see - (11) Republic Act No. 10586 S. No. 3365 H. No. 4251... - k's weather and more
"x x x.
SEC. 12. Penalties. – A driver found to have been driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, dangerous drugs and/or other similar substances, as provided for under Section 5 of this Act, shall be penalized as follows:
(a) If the violation of Section 5 did not result in physical injuries or homicide, the penalty of three (3) months imprisonment, and a fine ranging from Twenty thousand pesos (Php20,000.00) to Eighty thousand pesos (Php80,000.00) shall be imposed;
(b) If the violation of Section 5 resulted in physical injuries, the penalty provided in Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code or the penalty provided in the next preceding subparagraph, whichever is higher, and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (Php100,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos (Php200,000.00) shall be imposed;
(c) If the violation of Section 5 resulted in homicide, the penalty provided in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos (Php300,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) shall be imposed; and
(d) The nonprofessional driver’s license of any person found to have violated Section 5 of this Act shall also be confiscated and suspended for a period of twelve (12) months for the first conviction and perpetually revoked for the second conviction. The professional driver’s license of any person found to have violated Section 5 of this Act shall also be confiscated and perpetually revoked for the first conviction. The perpetual revocation of a driver’s license shall disqualify the person from being granted any kind of driver’s license thereafter.
The prosecution for any violation of this Act shall be without prejudice to criminal prosecution for violation of the Revised Penal Code, Republic Act No. 9165 and other special laws and existing local ordinances, whenever applicable.
x x x."
Friday, May 31, 2013
Brillantes culpably violated the Constitution – thrice | Opinion, News, The Philippine Star | philstar.com
see - Brillantes culpably violated the Constitution – thrice | Opinion, News, The Philippine Star | philstar.com
"x x x.
"x x x.
Comelec chairman Sixto Brillantes Jr. violated the Constitution in giving himself and the six commissioners intelligence funds last Feb. He also broke the fundamental law in buying land in behalf of the poll body in 2012. His legal brilliancy self-proclaimed, Brillantes presumably knew what he was doing was wrong. He could be impeached for such culpability.
Malacañang disclosed Brillantes’s P30-million intelligence fund last week in the course of defending the commissioners’ pocketing of a prior P10 million. Deputy presidential spokesperson Abigail Valte said the P30 million was “realigned” from the Comelec’s budget savings in 2012. Brillantes had sought and got presidential clearance for the fund juggling.
The realignment went against the express provisions of the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2012. That budget law specifically forbade the Comelec from thenceforth having intelligence funds.
The prohibition was inserted during the budget hearings in late 2011 by Sen. Franklin Drilon, head of the Senate finance committee. He had then just finished a probe of fund abuses by government-owned and -controlled corporations. Unearthed were the pocketing of confidential and/or intelligence funds by GOCC heads. Example: P18 million at the Clark Development Corp. in 2010. Also just concluded was an inquiry into the military comptroller’s “conversions” of unused personnel funds into multimillion-peso pabaon (going-away cash gifts) for retiring chiefs. No longer would the malpractices be allowed.
Only security and policing agencies were to have intelligence funds starting with the 2012 budget. Specifically to be debarred from then on, the press quoted Drilon, were the Comelec, Public Attorney’s Office, Office of the Solicitor General, Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, Presidential Commission on Good Government, National Telecoms Commission, and the Judiciary.
Brillantes thus was explicitly prohibited from converting the Comelec’s savings into intelligence funds.
Specifically, Brillantes broke the Constitution’s Article VI (The Legislative Department), Section 25-(5), which states: “No law shall be passed authorizing the transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.”
No law has been enacted to let Brillantes augment the intelligence budgeting of his constitutional commission. The GAA of 2012 in fact disallowed him from doing so.
Brillantes cannot invoke the Comelec’s “fiscal autonomy.” Article IX (Constitutional Commissions, Common Provisions), Section 5 is not applicable. For all it means is that his agency’s approved budget shall be automatically and regularly released, not subject to delay by the budget department.
Brillantes’s securing of a presidential approval does not exculpate him either. If at all, it shows a lawyer’s attempts to pass blame on a non-lawyer.
Ex-commissioner Gus Lagman exposed last week the misuse of Comelec intelligence funds. He said he was given two checks for P1.25 million in late 2011. In Mar. 2012 he was advised by the agency’s finance chief to sign a one-page report of concocted expenditures, and the money would be his to pocket. Appalled, he returned the P1.25 million.
