against Arroyo from prospering until last week.

The Corona Court has flip-flopped five times on the constitutionality of the laws making 16 municipalities cities. And just recently, on a mere letter from lawyer Estelito Mendoza, it recalled its decision, reached with finality with no further pleadings to be entertained, ordering the reinstatement of 1,400 Philippine Airlines (PAL) flight attendants. The flight attendants pointed out that the high tribunal had said three times that “PAL’s retrenchment was illegal.”

The issuance of the TRO against De Lima’s hold departure order seems to have been issued with undue and unusual haste when there was no urgency for it as GMA’s health condition, according to the abstracts submitted by her doctors, was not life-threatening. According to some non-partisan lawyers, Corona should have ordered an en banc session to hear the oral arguments of de Lima before issuing the TRO. Instead, he issued the TRO before de Lima could argue against the TRO, raising the suspicion of many that he was really giving the Arroyos the chance to flee before any criminal complaint could be filed against them.

If a mere letter from the counsel of the respondent in a case can make the Corona Court recall a final decision affirmed twice, would it be considered bold of the Secretary of Justice to hold in abeyance an order of the Corona Court until she has argued against the order as is the standard judicial procedure?

Last year the academic world accused the Corona Court of intellectual dishonesty when it absolved Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo of plagiarism. The Catholic Educational Association of the Philippines accused the Supreme Court of abetting a culture of intellectual sloth and dishonesty. The Coordinating Council of Private Educational Associations declared plagiarism thievery of intellectual property.

After exculpating del Castillo, the Corona Court issued a show-cause contempt order to UP Law Dean Marvic Leonen and 37 members of the faculty for demanding the resignation of Del Castillo. Associate Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno pointed out that “it is not the place of the Court to seek revenge against those who, in their wish to see reform in the judiciary, have the courage to say what is wrong with it. The Court finds its legitimacy in demonstrating its moral vein case after case, not in flaunting its judicial brawn.”

The Court’s decision declaring the Truth Commission unconstitutional was indicative of that culture of intellectual dishonesty. The Corona Court shot down the proposed Truth Commission because it singled out the GMA administration and made it a vehicle for selective retribution, in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Yet the same Corona Court did not find the Anti-Graft Commission in violation of that clause of the Constitution when that commission covered only presidential appointees, to the exclusion of other government officials. Corona was the presidential chief of staff and spokesman when then President Arroyo formed the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission in April 2001.

Anyway, that character infirmity of intellectual dishonesty seems to be true also of the Corona Court’s spokesman, Midas Marquez. After Justice Sereno officially advised Marquez that it was wrong for him to say that the TRO on de Lima’s hold departure order against the Arroyos was in full force and effect, he told media that he respected Sereno’s opinion, making it appear that the issue was a matter of opinion, when in fact it was the ruling of the court by a vote of 7-6 that the TRO was deemed suspended pending compliance by GMA and her husband with Condition No. 2 of the TRO.

It is not the first time that Marquez had displayed intellectual dishonesty. Earlier this year, Associate Justices Antonio Carpio and Conchita Carpio Morales asked Marquez to correct his statement that all the justices were given copies of Merceditas Gutierrez’ 60-page petition before they took a vote on the status quo ante order stopping the House impeachment proceeding against Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez. When he was confronted with the fact that some justices had not really been given copies before the deliberation on the order, he said he was just quoting a clerk of the court.

That he was not dismissed for such a blatant lie only shows he is a protected underling. The strain on his face and the crack in his voice when he announced that GMA was barred from leaving the country because RTC Judge Jesus Mupas had issued a warrant of arrest against her only confirmed whose lackey he really is.

That culture of intellectual dishonesty is also manifested by the people who surround GMA. After Dr. Mario Ver, GMA’s bone doctor, had told Judge Mupas last Friday that GMA was well on the way to recovery, ANC’s Pinky Webb asked Raul Lambino, one of GMA’s official spokespersons, how GMA was. Lambino said that GMA was already getting well at home until she was hustled at the airport. It was as if he had not been saying just days before that GMA’s bone disease had worsened, spreading down to the lower part of her spine, threatening not only permanent paralysis but death, that is why the urgency to seek treatment abroad.

