Aquino's human rights record a 'failure' – watchdog. - rappler.com

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"x x x.

Aquino's human rights record a 'failure' – watchdog

Human Rights Watch also denounces Davao City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte for 'encouraging' extrajudicial killings

By Acor Arceo

Published 5:40 PM, January 28, 2016

Updated 10:24 PM, January 28, 2016

'NO REAL PROGRESS.' Human Rights Watch criticizes the human rights record of President Benigno Aquino III, whose 6-year term ends in June 2016. File photo by Joseph Vidal/Malacañang Photo Bureau

MANILA, Philippines – An international watchdog condemned the human rightsrecord of President Benigno Aquino III, saying he has failed to make the reforms needed for a lasting legacy.

In its World Report 2016 released on Thursday, January 28, Human Rights Watch said there has been "no real progress on justice for serious abuses" committed under the Aquino administration.

It added that with just 5 months left in the President's 6-year term, his performance when it comes to human rights has been "disappointing."

“Since his election, President Aquino held out the promise of a rights-respecting Philippines for which he has sadly been unable to deliver,” Phelim Kine, deputy Asia director of Human Rights Watch, said in a statement.

“While the number of serious violations has declined during Aquino’s administration, ongoing killings of prominent activists and the lack of successful prosecutions mean there’s nothing to prevent an upsurge of abuses in the future.”

Extrajudicial killings & death squads

Human Rights Watch said 65 leftist activists, human rights defenders, and alleged supporters of communist rebels were killed in the first 10 months of 2015 alone, according to data from local groups.

Since Aquino rose to power in 2010, nearly 300 have been killed.

Justice remains elusive as well, said the global watchdog, because "killings implicating the military and paramilitary groups almost never result in prosecutions."

'VIGILANTE JUSTICE.' Human Rights Watch says some public officials like Davao City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte promote the perception that death squads would solve criminality. File photo by Alecs Ongcal/Rappler

It does not help that the extrajudicial killings are "publicly encouraged" by some local officials. The group's primary example: Rodrigo Duterte, the tough-talking mayor of Davao City known for his iron-fist approach to criminality.

"[Duterte] has popularized the perception of death squads as valuable tools of 'swift justice' against crime," the Human Rights Watch report stated. "The Aquino government has failed to investigate Duterte’s claims of masterminding the Davao City death squad."

In May 2015, the group had called for a probe into Duterte's statements, saying an investigation was long overdue.

While the mayor has since claimed his "bad" human rights record merely started as his opponent's political gimmick, he also once told Rappler that he was willing to kill to ensure peace.

'STOP THE KILLINGS.' Protesters march in Davao City in September 2015, demanding that President Benigno Aquino III order the pullout of military and paramilitary groups from Lumad communities. File photo by Kilab Multimedia

Indigenous peoples

Human Rights Watch also cited data from local advocacy groups, which reported at least 13 killings of tribal leaders and community members in the first 8 months of 2015. The alleged perpetrators – military and paramilitary groups.

"Paramilitary groups, some of them funded and supplied by the military, are frequently deployed as 'force multipliers' against insurgents.... spawning abuses against the local population," said the global watchdog.

Indigenous peoples in Mindanao, added Human Rights Watch, are being driven from their ancestral lands by the military operations. (READ: Voice of a Lumad widow: Our land, our blood)

The United Nations' refugee agency puts the number of displaced people at 243,000, many of them facing "inadequate food, shelter, and health care." (WATCH: Rappler Talk: Addressing Lumad killings and internally displaced people)

In November 2015, Aquino met with Lumad leaders in Malacañang. The Palace did not give specifics at the time, only saying that the President "heard the totality of their concerns and issued directives to come up with concrete action plans to address these, both in immediate and long-term."

END IMPUNITY. Students demand justice for those killed in the 2009 Maguindanao massacre. Of the 58 victims, 32 were journalists. File photo by Michael Bueza/Rappler

Attacks on media

More members of the media also lost their lives in 2015. (READ: Change PH image as 'killing fields of journalists' – senators)

Human Rights Watch said 9 journalists were killed last year – 3 of them in August – and only one suspect was reported arrested.