It was part of a P10-million “intelligence fund” to which the six commissioners were “entitled” P1.25 million each, with Brillantes as chairman getting double, P2.5 million.
Brillantes has acknowledged receiving that amount. Presumably he has taken too his P7.5-million share of the subsequent P30 million released last Feb.
* * *
Another “savings” anomaly was committed earlier. Sometime in 2012 Brillantes negotiated to purchase land for P1.2 billion from the Philippine Retirement Authority. During the hearings in late 2012 for the GAA of 2013, he admitted to the Senate having paid an advance of P250 million. The money supposedly came from the Comelec’s P3.5-billion savings in 2011.
That again was a culpable violation of the Constitution’s Article VI, Section 25-(5). For, Brillantes had no authority from any congressional enactment to buy land for his agency from savings. There was no provision in the GAA of 2012 for the land acquisition.
As a constitutional commission, the Comelec may use its savings to augment only approved or existing programs. Like, if it has provisions of P1 million in salaries for 100 new recruits, but actually hires only 50, it can use the savings of P500,000 to augment ongoing projects, say, voter education.
No way may Brillantes cook up any expenditure at whim, like P1.2 billion for real estate, with a whopping P250-million down payment. The Constitution and the yearly GAAs contain checks and balances against fund abuses.
Brillantes has scuttled the P1.2-billion land deal. He said last Nov. that he did so on the Ombudsman’s advice that he could be breaking the Constitution (seehttp://www.philstar.com/headlines/2012/11/14/866395/comelec-stops-paymen...).
But then, discontinuing the purchase does not absolve Brillantes. For he already gave away P250 million without congressional consent.
Brillantes was piqued with Sen. Alan Peter Cayetano’s questioning that made him confess to the P250-million indiscretion. The latter had wanted to know if there was hanky-panky. Drilon said then that if Brillantes was removed from office for culpable violation of the Constitution, criminal prosecution could follow for technical malversation of public funds, with jail time.
Members of constitutional commissions can only be ousted by impeachment. Aside from breach of Constitution, the other grounds are graft and corruption, bribery, treason and other high crimes, and betrayal of public trust.
Brillantes is under fire for a series of blunders and fund anomalies related to the automation of Election 2013.
* * *
In wangling Malacañang consent of his P30-million intelligence fund, Brillantes needed justification. Valte said Brillantes’s stated reasons was “for intelligence and counter-intelligence activities and gathering of information relative to the activities of certain groups, individuals and technology experts suspected of conducting overt and covert operations to sabotage the results of the upcoming elections.”
The “technology experts” are likely the members of AES (Automated Election Systems) Watch, who have been critical of the Comelec’s use of unreliable, expensive voting machines. Brillantes at one point had called them “election saboteurs,” but gave no specifics of their alleged heinous offenses. After the election of May 13 he also said that, for making life difficult for him, he would get even with them by naming their supposed orchestrator. He has not done so.
The AES Watch has challenged Brillantes to make public his intelligence gatherings, if any. He has remained quiet. Perhaps he knows that he had treaded on illegal grounds — violation of civil liberties. The Bill of Rights guarantees freedom of speech and redress of grievance; and the security of persons, houses, papers, and effects.
Brillantes culpably has violated those rights with his P30 million.
* * *
x x x."
Writ of execution; when issued - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/april2013/5119.pdf
see - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/april2013/5119.pdf
"x x x.
Writ of execution should issue only when judgment has become final and executory; DAR regional lawyer punished w/ suspension of 3 months. -
"While a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment absent proof that such error was made with a conscious and deliberate intent to cause an injustice,51 the facts on hand prove otherwise. Florin’s issuance of the writ of execution and writ of possession in order to fully implement Regional Director Dalugdug’s Order dated February 15, 1999 clearly constitutes ignorance of the law for as a rule, a writ of execution is issued only after the subject judgment or order has already become final and executory.52 As aptly stated by IBP Commissioner San Juan, Florin ordered the issuance of such writs despite the pendency of the appeal with the
DARAB.53 Consequently, the Court finds merit in the recommendation of
suspension.
As to the penalty –
Judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith or deliberate intent to do injustice will be administratively sanctioned. 54 In this case, it appears, however, that this is the first time that Florin has been made administratively liable. Although there is no showing that malice or bad faith attended the commission of the acts complained of, the same does not negate the fact that Florin executed an act that would cause an injustice to the Berenguers. To our mind, the act of issuing the writ of execution and writ of possession is not simply an honest error in judgment but an obstinate disregard of the applicable laws and jurisprudence.
