Read - 2819.pdf
"Please take notice that the Court en bane issued a Resolution dated APRIL 22, 2014, which reads as follows:
"B.M. No. 2819 (In re: 2014 Bar Examinations).- Acting on the Letter dated April 21, 2014 of Atty. Ma. Cristina B. Layusa, Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant, and upon the recommendation of Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, Chairperson, 2014 Committee on Bar Examinations, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the following:
(a) conduct of the 2014 Bar Examinations on October 5, 12, 19 and 26, 2014;
(b) holding of the said examinations at the University of Santo Tomas, Espana, Manila;
(c) acceptance of the applications to take the 2014 Bar Examinations by the Office of the Bar Confidant starting June 1, 2014 and ending on July 15, 2014 without any extension; and
(d) negotiation by the Bar Confidant with the University of Santo Tomas for the use of the latter's campus and facilities for the subject Bar examinations."
See -
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/resolutions/2014/04/2819.pdf
Wednesday, May 28, 2014
Vigilantism; Death squads; Gunslinging messiahs.
Read - Gunslinging messiahs
"x x x.
"x x x.
The politics of naming
In the rhetoric of vigilantism, the enemies are not citizens. They are caricatures, symbols, phantoms that lurk outside the circle of a yellow streetlight: the weeds, the criminals, the low-lifes, the thieves, the drug dealers. Their individual stories are irrelevant in the fight for peace and order. What matters is the drawing of the line, black against white, good against evil, the heroes against the villains.
It is a shootout, and victory goes to the man with the biggest posse. There is no death squad to avenge the murders of drug dealers and smugglers in Davao. There are no sad stories of the mothers who discover their sons murdered in empty parking lots. The fact that a 9-year-old suspected thief named Jenny Boy Lagulos was found with 22 stab wounds may affect some, but in the battle against crime, his death is the death of an enemy combatant.
Any just crusade demands the naming of its enemies. In a democracy, it means a trial in a public court. It demands evidence and affidavits, context and intent, the right to a defense and the claim to an appeal before men and women accountable to the rule of law. The target of a death squad is always a man unable to defend himself against allegations, a man deprived of his day in court, sentenced by an arbitrary voice that is judge, jury and executioner all at once.
It is why the idea of a death squad fails its very purpose. The core of vigilantism is the certainty that the enemy is always guilty, but there is no certainty of guilt once due process is absent. It is difficult to believe a single mayor, a single police chief, a single man untrained in the ways of the law can determine guilt or innocence after a day’s surveillance resulting from a complaint to a public hotline.
Yet the decision is made, and the penalty is execution. It is a punishment that is absolute, without recourse or appeal, without space for error or the opportunity for reform, sustained in spite of the fact this is a country that bans the death penalty. Justice demands that punishments fit the crime, and yet there is one punishment for the targets of a death squad. A laptop thief, a drug dealer, a pickpocket, a rice smuggler – all of them are punished in the same final, irrevocable way.
The argument against death squads is not that they are prone to abuse. It is that their existence is abuse in itself.
x x x."
What Every Attorney Needs to Know About Social Media - FindLaw
Read - What Every Attorney Needs to Know About Social Media - FindLaw
"x x x.
- See more at: http://technology.findlaw.com/modern-law-practice/what-every-attorney-needs-to-know-about-social-media.html?DCMP=CCX-TWLP#sthash.ukrOc7Pj.dpuf
"x x x.
In 2012, the ABA amended Model Rule 1.1, Comment 8 on Maintaining Competence so that it reads:
"To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology, engage in continuing study and education and comply with all continuing legal education requirements to which the lawyer is subject."
For example, more and more courts are allowing discovery into social media accounts, regardless of whether the accounts are public or private, so it is becoming increasingly imperative that attorneys not only understand how social media works, but also how to conduct their own research on the various sites.
Additionally, social media can benefit a law practice in other ways. It is a unique medium which can allow you to interact with others, set yourself apart in your field of practice, and may increase your overall online visibility.
x x x,:
- See more at: http://technology.findlaw.com/modern-law-practice/what-every-attorney-needs-to-know-about-social-media.html?DCMP=CCX-TWLP#sthash.ukrOc7Pj.dpuf
Tuesday, May 27, 2014
How to Prepare for Oral Argument
Read - How to Prepare for Oral Argument
"x x x.
"x x x.
You must know four things about your case for every argument:
1The facts. Know the facts of your case backwards and forwards. Make sure you know which are actually in the record, too.
2The law. Although you probably researched the law at various points in the litigation, including when you wrote the brief, you should review at least the key cases before your argument, and learn them well enough to talk about the nuances without the case in front of you. The same goes for any statutes or rules involved, which you should know inside out.
You must also be able to state the rule you want the court to adopt and apply, whether it is a rule from existing law or a new one that you want the court to adopt. Enough judges have asked me about this that it has become one of my favorite questions to ask students when I judge moot court competitions — few are prepared with a rule. But if you want to win, you had better know how you want the court to do it.
3Your argument. Make sure you can explain why your client should win. This ought to go without saying, but I have seen an astonishing number of attorneys who cannot seem to articulate a coherent reason why their client ought to win.
Your job is to convince the court that your client ought to win, and give the court a legally-permissible route to that result. Don’t forget the second part. You cannot win without it.
4What you want. This should go without saying, too. You must be able to tell the court what you want it to do. By the way, as part of this, you should make sure the court can do what you want it to do. Your client won’t thank you for the time and expense of a motion hearing if the court doesn’t have the power to grant your motion.
x x x."
Friday, May 23, 2014
Starting Your Own Legal Practice - Top Tips – Decoded
See - Starting Your Own Legal Practice - Top Tips – Decoded
Also - http://www.decoded.com/view-post/Starting-Your-Own-Legal-Practice-Top-Tips?sf26466740=1
"x x x.
Also - http://www.decoded.com/view-post/Starting-Your-Own-Legal-Practice-Top-Tips?sf26466740=1
"x x x.
Despite the recession, now’s the best time ever for starting your own business according to researchers. Here are ten top tips to bear in mind if you fancy starting your own law firm.
1. Don’t over-pontificate
Obviously you need to put the preparatory work in prior to launching your new business venture, but don’t spend too long contemplating your navel before taking the plunge. Some lawyers become overly methodical in their planning and prepping stages and never actually get around to starting a practice at all.
Equip yourself with a website, computer, printer, scanner and a good suite of practice management software and make a start.
2. Get a good website
These days every business, no matter how new or small, needs a good website. Your online presence is your shop window. It’s where people can find out all about you and the services you can offer them; the more professional-looking your site the better, even if it costs you a good chunk of your marketing budget. If your site looks amateurish and cheap, it reflects very poorly on your practice. If possible, make sure your site is geared for mobiles and tablets too.
3. Keep overheads down
Never be tempted to try to compete with the big law firms; you can’t. They have access to huge budgets that a newly started solo practice does not. Keep it simple until you are more established. You can manage perfectly well with a home office and consider using a business concierge service rather than employing reception and secretarial staff. This of course means that some of the administrative duties will fall to you to look after, but the huge cost savings will make this extra work worth it.
