LEGAL CAPACITY TO INHERIT. -

"Xxx. 

Xxx. Under the law, specifically Article 1025 of Republic Act 386, otherwise known as the New Civil Code of the Philippines, the rules regarding a person's capacity to inherit are provided, viz:

"Article 1025. In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in case of representation, when it is proper.

A child already conceived at the time of the death of the decedent is capable of succeeding provided it be born later under the conditions prescribed in Article 41. (n) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Pertinent to the above provision, the following are considered as compulsory heirs:

"Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and descendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287.

Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.

In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.

The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent established by this Code. (807a)" (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Succinctly, a reading of the cited laws dictate that a child, regardless of status and physical condition, is deemed capacitated to inherit. In fact, aside from such capacity, a legitimate child is also considered as a compulsory heir who is entitled to receive his or her inheritance. To reiterate, the only condition required by law is for an heir, devisee or legatee to be living at the moment the succession opens.

For your guidance, there is nothing in the law which says that a person's disability, physical condition and special needs constitute a ground for disinheritance under Article 919 nor as a cause for incapacity as stated under Article 1027 of the same law.

At most, it must be noted that a person's physical incapacity and special needs may be considered as restrictions on his or her capacity to act for being akin to minority, insanity or imbecility. But the same must not be interpreted and construed to deny a child of his or her rightful inheritance. For your reference, Article 38 and Article 39 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines state the meaning of restrictions and indicate some grounds, which limit a person's capacity to act, thus:

"Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements. (32a)

Article 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity to act: age, insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family relations, alienage, absence, insolvency and trusteeship. The consequences of these circumstances are governed in this Code, other codes, the Rules of Court, and in special laws. Capacity to act is not limited on account of religious belief or political opinion.

A married woman, twenty-one (21) years of age or over, is qualified for all acts of civil life, except in cases specified by law." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

At any rate, it is worth emphasizing that a person must never be discriminated against on the sole basis of his or her mental capacity or deficiency. To elucidate, a person with special needs stands on an equal footing with any other person and is entitled to his civil rights including the right to receive inheritance. Precisely, in Section 5 of Republic Act 11036, otherwise known as the Mental Health Act, it is stated that:

"Section 5. Rights of Service Users. - Service users shall enjoy, on an equal and nondiscriminatory basis, all rights guaranteed by the Constitution as well as those recognizes under the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and all other relevant international and regional human rights conventions and declarations, including the right to:

(a) Freedom from social economic, and political discrimination and stigmatization, whether committed by public or private actors;

(b) Exercise all their inherit civil, political, economic, social, religious, educational, and cultural rights respecting individual qualities, abilities and diversity of background, without discrimination on the basis of physical disability, age, gender, sexual orientation, race, color, language, religion or nationality, ethnic, or social origin; x x x." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Xxx. "

Source:

https://www.manilatimes.net/2021/11/29/legal-advice/child-with-special-needs-can-inherit/1824021

Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy

"A Brief Primer on Petitions to Deny Due Course or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy in Philippine Elections

By: Nicolas & De Vega Law Offices 

The information provided by a candidate in his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) cannot be taken lightly. Should a candidate make false statements of a material representation in the COC, his COC may be cancelled or denied due course. Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, provides the remedy of filing a verified petition to deny due course or to cancel a COC on the ground that any material representation contained in the COC is false. The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the COC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. (Tagolino vs. HRET, G.R. No. 202202, 19 March 2013)

It must be emphasized that not all matters stated in the COC are considered material to warrant the invocation of a Section 78 petition. The material misrepresentation referred to in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code pertains to qualifications for elective office. The misrepresentation must be material, i.e. misrepresentation regarding age, residence and citizenship or non-possession of natural-born Filipino status. (Gonzalez vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 192856, 8 March 2011). Thus, the COC of a former Filipino citizen who failed to reacquire her Filipino citizenship under Republic Act 9225 can be cancelled for failure to meet the citizenship and residency requirements. (Ongsiako Reyes vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 207264) Similarly, the candidate’s status as a registered voter falls under this classification as it is a legal requirement which must be reflected in the COC. (Hayudini vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 207900, 12 April 2014). Furthermore, as held in Talaga vs. Comelec (G.R. No. 196804, 9 October 2012), violation of the three-term limit by a local official candidate can be questioned by filing a petition to deny due course or cancel COC.

On the other hand, statements that do not refer to the qualifications of a candidate cannot warrant the invocation of Section 78. Wrong entries as to the profession of a candidate is not considered a valid ground to cancel a COC. Thus, a declaration by a candidate for punong barangay in his COC that he was a Certified Public Accountant, but in fact was not, is NOT a ground to cancel the COC because profession is not a qualification for elective office and therefore not a material fact. (Lluz v. Comelec, 523 SCRA 456.) Further, the use of a name other than that stated in the certificate of birth is not a material misrepresentation. (Villafuerte vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 206698, 25 February 2014).

Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must consist of a “deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.” In other words, it must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one’s qualifications for public office. The use of surname, when not intended to mislead, or deceive the public as to one’s identity is not within the scope of the provision. (Villafuerte vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 206698, 25 February 2014).