With all these, the Court deems it reasonable to reconsider the penalty recommended and instead impose the penalty of suspension for three (3)
months 55 without pay. As also held in Rallos v. Judge Gako, Jr.,56 three (3) months suspension without pay was imposed against a judge after finding out that the ignorance of the law he committed was not tainted with bad faith."
See - http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/april2013/5119.pdf
"x x x.
Writ of execution should issue only when judgment has become final and executory; DAR regional lawyer punished w/ suspension of 3 months. -
"While a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment absent proof that such error was made with a conscious and deliberate intent to cause an injustice,51 the facts on hand prove otherwise. Florin’s issuance of the writ of execution and writ of possession in order to fully implement Regional Director Dalugdug’s Order dated February 15, 1999 clearly constitutes ignorance of the law for as a rule, a writ of execution is issued only after the subject judgment or order has already become final and executory.52 As aptly stated by IBP Commissioner San Juan, Florin ordered the issuance of such writs despite the pendency of the appeal with the
DARAB.53 Consequently, the Court finds merit in the recommendation of
suspension.
As to the penalty –
Judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith or deliberate intent to do injustice will be administratively sanctioned. 54 In this case, it appears, however, that this is the first time that Florin has been made administratively liable. Although there is no showing that malice or bad faith attended the commission of the acts complained of, the same does not negate the fact that Florin executed an act that would cause an injustice to the Berenguers. To our mind, the act of issuing the writ of execution and writ of possession is not simply an honest error in judgment but an obstinate disregard of the applicable laws and jurisprudence.
With all these, the Court deems it reasonable to reconsider the penalty recommended and instead impose the penalty of suspension for three (3)
months 55 without pay. As also held in Rallos v. Judge Gako, Jr.,56 three (3) months suspension without pay was imposed against a judge after finding out that the ignorance of the law he committed was not tainted with bad faith."
See - http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/april2013/5119.pdf
Judicial notice of other past or present cases - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/april2013/185518.pdf
see - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/april2013/185518.pdf
"x x x.
Petitioners claim that the CA erroneously considered this testimony in
Civil Case No. Q-95-22865. They cite the general rule that courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other
cases. This rule, however, admits of exceptions. As early as United States v. Claveria, this Court has stated: “In the absence of objection and as a matter of convenience, a court may properly treat all or part of the original record of a former case filed in its archives, as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing party,
reference is made to it for that purpose by name and number or in some
other manner by which it is sufficiently designated.”13
We reiterated this stance in Adiarte v. Domingo,14 in which the trial
court decided the action pending before it by taking judicial notice of the
records of a prior case for a sum of money. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the Complaint, after it considered evidence clearly showing that the subject matter thereof was the same as that in the prior litigation. In a 1993 case, Occidental Land Transportation Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled:
The reasons advanced by the respondent court in taking judicial notice of Civil Case No. 3156 are valid and not contrary to law. As a general rule, “courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending before the same judge.”
The general rule admits of exceptions as enumerated in Tabuena v. Court of Appeals, the Court, citing U.S. v. Claveria, which We quote:
x x x (I)n the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all
parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a
case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it,
when, with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it for
that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is
sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former case or
any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's
direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.
It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when, ‘in the absence of objection,’ ‘with the knowledge of the opposing party,’ or ‘at the request or with the consent of the parties’ the case is clearly referred to or ‘the original or part of the records of the case are actually withdrawn from the archives' and 'admitted as part of the record of the case then pending.’
xxxx
And unlike the factual situation in Tabuena v. CA, the decision in Civil Case No. 3156 formed part of the records of the instant case (Civil Case No. 2728) with the knowledge of the parties and in the absence of their objection. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted).15
This doctrine was restated in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, viz: “As a matter of convenience to all the parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of, and absent an objection from, the adverse party, reference is made to it for that purpose,
by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently
designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives at the court’s direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.”16 (Underscoring supplied)
x x x."
"x x x.