As the business grows, you could hire a paralegal to help you with specific jobs and take on a full-time admin/receptionist and move to a modest permanent office premises. Allow your practice to grow and grow with it; rather than starting big and trying to grow into it.
4. In-house marketing
Marketing is obviously very important in the strategy of any business, but it’s also very expensive to outsource. Take the time to learn about content marketing and blogging for example and keep all your marketing activities in-house. Check out the GoodBlogs Tegomedia site for advice and tips.http://www.tegomedia.com
5. Avoid print advertising
Print advertising like billboards, newspapers and yellow pages is mega-expensive and not tremendously effective unless you have a massive budget to throw at it. Stick to digital marketing, word of mouth and personal recommendation.
6. Be technology savvy
Instead of spending out on a photocopier, scanner, printer and fax machine; buy one that does everything. You can actually avoid copying altogether if you choose a machine that scans both sides of a page. Many of your contacts will be happy with an emailed pdf copy of a document anyway, so you won’t even need to copy much which will save you time, paper and toner.
7. eBooks versus paper manuals
Legal books are very expensive. Luckily most of them can now be bought in ebook format so get yourself a Kindle or an iPad and buy them in digital form. Not only is this considerably cheaper but you can also carry your entire legal library with you at all times! They are also easily searchable and you won’t be filling your entire storage space with dusty legal tomes.
8. Use the Cloud
Practice management software and data storage is best achieved through using the Cloud. Not only is this option much the cheapest and most convenient, it also means you have 24/7 mobile access from anywhere.
9. Innovation
The beauty of running your own firm is that you have total flexibility. You can adapt your practice to meet the demands of your clients, to incorporate new technology and to run in the way that you want it to.
If you decide to try new ideas and systems, it’s your decision alone. Research new technology and be as inventive and radical as you like; after all, there’s no senior partner in the office down the hall to tell you ‘no’. The ability to innovate is part of the fun and challenge of running your own business; don’t be afraid to embrace it.
Whilst it’s undoubtedly true to say that setting up your own legal practice comes with its own problems and stresses, it does provide you with a degree of freedom that you would never get working for someone else. Be focused, determined, work hard and reap the rewards.
x x x."
Execution of judgments against government agencies and local government units. - 181792.pdf
See - 181792.pdf
"x x x.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court cannot blame petitioners for resorting to the remedy of
mandamus because they have done everything in the books to satisfy their
just and demandable claim. They went to the courts, the COA, the
Ombudsman, and the DILG. They resorted to the remedy of mandamus
because in at least three (3) cases, the Court sanctioned the remedy in cases
of final judgments rendered against a local government unit (LGU). The
Court ruled that a claimant may resort to the remedy of mandamus to compel an LGU to enact the necessary ordinance and approve the corresponding disbursement in order to satisfy the judgment award. In Municipality of Makati v. The Honorable Court of Appeals,24 it was written:
There is merit in this contention. The funds deposited in the second PNB Account No. S/A 263-530850-7 are public funds of the municipal government. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute [Republic v. Palacio, supra.; The Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, G.R. No. L-30098, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 616]. More particularly, the properties of a municipality, whether real or personal, which are necessary for public use cannot be attached and sold at execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the municipality.
Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution [See Viuda De Tan Toco v. The Municipal Council of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 52 (1926): The Municipality of Paoay, Ilocos Norte v. Manaois, 86 Phil. 629 (1950); Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 61744, June 25, 1984, 130 SCRA 56]. The foregoing rule finds application in the case at bar. Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating from its public funds an amount corresponding to the balance due under the RTC decision dated June 4, 1987, less the sum of ₱99,743.94 deposited in Account No. S/A 265-537154-3, no levy under execution may be validly effected on the public funds of petitioner deposited in Account No. S/A 263-530850-7.
This doctrine was reiterated in Teresita M. Yujuico v. Hon. Jose L. Atienza,25 as follows:
"x x x.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court cannot blame petitioners for resorting to the remedy of
mandamus because they have done everything in the books to satisfy their
just and demandable claim. They went to the courts, the COA, the
Ombudsman, and the DILG. They resorted to the remedy of mandamus
because in at least three (3) cases, the Court sanctioned the remedy in cases
of final judgments rendered against a local government unit (LGU). The
Court ruled that a claimant may resort to the remedy of mandamus to compel an LGU to enact the necessary ordinance and approve the corresponding disbursement in order to satisfy the judgment award. In Municipality of Makati v. The Honorable Court of Appeals,24 it was written:
There is merit in this contention. The funds deposited in the second PNB Account No. S/A 263-530850-7 are public funds of the municipal government. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute [Republic v. Palacio, supra.; The Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, G.R. No. L-30098, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 616]. More particularly, the properties of a municipality, whether real or personal, which are necessary for public use cannot be attached and sold at execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the municipality.
Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution [See Viuda De Tan Toco v. The Municipal Council of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 52 (1926): The Municipality of Paoay, Ilocos Norte v. Manaois, 86 Phil. 629 (1950); Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 61744, June 25, 1984, 130 SCRA 56]. The foregoing rule finds application in the case at bar. Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating from its public funds an amount corresponding to the balance due under the RTC decision dated June 4, 1987, less the sum of ₱99,743.94 deposited in Account No. S/A 265-537154-3, no levy under execution may be validly effected on the public funds of petitioner deposited in Account No. S/A 263-530850-7.
Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and PSB are left with no legal recourse. Where a municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds therefor [See Viuda De Tan Toco v. The Municipal Council of Iloilo, supra; Baldivia v. Lota, 107 Phil. 1099 (1960); Yuviengco v. Gonzales, 108 Phil. 247 (1960)]. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
This doctrine was reiterated in Teresita M. Yujuico v. Hon. Jose L. Atienza,25 as follows:
Respondents also argue that the members of the CSB cannot be directed to decide a discretionary function in the specific manner the court desires. The question of whether the enactment of an ordinance to satisfy the appropriation of a final money judgment rendered against an LGU may be compelled by mandamus has already been settled in Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals.
Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and PSB are left with no legal recourse. Where a municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant
may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds therefore [See Viuda De Tan Toco v. The
Municipal Council of Iloilo, supra, Baldivia v. Lota, 107 Phil 1099 (1960); Yuviengco v. Gonzales, 108 Phil 247 (1960)].
Clearly, mandamus is a remedy available to a property owner when a money judgment is rendered in its favor and against a municipality or city, as in this case.
The same ruling was arrived at in the more recent case of Spouses Ciriaco and Arminda Ortega v. City of Cebu.