The petition to deny due course or cancel COC must be filed within five days from the last day of the filing of the COC, but not later than 25 days from the filing thereof. It must be lodged with the Comelec in division. (Ibrahim vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 192289, 08 January 2013). However, when the ground for the petition to deny due course or cancel COC is based on a candidate’s final conviction of a crime, Comelec en banc may assume jurisdiction since it is subsumed under the Comelec’s mandate duty to enforce and administer election laws in cancelling the COC on the basis of the candidate’s perpetual absolute disqualification, the fact of which had already been established by his final conviction. As this pertains to the Comelec’s administrative functions, Comelec en banc will exercise jurisdiction over the said petition. (Jalosjos vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 205033, 18 June 2013)

The person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he never filed a COC. (Munder vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 194076, 19 October 2011). It should be clear, too, that a candidate who does not file a valid COC may not be validly substituted, because a person without a valid COC is not considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed a CoC is not at all a candidate. (Miranda v. Abaya, G.R. No. 136351, 28 July 1999) A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. (Tea vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 195229, 9 October 2012) Therefore, votes cast in favor of a candidate whose COC was cancelled either before or after the elections, are considered as stray votes. Being stray votes, should the candidate whose COC was cancelled garner the highest number of votes, he cannot be proclaimed as the winner. It shall be the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes who will be declared victorious.

Author:

Nicolas & De Vega Law Offices is a full-service law firm in the Philippines. You may visit us at the 16th Flr., Suite 1607 AIC Burgundy Empire Tower, ADB Ave., Ortigas Center, 1605 Pasig City, Metro Manila, Philippines. You may also call us at +632 4706126, +632 4706130, +632 4016392 or e-mail us at info@ndvlaw.com . Visit our website www.ndvlaw.com."

Link:

https://ndvlaw.com/a-brief-primer-on-petitions-to-deny-due-course-or-cancel-a-certificate-of-candidacy-in-philippine-elections/?amp=1

Further, this Court has ruled that "it is not necessary that the person in charge of the defendant's regular place of business be specifically authorized to receive the SUMMONS. It is enough that he appears to be in charge." In this case, Canave, a secretary whose job description necessarily includes receiving documents and other correspondence, would have the semblance of authority to accept the court documents.

"Xxx.The Issue Presented

The sole issue presented in this case is whether the CA correctly ruled that summons had not been properly served on respondent Consulta with the result that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over his person and that the judgment against him was void.

The Ruling of the Court

First of all, only Consulta brought an action for the annulment of the RTC decision. CTC and Sarayba did not. Consequently, the CA had no business deciding whether or not the latter two were properly served with summons. The right to due process must be personally invoked and its circumstances specifically alleged by the party claiming to have been denied such. [18]

Second, there is valid substituted service of summons on Consulta at his place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. According to the sheriff's return, which is prima facie evidence of the facts it states,[19] he served a copy of the complaint on Canave, an authorized representative of both Consulta and Sarayba.[20] Besides Consulta's bare allegations, he did not present evidence to rebut the presumption of regularity on the manner that the sheriff performed his official duty.[21] Nor did Consulta present clear and convincing evidence that Canave was not competent to receive the summons and the attached documents for him.

In fact, in his petition for annulment of judgment, Consulta said that CTC had been apprised of the civil action through Canave.[22] In other words, Canave was a person charged with authority to receive court documents for the company as well as its officers who held office in that company. Absent contrary evidence, the veracity of the return's content and its effectiveness stand.

Further, this Court has ruled that "it is not necessary that the person in charge of the defendant's regular place of business be specifically authorized to receive the summons. It is enough that he appears to be in charge."[23] In this case, Canave, a secretary whose job description necessarily includes receiving documents and other correspondence, would have the semblance of authority to accept the court documents.

It is true that this Court emphasized the importance of strict and faithful compliance in effecting substituted service.[24] It must, however, be reiterated that when the rigid application of rules becomes a conduit for escaping one's responsibility, the Court will intervene to set things right according to the rules.[25]

Further, Consulta does not deny a) that summons had been properly served on Sarayba, his vice-president, through Canave at the company's office; b) that the summons on him was served on the same occasion also through Canave; c) that the sheriff had succeeded in garnishing his company's bank deposits; and d) that his company subsequently made an offer to settle the judgment against it. The Court is not dumb as to believe that Consulta became aware of the suit only when the sheriff served a notice of execution sale covering his house and lot.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court REVERSES the Court of Appeals' Decision in CA-G.R. SP 94817 dated March 17, 2008 and REINSTATES the Regional Trial Court's Decision in Civil Case 70544 dated December 14, 2005.

SO ORDERED.

Xxx."

GENTLE SUPREME PHILIPPINES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. RICARDO F. CONSULTA, Respondent. G.R. No. 183182, September 01, 2010.

Murder, as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is the unlawful killing of a person which is not parricide or infanticide, provided that treachery or evident premeditation, inter alia, attended the killing.

"Xxx.

Crime committed and proper penalty

While the Decision of the trial court recognized the guilt of the petitioners for the offense as charged to have been proven beyond reasonable doubt, the trial court went on to hold them guilty to a lesser offense of homicide citing the Court's ruling in People v. Tapalla.[31] In said case, this Court declared that if the prosecution accepts from any of the defendants charged with conspiracy in the commission of a crime, a plea of guilty to a lesser offense included in the one alleged in the information, such acceptance will benefit his co-defendants. In arriving at this conclusion, the trial court was of the impression that Maramara's plea of guilty to a lesser offense of homicide in Criminal Case No. DU-3721 should benefit the petitioners in this case.