Petitioners claim that the CA erroneously considered this testimony in
Civil Case No. Q-95-22865. They cite the general rule that courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other
cases. This rule, however, admits of exceptions. As early as United States v. Claveria, this Court has stated: “In the absence of objection and as a matter of convenience, a court may properly treat all or part of the original record of a former case filed in its archives, as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing party,
reference is made to it for that purpose by name and number or in some
other manner by which it is sufficiently designated.”13
We reiterated this stance in Adiarte v. Domingo,14 in which the trial
court decided the action pending before it by taking judicial notice of the
records of a prior case for a sum of money. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the Complaint, after it considered evidence clearly showing that the subject matter thereof was the same as that in the prior litigation. In a 1993 case, Occidental Land Transportation Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled:
The reasons advanced by the respondent court in taking judicial notice of Civil Case No. 3156 are valid and not contrary to law. As a general rule, “courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending before the same judge.”
The general rule admits of exceptions as enumerated in Tabuena v. Court of Appeals, the Court, citing U.S. v. Claveria, which We quote:
x x x (I)n the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all
parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a
case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it,
when, with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it for
that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is
sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former case or
any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's
direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.
It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when, ‘in the absence of objection,’ ‘with the knowledge of the opposing party,’ or ‘at the request or with the consent of the parties’ the case is clearly referred to or ‘the original or part of the records of the case are actually withdrawn from the archives' and 'admitted as part of the record of the case then pending.’
xxxx
And unlike the factual situation in Tabuena v. CA, the decision in Civil Case No. 3156 formed part of the records of the instant case (Civil Case No. 2728) with the knowledge of the parties and in the absence of their objection. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted).15
This doctrine was restated in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, viz: “As a matter of convenience to all the parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of, and absent an objection from, the adverse party, reference is made to it for that purpose,
by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently
designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives at the court’s direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.”16 (Underscoring supplied)
x x x."
[Science Solitaire] Do you still own your genes?
see - [Science Solitaire] Do you still own your genes?
"x x x.
I once described genes as nature’s first gift pack to each of us. I now take that back. This is because some companies already have patents for 20% of our genes. And that number will most likely increase.
"x x x.
I once described genes as nature’s first gift pack to each of us. I now take that back. This is because some companies already have patents for 20% of our genes. And that number will most likely increase.
This is how it happens. Pharma research dudes find the gene that causes serious diseases—like for example breast cancer or diabetes—and file a patent for it. When genes get patented, it means that before you can have any test done with that gene, you would have to pay license fees to the patent holder, even if it is your body that houses, suffers or celebrates that gene. In fact, if you want a different test on that gene, you still do not escape the royalty fees because you cannot do another test to that patented gene without first paying royalties to the patent holder.
Years ago, I wrote about how many pharmaceutical companies have filed for patents for human genes. It was my take on a very good piece written by Gary Stix in a Scientific American issue in 2004 entitled “Owning the Stuff of Life.” He revealed that 20% of the human genome is already covered by at least one patent per gene. I checked again and it seems that the proportion has not changed to this date. I don’t know about you but that does not quell my long standing uproar. Anything that lays claim to what I am made of deserves the intellectual equivalent of the martial arts defensive. I am still figuring out what level of science understanding do authorities in patent offices around the world possess to even consider that genes are fair game to patents.
I am sure that after reading the previous paragraphs, some of you have felt the hand of commerce invading your innermost chambers but you hear your own objections drown in the louder bells and whistles of the pharma companies’ cash registers. I wish I could tell you that there is hope but it gets worse. They are not only patenting genes now but also the processes that happen inside our bodies.
According to the Guardian online dated May 25, Jacques Cohen, a foremost embryologist published his objection to the approval of the US patent office of a mechanism involved in embryo development. Dr. Cohen published it in Reproductive BioMedicine Online. The US Patent Office approved the patent filed by Auxogyn and Stanford University on the “cell cycle data” of the human embryo. “Cell cycle data” is the scientific term for the timing of the three cell cycles of an embryo as it develops. Getting a clear picture of what actually happens when an embryo develops is crucial in in-vitro fertilization (IVF) treatments. This timing in human embryo development exists whether or not the dudes in Auxogyn and Stanford documented it or not. But now, they own it.
To be clear, patent filers and holders are not only business people. They also include scientists. But the scientists who are opposed to the patenting of natural processes say that aside from it being unethical, it also hampers research since it would prove more and more costly to study genes or bodily processes that are already covered by patents. Non-scientists should lament that because, while research is done by scientists, the results affect all of us. From my limited legal perspective, there is no disputing that we all commonly possess the genes and processes that pharma companies are beginning to own. Whatever happened to “possession is 9/10 of the law?”