It has been held, however, that a resort to the remedy of mandamus is
improper if the standard modes of procedure and forms of remedy are still
available and capable of affording relief. The equitable nature of a writ of
mandamus was discussed in the case of Uy Kiao Eng vs. Nixon Lee,
27 thus:
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of
competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign,
directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some
corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular
duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of
the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation of law. This
definition recognizes the public character of the remedy, and clearly
excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of
enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no
interest. The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to
enforce a public right and to compel the performance of a public
duty, most especially when the public right involved is mandated by
the Constitution. As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will
lie if the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust or station.
The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an
official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his
duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which he is
not entitled by law. Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right
which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt
exists, although objection raising a mere technical question will be
disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious. As a
rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following
grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or person against whom
the action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office,
trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or person has
unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment
of a right or office to which he is entitled. On the part of the relator,
it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should
have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the
imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required.
Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that
mandamus cannot be used to enforce contractual obligations.
Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract
rights, and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation
in the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is
not appropriate to enforce a private right against an individual. The
writ of mandamus lies to enforce the execution of an act, when,
otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues only
in cases relating to the public and to the government; hence, it is
called a prerogative writ. To preserve its prerogative character,
mandamus is not used for the redress of private wrongs, but only in
matters relating to the public.
Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of mandamus being invoked. In other words, mandamus can be issued only in cases where the usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief. Although classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature and its issuance is generally controlled by equitable principles. Indeed, the grant of the writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the court. [Emphasis
supplied]
Regarding final money judgment against the government or any of its
agencies or instrumentalities, the legal remedy is to seek relief with the COA
pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular 10-2000 dated October 25, 2000, which states as follows:
SUBJECT : EXERCISE OF UTMOST CAUTION, PRUDENCE AND JUDICIOUSNESS IN THE ISSUANCE OF WRITS OF EXECUTION TO SATISFY MONEY JUDGMENTS AGAINST GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS.
In order to prevent possible circumvention of the rules and
procedures of the Commission on Audit, judges are hereby enjoined
to observe utmost caution, prudence and judiciousness in the
issuance of writs of execution to satisfy money judgments against
government agencies and local government units.
Judges should bear in mind that in Commissioner of Public
Highways v .San Diego (31 SCRA 617, 625 [1970]), this Court
explicitly stated:
"The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to
be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may
limit claimant's action 'only up to the completion of proceedings
anterior to the stage of execution' and that the power of the Court
ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and
properties may not be seized under writs of execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious
considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must
be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law.
The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be
allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public
funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by
law.”
Moreover, it is settled jurisprudence that upon determination
of State liability, the prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction thereof
must still be pursued in accordance with the rules and procedures laid
down in P. D. No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing
Code of the Philippines (Department of Agriculture v. NLRC, 227
SCRA 693, 701-02 [1993] citing Republic v. Villasor, 54 SCRA 84
[1973]). All money claims against the Government must first be filed
with the Commission on Audit which must act upon it within sixty
days. Rejection of the claim will authorize the claimant to elevate the
matter to the Supreme Court on certiorari and, in effect, sue the State
thereby (P. D. 1445, Sections 49-50).
However, notwithstanding the rule that government
properties are not subject to levy and execution unless otherwise
provided for by statute (Republic v. Palacio, 23 SCRA 899 [1968];
Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, supra) or
municipal ordinance (Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals,
190 SCRA 206 [1990]), the Court has, in various instances,
distinguised between government funds and properties for public
use and those not held for public use. Thus, in Viuda de Tan Toco
v. Muncipal Council of Iloilo (49 Phil 52 [1926]), the Court ruled
that "[w]here property of a municipal or other public corporation
is sought to be subjected to execution to satisfy judgments
recovered against such corporation, the question as to whether
such property is leviable or not is to be determined by the usage
and purposes for which it is held." The following can be culled from
Viuda de Tan Toco v. Municipal Council of Iloilo:
1. Properties held for public uses - and generally everything
held for governmental purposes - are not subject to levy and sale
under execution against such corporation. The same rule applies to
funds in the hands of a public officer and taxes due to a municipal
corporation.
2. Where a municipal corporation owns in its proprietary
capacity, as distinguished from its public or governmental capacity,
property not used or used for a public purpose but for quasi-private
purposes, it is the general rule that such property may be seized and
sold under execution against the corporation.
3. Property held for public purposes is not subject to
execution merely because it is temporarily used for private
purposes. If the public use is wholly abandoned, such property
becomes subject to execution.
This Administrative Circular shall take effect immediately
and the Court Administrator shall see to it that it is faithfully
implemented.
Issued this 25th day of October, 2000 in the City of Manila.
On July 31, 2001, the COA itself issued COA Circular No. 2001-00228 which cited the full mandate of Supreme Court Administrative Circular 10-2000 for the information and guidance of its Heads of Departments, Chiefs of Bureaus and Offices, Managing Heads of
Government-Owned and/or Controlled Corporations, Local Chief
Executives, Assistant Commissioners, Directors, Officers-In-Charge, and
Auditors of COA.
x x x."
PNoy to appoint new SC justice as Abad retires | ABS-CBN News
See - PNoy to appoint new SC justice as Abad retires | ABS-CBN News
"x x x.
"x x x.
The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) has started the selection process for the replacement of Abad. It received a total of 15 nominees, including 11 insiders in the judiciary and four outsiders.
They are Presiding Justice Andres Reyes Jr. and Associate Justices Apolinario Bruselas, Rosmari Carandang, Stephen Cruz, Ramon Paul Hernando, Jose Reyes Jr., Noel Tijam and Nina Antonio-Valenzuela, all from the Court of Appeals; Associate Justices Ma. Cristina Cornejo and Rafael Lagos, both from the Sandiganbayan; and Quezon City regional trial court Judge Reynaldo Daway.
Also nominated were Commission on Audit chair Grace Pulido-Tan and commissioner Ma. Rowena Guanzon, De La Salle University law dean Jose Manuel Diokno and Solicitor General Francis Jardeleza.
The public interviews of the aspirants are set on May 29 and 30.
The Constitution requires candidates for the position of associate justice of the high court to be natural born citizen, at least 40 years of age; and with 15 years or more of experience as a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the country. The magistrate must also be “a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.”
Aquino’s appointees at the SC so far are Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes Sereno and Associate Justices Bienvenido Reyes, Estela Perlas-Bernabe and Marvic Leonen.
x x x."
Thursday, May 22, 2014
Abused women, kids to get legal aid from IBP
see - Abused women, kids to get legal aid from IBP
"x x x.
Read more: http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/602796/abused-women-kids-to-get-legal-aid-from-ibp#ixzz32PoanYCY
Follow us: @inquirerdotnet on Twitter | inquirerdotnet on Facebook
"x x x.
MANILA, Philippines—The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) has signed a memorandum of agreement (MOA) with the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to provide free legal aid to women and children who are victims of violence, abuse, neglect, discrimination and human trafficking.
The MOA, signed by IBP president Vicente Joyas and DSWD Secretary Corazon “Dinky” Soliman, also covers assistance to children in conflict with the law, and prospective adoptive/foster parents and children.