Well, it should not surprise anybody that Lambino can prevaricate through his teeth. It should be recalled that in 2006, he started a movement called Sigaw ng Bayan whose aim was to gather enough signatures calling for charter change. The Supreme Court, then headed by Artemio Panganiban, rejected Sigaw ng Bayan’s initiative, calling it a “grand deception” and a “gigantic fraud” on the Filipino people.

Speaking of grand deception, that airport incident where GMA was “hustled” was a grand deception gone wrong. Considering that Elena Bautista Horn was into events management before she joined government, it is not inconceivable that she stage managed the whole thing. She was very visible and grating during that event.

She kept on saying that PNoy had sworn to uphold the Constitution and yet he denied GMA her constitutional right to travel. Horn ignored the fact that GMA had sworn to uphold the same Constitution not once but twice and that it was GMA when she was president who ordered her Secretary of Justice Alberto Agra to issue Circular 41, the same circular Horn finds in violation of the Constitution. That is intellectual dishonesty.

x x x."

When judge acts in good faith - Pangan vs Ganay : AM RTJ-04-1887 : December 9, 2004 : J. Callejo Sr : Second Division : Decision

Pangan vs Ganay : AM RTJ-04-1887 : December 9, 2004 : J. Callejo Sr : Second Division : Decision

"x x x.

It is settled that as a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a Judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous. He cannot be subjected to liability – civil, criminal or administrative – for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith.[13] Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned.[14] To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.[15] Furthermore, even in an administrative case, the Rules of Court require that if the respondent Judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence against him should be competent and should be derived from direct knowledge. The judiciary to which the respondent belongs demands no less. Before any of its members could be faulted, competent evidence should be presented, especially since the charge is penal in character.[16]

Indeed, while it is our duty to investigate and determine the truth behind every matter in complaints against Judges and other court personnel, it is also our duty to see to it that they are protected and exonerated from baseless administrative charges. The Court will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon its magistrates, but neither will it hesitate to shield them from unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice.[17]

x x x."

Detention; house arrest - G.R. No. 179817

G.R. No. 179817

"x x x.

In sum, petitioner’s first ground posits that there is a world of difference between his case and that of Jalosjos respecting the type of offense involved, the stage of filing of the motion, and other circumstances which demonstrate the inapplicability of Jalosjos.[14]

A plain reading of. Jalosjos suggests otherwise, however.

The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.[15]

It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of justice. No less than the Constitution provides:

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.[16] (Underscoring supplied)

The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense,[17] or an offense punishable byreclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action.[18]

That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d’etat cases, both being punishable by reclusionperpetua,[19] is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged.

In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner’s application for bail and for release on recognizance was denied.[20] The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail[21] or imported from a trial court’s judgment of conviction,[22] justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is “regardless of the stage of the criminal action.” Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense[23] applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos.

As the Court observed in Alejano v. Cabuay,[24] it is impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security; and while pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement, the fact of their detention makes their rights more limited than those of the public.

The Court was more emphatic in People v. Hon. Maceda:[25]

As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.[26](Underscoring supplied)

These inherent limitations, however, must be taken into account only to the extent that confinement restrains the power of locomotion or actual physical movement. It bears noting that in Jalosjos, which was decided en banc one month after Maceda, the Court recognized that the accused could somehow accomplish legislative results.[27]

The trial court thus correctly concluded that the presumption of innocence does not carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and political rights.

Petitioner is similarly situated with Jalosjos with respect to the application of the presumption of innocence during the period material to the resolution of their respective motions. The Court in Jalosjos did not mention that the presumption of innocence no longer operates in favor of the accused pending the review on appeal of the judgment of conviction. The rule stands that until a promulgation of final conviction is made, the constitutional mandate of presumption of innocence prevails.[28]

In addition to the inherent restraints, the Court notes that petitioner neither denied nor disputed his agreeing to a consensus with the prosecution that media access to him should cease after his proclamation by the Commission on Elections.[29]

Petitioner goes on to allege that unlike Jalosjos who attempted to evade trial, he is not a flight risk since he voluntarily surrendered to the proper authorities and such can be proven by the numerous times he was allowed to travel outside his place of detention.