I think this is another tragedy of the commons—a term used to refer to the sad fate of natural resources, like our forests and seas, that we all know we collectively own. Because we take them for granted that they are free, selfish interests are not checked and this results in the degradation or the depletion of those resources. Now, we seem to be bringing that same tragedy to our innermost spaces- our genes and our physiological processes. We effectively surrendered them to these companies because we took them for granted that they were inviolably ours. But alas, commercial minds most likely aided by lawyers saw that to be a potentially profitable oversight and lo and behold, we now have patented genes.
You think that is bad enough? Oh but wait, there’s more. The work on understanding the brain has just begun and two big projects spearhead this effort. One will try to simulate the human brain. The other will map the connections between and among our 86-100 billion neurons or our “connectome” and perhaps, the movement, behaviour, talent, diseases that they give rise to. What if companies started getting patents approved for those connections? How much longer do you think can we call our minds our own? – Rappler.com
Maria Isabel Garcia is a science writer. She has written two books, “Science Solitaire” and “Twenty One Grams of Spirit and Seven Ounces of Desire.” Her column appears every Friday and you can reach her at sciencesolitaire@gmail.com.
Thursday, May 30, 2013
Republic Act No. 10572 | Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines
see - Republic Act No. 10572 | Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines
[REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10572]
AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE LIABILITY OF THE ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OR CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP FOR AN OBLIGATION OF A SPOUSE WHO PRACTICES A PROFESSION AND THE CAPABILITY OF EITHER SPOUSE TO DISPOSE OF AN EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE OTHER SPOUSE, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLES 73 AND 111 OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209, ALSO KNOWN AS THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Article 73 of the Family Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
“Art. 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity without the consent of the other. The latter may object only on valid, serious, and moral grounds.
“In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not:
“(1) The objection is proper, and
“(2) Benefit has accrued to the family prior to the objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to the objection, the resulting obligation shall be enforced against the community property. If the benefit accrued thereafter, such obligation shall be enforced against the separate property of the spouse who has not obtained consent.
“The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in good faith.”
SEC. 2. Article 111 of the Family Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
“Art. 111. Either spouse may mortgage, encumber, alienate or otherwise dispose of his or her exclusive property.”
SEC. 3. Separability Clause. – If any provision or part hereof is held invalid or unconstitutional, the remainder of the law or the provision not otherwise affected shall remain valid and subsisting.
SEC. 4. Repealing Clause. – Any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive order, letter of instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of this Act is hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly.
SEC. 5. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
Approved,
(Sgd.) JUAN PONCE ENRILEPresident of the Senate | (Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.Speaker of the House of Representatives |
This Act which originated in the House of Representatives was finally passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate on September 20, 2012 and January 30, 2013, respectively.
(Sgd.) EMMA LIRIO-REYESSecretary of the Senate | (Sgd.) MARILYN B. BARUA-YAPSecretary General House of Representatives |
Approved: MAY 24 2013
(Sgd.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO IIIPresident of the Philippines
RESOURCES
DOWNLOAD PDF
Republic Act No. 10586 | Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines
see - Republic Act No. 10586 | Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines
[REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10586]
AN ACT PENALIZING PERSONS DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL, DANGEROUS DRUGS, AND SIMILAR SUBSTANCES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Short Title. – This Act shall be known as the “Anti-Drunk and Drugged Driving Act of 2013″.
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – Pursuant to the Constitutional principle that recognizes the protection of life and property and the promotion of the general welfare as essential for the enjoyment of the blessing of democracy, it is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure road safety through the observance of the citizenry of responsible and ethical driving standards.
Towards this end, the State shall penalize the acts of driving under the influence of alcohol, dangerous drugs and other intoxicating substances and shall inculcate the standards of safe driving and the benefits that may be derived from it through institutional programs and appropriate public information strategies.
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – For purposes of this Act:
(a) Alcohol refers to alcoholic beverages classified into beer, wine and distilled spirits, the consumption of which produces intoxication.
(b) Breath analyzer refers to the equipment which can determine the blood alcohol concentration level of a person through testing of his breath.
(c) Chemical tests refer to breath, saliva, urine or blood tests to determine the blood alcohol concentration level and/or positive indication of dangerous drugs and similar substances in a person’s body.
(d) Dangerous drugs and other similar substances refer to drugs listed in the schedules annexed to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol, and in the schedules annexed to the 1971 Single Convention of Psychotropic Substances as enumerated in its attachment which is an integral part of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002″ and those that the Board may reclassify, add to or remove from the list of dangerous drugs.