"Task Force Usig, a unit created by the Philippine National Police in 2007 to investigate these murders, has not been able to fully investigate most of these killings, mainly due to the lack of witnesses willing to publicly identify themselves and share information with police," said Human Rights Watch. (READ: PH 4th worst country in unsolved media murders)

Aquino has previously said that his administration is addressing media killings, but admitted that "unfortunately, speed is not a hallmark of our current judicial system."

'Unfulfilled' promise

Last June, Malacañang reiterated it was "committed" to improving the state of human rights, especially in conflict zones. It also urged lawmakers to pass measures that could address concerns of human rights activists. (READ:Palace urges co-equal branches to help improve PH HR record)

But it's a promise that Human Rights Watch said Aquino has not achieved, and a goal that now rests on the shoulders of his successor.

"The Philippines’ next president must be prepared to tackle deep-seated impunity for abuses by state security forces and the corrupt and politicized criminal justice system." – Rappler.com.

x x x."

Disability benefits of seaman denied; conflict resolution rule not followed

BAHIA SHIPPING SERVICES, INC., FRED OLSEN CRUISE LINE, and MS. CYNTHIA C. MENDOZA vs. JOEL P. HIPE, JR., G.R. No. 204699, November 12, 2014

“x x x .

The issue of whether the seafarer can legally demand and claim disability benefits from the employer/manning agency for an injury or illness suffered may be determined from the pertinent provisions of Section 20 (B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC68 which enumerates the duties of an employer to his employee who suffers a work-related injury or disease during the term of his employment,69 viz.:

SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

x x x x

B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS

The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers workrelated injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:

x x x x

2. x x x.

However,if after repatriation, the seafarer still requires medical attention arising from said injury or illness, he shall be so provided at cost to the employer until such time he is declared fit or the degree of his disability has been established by the company-designated physician.

3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.

For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a postemployment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.

If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties. (Emphases supplied)

x x x x

Pursuant to the afore-quoted provision, two (2) elements must concur for an injury or illness of a seafarer to be compensable: (a) the injury or illness must be work-related; and (b) that the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer’s employment contract.70

In the present case, Hipe was made to continuously perform work aboard the vessel beyond his six-month contract without the benefit of a formal contract. Considering that any extension of his employment is discretionary on the part of respondents and that the latter offered no explanation why Hipe was not repatriated when his contract expired on June 5, 2008, the CA correctly ruled that he was still under the employ of respondents when he sustained an injury on June 22, 2008. Consequently, the injury suffered by Hipe was a work-related injury and his eventual repatriation on August 5, 2008, for which he was treated/rehabilitated can only be considered as a medical repatriation.

Nonetheless, Hipe was subsequently declared fit to work by the company-designated physician on October 9, 2008, or merely 65 days after his repatriation, thus negating the existence of any permanent disability for which compensability is sought. Said fit-to-work certification must stand for two (2) reasons:

First, while Hipe’s personal doctor disagreed with the above mentioned assessment, opining that "it would be impossible for him to work as seaman-plumber"71 and recommending a disability grade of five, records show, however, that such opinion was not supported by any diagnostic tests and/or procedures as would adequately refute the fit-to-work assessment, but merely relied on a review of Hipe’s medical history and his physical examination;72 and

Second, Hipe failed to comply with the procedure laid down under Section 20 (B) (3) of the 2000 POEA-SEC with regard to the joint appointment by the parties of a third doctor whose decision shall be final and binding on them in case the seafarer’s personal doctor disagrees with the company-designated physician’s fit-to-work assessment. In Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc. v. Dumadag73 (Philippine Hammonia), the Court held that the seafarer’s non-compliance with the said conflict resolution procedure results in the affirmance of the fit-to-work certification of the company-designated physician, viz.:74