Subsequent events reveal the contrary, however. The assailed Orders augured well when on November 29, 2007 petitioner went past security detail for some reason and proceeded from the courtroom to a posh hotel to issue certain statements. The account, dubbed this time as the “Manila Pen Incident,”[30] proves that petitioner’s argument bites the dust. The risk that he would escape ceased to be neither remote nor nil as, in fact, the cause for foreboding became real.

Moreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight find relevance as a factor in ascertaining the reasonable amount of bail and in canceling a discretionary grant of bail.[31] In cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is controlling is the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong. Once it is established that it is so, bail shall be denied as it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion.[32]

Petitioner cannot find solace in Montano v. Ocampo[33] to buttress his plea for leeway because unlike petitioner, the therein petitioner, then Senator Justiniano Montano, who was charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder,[34] was able to rebut the strong evidence for the prosecution. Notatu dignum is this Court’s pronouncement therein that “if denial of bail is authorized in capital cases, it is only on the theory thatthe proof being strong, the defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the jury.”[35] At the time Montano was indicted, when only capital offenses were non-bailable where evidence of guilt is strong,[36] the Court noted the obvious reason that “one who faces a probable death sentence has a particularly strong temptation to flee.”[37] Petitioner’s petition for bail having earlier been denied, he cannot rely on Montano to reiterate his requests which are akin to bailing him out.

Second, petitioner posits that, contrary to the trial court’s findings, Esperon did not overrule Obeña’s recommendation to allow him to attend Senate sessions. Petitioner cites the Comment[38] of Obeña that he interposed no objection to such request but recommended that he be transported by the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms with adequate Senate security. And petitioner faults the trial court for deeming that Esperon, despite professing non-obstruction to the performance of petitioner’s duties, flatly rejected all his requests, when what Esperon only disallowed was the setting up of a political office inside a military installation owing to AFP’s apolitical nature.[39]

The effective management of the detention facility has been recognized as a valid objective that may justify the imposition of conditions and restrictions of pre-trial detention.[40] The officer with custodial responsibility over a detainee may undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the safety and prevent the escape of the detainee.[41] Nevertheless, while the comments of the detention officers provide guidance on security concerns, they are not binding on the trial court in the same manner that pleadings are not impositions upon a court.

Third, petitioner posits that his election provides the legal justification to allow him to serve his mandate, after the people, in their sovereign capacity, elected him as Senator. He argues that denying his Omnibus Motion is tantamount to removing him from office, depriving the people of proper representation, denying the people’s will, repudiating the people’s choice, and overruling the mandate of the people.

Petitioner’s contention hinges on the doctrine in administrative law that “a public official can not be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor.”[42]

The assertion is unavailing. The case against petitioner is not administrative in nature. And there is no “prior term” to speak of. In a plethora of cases,[43] the Court categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner’s electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate, “they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action [and] x x x with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison.”[44]

In once more debunking the disenfranchisement argument,[45] it is opportune to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice of the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of the people yields to the Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of law.

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the “mandate of the people” are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members
of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.[46] (Underscoring supplied)

Lastly, petitioner pleads for the same liberal treatment accorded certain detention prisoners who have also been charged with non-bailable offenses, like former President Joseph Estrada and former Governor Nur Misuari who were allowed to attend “social functions.” Finding no rhyme and reason in the denial of the more serious request to perform the duties of a Senator, petitioner harps on an alleged violation of the equal protection clause.

In arguing against maintaining double standards in the treatment of detention prisoners, petitioner expressly admits that he intentionally did not seek preferential treatment in the form of being placed under Senate custody or house arrest,[47] yet he at the same time, gripes about the granting of house arrest to others.

Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.[48] That this discretion was gravely abused, petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner to register as a voter in December 2006, file his certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his oath of office[49] on June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete turn-around,[50] petitioner largely banks on these prior grants to him and insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations.