The case of Tapalla,[32] invoked by the trial court as authority in arriving at such conclusion, is not applicable in the present case. The information in Criminal Case No. DU-3721 indicting Maramara alone of murder is distinct and separate from the information charging petitioners for the same offense in the instant case. Moreover, Maramara was neither charged as co-accused of petitioners nor of conspiring to commit a crime in either case. As correctly observed by the trial court, Maramara was only a principal witness in this case[33] though admittedly a conspirator in the commission of the crime. These circumstances provide a distinction from the Tapalla case where the accused Tingzon, who pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide, was a co- accused in the same information charging him along with others of conspiring to commit murder. We therefore cannot agree with the trial court's conclusion drawn from the principle laid down in the Tapalla case and neither can we give imprimatur on the appellate court's affirmation thereof. The basis thus used is, in our opinion, wrong.

As the evidence stands, the crime committed by petitioners is murder in view of the attending circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. Murder, as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is the unlawful lolling of a person which is not parricide or infanticide, provided that treachery or evident premeditation, inter alia, attended the killing. The presence of any one of the enumerated circumstances under Article 248 is enough to qualify a killing as murder punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. When more than one qualifying circumstance is proven, as in this case, the rule is that the other must be considered as generic aggravating.[34] In the present case, the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation will be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance warranting the imposition of the penalty of death in the absence of any mitigating circumstance.[35] Since the imposition of the death penalty has been prohibited by Republic Act No. 9346,[36] a law favorable to petitioners which took effect on June 24, 2006, the penalty that should be imposed on petitioners is reduced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. Sections 2 and 3 of the Act provide:

Section 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:

a) The penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties, of the Revised Penal Code;

xxxx

Section 3. Person convicted of offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103 otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.

Civil Liability

When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and, (6) interest, in proper cases.[37]

The Decision of the trial couit as affirmed by the appellate court only awarded P50,000.00 to the legal heirs of the victim without stating the nature of this grant. As held in People v. Zamorqga, [38] civil indemnity and moral damages, being based on differen jural foundations are separate and distinct from each other. Thus, it becomes imperative for this Court to rectify the error and award additional damages following precedents.

In line with prevailing jurisprudence, we award the fixed amount of P75,000.00 for the death of the victim[39] as civil indemnity ex delicto without any need of proof other than the commission of the crime. An award of moral damages is also in order even though the prosecution did not present any proof of the heirs' emotional suffering apart from the fact of death of the victim, since the emotional wounds from the vicious killing of the victim cannot be denied.[40] The award of P75,000.00 is proper pursuant to established jurisprudence.

Although the prosecution presented evidence that the heirs had incurred actual expenses, no receipts were presented in the trial court. An award of temperate damages in lieu of actual damages in the amount of P25,000.00 to the heirs of the victim is warranted because it is reasonable to presume that when death occurs, the family of the victim suffered pecuniary loss for the wake and funeral of the victim although the exact amount was not proved.[41]

In addition, exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 should be awarded considering the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of treachery that qualified the killing to murder and evident premeditation which served as generic aggravating circumstance. Exemplary damages are awarded when treachery attended the commission of the crime.[42]

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Petitioners Gregorio Manatad, Virgilio Bug-atan and Bernie Labandero are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of murder, not homicide, qualified by treachery, and sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.

Petitioners are ORDERED to pay the heirs of victim Pastor Papauran the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Xxx."

VIRGILIO BUG-ATAN, BERME LABANDERO GREGORIO MANATAD PETITIONERS, VS. THE PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. 175195, September 15, 2010.

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2010septemberdecisions.php?id=319

Treachery and evident premeditation.

"Xxx.

Prosecution's evidence sufficiently
established the presence of treachery
and evident premeditation.

Treachery qualifies the crime to murder. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, method or forms which tend directly and especially to ensure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense that the offended party might make.[29] The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk to himself.[30]

In the present case, the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery was indubitably established. The attack on the unarmed victim was so sudden, unexpected, without preliminaries and provocation. The victim was totally unprepared and oblivious of the attack since he was peacefully resting inside his house. The single shot found its mark at the back portion of his head indicating that he was shot from behind with his back turned to the assailant. This position was disadvantageous to the victim since he was not in a position to defend himself or to retaliate. Moreover, the location of the wound obviously indicates that the assailant deliberately and consciously aimed for the vital part of the victim's body to ensure the commission of the crime. The attack from the rear is treacherous. As has been held many times, treachery exists since the defenseless victim was shot from behind. The fact that Bug-atan furnished the deadly weapon used in the shooting eloquently shows that they made a deliberate and conscious adoption of the means to kill the victim. These facts, established by evidence on record, clearly constitute treachery as defined in Article 14(16) of the Revised Penal Code.

Before evident premeditation may be appreciated, the following elements must be proved: a) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination; and, c) sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.

The foregoing requisites were fulfilled. First, it was on April 14, 1993 when Manatad and Bug-atan gave Maramara a .38 caliber revolver and P500.00 as expenses for transportation, instructing the latter to proceed to Mandaue City and kill the victim. Undisputedly, these presuppose planning. Second, the execution of the crime was done the following morning of April 15, 1993 where Bug-atan and Labandero accompanied Maramara to the house of the victim. Third, the more than one day period, at the very least, was substantial interval of time clearly sufficient to afford a full opportunity for meditation and reflection upon the consequences of their nefarious acts. These proved their premeditated design to end the life of the victim which was accomplished.

Xxx."

VIRGILIO BUG-ATAN, BERME LABANDERO GREGORIO MANATAD PETITIONERS, VS. THE PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. 175195, September 15, 2010.

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2010septemberdecisions.php?id=319

For alibi to prevail, the established doctrine is that the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis or within its immediate vicinity.

"Xxx.

Defense of alibi and denial
was correctly rejected.