The filing of the complaint constituted a breach of [the seafarer’s] contractual obligation to have the conflicting assessments of his disability referred to a third doctor for a binding opinion. x x x Thus, the complaint should have been dismissed, for without a binding third opinion, the fit-to-work certification of the company-designated physician stands x x x.

x x x x

Whatever his reasons might have been, [the seafarer’s] disregard of the conflict-resolution procedure under the POEA-SEC and the CBA cannot and should not be tolerated and allowed to stand, lest it encourage a similar defiance. x x x The third-doctor-referral provision of the POEA SEC, it appears to us, has been honored more in the breach than in the compliance. This is unfortunate considering that the provision is intended to settle disability claims voluntarily at the parties’level where the claims can be resolved more speedily than if they were brought to court. Given the circumstances under which [the seafarer] pursued his claim, especially the fact that he caused the non-referral to a third doctor, [the company doctor’s] fit-to-work certification must be upheld. In Santiago v. Pacbasin Ship Management, Inc., the Court declared: "[t]here was no agreement on a third doctor who shall examine him anew and whose finding shall be final and binding. x x x [T]his Court is left without choice but touphold the certification made by [the company doctor] with respect to [the seafarer’s] disability. (Emphases and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

In light of the contrasting diagnoses of the company-designated physician and Hipe’s personal doctor, Hipe filed his complaint before the NLRC but prematurely did so without any regard to the conflict-resolution procedure under Section 20 (B) (3) of the 2000 POEA-SEC. Thus, consistent with Philippine Hammonia, the fit-to-work certification of the company designated physician ought to be upheld.

In fine, given that Hipe’s permanent disability was not established through substantial evidence for the reasons above-stated, the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint for permanent disability benefits, thereby warranting the reversal of the CA’s contrary ruling. Verily, while the Court adheres tothe principle of liberality in favor of the seafarer in construing the POEA-SEC, when the evidence presented then negates compensability, the claim for disability benefits must necessarily fail,75 as in this case.

X x x.”

Labor cases; when certiorari is justified; grave abuse of discretion

BAHIA SHIPPING SERVICES, INC., FRED OLSEN CRUISE LINE, and MS. CYNTHIA C. MENDOZA vs. JOEL P. HIPE, JR., G.R. No. 204699, November 12, 2014

“x x x.

To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, done in a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, the character of which being so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act all in contemplation of law.64

In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings and conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence,65 or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.66 The onus probandi falls on the seafarer to establish his claim for disability benefits by the requisite quantum of evidence to justify the grant of relief.67

Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the CA committed reversible error in granting Hipe’s certiorari petition since the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint for permanent disability benefits for Hipe’s failure to establish his claim through substantial evidence.

X x x.”

Adoption; reversion or restoration of parental authority of biological parents; right of biological parents to inherit from the estate of the deceased adoptee

BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES, INC., G.R. No. 192531, November 12, 2014

“x x x.

In attempting to cure the glaring constitutional violation of the adverted rule, the ECC extended illegitimate parents an opportunity to file claims for and receive death benefits by equating dependency and legitimacy to the exercise of parental authority. Thus, as insinuated by the ECC in its assailed Decision, had petitioner not given up John for adoption, she could have still claimed death benefits under the law.

To begin with, nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that "legitimate parents" pertain to those who exercise parental authority over the employee enrolled under the ECP. It was only in the assailed Decision wherein such qualification was made. In addition, assuming arguendo that the ECC did not overstep its boundaries in limiting the adverted Labor Code provision to the deceased’s legitimate parents, and that the commission properly equated legitimacy to parental authority, petitioner can still qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary.

True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then about two (2) years old, petitioner’s parental authority over John was severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelio’s death, was that when the adoptive parent died less than three (3) years after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age.

John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption,21 who was then left to care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?