Petitioner’s position fails. On the generality and permanence of his requests alone, petitioner’s case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves. Jaloslos succinctly expounds:

x x x Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.[51]

x x x."

How Many Times Did Chief Justice Corona Vote in Favor of Arroyo?

"x x x.

Sen. Franklin M. Drilon issued this statement on Monday, Nov. 28, as he reiterated his call for Corona to inhibit himself from cases involving former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. He said Corona's "judicial record" is "untarnished by a negative vote against the ex-president," who is now under hospital arrest over election sabotage charges.

Drilon cited the following cases:

1) Corona concurred in the Dec. 7, 2010 SC ruling declaring as unconstitutional President Aquino's order creating the Truth Commission. The commission was tasked to, among others. investigate past abuses under the Arroyo administration.

2) Corona concurred in the Oct. 10 2010 SC decision stopping the Aquino administration from revoking the appointment of alleged midnight appointees made by former President Arroyo. Corona himself was branded as a "midnight appointee," since he was named Chief Justice by Mrs. Arroyo on May 17, 2010, after the presidential elections that Aquino won.

3) Corona concurred in the April 7 2010 SC ruling denying the petition of then Sen. Benigno Aquino III and upholding Republic Act 9716 creating the First and Second Districts of Camarines Sur, which eventually benefited an Arroyo son, now Camarines Sur Rep. Dato Arroyo.

4) Corona concurred in the SC decision reversing its previous decision ordering the Sandiganbayan to proceed with the trial of former Rep. Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, whose son, Rep. Ferdinand Martin Romualdez, is a known ally of Arroyo.

5) Corona concurred in the Feb. 11, 2009 SC decision upholding the validity of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Philippines and the United States and ordering the transfer of US serviceman and rape convict Daniel Smith to a Philippine detention facility.

6) Corona dissented in the SC October 14, 2008 SC decision declaring the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) entered into by then President Arroyo's peace negotiators with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) as "contrary to law and the Constitution."

7) Corona concurred with the July 16, 2008 SC decision declaring that communications in the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement signed by then President Arroyo and former Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on September 9, 2006 were covered by executive privilege and not subject to public disclosure.

8) Corona concurred with the March 25, 2009 SC decision stating that then Social Security System Chairman Romulo Neri was not liable for contempt for not appearing in the Senate hearings of the NBN-ZTE scandal because his testimony was covered by executive privilege.

9) Corona dissented in the February 15, 2008 SC decision declaring that the wiretapped conversation between then presidential candidate Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Commission on then Elections Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano was not prohibited from broadcast.

10) Corona dissented in the May 3, 2006 SC decision declaring then President Arroyo's Presidential Proclamation 1017, which placed the country under a state of national emergency in March 2006, as "partly constitutional, partly unconstitutional."

11) Corona dissented in the October 25, 2006 SC decision dismissing the petition of the pro-Arroyo Sigaw ng Bayan to allow a people's initiative to amend the 1987 Constitution due to their failure to comply with a constitutional requirement of conducting a people's initiative.

12) Corona concurred in the Aug. 15, 2006 SC decision declaring as valid then President Arroyo's gag order that prohibited executive and military officials from appearing before congressional investigations without the President's consent. The case was filed by then Marines Brig. General (now retired) Francisco Gudani.

13) Corona concurred in the April 20, 2006 SC decision upholding the controversial gag order known as Executive Order 464, which allowed Malacanang and other executive officials to invoke executive privilege in refusing to testify in congressional investigations.

14) Corona concurred with the April 19, 2006 SC cases declaring as valid then President Arroyo's Executive Order 420 establishing a national identification card policy.

15) Corona concurred in the December 13, 2005 SC decision declaring that then President Arroyo can make appointments "in an acting capacity" without seeking confirmation from the Commission on Appointments.

16) Corona concurred in the October 18, 2005 SC decision declaring as constitutional Republic Act 9337, also known as the VAT Reform Act.