For alibi to prevail, the established doctrine is that the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis or within its immediate vicinity.[25] Physical impossibility means that the accused was at such other place for such a length of time that it was impossible for him to have been at the crime scene either before or after the time he was at such other place.[26]

Manatad's alibi is that from April 11 to 15, 1993, he was in Cuyang, San Remigio and Tigbawan, Tabuelan, doing faith healing. His alibi, assuming it to be true, cannot be given merit. He could have easily been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission considering that San Remigio and Tabuelan are municipalities located in the province of Cebu. His presence therein did not, therefore, render impossible his being at the scene of the killing at Labogon, Mandaue City, a place also located in the province of Cebu.

To corroborate his exculpatory tale, Manatad presented, among others, Patrocino Vaflor and Rafaela Maglinte to support his alleged alibi. However, these witnesses were shown to be biased since they have the tendency to falsely testify in Manatad's favor for they admittedly owed him a great debt of gratitude.[27]

For his part, Labandero posits that he was in Manila at the time of the incident because of a previous death threat on him after giving his testimony in Criminal Case No. 24099 such that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis. Considering that his alibi and supposed death threat were uncorroborated and unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, the Court finds the same self-serving and deserving of no weight in law. Moreover, the fact that he has no derogatory record will not affect the outcome of his case since it does not disprove his complicity in the commission of the offense.

Respecting the denial of Bug-atan, suffice it to state that a mere denial constitutes negative evidence and warrants the least credibility or none at all. Absent any strong evidence of non-culpability, a denial crumbles in the face of positive declarations.[28]

In fine, petitioners failed to rebut the prosecution's evidence and their defense of alibi and denial must be rejected.

The foregoing notwithstanding, this Court has perused the lengthy discussion of the trial court and the assailed Decision of the appellate court.

Xxx."

VIRGILIO BUG-ATAN, BERME LABANDERO GREGORIO MANATAD PETITIONERS, VS. THE PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. 175195, September 15, 2010.

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2010septemberdecisions.php?id=319

Evaluation of the witnesses' credibility is a matter best left to the trial court.

"xxx.

Evaluation of the witnesses' credibility
is a matter best left to the trial court.

Indubitably, the credibility of the testimony of prosecution's prime witness Maramara is the meat of the instant controversy. Petitioners postulate that he is not a credible witness. They point out that there were inconsistencies in his testimonies vis-a-vis his confession, and that his declarations should be totally rejected considering his questionable reputation and personal background as evidenced by his previous conviction. Being a confessed conspirator, his testimony was procured from a polluted source. Moreover, he had the ill-motive of revenge against Labandero and Bug-atan considering that Labandero was a witness against Maramara in the killing of Lanogan while Bug-atan was responsible for his arrest on April 21, 1993.

We are not convinced.

Petitioners try to discredit Maramara by highlighting his alleged inconsistent statements in his extrajudicial confession and his testimony in court, i.e., he allegedly averred in his confession that Manatad and Bug-atan went to see him on April 9, 1993 whereas in his direct examination, he merely stated that there was only one person who went to him. Petitioners also invite our attention to the variance regarding the place where the meeting was held, whether it was at the house of Maramara's aunt or at the pier.

These perceived inconsistencies provide no persuasive reason for us to distrust the credibility of Maramara. They refer to minor details and not to the central fact of the crime. They are too trivial to affect his straightforward account of the killing of the victim and the complicity of the petitioners. It is settled that inconsistencies relating to minor details do not affect the creditworthiness of the witness testifying and that minor inconsistencies tend to show that the witnesses were not coached or rehearsed. This is a well- settled doctrine which need not require much documentation. The testimony of a witness must be considered in its entirety instead of in truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a testimony is not to consider only its isolated parts and anchor a conclusion on the basis of said parts.[16] At any rate, Maramara had adequately explained and properly corrected himself regarding these alleged inconsistencies during his examination in court.[17]

Maramara's previous conviction neither detracts his competency as a witness nor necessarily renders his testimony totally untrustworthy and inadmissible. While Maramara admitted to having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. DU-3721, this circumstance does not necessarily make him or his testimony ipso facto incredible. The determination of the character of a witness is not a prerequisite to belief in his testimony.[18] His alleged bad reputation, even if true, should not sway the court in the evaluation of the veracity of his testimony. Other important factors should be considered in determining the inherent probability of his statements for a convicted person is not necessarily a liar. After all, conviction of a crime, unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification of witnesses.[19] More importantly, the testimony of Maramara who undeniably pleaded guilty in killing the victim should definitely be given more weight inasmuch as his testimony pertains in not insignificant points to the specific incident. It is to be noted that Dr. Crisostomo Abbu, the medical officer who conducted the post- mortem examination on the body of the victim, provided collaborating testimony regarding the location of the inflicted wound, thereby rendering more credible the testimonial account of Maramara. In fine, we defer to the trial court's finding, sustained by the appellate court, giving full weight and credit to Maramara's testimony. The trial court's findings regarding the witness's credibility are accorded the highest degree of respect.[20]

The Court finds the supposed enmity of Maramara not sufficient reason to impel him to implicate petitioners in the killing of the victim. While it may be conceded that Labandero was a witness against Maramara in a murder case while Bug-atan was instrumental in Maramara's arrest, still, the defense was unable to conclusively establish that Maramara was ill-motivated in denouncing petitioners as his co-conspirators in the commission of the crime. There is no proof that Maramara had the intention to pervert the truth and prevaricate just to implicate petitioners in so serious a crime as murder. In fact, the trial court did not perceive such improper motivation on his part. All that petitioners had are pure speculation and afterthought. The absence of evidence of improper motive tends to indicate that a witness's testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.[21]