(e) Driving under the influence of alcohol refers to the act of operating a motor vehicle while the driver’s blood alcohol concentration level has, after being subjected to a breath analyzer test, reached the level of intoxication, as established jointly by the Department of Health (DOH), the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC).
(f) Driving under the influence of dangerous drugs and other similar substances refers to the act of operating a motor vehicle while the driver, after being subjected to a confirmatory test as mandated under Republic Act No. 9165, is found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug.
(g) Field sobriety tests refer to standardized tests to initially assess and determine intoxication, such as the horizontal gaze nystagmus, the walk-and-turn, the one-leg stand, and other similar tests as determined jointly by the DOH, the NAPOLCOM and the DOTC.
(h) Motor vehicle refers to any land transportation vehicle propelled by any power other than muscular power.
(i) Motor vehicles designed to carry hazardous materials refer to those designed to carry or transport materials which may endanger health and lives of the public.
(j) Public utility vehicles refer to motor vehicles for hire and used to carry or transport passengers or goods.
SEC. 4. Driver’s Education. – Every applicant for a motor vehicle driver’s license shall complete a course of instruction that provides information on safe driving including, but not limited to, the effects of the consumption of alcoholic beverages on the ability of a person to operate a motor vehicle, the hazards of driving under the influence of alcohol, dangerous drugs and/or other similar substances, and the penalties attached for violation thereof.
For professional drivers, every applicant for a driver’s license or those applying for renewal thereof shall undergo the driver’s education herein stated.
The driver’s license written examination shall include questions concerning the effects of alcohol and drug intoxication on the ability of a person to operate a motor vehicle and the legal and pecuniary consequences resulting from violation of the provisions of this Act.
SEC. 5. Punishable Act. – It shall be unlawful for any person to drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, dangerous drugs and/or other similar substances.
SEC. 6. Conduct of Field Sobriety, Chemical and Confirmatory Tests. – A law enforcement officer who has probable cause to believe that a person is driving under the influence of alcohol, dangerous drugs and/or other similar substances by apparent indications and manifestations, including overspeeding, weaving, lane straddling, sudden stops, swerving, poor coordination or the evident smell of alcohol in a person’s breath or signs of use of dangerous drugs and other similar substances, shall conduct field sobriety tests.
If the driver fails in the sobriety tests, it shall be the duty of the law enforcement officer to implement the mandatory determination of the driver’s blood alcohol concentration level through the use of a breath analyzer or similar measuring instrument.
If the law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a person is driving under the influence of dangerous drugs and/or other similar substances, it shall be the duty of the law enforcement officer to bring the driver to the nearest police station to be subjected to a drug screening test and, if necessary, a drug confirmatory test as mandated under Republic Act No. 9165.
Law enforcement officers and deputized local traffic enforcement officers shall be responsible in implementing this section.
SEC. 7. Mandatory Alcohol and Chemical Testing of Drivers Involved in Motor Vehicular Accidents. – A driver of a motor vehicle involved in a vehicular accident resulting in the loss of human life or physical injuries shall be subjected to chemical tests, including a drug screening test and, if necessary, a drug confirmatory test as mandated under Republic Act No. 9165, to determine the presence and/or concentration of alcohol, dangerous drugs and/or similar substances in the bloodstream or body.
SEC. 8. Refusal to Subject Oneself to Mandatory Tests. – A driver of a motor vehicle who refuses to undergo the mandatory field sobriety and drug tests under Sections 6, 7 and 15 of this Act shall be penalized by the confiscation and automatic revocation of his or her driver’s license, in addition to other penalties provided herein and/or other pertinent laws.
SEC. 9. Acquisition of Equipment. – Within four (4) months from the effectivity of this Act, the Land Transportation Office (LTO) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall acquire sufficient breath analyzers and drug-testing kits to be utilized by law enforcement officers and deputized local traffic enforcement officers nationwide giving priority to areas with high reported occurrences of accidents. For purposes of acquiring these equipment and for the training seminars indicated in Section 10 hereof, the LTO shall utilize the Special Road Safety Fund allotted for this purpose as provided under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8794, entitled: “An Act Imposing a Motor Vehicle User’s Charge on Owners of All Types of Motor Vehicles and for Other Purposes”. Additional yearly appropriations for the purchase of breath analyzers and drug-testing kits shall be provided annually under the General Appropriations Act.