To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological parents is not a novel concept. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 855222 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act, provides:

Section 20. Effects of Rescission.– If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished. (emphasis added)

The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar as the restoration of custody is concerned.1âwphi1 The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the grounds for rescission,23 justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations between the adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental authority in favor of the biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a tender age.

To emphasize, We can only apply the rule by analogy, especially since RA 8552 was enacted after Cornelio’s death. Truth be told, there is a lacuna in the law as to which provision shall govern contingencies in all fours with the factual milieu of the instant petition. Nevertheless, We are guided by the catena of cases and the state policies behind RA 855224 wherein the paramount consideration is the best interest of the child, which We invoke to justify this disposition. It is, after all, for the best interest of the child that someone will remain charged for his welfare and upbringing should his or her adopter fail or is rendered incapacitated to perform his duties as a parent at a time the adoptee isstill in his formative years, and, to Our mind, in the absence or, as in this case, death of the adopter, no one else could reasonably be expected to perform the role of a parent other than the adoptee’s biological one.

Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental authority is severed by virtue of adoption, the ties between the adoptee and the biological parents are not entirely eliminated. To demonstrate, the biological parents, in some instances, are able to inherit from the adopted, as can be gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family Code:

Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed by the following rules:

xxx

(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the adopted concur with the adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half to be inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;

xxx

(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession shall apply.

Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcol’s death, which was prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the governing provision is Art. 984 of the New Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or descendants, his parents and relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs.

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which, We rule, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent. We cannot leave undetermined the fate of a minor child whose second chance ata better life under the care of the adoptive parents was snatched from him by death’s cruel grasp. Otherwise, the adopted child’s quality of life might have been better off not being adopted at all if he would only find himself orphaned in the end. Thus, We hold that Cornelio’s death at the time of John’sminority resulted in the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority over the adopted child.

On top of this restoration of parental authority, the fact of petitioner’s dependence on John can be established from the documentary evidence submitted to the ECC. As it appears in the records, petitioner, prior to John’s adoption, was a housekeeper. Her late husband died in 1984, leaving her to care for their seven (7) children. But since she was unable to "give a bright future to her growing children" as a housekeeper, she consented to Cornelio’s adoption of Johnand Elizabeth in 1985.

Following Cornelio’s death in 1987, so records reveal, both petitioner and John repeatedly reported "Brgy. Capurictan, Solsona, Ilocos Norte" as their residence. In fact, this veryaddress was used in John’s Death Certificate25 executed in Brazil, and in the Report of Personal Injury or Loss of Life accomplished by the master of the vessel boarded by John.26 Likewise, this is John’s known address as per the ECC’s assailed Decision.27 Similarly, this same address was used by petitioner in filing her claim before the SSS La Union branch and, thereafter, in her appeal with the ECC. Hence, it can be assumed that aside from having been restored parental authority over John, petitioner indeed actually execised the same, and that they lived together under one roof.

Moreover, John, in his SSS application,28 named petitioner as one of his beneficiaries for his benefits under RA 8282, otherwise known as the "Social Security Law." While RA 8282 does not cover compensation for work-related deaths or injury and expressly allows the designation of beneficiaries who are not related by blood to the member unlike in PD 626, John’s deliberate act of indicating petitioner as his beneficiary at least evinces that he, in a way, considered petitioner as his dependent. Consequently, the confluence of circumstances – from Cornelio’s death during John’s minority, the restoration ofpetitioner’s parental authority, the documents showing singularity of address, and John’s clear intention to designate petitioner as a beneficiary - effectively made petitioner, to Our mind, entitled to death benefit claims as a secondary beneficiary under PD 626 as a dependent parent.

All told, the Decision of the ECC dated March 17, 2010 is bereft of legal basis. Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption already died, then the death benefits under the Employees' Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John's sole remaining beneficiary.

X x x.”

Unauthorized exercise of administrative rule-making power

BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES, INC., G.R. No. 192531, November 12, 2014

“x x x.