We see no reason to deviate from the trial court's keen observation that the credibility of Maramara as witness has remained intact notwithstanding the attempts of the defense to demolish it. Hence, his testimony should be given full weight and credit. We likewise agree with the appellate court in holding that the trial court did not err in appreciating the testimony of Maramara since it was corroborated by the testimonies of other witnesses and was given unhesitatingly in a straightforward manner and full of details which could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought. His testimony is too rich in details brought out during his examination in court which cannot simply be swept aside as mere fabrication. The declarations of the other prosecution witnesses, individually considered, may have been circumstantial and lacking in full details. But their combined testimonies somehow supplement in no small measure the testimonial account of Maramara. As we and the courts below cautiously determined, they strengthen the prosecution's evidence not only with respect to the fact of killing but also on the conspiracy angle of the case.

Xxx."

VIRGILIO BUG-ATAN, BERME LABANDERO GREGORIO MANATAD PETITIONERS, VS. THE PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. 175195, September 15, 2010.

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2010septemberdecisions.php?id=319

Plea of guilty to lesser offense. - At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary.

"Xxx.

Preliminarily, petitioners are challenging, on procedural standpoint, the manner in which the proceeding in Criminal Case No. DU-3721 entitled People v. Norman Maramara was conducted. They point out that after Maramara was arraigned in the morning of July 19, 1993, the trial court hastily heard and approved a plea bargain motion in the afternoon leading to his immediate conviction on the same day. They also fault the trial court in concluding that there were no aggravating or mitigating circumstances to appreciate despite Maramara's confession to the murder of the victim. They likewise question why the filing of Criminal Case Nos. DU-3721 and DU-3938[15] was done separately and not simultaneously. According to petitioners, the conviction of Maramara in Criminal Case No. DU-3721 was precipitately done following a skewed procedure.

We disagree. We find no legal flaw in the assailed actions of the trial court in Criminal Case No. DU-3721.

At the outset, it is easily discemable that petitioners failed to point out any rule of procedure or provision of law that was transgressed by the trial court. On the contrary, the plea bargain was validly acted upon despite the fact that all the proceedings, i.e. arraignment, plea bargaining and conviction, occurred on a single day. Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which authorizes plea bargain for a lesser offense in a criminal case, is explicit on how and when a plea bargain may be allowed. The rule pertinently provides:

Sec. 2. Plea of guilty to lesser offense. - At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary.

As clearly worded, there is nothing in the law which expressly or impliedly prohibits the trial court from allowing an accused to change his plea, on a plea bargain, immediately after a previous plea of not guilty. In approving the plea bargaining agreement, the trial court undoubtedly took into consideration the timeliness of the plea bargaining and its compliance with the requirements of the law.

Neither do we see any error in the trial court's holding that there were no aggravating or mitigating circumstances to appreciate even with Maramara's confession of murder for the obvious reason that introduction of evidence became no longer necessary after entering a plea of guilty.

Respecting the non-simultaneous filing of Criminal Case Nos. DU-3721 and DU-3938, suffice it to say that at the time Maramara pleaded guilty, the present charge against petitioners was still in the initial stage of preliminary investigation.

Xxx."

VIRGILIO BUG-ATAN, BERME LABANDERO GREGORIO MANATAD PETITIONERS, VS. THE PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. 175195, September 15, 2010.

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2010septemberdecisions.php?id=319

As an exception, however, the testimony of a co-conspirator, even if uncorroborated, will be considered sufficient if given in a straightforward manner and contains details which could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought

"Xxx.

The testimony of a co-conspirator is not sufficient for the conviction of the accused unless such testimony is supported by other evidence. As an exception, however, the testimony of a co-conspirator, even if uncorroborated, will be considered sufficient if given in a straightforward manner and contains details which could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought.[1]

Xxx.

Conspiracy was duly proven.

Like the courts below, we are equally convinced that there is sufficient evidence of conspiracy as convincing as the evidence of the participation of each of the petitioners. The records teem with circumstances correctly outlined by the trial court clearly indicating the collective and individual acts of the petitioners which reveal their common purpose to assault and liquidate the victim. For emphasis, we need to quote a portion of the ratiocination of the appellate court in this regard:

In the case at bench, as categorically attested to by witness Maramara. accused-appellants asked him to kill Pastor Papauran in exchange for money and dropping an earlier case, Criminal Case No. 24099, filed against him. They also accompanied him on the day of the shooting to see to it that the job was done. The concerted acts of accused-appellants reveal a consciously adopted plan and clearly demonstrate their joint design to exterminate Pastor Papauran. Conspiracy having been established, the act of one is the act of all.[22]

Needless to stress, these circumstances are clear enough to show that petitioners acted in concert in the implementation of a common objective - to kill the victim. In conspiracy, proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence. Conspiracy may be deduced from the acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime which indubitably point to and are indicative of a joint purpose, concert of action and community of interest.[23] To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the execution nor talce part in every act and may not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy.[24] But once conspiracy is shown, as in this case, the act of one is the act of all.

Xxx."

VIRGILIO BUG-ATAN, BERME LABANDERO GREGORIO MANATAD PETITIONERS, VS. THE PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. 175195, September 15, 2010.

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2010septemberdecisions.php?id=319

In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained [of] affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental.

"Xxx.