In a statement, lawyer Minerva Ambrosio, director of the IBP National Center for Legal Aid (NCLA), said the DSWD earlier sought the assistance of the IBP to help the department address the clamor for legal advice, counseling and representation for many women and children who cannot afford the services of competent and committed lawyers.
“The IBP has pledged its legal aid program to assist marginalized groups, with special emphasis on women and children,” Ambrosio said.
Under the MOA, the DSWD will evaluate the cases and submit requests for legal assistance to the IBP president. The IBP president will then refer the requests to the NCLA to verify compliance with its “means and merit” test, which evaluates the financial capacity of prospective clients as well as the worthiness of legal support.
Qualified clients are endorsed by the NCLA to the appropriate IBP chapter. The NCLA may also refer cases to a legal aid office or organization whose advocacy is related to the cases submitted.
RELATED STORIES
x x x."
Read more: http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/602796/abused-women-kids-to-get-legal-aid-from-ibp#ixzz32PoanYCY
Follow us: @inquirerdotnet on Twitter | inquirerdotnet on Facebook
Solons want Bar exams held in Visayas and Mindanao
See - Solons want Bar exams held in Visayas and Mindanao
"x x x.
"x x x.
MANILA, Philippines—Simultaneous Bar exams should also be held in Visayas and in Mindanao, lawmakers said as they urged the Supreme Court to revise the rules of court.
Cagayan de Oro City Representative Rufus Rodriguez and his brother Abante Mindanao party-list Representative Maximo Rodriguez filed House Resolution 1023, urging the high court to amend Section 11, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court to allow examinations for bar admission to be held not only in Manila but also in Cebu City and Cagayan de Oro.
“Various law schools in the Visayas and Mindanao have, in recent years, called for the decentralization of the Bar exams and have said exams be held simultaneously in Manila, Visayas and Mindanao,” the solons said in their resolution.
They acknowledged the challenges in holding simultaneous Bar exams, including higher risk of leakages and budget constraints. However, they also said the proposal would benefit many examinees who live far from Manila.
“Many bar takers from outside Manila have additional difficulties in going to Manila and staying there for four weeks. [It] would be more disadvantageous for the examinees from the provinces, not only financially but also emotionally and psychologically,” they said.
Both pointed out that law schools in the Visayas and in Mindanao have been calling for the “decentralization of the bar exams.”
University of Cebu-College of Law Dean Baldomero Estenzo and other law deans from Visayas filed such a petition before the Supreme Court back in 2010.
Last year, the Supreme Court said it is already studying the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant after the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu asked that Bar examinations be held outside Metro Manila.
RELATED STORIES
x x x."
Saturday, May 17, 2014
Landmark decision on MARITAL RAPE - 187495.pdf
See - 187495.pdf
"x x x.
Rape is a crime that evokes global condemnation because it is an
abhorrence to a woman's value and dignity as a human being. It respects no
time, place, age, physical condition or social status. It can happen anywhere
and it can happen to anyone. Even, as shown in the present case, to a wife,
inside her time-honored fortress, the family home, committed against her by
her husband who vowed to be her refuge from cruelty. The herein
pronouncement is an affirmation to wives that our rape laws provide the atonement they seek from their sexually coercive husbands.
Husbands are once again reminded that marriage is not a license to forcibly rape their wives.
A husband does not own his wife's body by reason of marriage.
By marrying, she does not divest herself of the human right to an exclusive autonomy over her own body and thus, she can lawfully opt to give or withhold her consent to marital coitus.
A husband aggrieved by his wife's unremitting refusal to engage in sexual intercourse cannot resort to felonious force or coercion to make her yield.
He can seek succor before the Family Courts that can determine whether her refusal constitutes psychological incapacity justifying an annulment of the marriage.
Sexual intimacy is an integral part of marriage because it is the
spiritual and biological communion that achieves the marital purpose of
procreation. It entails mutual love and self-giving and as such it
contemplates only mutual sexual cooperation and never sexual coercion or
imposition.
The Court is aware that despite the noble intentions of the herein
pronouncement, menacing personalities may use this as a tool to harass
innocent husbands. In this regard, let it be stressed that safeguards in the
criminal justice system are in place to spot and scrutinize fabricated or false
marital rape complaints and any person who institutes untrue and malicious
charges will be made answerable under the pertinent provisions of the RPC
and/or other laws."
"x x x.
Rape is a crime that evokes global condemnation because it is an
abhorrence to a woman's value and dignity as a human being. It respects no
time, place, age, physical condition or social status. It can happen anywhere
and it can happen to anyone. Even, as shown in the present case, to a wife,
inside her time-honored fortress, the family home, committed against her by
her husband who vowed to be her refuge from cruelty. The herein
pronouncement is an affirmation to wives that our rape laws provide the atonement they seek from their sexually coercive husbands.
Husbands are once again reminded that marriage is not a license to forcibly rape their wives.
A husband does not own his wife's body by reason of marriage.
By marrying, she does not divest herself of the human right to an exclusive autonomy over her own body and thus, she can lawfully opt to give or withhold her consent to marital coitus.
A husband aggrieved by his wife's unremitting refusal to engage in sexual intercourse cannot resort to felonious force or coercion to make her yield.
He can seek succor before the Family Courts that can determine whether her refusal constitutes psychological incapacity justifying an annulment of the marriage.
Sexual intimacy is an integral part of marriage because it is the
spiritual and biological communion that achieves the marital purpose of
procreation. It entails mutual love and self-giving and as such it
contemplates only mutual sexual cooperation and never sexual coercion or
imposition.
The Court is aware that despite the noble intentions of the herein
pronouncement, menacing personalities may use this as a tool to harass
innocent husbands. In this regard, let it be stressed that safeguards in the
criminal justice system are in place to spot and scrutinize fabricated or false
marital rape complaints and any person who institutes untrue and malicious
charges will be made answerable under the pertinent provisions of the RPC
and/or other laws."
Presidential cousin: Henares ‘anti-poor’
See - Presidential cousin: Henares ‘anti-poor’
"x x x.
"x x x.
PRESIDENTIAL cousin and Senator Bam Aquino on Friday denounced what he tagged as an “anti-poor” circular of Bureau of Internal Revenue Commissioner Kim Henares, saying that it was tantamount to confiscating the daily income of marginal income earners (MIE).
The BIR memorandum circular—Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 7-2014—compels micro entrepreneurs to pay income tax returns.
The BIR circular would cover agricultural growers/producers such as farmers and fishermen selling directly to consumers, small sari-sari stores, small carinderias or turo-turo, and drivers/operators of single unit tricycles.
Aquino said charging taxes does not help these people in any way as it ‘becomes a burden to a sector that is situated below the poverty line.”
To counter the circular, the neophyte senator has filed Senate Bill 2227, which seeks to exempt Marginal Income Earners (MIEs), including farmers, fishermen, tricycle drivers, small sari-sari storeowners and other micro-entrepreneurs, from payment of income tax.
Under his proposed measure, Aquino said MIEs, or self-employed individuals who earn not more than P150,000 annually, should be spared from paying income tax, just like minimum wage earners.