The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents is contrary to law

This brings us to the question of whether or not petitioner is entitled to the death benefits claim in view of John’s work-related demise. The pertinent provision, in this regard, is Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended, which reads:

ART. 167. Definition of terms. – As used in this Title unless the context indicates otherwise:

x x x x

(j) 'Beneficiaries' means the dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided, that the dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit. (Emphasis supplied)

Concurrently, pursuant to the succeeding Article 177(c) supervising the ECC "[T]o approve rules and regulations governing the processing of claims and the settlement of disputes arising therefrom as prescribed by the System," the ECC has issued the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation, interpreting the above-cited provision as follows:

RULE XV – BENEFICIARIES

SECTION 1. Definition. (a) Beneficiaries shall be either primary or secondary, and determined atthe time of employee’s death.

(b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered primary:

(1) The legitimate spouse living with the employee at the time of the employee’s death until he remarries; and

(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or acknowledged natural children, who are unmarried not gainfully employed, not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age provided that he is incapacitated and incapable of self - support due to physicalor mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority; Provided, further, that a dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary only when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit; provided finally, that if there are two or more acknowledged natural children, they shall be counted from the youngest and without substitution, but not exceeding five.

(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered secondary:

(1) The legitimate parents wholly dependent upon the employee for regular support;

(2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who are unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age providedthat he is incapacitated and incapable of self - support dueto physical or mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority. (Emphasis supplied)

Guilty of reiteration, the ECC denied petitioner’s claim on the ground that she is no longer the deceased’s legitimate parent, as required by the implementing rules. As held by the ECC, the adoption decree severed the relation between John and petitioner, effectively divesting her of the status of a legitimate parent, and, consequently, that of being a secondary beneficiary.

We disagree.

a. Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation deviates from the clear language of Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended

Examining the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation in light of the Labor Code, as amended, it is at once apparent that the ECC indulged in an unauthorized administrative legislation. In net effect, the ECC read into Art. 167 of the Code an interpretation not contemplated by the provision. Pertinent in elucidating on this point is Article 7 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which reads:

Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.(Emphasis supplied)

As applied, this Court held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation16 that:

As we have previously declared, rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings in order to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law. (Emphasis supplied)

Guided by this doctrine, We find that Rule XV of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation is patently a wayward restriction of and a substantial deviation from Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code when it interpreted the phrase "dependent parents" to refer to "legitimate parents."

It bears stressing that a similar issue in statutory construction was resolved by this Court in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court17 in this wise:

It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general acceptation. Amicus curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to say:

The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by it. In accordance therefore with the canons of statutory interpretation, it should be understood to have a general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is a general one. Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda. That the law does not make a distinction prevents us from making one: Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguera debemus. xxx

According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more restrictive sense than it is used and intended is not warranted by any rule of interpretation. Besides, he further states that when the law intends to use the term in a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with the wuleord collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code.

Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not only collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context indicates that it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense — which as already discussed earlier, is not so in the case at bar. (Emphasis supplied)

In the same vein, the term "parents" in the phrase "dependent parents" in the afore-quoted Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is used and ought to be taken in its general sense and cannot be unduly limited to "legitimate parents" as what the ECC did. The phrase "dependent parents" should, therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether by nature or by adoption. When the law does not distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly, "dependent parents" are parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption, who are in need of support or assistance.

Moreover, the same Article 167 (j),as couched, clearly shows that Congress did not intend to limit the phrase "dependent parents" to solely legitimate parents. At the risk of being repetitive, Article 167 provides that "in their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are secondary beneficiaries." Had the lawmakers contemplated "dependent parents" to mean legitimate parents, then it would have simply said descendants and not "legitimate descendants." The manner by which the provision in question was crafted undeniably show that the phrase "dependent parents" was intended to cover all parents – legitimate, illegitimate or parents by nature or adoption.

b. Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation is in contravention of the equal protection clause

To insist that the ECC validly interpreted the Labor Code provision is an affront to the Constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws for the rule, as worded, prevents the parents of an illegitimate child from claiming benefits under Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended by PD 626. To Our mind, such postulation cannot be countenanced.