The Petition for Annulment of Sale, Reconveyance and Damages survived the death of petitioner

The criterion for determining whether an action survives the death of a petitioner was elucidated in Bonilla v. Barcena,7 to wit:

The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained [of] affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental.8

If the case affects primarily and principally property and property rights, then it survives the death of the plaintiff or petitioner. In Sumaljag v. Literato,9 we held that a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale of Real Property is one relating to property and property rights, and therefore, survives the death of the petitioner. Accordingly, the instant case for annulment of sale of real property merits survival despite the death of petitioner Memoracion Z. Cruz.

The CA erred in affirming RTC’s dismissal of the
Petition for Annulment of Deed of Sale,
Reconveyance and Damages

When a party dies during the pendency of a case, Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure necessarily applies, viz:

Sec. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. - Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.

The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.

If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs.

The foregoing section is a revision of Section 17, Rule 3 of the old Rules of Court:

SEC. 17. Death of party. - After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

If the action survives despite death of a party, it is the duty of the deceased’s counsel to inform the court of such death, and to give the names and addresses of the deceased’s legal representatives. The deceased may be substituted by his heirs in the pending action. As explained in Bonilla:

x x x Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings. When [plaintiff], therefore, died[,] her claim or right to the parcels of land x x x was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became parties in interest in the case. There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their substitution as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.10

If no legal representative is named by the counsel of the deceased, or the legal representative fails to appear within a specified period, it is the duty of the court where the case is pending to order the opposing party to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased. The reason for this rule is to protect all concerned who may be affected by the intervening death, particularly the deceased and his estate.111avvphi1

In the instant case, petitioner (plaintiff) Memoracion Z. Cruz died on 30 October 1996. Her counsel, Atty. Roberto T. Neri, notified the trial court of such death on 13 January 1997, through a Manifestation stating thus:

COMES NOW the undersigned counsel and to this Honorable Court respectfully gives notice that the plaintiff, Memoracion Z. Cruz, died on October 30, 1996, in Manila as shown by a Certificate of Death, a certified true copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "A" hereof.

The legal representative of the deceased plaintiff is her son EDGARDO CRUZ whose address is at No. 3231-E Tabora St., Bo. Obrero, Tondo, Manila.

x x x x12

On 24 January 1997, respondent (defendant) Oswaldo Z. Cruz moved to dismiss the case alleging that it did not survive Memoracion’s death. The RTC granted the motion to dismiss in the assailed Order dated 2 June 1997.

We rule that it was error for the RTC to dismiss the case. As mentioned earlier, the petition for annulment of deed of sale involves property and property rights, and hence, survives the death of petitioner Memoracion. The RTC was informed, albeit belatedly,13 of the death of Memoracion, and was supplied with the name and address of her legal representative, Edgardo Cruz. What the RTC could have done was to require Edgardo Cruz to appear in court and substitute Memoracion as party to the pending case, pursuant to Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, and established jurisprudence.

We note that on 17 October 1997, Edgardo Cruz filed with the RTC a Manifestation, stating that he is retaining the services of Atty. Roberto T. Neri. We quote:14

UNDERSIGNED HEIR of the late Memoracion Z. Cruz respectfully manifests that he is retaining the services of ATTY. ROBERTO T. NERI as counsel for the plaintiff.

(Sgd.) EDGARDO Z. CRUZ
Plaintiff

Consistent with our ruling in Heirs of Haberer v. Court of Appeals,15 we consider such Manifestation, signed by Memoracion’s heir, Edgardo Cruz, and retaining Atty. Neri’s services as counsel, a formal substitution of deceased Memoracion by her heir, Edgardo Cruz. It also needs mention that Oswaldo Cruz, although also an heir of Memoracion, should be excluded as a legal representative in the case for being an adverse party therein.16

Xxx."

MEMORACION Z. CRUZ, represented by EDGARDO Z. CRUZ, Petitioner, vs. OSWALDO Z. CRUZ, Respondent. G.R. No. 173292, September 1, 2010.

The crime committed by petitioner (violation of Section 3 [h] of R.A. 3019) did not involve moral turpitude.

"Xxx.

Hence, it behooves the Court to resolve the issue of whether or not petitioner’s violation of Section 3(h), R.A. No. 3019 involves moral turpitude.1avvphi1

Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code reads:

Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.lawphil.net

The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis supplied)

Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general.9

Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019 of which petitioner was convicted, reads:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

x x x x

(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.

The essential elements of the violation of said provision are as follows: 1) The accused is a public officer; 2) he has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction; 3) he either: a) intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such interest, or b) is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or by law.10

Thus, there are two modes by which a public officer who has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction may violate Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019. The first mode is when the public officer intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with his financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction. The second mode is when he is prohibited from having such an interest by the Constitution or by law.11

In Teves v. Sandiganbayan,12 petitioner was convicted under the second mode for having pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit which is prohibited under Sec. 89(2) of the Local Government Code of 1991. The Court held therein:

However, the evidence for the prosecution has established that petitioner Edgar Teves, then mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, owned the cockpit in question. In his sworn application for registration of cockpit filed on 26 September 1983 with the Philippine Gamefowl Commission, Cubao, Quezon City, as well as in his renewal application dated 6 January 1989 he stated that he is the owner and manager of the said cockpit. Absent any evidence that he divested himself of his ownership over the cockpit, his ownership thereof is rightly to be presumed because a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of that nature. His affidavit dated 27 September 1990 declaring that effective January 1990 he "turned over the management of the cockpit to Mrs. Teresita Z. Teves for the reason that [he] could no longer devote a full time as manager of the said entity due to other work pressure" is not sufficient proof that he divested himself of his ownership over the cockpit. Only the management of the cockpit was transferred to Teresita Teves effective January 1990. Being the owner of the cockpit, his interest over it was direct.

Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar Teves over the cockpit were transferred to his wife, still he would have a direct interest thereon because, as correctly held by respondent Sandiganbayan, they remained married to each other from 1983 up to 1992, and as such their property relation can be presumed to be that of conjugal partnership of gains in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. And Section 143 of the Civil Code declares all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains to be owned in common by the husband and wife. Hence, his interest in the Valencia Cockpit is direct and is, therefore, prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991, which reads:

Section 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest. – (a) It shall be unlawful for any local government official or employee, directly or indirectly, to:

x x x x

(2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a local government unit…. [Emphasis supplied].

The offense proved, therefore, is the second mode of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, which is possession of a prohibited interest.13

However, conviction under the second mode does not automatically mean that the same involved moral turpitude. A determination of all surrounding circumstances of the violation of the statute must be considered. Besides, moral turpitude does not include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited, as in the instant case.

Thus, in Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections,14 the Court clarified that:

Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that "as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine." In resolving the foregoing question, the Court is guided by one of the general rules that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not, the rationale of which was set forth in "Zari v. Flores," to wit:

"It (moral turpitude) implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is punishable by law or not. It must not be merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude. Moral turpitude does not, however, include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited."

This guideline nonetheless proved short of providing a clear-cut solution, for in "International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC, the Court admitted that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by merely classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum. There are crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute. (Emphasis supplied)1awphi1

Applying the foregoing guidelines, we examined all the circumstances surrounding petitioner’s conviction and found that the same does not involve moral turpitude.

First, there is neither merit nor factual basis in COMELEC’s finding that petitioner used his official capacity in connection with his interest in the cockpit and that he hid the same by transferring the management to his wife, in violation of the trust reposed on him by the people.

The COMELEC, in justifying its conclusion that petitioner’s conviction involved moral turpitude, misunderstood or misapplied our ruling in Teves v. Sandiganbayan. According to the COMELEC:

In the present case, while the crime for which [petitioner] was convicted may per se not involve moral turpitude, still the totality of facts evinces [his] moral turpitude. The prohibition was intended to avoid any conflict of interest or any instance wherein the public official would favor his own interest at the expense of the public interest. The [petitioner] knew of the prohibition but he attempted to circumvent the same by holding out that the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center is to be owned by a certain Daniel Teves. Later on, he would aver that he already divested himself of any interest of the cockpit in favor of his wife. But the Supreme Court saw through the ruse and declared that what he divested was only the management of the cockpit but not the ownership. And even if the ownership is transferred to his wife, the respondent would nevertheless have an interest thereon because it would still belong to the conjugal partnership of gains, of which the [petitioner] is the other half.

[Petitioner] therefore maintained ownership of the cockpit by deceit. He has the duty to divest himself but he did not and instead employed means to hide his interests. He knew that it was prohibited he nevertheless concealed his interest thereon. The facts that he hid his interest denotes his malicious intent to favor self-interest at the expense of the public. Only a man with a malevolent, decadent, corrupt and selfish motive would cling on and conceal his interest, the acquisition of which is prohibited. This plainly shows his moral depravity and proclivity to put primacy on his self interest over that of his fellowmen. Being a public official, his act is also a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the people. Clearly, the totality of his acts is contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, honesty and good morals. The crime, as committed by the [petitioner], plainly involves moral turpitude.15

On the contrary, the Court’s ruling states:

The Sandiganbayan found that the charge against Mayor Teves for causing the issuance of the business permit or license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center is "not well-founded." This it based, and rightly so, on the additional finding that only the Sangguniang Bayan could have issued a permit to operate the Valencia Cockpit in the year 1992. Indeed, under Section 447(3) of the LGC of 1991, which took effect on 1 January 1992, it is the Sangguniang Bayan that has the authority to issue a license for the establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits. Unlike in the old LGC, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, wherein the municipal mayor was the presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, under the LGC of 1991, the mayor is not so anymore and is not even a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. Hence, Mayor Teves could not have intervened or taken part in his official capacity in the issuance of a cockpit license during the material time, as alleged in the information, because he was not a member of the Sangguniang Bayan.16

Thus, petitioner, as then Mayor of Valencia, did not use his influence, authority or power to gain such pecuniary or financial interest in the cockpit. Neither did he intentionally hide his interest in the subject cockpit by transferring the management thereof to his wife considering that the said transfer occurred before the effectivity of the present LGC prohibiting possession of such interest.

As aptly observed in Teves v. Sandiganbayan:

As early as 1983, Edgar Teves was already the owner of the Valencia Cockpit. Since then until 31 December 1991, possession by a local official of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not yet prohibited. It was before the effectivity of the LGC of 1991, or on January 1990, that he transferred the management of the cockpit to his wife Teresita. In accordance therewith it was Teresita who thereafter applied for the renewal of the cockpit registration. Thus, in her sworn applications for renewal of the registration of the cockpit in question dated 28 January 1990 and 18 February 1991, she stated that she is the Owner/Licensee and Operator/Manager of the said cockpit. In her renewal application dated 6 January 1992, she referred to herself as the Owner/Licensee of the cockpit. Likewise in the separate Lists of Duly Licensed Personnel for Calendar Years 1991 and 1992, which she submitted on 22 February 1991 and 17 February 1992, respectively, in compliance with the requirement of the Philippine Gamefowl Commission for the renewal of the cockpit registration, she signed her name as Operator/Licensee.17 (Emphasis supplied)