He noted that granting income tax exemption to minimum wage earners while subjecting our small businessmen to income tax was contrary to the mandate of the Constitution, there being no substantial distinction between them in terms of earning capacity.
The bill classifies MIEs as self-employed individuals—working neither for the private sector nor the government—deriving gross sales/receipts not exceeding P150,000 during any 12-month period, which will be used principally for subsistence or livelihood.
If enacted into law, the bill would instruct the BIR to adjust the income cap on the gross sales of the small businessmen to match any increase that minimum wage income earners may receive.
Aside from income tax, MIEs shall be exempt from 12 percent value-added tax and any percentage tax imposed under the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 because they are not engaged in trade for which these taxes are imposed.
x x x."
Friday, May 16, 2014
High court finds husband guilty of raping wife
See - High court finds husband guilty of raping wife
"x x x.
Read more: http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/602564/high-court-finds-husband-guilty-of-raping-wife#ixzz31qrYBwFZ
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"x x x.
MANILA, Philippines—The Supreme Court handed down a guilty verdict against a man who raped his wife twice in a historic ruling that cautions husbands: You don’t have property rights over your wives’ bodies.
In a decision written by Associate Justice Bienvenido Reyes, the high court affirmed the lower court’s penalty of reclusion perpetua in the rape case that first occurred close to 23 years after the couple’s marriage.
The man is not eligible for parole.
The two got married on Oct. 18, 1975 and have four children. They opened a variety store that over the years grew into several businesses.
On the night of Oct. 16, 1998, the wife was not feeling well and opted to sleep on a cot outside their bedroom. The husband demanded that she transfer to their bed. When she declined, he lifted the cot and threw it against the wall causing the wife to fall.
She then obliged to move to the bed where her husband raped her amid her plea. With a concrete wall on one side and a mere wooden partition on another, her pleading could be heard by their two daughters.
The girls tried to interfere with the elder child kicking the door open. Their father told them to go away.
The next evening, the woman chose to sleep with their children but the husband insisted that she go to their bedroom. When the wife declined, the husband tried to carry her. As she struggled, the husband tore her shorts and tried to rape her in front of their children.
Their elder child told the father to stop but the man said that he could do anything he wanted, saying he was the head of the family and ordered the children to leave the room.
In December 1999, the wife accused her husband in court of two counts of rape.
The husband denied the accusation, saying he was in another place tending to their damaged delivery truck on Oct. 16 and 17.
He also said that his wife made the accusation because she was angry after he took control of their businesses. The husband also accused his wife of squandering P3 million from their bank savings and accused his wife of having an illicit affair.
But both the lower court and the Court of Appeals were not convinced. The appeals court said that the fact the complainant and the accused were spouses “only reinforces the truthfulness of [the wife’s] accusations because no wife in her right mind would accuse her husband of having raped her if it were not true.”
The Supreme Court said the presumption of innocence of the husband was “sufficiently overcome by the wife’s clear, straightforward, credible, and truthful declaration that on two separate occasions, he succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her, without her consent and against her will.”
It said that the “evidence of overwhelming force and intimidation to consummate rape is extant from the wife’s narration as believably corroborated by the testimonies of their two children and the physical evidence of wife’s tom panties and short pants.”
The high court reminded that “a husband does not own his wife’s body by reason of marriage.”
“By marrying, she does not divest herself of the human right to an exclusive autonomy over her own body and thus, she can
lawfully opt to give or withhold her consent to marital coitus,” it said.
The high court affirmed the penalty of P50,000 in moral damages, P50,000 civil indemnity and P30,000 exemplary damages.
The law on Anti-Violence against Women and their Children, which was passed in 2004, “regards rape within marriage as a form of sexual violence that may be committed by a man against his wife within or outside the family abode.”
The high court also stressed that the Family Code “obligates the spouses to love one another but this rule sanctions affection and sexual intimacy, as expressions of love, that are both spontaneous and mutual and not the kind which is unilaterally exacted by force or coercion.”
Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno and Justices Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro, Lucas P. Bersamin, and Martin S. Villarama Jr. concurred in the decision.
x x x."
RELATED STORY
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Tuesday, May 13, 2014
Dynasties in PH politics; a threat to democracy.
See - GUESS | What are the top 10 provinces with the biggest political 'dynastic share'?
"x x x.
"x x x.
MANILA, Philippines - As Congress deliberates on the anti-political dynasty bill, an Asian Institute of Management 2012 study lists the top 10 provinces in the country with the biggest “dynastic share.”
According to the "Inequality in democracy: Insights from an empirical analysis of political dynasties in the 15th Congress,” a copy of which was provided InterAksyon.com, they are: Maguindanao, Apayao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Ilocos Norte, Abra, Negros Occidental, Ilocos Sur, Quirino, and, Cebu.
The study’s authors, Ronald Mendoza, David Yap, Edsel Beja Jr., and Victor Venida also found that:
- 70% of the 15th Congress is dynastic, with dynasties dominating all major political parties.
- On the average, there are more dynasties in regions with higher poverty and lower human development.
- Dynasties tend to be richer (with higher Statement of Assets Liabilities and Net worth).
- 80% of the youngest congressmen (age 26-40) are more dynastic clans.
Poverty and political dynasties
The study, cited in separate sponsorship speeches of Caloocan Representative Edgar Erice and Pampanga Representative Oscar Rodriguez, gave "strong evidence that the more severe poverty is, the higher the prevalence of political dynasties."
Rodriguez quoted an analysis in the study, which said: "Given that the poor are most vulnerable to political patronage and manipulation as well as practical to sell their votes, a worsening, if not unchanging, poverty would be beneficial to political dynasties."
"Since the largest political dynasties would, in most situations, be the families that have cultivated the most extensive networks of patronage, accumulated the most political and financial capital, and have access to the largest political machineries, they would be in the best position to take advantage of vulnerable economically disadvantaged voters," the study said.
ACT Teachers partylist Representative Antonio Tinio said that Congress and successive Presidents "have failed to prohibit the oligarchic rule of elite families as mandated in the Constitution."
Tinio cited a 2007 study of the Center for People Empowerment and Governance that estimated that 94 percent of all provinces in the country have political dynasties, with an average of 2.3 political families per province.
Tinio said there is now a clamor among the people for good governance and greater transparency and the growing opposition to political dynasties.
"The entrenchment of dynasties in the political branches of government is a great obstacle to the enactment of an anti-political dynasty law, but the Filipino people's resolve is greater," Tinio said.
x x x."
GUIDELINES FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE
GUIDELINES FOR IMPOSING
LAWYER SANCTIONS
A.PURPOSE AND NATURE OF SANCTIONS
1.1 Purpose of Lawyer Discipline Proceedings
The purpose of lawyer discipline proceedings is to protect the public and the administration of justice from lawyers who have not discharged, will not discharge, or are unlikely to discharge properly their professional duties to clients, the public, the legal system, and the legal profession.