17) Corona dissented in the March 2, 2004 SC ruling dismissing petitions to disqualify then presidential aspirant Fernando Poe Jr. on grounds that he was not a natural born citizen.

18) Corona concurred with the Feb. 3, 2004 SC decision declaring that President Arroyo did not exceed her powers in issuing Proclamation number 427, 435 and General Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion during the so-called Oakwood Mutiny.

19) Corona dissented in the January 13, 2004 SC decision voiding the contract entered into by the Commission on Elections with the Mega-Pacific firm for not undergoing the required public bidding.

"All his decisions are all for Gloria. His own record shows that he favors Arroyo. Even if Chief Justice Corona's votes in the 19 cases are based on merit, what is important here is how people perceive him," Drilon said in a statement.

He noted that Corona's voluntary inhibition would "go a long way in maintaining the credibility of the Supreme Court especially in cases involving Arroyo."

Presided over by Corona, the SC en banc today resumes oral arguments on the petitions of the Arroyo camp for the High Tribunal to nullify the justice department-Commission on Elections probe on alleged vote-rigging in the 2007 senatorial race. The panel's findings were made as basis for the filing of an electoral sabotage case against former President Arroyo and three others. - Move.PH

x x x."

Fresh Perspectives on Managing Reputational Corporate Risk

"x x x.

3 steps compliance executives can take

Compliance professionals in global organizations face a multitude of complex regulatory, jurisdictional and marketplace challenges, but taking a Risk Intelligent approach provides three important and relatively accessible ways that they can quickly enhance their contribution to and impact on reputational risk issues:

Take what we call an outside-in perspective, identifying key drivers of the enterprise reputation from the vantage point of outside observers—many of whom are vital constituents for regulated industries, such as government authorities, analysts, legislators and investors.
Connect to and align with company strategy. This means understanding the broader business context in which you do business. For instance, it requires development of a fuller understanding of your organization’s fundamental business strategy, including how your compliance activities tie to and support company strategy, and how meeting regulatory requirements fit in with building public trust and stakeholder confidence.
This process definitely includes protecting what you already have but also introduces new dimensions for proactively burnishing a desired brand image by raising awareness of outside threats and improving opportunities for business units and functions to address them in a timely, if not cutting-edge, way.
A Risk Intelligent approach suggests, for example, that managing reputational risk might begin with challenging your organization’s more closely held assumptions about what makes and keeps the enterprise reputation strong.
Incorporate compliance into the overall risk management program. This also relates to understanding the broader context of compliance activities, such as exploring the essence of laws and regulations and responding to the protections they are designed to support. Making compliance part of the larger risk initiative also requires bridging silos, so that compliance isn’t just heads-down on check-the-box details.

While it is true that a comprehensive reputation risk management program employs a wide variety of sophisticated tools and processes, such as benchmarking, scorecards and new media measurement, the three steps cited above can help jump-start compliance readiness and pave the way for appropriate and effective involvement by compliance executives in supporting corporate reputational risk management programs.

This article contains general information only and Deloitte is not, by means of this article, rendering accounting, business, financial, investment, legal, tax, or other professional advice or services. This article is not a substitute for such professional advice or services, nor should it be used as a basis for any decision or action that may affect your business. Before making any decision or taking any action that may affect your business, you should consult a qualified professional advisor. Deloitte, its affiliates, and related entities shall not be responsible for any loss sustained by any person who relies on this article.Copyright © 2011 Deloitte Development LLC. All rights reserved. Member of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited

**********

About the Author

Henry Ristuccia has more than 25 years strategic and implementation experience in risk management and internal controls. He now serves as co-leader of Deloitte’s Governance and Risk Management practice.

As used in this document, ‘Deloitte’ means Deloitte & Touche LLP, Deloitte Consulting LLP, Deloitte Financial Advisory Services LLP, and Deloitte Tax LLP, which are separate subsidiaries of Deloitte LLP. Please see www.deloitte.com/us/about for a detailed description of the legal structure of Deloitte LLP and its subsidiaries. Certain services may not be available to attest clients under the rules and regulations of public accounting.

x x x."

Tuesday, November 29, 2011