SEC. 10. Deputation. – The LTO may deputize traffic enforcement officers of the PNP, the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) and cities and municipalities in order to enforce the provisions of this Act.
SEC. 11. Law Enforcement Officer Education. – The LTO and the PNP shall conduct training seminars for their law enforcers and deputies with regard to the proper conduct of field sobriety tests and breath analyzer tests every year. Within four (4) months from the effectivity of this Act, the LTO shall publish the guidelines and procedures for the proper conduct of field sobriety tests, which guidelines shall be made available to the public and made available for download through the official LTO website.
SEC. 12. Penalties. – A driver found to have been driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, dangerous drugs and/or other similar substances, as provided for under Section 5 of this Act, shall be penalized as follows:
(a) If the violation of Section 5 did not result in physical injuries or homicide, the penalty of three (3) months imprisonment, and a fine ranging from Twenty thousand pesos (Php20,000.00) to Eighty thousand pesos (Php80,000.00) shall be imposed;
(b) If the violation of Section 5 resulted in physical injuries, the penalty provided in Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code or the penalty provided in the next preceding subparagraph, whichever is higher, and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (Php100,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos (Php200,000.00) shall be imposed;
(c) If the violation of Section 5 resulted in homicide, the penalty provided in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos (Php300,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) shall be imposed; and
(d) The nonprofessional driver’s license of any person found to have violated Section 5 of this Act shall also be confiscated and suspended for a period of twelve (12) months for the first conviction and perpetually revoked for the second conviction. The professional driver’s license of any person found to have violated Section 5 of this Act shall also be confiscated and perpetually revoked for the first conviction. The perpetual revocation of a driver’s license shall disqualify the person from being granted any kind of driver’s license thereafter.
The prosecution for any violation of this Act shall be without prejudice to criminal prosecution for violation of the Revised Penal Code, Republic Act No. 9165 and other special laws and existing local ordinances, whenever applicable.
SEC. 13. Direct Liability of Operator and/or Owner of the Offending Vehicle. – The owner and/or operator of the vehicle driven by the offender shall be directly and principally held liable together with the offender for the fine and the award against the offender for civil damages unless he or she is able to convincingly prove that he or she has exercised extraordinary diligence in the selection and supervision of his or her drivers in general and the offending driver in particular.
This section shall principally apply to the owners and/or operators of public utility vehicles and commercial vehicles such as delivery vans, cargo trucks, container trucks, school and company buses, hotel transports, cars or vans for rent, taxi cabs, and the like.
SEC. 14. Nationwide Information Campaign. – Within one (1) month from the promulgation of the implementing rules and regulations as provided under Section 17 hereof, the Philippine Information Agency (PIA), in coordination with the LTO, the local government units (LGUs) and other concerned agencies, shall conduct information, education and communication (IEC) campaign for the attainment of the objectives of this Act.
SEC. 15. Nationwide Random Terminal Inspection and Quick Random Drug Tests. – The LTO shall conduct random terminal inspections and quick random drug tests of public utility drivers. The cost of such tests shall be defrayed by the LTO.
SEC. 16. Review of Penalties. – The LTO shall, after five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act and every five (5) years thereafter, review the applicability and enforcement of all foregoing pecuniary penalties and shall initiate amendment and/or upgrade the same as may be necessary, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the DOTC.
SEC. 17. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – The DOTC, the DOH and the NAPOLCOM shall, within three (3) months from the effectivity of this Act, jointly promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this Act.
SEC. 18. Separability Clause. – If, for any reason, any part or provision of this Act is declared invalid, such declaration shall not affect the other provisions of this Act.
SEC. 19. Repealing Clause. – Subparagraph (f), Section 56, Article 1 of Republic Act No. 4136, otherwise known as the “Land Transportation and Traffic Code”, as amended; subparagraph (f), Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7924, otherwise known as “An Act Creating the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, Defining its Powers and Functions, Providing Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes;” subparagraph (a), Section 36 of Republic Act No. 9165; and all other laws, orders, issuances, circulars, rules and regulations or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any provision of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
SEC. 20. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days from its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
Approved,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.Speaker of the House of Representatives | (Sgd.) JUAN PONCE ENRILEPresident of the Senate |
This Act which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 3365 and House Bill No. 4251 was finally passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives on January 28, 2013 and January 29, 2013, respectively.