1.1 Purpose of Lawyer Discipline Proceedings
The purpose of lawyer discipline proceedings is to protect the public and the administration of justice from lawyers who have not discharged, will not discharge, or are unlikely to discharge properly their professional duties to clients, the public, the legal system, and the legal profession.
1.2 Public Nature of Lawyer Discipline Proceedings
Upon the filing and service of formal charges, lawyer discipline proceedings should be public, and disposition of lawyer discipline should be public in cases of disbarment, suspension, and reprimand. Only in cases of minor misconduct, when there is little or no injury to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession, and when there is little likelihood of repetition by the lawyer, should private discipline be imposed.
Upon the filing and service of formal charges, lawyer discipline proceedings should be public, and disposition of lawyer discipline should be public in cases of disbarment, suspension, and reprimand. Only in cases of minor misconduct, when there is little or no injury to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession, and when there is little likelihood of repetition by the lawyer, should private discipline be imposed.
1.3 Purpose of These Standards
These standards are designed for use in imposing a sanction or sanctions following a determination by clear and convincing evidence that a member of the legal profession has violated a provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Descriptions in these standards of substantive disciplinary offenses are not intended to create grounds for determining culpability independent of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Standards constitute a model, setting forth a comprehensive system for determining sanctions, permitting flexibility and creativity in assigning sanctions in particular cases of lawyer misconduct. They are designed to promote: (1) consideration of all factors relevant to imposing the appropriate level of sanction in an individual case; (2) consideration of the appropriate weight of such factors in light of the stated goals of lawyer discipline; (3) consistency in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions for the same or similar offenses within and among jurisdictions.
These standards are designed for use in imposing a sanction or sanctions following a determination by clear and convincing evidence that a member of the legal profession has violated a provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Descriptions in these standards of substantive disciplinary offenses are not intended to create grounds for determining culpability independent of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Standards constitute a model, setting forth a comprehensive system for determining sanctions, permitting flexibility and creativity in assigning sanctions in particular cases of lawyer misconduct. They are designed to promote: (1) consideration of all factors relevant to imposing the appropriate level of sanction in an individual case; (2) consideration of the appropriate weight of such factors in light of the stated goals of lawyer discipline; (3) consistency in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions for the same or similar offenses within and among jurisdictions.
B. SANCTIONS
2.1 Scope
A disciplinary sanction is imposed on a lawyer upon a finding or acknowledgment that the lawyer has engaged in professional misconduct.
2.2 Disbarment
Disbarment terminates the individual’s status as a lawyer. Where disbarment is not permanent, procedures should be established for a lawyer who has been disbarred to apply for readmission, provided that:
Disbarment terminates the individual’s status as a lawyer. Where disbarment is not permanent, procedures should be established for a lawyer who has been disbarred to apply for readmission, provided that:
(1) no application should be considered for five years from the effective date of disbarment; and
(2) the petitioner must show by clear and convincing evidence:
(a) successful completion of the bar examination;
(b) compliance with all applicable discipline or disability orders or rules; and
(c) rehabilitation and fitness to practice law.
(2) the petitioner must show by clear and convincing evidence:
(a) successful completion of the bar examination;
(b) compliance with all applicable discipline or disability orders or rules; and
(c) rehabilitation and fitness to practice law.
2.3 Suspension
Suspension is the removal of a lawyer from the practice of law for a specified minimum period of time. Generally, suspension should be for a period of time equal to or greater than six months, but in no event should the time period prior to application for reinstatement be more than three years. Procedures should be established to allow a suspended lawyer to apply for reinstatement, but a lawyer who has been suspended should not be permitted to return to practice until he has completed a reinstatement process demonstrating rehabilitation, compliance with all applicable discipline or disability orders and rules, and fitness to practice law.
Suspension is the removal of a lawyer from the practice of law for a specified minimum period of time. Generally, suspension should be for a period of time equal to or greater than six months, but in no event should the time period prior to application for reinstatement be more than three years. Procedures should be established to allow a suspended lawyer to apply for reinstatement, but a lawyer who has been suspended should not be permitted to return to practice until he has completed a reinstatement process demonstrating rehabilitation, compliance with all applicable discipline or disability orders and rules, and fitness to practice law.
2.4 Interim Suspension
Interim suspension is the temporary suspension of a lawyer from the practice of law pending imposition of final discipline. Interim suspension includes:
(a) suspension upon conviction of a “serious crime” or,
(b) suspension when the lawyer’s continuing conduct is or is likely to cause immediate and serious injury to a client or the public.
Interim suspension is the temporary suspension of a lawyer from the practice of law pending imposition of final discipline. Interim suspension includes:
(a) suspension upon conviction of a “serious crime” or,
(b) suspension when the lawyer’s continuing conduct is or is likely to cause immediate and serious injury to a client or the public.
2.5 Reprimand
Reprimand, also known as censure or public censure, is a form of public discipline which declares the conduct of the lawyer improper, but does not limit the lawyer’s right to practice.
Reprimand, also known as censure or public censure, is a form of public discipline which declares the conduct of the lawyer improper, but does not limit the lawyer’s right to practice.
2.6 Admonition
Admonition, also known as private reprimand, is a form of non-public discipline which declares the conduct of the lawyer improper, but does not limit the lawyer’s right to practice.
Admonition, also known as private reprimand, is a form of non-public discipline which declares the conduct of the lawyer improper, but does not limit the lawyer’s right to practice.
2.7 Probation
Probation is a sanction that allows a lawyer to practice law under specified conditions. Probation can be imposed alone or in conjunction with a reprimand or an admonition; probation can also be imposed as a condition of readmission or reinstatement.
Probation is a sanction that allows a lawyer to practice law under specified conditions. Probation can be imposed alone or in conjunction with a reprimand or an admonition; probation can also be imposed as a condition of readmission or reinstatement.
2.8 Other Sanctions and Remedies
Other sanctions and remedies which may be imposed include:
(a) restitution,
(b) assessment of costs,
(c) limitation upon practice,
(d) appointment of a receiver,
(e) requirement that the lawyer take the bar examination or professional responsibility examination,
(f) requirement that the lawyer attend continuing education courses, and
(g) other requirements that the state’s highest court or disciplinary board deems consistent with the purposes of lawyer sanctions.
Other sanctions and remedies which may be imposed include:
(a) restitution,
(b) assessment of costs,
(c) limitation upon practice,
(d) appointment of a receiver,
(e) requirement that the lawyer take the bar examination or professional responsibility examination,
(f) requirement that the lawyer attend continuing education courses, and
(g) other requirements that the state’s highest court or disciplinary board deems consistent with the purposes of lawyer sanctions.
2.9 Reciprocal Discipline
Reciprocal discipline is the imposition of a disciplinary sanction for conduct for which a lawyer has been disciplined in another jurisdiction.
Reciprocal discipline is the imposition of a disciplinary sanction for conduct for which a lawyer has been disciplined in another jurisdiction.