As jurisprudence elucidates, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.18 In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.19

The concept of equal protection, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."20

In the instant case, there is no compelling reasonable basis to discriminate against illegitimate parents. Simply put, the above-cited rule promulgated by the ECC that limits the claim of benefits to the legitimate parents miserably failed the test of reasonableness since the classification is not germane to the law being implemented. We see no pressing government concern or interest that requires protection so as to warrant balancing the rights of unmarried parents on one hand and the rationale behind the law on the other. On the contrary, the SSS can better fulfill its mandate, and the policy of PD 626 – that employees and their dependents may promptly secure adequate benefits in the event of work-connected disability or death - will be better served if Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is not so narrowly interpreted.

There being no justification for limiting secondary parent beneficiaries to the legitimate ones, there can be no other course of action to take other than to strike down as unconstitutional the phrase "illegitimate" as appearing in Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation.

X x x.”

Equal protection clause of the Constitution

BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES, INC., G.R. No. 192531, November 12, 2014

“x x x.

b. Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation is in contravention of the equal protection clause

To insist that the ECC validly interpreted the Labor Code provision is an affront to the Constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws for the rule, as worded, prevents the parents of an illegitimate child from claiming benefits under Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended by PD 626. To Our mind, such postulation cannot be countenanced.

As jurisprudence elucidates, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.18 In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.19

The concept of equal protection, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."20

In the instant case, there is no compelling reasonable basis to discriminate against illegitimate parents. Simply put, the above-cited rule promulgated by the ECC that limits the claim of benefits to the legitimate parents miserably failed the test of reasonableness since the classification is not germane to the law being implemented. We see no pressing government concern or interest that requires protection so as to warrant balancing the rights of unmarried parents on one hand and the rationale behind the law on the other. On the contrary, the SSS can better fulfill its mandate, and the policy of PD 626 – that employees and their dependents may promptly secure adequate benefits in the event of work-connected disability or death - will be better served if Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is not so narrowly interpreted.

There being no justification for limiting secondary parent beneficiaries to the legitimate ones, there can be no other course of action to take other than to strike down as unconstitutional the phrase "illegitimate" as appearing in Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation.

X x x.”

Loan, mortgage; sample amended agreement

AMENDED AGREEMENT

            WE, the undersigned Parties, xxx and xxx (“Mortgagee”) and xxx (“Mortgagor”), hereby agree and covenant as follows:

1.       Existing Agreements to be Amended. - This agreement amends the following existing agreements previously executed by the parties involving a house located xxx, xxx, xxx, xxx City:

1.1.             SANLA/TIRA, dated August 18, 2015; and

1.2.            KASUNDUAN, dated August 22, 2015;

2.      Amended Schedule of Payment. – The parties depose and agree:

2.1.            The outstanding balance of EIGHTY THOUSAND PESOS (P80,000.00) shall be paid by the Mortgagee as follows:

2.1.1.                   Upon execution of this amended agreement. – FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P15,000.00), subject to deduction by Mortgagee of the amounts recently paid last week by Mortgagee for the MERALCO and the MAYNILAD consumption for the subject property;

2.1.2.                  FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P15,000.00) shall be paid by Mortgagee on November 12, 2015; December 12, 2015; and January 12, 2016; February 12, 2016; and

2.1.3.                  FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) to be paid on March 12, 2016;

3.      The rest of the terms and conditions, stipulations, and provisions of the aforecited two (2) agreements mentioned in Par.  1.1 and Par. 1.2 of this amended agreement shall remain.

4.      It is understood that the Mortgagor shall pay IN FULL her loan obligation of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00), without interest. Unless the said loan is fully paid/settled  by Mortgagor, the Mortgagee shall continue to have possession and occupy the subject property.

xxx City, xxx.

                                                    (Names, addresses of Parties and Witnesses)