(Sgd.) MARILYN B. BARUA-YAPSecretary General House of Representatives | (Sgd.) EDWIN B. BELLENActing Senate Secretary |
Approved: MAY 27 2013
(Sgd.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO IIIPresident of the Philippines
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Is your spouse's job legitimate? Court can decide
see - Is your spouse's job legitimate? Court can decide
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MANILA, Philippines - For those who have a job their spouse disapproves of, there's a new law that lets you keep on working without the consent of your husband or wife— provided it is a legitimate profession.
On Wednesday, May 29, Deputy Presidential Spokesperson Abigail Valte said President Benigno Aquino III signed Republic Act (RA) 10572, which effectively gives the court the power to decide whether there is basis to the objection of a spouse over his or her partner's profession, occupation, business or activity.
In the event the job is proven to be illegitimate, the law also allows the court to determine whether the benefits from the job or activity will be accrued against community property—shared by the couple—or separate property, owned only by the spouse whose occupation is the one being objected to.
Valte said spouses can object to professions or activities "only on various serious and moral grounds." She also clarified how wealth earned from the activity, if proven illegitimate, would be paid back to the court.
"If the family has benefitted from the proceeds of that occupation or profession that is being objected to, then the benefit can be charged to community property. But if there was no objection, then there was a benefit, and that was the only time there was an objection, then it should be charged to the separate property of the spouse," she said in a mix of Filipino and English.
Right over property
She said the amendment to a separate article now reads, "Either spouse may mortgage, encumber, alienate, or otherwise, dispose of his/her exclusive property without the consent of the other spouse and appear alone in court to litigate with regard to the same."
The older version only allowed this privilege for "a spouse of age."
The new law, known as an Act Establishing the Liability of the Absolute Community or Conjugal Partnership for an Obligation of a Spouse who Practices a Profession and the Capability of Either Spouse to Dispose of an Exclusive Property, amends Articles 73 and 111 of the Family Code of the Philippines (FCP) or Executive Order No 209.
It is one of several laws recently signed by Aquino, in addition to R.A. 10562 to R.A. 10571, or laws creating new courts in Paniqui, Capas, Concepcion, Tarlac; Digos, Davao del Sur; Pasig; Urdaneta, Pangasinan; Antipolo, Rizal; Biñan, Laguna; Cebu City; and Bais, Negros Oriental.
He also signed RA 10574, an Act Allowing the Infusion of Foreign Equity and the Capital of Rural Banks. - Rappler.com
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The Philippine Star Digital Edition NEWSPAPER VIEW FOR 2013-05-30
see - The Philippine Star Digital Edition NEWSPAPER VIEW FOR 2013-05-30
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President Aquino has signed a law allowing foreigners to own up to 60 percent of voting stocks in rural banks.
Under RA 10574, signed by the President last May 24, non-Filipino citizens may now own, acquire or purchase up to 60 percent of the voting stocks in a rural bank.
“It opens up another area where foreign capital can go into,” deputy presidential spokesperson Abigail Valte told a news briefing in Malacañang.
Under the law, foreigners can now be elected members of the board of directors of rural banks in the countryside. However, “their participation is limited to their proportionate share in the equity of the rural bank.”
Previously, rural banks should be “100 percent Filipino-owned,” but now that the law has been amended the arrangement can now be 60-40 – or 60 percent foreign and 40 percent local.
The new law likewise allows rural banks to foreclose the mortgage of properties or lands even if these are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, although the threshold should not be “more than five hectares,” as provided for in the statute.
“It’s subject to the retention limits under Section 6 of RA 6657, or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law,” Valte explained.
Meanwhile, the Rural Bankers Association of the Philippines (RBAP) lauded yesterday Malacañang’s move to pass RA 10574.
RBAP president Leandro Z. Garcia Jr. said this law would help create an environment conducive to economic growth in the countryside.
“The passage of the foreign equity bill into a law is a major win not only for rural banks, but to the countryside as well. Now that foreign investments are allowed, rural banks are now in a better financial position to reach out and serve both the unbanked and under-banked through improved banking services,” he said.
“We expect continuous development in the countryside especially now that rural banks are made even stronger and sustainable,” he added.
In effect, Garcia said the measure would provide an additional source of capital for rural banks, placing them on a level playing field with thrift and commercial banks.
He said with the law in place, RBAP could now open its doors for talks on potential foreign partnerships.
Under the new law, foreign investors — individuals or entities – may now own up to 60 percent of voting stocks in rural banks. It also states that the percentage of the foreign owned voting stock would be determined by the citizenship of the individual or corporate stockholders of the bank. – With Donnabelle Gatdula
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