2.10 Readmission and Reinstatement
In jurisdictions where disbarment is not permanent, procedures should be established to allow a disbarred lawyer to apply for readmission. Procedures should be established to allow a suspended lawyer to apply for reinstatement.
In jurisdictions where disbarment is not permanent, procedures should be established to allow a disbarred lawyer to apply for readmission. Procedures should be established to allow a suspended lawyer to apply for reinstatement.
C. FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN
IMPOSING SANCTIONS
IMPOSING SANCTIONS
3.0 Generally
In imposing a sanction after a finding of lawyer misconduct, a court should consider the following factors:
In imposing a sanction after a finding of lawyer misconduct, a court should consider the following factors:
(a) the duty violated;
(b) the lawyer’s mental state; and
(c) the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct; and
(d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.
(b) the lawyer’s mental state; and
(c) the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct; and
(d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.
4.0 Violations of Duties Owed to Clients
4.1 Failure to Preserve the Client’s Property
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out in 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving the failure to preserve client property:
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out in 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving the failure to preserve client property:
4.11 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly converts client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client.
4.12 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows or should know that he is dealing improperly with client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client.
4.13 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent in dealing with client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client.
4.14 Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent in dealing with client property and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a client.
4.2 Failure to Preserve the Client’s Confidences
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out in 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving the failure to preserve client property:
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out in 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving the failure to preserve client property:
4.21 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer, with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another, knowingly reveals information relating to representation of a client not otherwise lawfully permitted to be disclosed, and this disclosure causes injury or potential injury to a client.
4.22 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly reveals information relating to the representation of a client not otherwise lawfully permitted to be disclosed, and this disclosure causes injury or potential injury to a client.
4.23 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently reveals information relating to representation of a client not otherwise lawfully permitted to be disclosed and this disclosure causes injury or potential injury to a client.
4.24 Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently reveals information relating to representation of a client not otherwise lawfully permitted to be disclosed and this disclosure causes little or no actual or potential injury to a client.
4.3 Failure to Avoid Conflicts of Interest
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving conflicts of interest:
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving conflicts of interest:
4.31 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer, without the informed consent of client(s):
(a) engages in representation of a client knowing that the lawyer’s interests are adverse to the client’s with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to the client; or
(b) simultaneously represents clients that the lawyer knows have adverse interests with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client; or
(c) represents a client in a matter substantially related to a matter in which the interests of a present or former client are materially adverse, and knowingly uses information relating to the representation of a client with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client.
(b) simultaneously represents clients that the lawyer knows have adverse interests with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client; or
(c) represents a client in a matter substantially related to a matter in which the interests of a present or former client are materially adverse, and knowingly uses information relating to the representation of a client with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client.
4.32 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows of a conflict of interest and does not fully disclose to a client the possible effect of that conflict, and causes injury or potential injury to a client.
4.33 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent in determining whether the representation of a client may be materially affected by the lawyer’s own interests, or whether the representation will adversely affect another client, and causes injury or potential injury to a client.
4.34 Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an isolated instance of negligence in determining whether the representation of a client may be materially affected by the lawyer’s own interests, or whether the representation will adversely affect another client, and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a client.
4.4 Lack of Diligence
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving a failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client:
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving a failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client:
4.41 Disbarment is generally appropriate when:
(a) a lawyer abandons the practice and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client; or
(b) a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client; or
(c) a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect with respect to client matters and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client.
(b) a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client; or
(c) a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect with respect to client matters and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client.
4.42 Suspension is generally appropriate when:
(a) a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes injury or potential injury to a client; or
(b) a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect and causes injury or potential injury to a client.
(a) a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes injury or potential injury to a client; or
(b) a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect and causes injury or potential injury to a client.
4.43 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent and does not act with reasonable diligence in representing a client, and causes injury or potential injury to a client.
4.44 Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent and does not act with reasonable diligence in representing a client, and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a client.
4.5 Lack of Competence
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factor set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving failure to provide competent representation to a client:
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factor set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving failure to provide competent representation to a client:
4.51 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer’s course of conduct demonstrates that the lawyer does not understand the most fundamental legal doctrines or procedures, and the lawyer’s conduct causes injury or potential injury to a client.
4.52 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an area of practice in which the lawyer knows he or she is not competent, and causes injury or potential injury to a client.
4.53 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(a) demonstrates failure to understand relevant legal doctrines or procedures and causes injury or potential injury to a client; or
(b) is negligent in determining whether he or she is competent to handle a legal matter and causes injury or potential injury to a client.
(b) is negligent in determining whether he or she is competent to handle a legal matter and causes injury or potential injury to a client.
4.54 Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an isolated instance of negligence in determining whether he or she is competent to handle a legal matter, and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a client.
4.6 Lack of Candor Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases where the lawyer engages in fraud, deceit, misrepresentation directed toward a client:
4.61 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly deceives a client with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another, and causes serious injury or potentially serious injury to a client.
4.62 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly deceives a client, and causes injury or potential injury to the client.
4.63 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently fails to provide a client with accurate or complete information, and causes injury or potential injury to the client.
4.64 Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an isolated instance of negligence in failing to provide a client with accurate or complete information, and causes little or no actual or potential injury to the client.
5.0 Violations of Duties Owed to the Public
5.1 Failure to Maintain Personal Integrity
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the facts set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving commission of a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, or in cases with conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation:
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the facts set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving commission of a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, or in cases with conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation:
5.11 Disbarment is generally appropriate when:
(a) a lawyer engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of which includes intentional interference with the administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriation, or theft; or the sale, distribution or importation of controlled substances; or the intentional killing of another; or an attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit any of these offenses; or
(b) a lawyer engages in any other intentional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice.
5.12 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in criminal conduct which does not contain the elements listed in Standard 5.11 and that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice.
5.13 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in any other conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law.
5.14 Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other conduct that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law.
5.2 Failure to Maintain the Public Trust Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving public officials who engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice or who state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official:
5.21 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer in an official or governmental position knowingly misuses the position with the intent to obtain a significant benefit or advantage for himself or another, or with the intent to cause serious or potentially serious injury to a party or to the integrity of the legal process.
5.22 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer in an official or governmental position knowingly fails to follow proper procedures or rules, and causes injury or potential injury to a party or to the integrity of the legal process.
5.23 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer in an official or governmental position negligently fails to follow proper procedures or rules, and causes injury or potential injury to a party or to the integrity of the legal process.
5.24 Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer in an official or governmental position engages in an isolated instance of negligence in not following proper procedures or rules, and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a party or to the integrity of the legal process.
6.0 Violations of Duties Owed to the Legal System
6.1 False Statements, Fraud, and Misrepresentation
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice or that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation to a court:
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice or that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation to a court:
6.11 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer, with the intent to deceive the court, makes a false statement, submits a false document, or improperly withholds material information, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, or causes a significant or potentially significant adverse effect on the legal proceeding.
6.12 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows that false statements or documents are being submitted to the court or that material information is improperly being withheld, and takes no remedial action, and causes injury or potential injury to a party to the legal proceeding, or causes an adverse or potentially adverse effect on the legal proceeding.
6.13 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent either in determining whether statements or documents are false or in taking remedial action when material information is being withheld, and causes injury or potential injury to a party to the legal proceeding, or causes an adverse or potentially adverse effect on the legal proceeding.
6.14 Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an isolated instance of neglect in determining whether submitted statements or documents are false or in failing to disclose material information upon learning of its falsity, and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a party, or causes little or no adverse or potentially adverse effect on the legal proceeding.
6.2 Abuse of the Legal Process
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving failure to expedite litigation or bring a meritorious claim, or failure to obey any obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists:
6.21 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly violates a court order or rule with the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes serious injury or potentially serious injury to a party, or causes serious or potentially serious interference with a legal proceeding.
6.22 Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knows that he is violating a court order or rule, and there is injury or potential injury to a client or a party, or interference or potential interference with a legal proceeding.
6.23 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently fails to comply with a court order or rule, and causes injury or potential injury to a client or other party, or causes interference or potential interference with a legal proceeding.
6.24 Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an isolated instance of negligence in complying with a court order or rule, and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a party, or causes little or no actual or potential interference with a legal proceeding.
6.3 Improper Communications With Individuals in the Legal System
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving attempts to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by means prohibited by law:
6.31 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(a) intentionally tampers with a witness and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, or causes significant or potentially significant interference with the outcome of the legal proceeding; or
(b) makes an ex parte communication with a judge or juror with intent to affect the outcome of the proceeding, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, or causes significant or potentially significant interference with the outcome of the legal proceeding; or
(c) improperly communicates with someone in the legal system other than a witness, judge, or juror with the intent to influence or affect the outcome of the proceeding, and causes significant or potentially significant interference with the outcome of the legal proceeding.
(b) makes an ex parte communication with a judge or juror with intent to affect the outcome of the proceeding, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, or causes significant or potentially significant interference with the outcome of the legal proceeding; or
(c) improperly communicates with someone in the legal system other than a witness, judge, or juror with the intent to influence or affect the outcome of the proceeding, and causes significant or potentially significant interference with the outcome of the legal proceeding.
6.32 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in communication with an individual in the legal system when the lawyer knows that such communication is improper, and causes injury or potential injury to a party or causes interference or potential interference with the outcome of the legal proceeding.
6.33 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent in determining whether it is proper to engage in communication with an individual in the legal system, and causes injury or potential injury to a party or interference or potential interference with the outcome of the legal proceeding.
6.34 Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an isolated instance of negligence in improperly communicating with an individual in the legal system, and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a party, or causes little or no actual or potential inference with the outcome of the legal proceeding.
7.0 Violations of Duties Owed to the Profession
7.1 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed to the profession with the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.
7.2 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed to the profession, and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.
7.3 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed to the profession, and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.
7.4 Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an isolated instance of negligence in determining whether the lawyer’s conduct violates a duty owed to the profession, and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.
8.0 Prior Discipline Orders
8.1 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(a) intentionally or knowingly violates the terms of a prior disciplinary order and such violation causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession; or
(b) has been suspended for the same or similar misconduct, and intentionally or knowingly engages in further acts of misconduct that cause injury or potential injury to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession.
(a) intentionally or knowingly violates the terms of a prior disciplinary order and such violation causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession; or
(b) has been suspended for the same or similar misconduct, and intentionally or knowingly engages in further acts of misconduct that cause injury or potential injury to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession.
8.2 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer has been reprimanded for the same or similar misconduct and engages in further acts of misconduct that cause injury or potential injury to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession.
8.3 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(a) negligently violates the terms of a prior disciplinary order and such violation causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession; or
(b) has received an admonition for the same or similar misconduct and engages in further acts of misconduct that cause injury or potential injury to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession.
(a) negligently violates the terms of a prior disciplinary order and such violation causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession; or
(b) has received an admonition for the same or similar misconduct and engages in further acts of misconduct that cause injury or potential injury to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession.
8.4 An admonition is generally not an appropriate sanction when a lawyer violates the terms of a prior disciplinary order or when a lawyer has engaged in the same or similar misconduct in the past.
9.0 Aggravation and Mitigation
9.1 Generally After misconduct has been established, aggravating and mitigating circumstances may be considered in deciding what sanction to impose
9.2 Aggravation
9.21 Definition. Aggravation or aggravating circumstances are any considerations, or factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed.
9.22 Factors which may be considered in aggravation. Aggravating factors include:
(a) prior disciplinary offenses;
(b) dishonest or selfish motive;
(c) a pattern of misconduct;
(d) multiple offenses;
(e) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency;
(f) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary process;
(g) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct;
(h) vulnerability of victim;
(i) substantial experience in the practice of law;
(j) indifference to making restitution.
(a) prior disciplinary offenses;
(b) dishonest or selfish motive;
(c) a pattern of misconduct;
(d) multiple offenses;
(e) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency;
(f) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary process;
(g) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct;
(h) vulnerability of victim;
(i) substantial experience in the practice of law;
(j) indifference to making restitution.
9.3 Mitigation
9.31 Definition. Mitigation or mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed.
9.32 Factors which may be considered in mitigation. Mitigating factors include:
(a) absence of a prior disciplinary record;
(b) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive;
(c) personal or emotional problems;
(d) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify consequences of misconduct;
(e) full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings;
(f) inexperience in the practice of law;
(g) character or reputation;
(h) physical or mental disability or impairment;
(i) delay in disciplinary proceedings;
(j) interim rehabilitation;
(k) imposition of other penalties or sanctions;
(l) remorse;
(m) remoteness of prior offenses.
(a) absence of a prior disciplinary record;
(b) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive;
(c) personal or emotional problems;
(d) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify consequences of misconduct;
(e) full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings;
(f) inexperience in the practice of law;
(g) character or reputation;
(h) physical or mental disability or impairment;
(i) delay in disciplinary proceedings;
(j) interim rehabilitation;
(k) imposition of other penalties or sanctions;
(l) remorse;
(m) remoteness of prior offenses.
9.4 Factors Which Are Neither Aggravating Nor Mitigating. The following factors should not be considered as either aggravating or mitigating:
(a) forced or compelled restitution;
(b) agreeing to the client’s demand for certain improper behavior or result;
(c) withdrawal of complaint against the lawyer;
(d) resignation prior to completion of disciplinary proceedings;
(e) complainant’s recommendation as to sanction;
(f) failure of injured client to complain.
(a) forced or compelled restitution;
(b) agreeing to the client’s demand for certain improper behavior or result;
(c) withdrawal of complaint against the lawyer;
(d) resignation prior to completion of disciplinary proceedings;
(e) complainant’s recommendation as to sanction;
(f) failure of injured client to complain.