Second, while possession of business and pecuniary interest in a cockpit licensed by the local government unit is expressly prohibited by the present LGC, however, its illegality does not mean that violation thereof necessarily involves moral turpitude or makes such possession of interest inherently immoral. Under the old LGC, mere possession by a public officer of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not among the prohibitions. Thus, in Teves v. Sandiganbayan, the Court took judicial notice of the fact that:

x x x under the old LGC, mere possession of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not among the prohibitions enumerated in Section 41 thereof. Such possession became unlawful or prohibited only upon the advent of the LGC of 1991, which took effect on 1 January 1992. Petitioner Edgar Teves stands charged with an offense in connection with his prohibited interest committed on or about 4 February 1992, shortly after the maiden appearance of the prohibition. Presumably, he was not yet very much aware of the prohibition. Although ignorance thereof would not excuse him from criminal liability, such would justify the imposition of the lighter penalty of a fine of P10,000 under Section 514 of the LGC of 1991.18 (Italics supplied)

The downgrading of the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of nine years and twenty-one days as minimum to twelve years as maximum to a lighter penalty of a fine of P10,000.00 is a recognition that petitioner’s violation was not intentionally done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals but due to his lack of awareness or ignorance of the prohibition.

Lastly, it may be argued that having an interest in a cockpit is detrimental to public morality as it tends to bring forth idlers and gamblers, hence, violation of Section 89(2) of the LGC involves moral turpitude.

Suffice it to state that cockfighting, or sabong in the local parlance, has a long and storied tradition in our culture and was prevalent even during the Spanish occupation.19 While it is a form of gambling, the morality thereof or the wisdom in legalizing it is not a justiciable issue. In Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., it was held that:

The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts do no sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. That is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicability of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative and executive departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way these branches decide, they are answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents who will ultimately judge their acts, and not to the courts of justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Commission on Elections dated May 11, 2007 and October 9, 2007 disqualifying petitioner Edgar Y. Teves from running for the position of Representative of the 3rd District of Negros Oriental, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered declaring that the crime committed by petitioner (violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019) did not involve moral turpitude.

SO ORDERED.

Xxx."

EDGAR Y. TEVES, Petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HERMINIO G. TEVES, Respondents. G.R. No. 180363, April 28, 2009.

Administrative liability is separate and distinct from penal or criminal liability.

"Xxx.

Finally, Salvador argues that her conviction and eventual discharge from probation presents another administrative case to be filed against her because to do so would defeat the purpose of the Probation Law45 which was to erase the effect of conviction and to restore civil rights that were lost or suspended. Suffice it to state that probation does not erase the effects and fact of conviction, but merely suspends the penalty imposed. While indeed the purpose of the Probation Law is to save valuable human material, it must not be forgotten that unlike pardon, probation does not obliterate the crime for which the person under probation has been convicted. The reform and rehabilitation of the probationer cannotjustify his retention in the government service.46 Furthermore, probation only affects the criminal liability of the accused, and not his administrative liabilities, if any. The Court once ruled in the case of Samalio vs. Court of Appeals47 that:

Finally, even if dismissal had been one of the accessory penalties of the principal penalty imposed upon petitioner in the criminal case, and even if the administrative case had been decided earlier than the criminal case, still the imposition of the penalty of dismissal could not have been suspended by the grant of probation.As petitioner himself contends, the criminal action is separate and distinct from the administrative case. And, if only for that reason, so is administrative liability separate and distinct from penal liability. Hence, probation affects only the criminal aspect of the case, not its administrative dimension.48 [Emphases supplied]

Xxx."

CECILIA PAGADUAN, Petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and REMA MARTIN SALVADOR, Respondents. G.R. No. 206379, November 19, 2014.

Moral turpitude

"xxx.

Moral turpitude has been defined aseverything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; anact of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general,30 contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.31 Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that the Court has to determine as to what crime involves moral turpitude.32 Salvador was convicted of falsification of public document. The MTCC found that she made an untruthful statement in a narration of facts and perverted the truth with a wrongful intent.33 While Salvador invoked good faith as a defense, the MTCC was not convinced, stating that good faith could not be made to depend solely on the self-serving statement of the accused. It must be supportedby other independent evidence.34 To the MTCC, Salvador miserably failed to clearly show the presence of good faith. More specifically, the trial court stated:

She alleged that she honestlybelieved she was employed with VWI because Alfonso Tuzon is the operations manager of VWI. Second, she was responsible in the preparation of the payroll sheets of VWI.

However, the following circumstances negate the existence of good faith:

1. Accused was not included in the list of employees of VWI as shown in Exhibits "G", "G-1", "G-2", "G-3", and "G-4," "J" and its sub-markings and "K" and its sub-markings;

2. Accused was not in the payroll of VWI as shown in Exhibit "L";

3. Accused received her salary from Rodolfo Quiambao and not from VWI;

4. Rodolfo Quiambao, who is not a VWI employee, issued directives to the accused;

5. Accused never went to the VWI office at Magapit, Lallo, Cagayan;

6. Accused never had any VWI identification card;

7. Accused had no contract of employment with VWI; and finally,

8. Rodolfo Quiambao worked personally with Alfonso Tuzon and not with VWI.

These circumstances were known to the accused. Despite knowledge of these facts, accused stated in her PDS that she was employed with VWI, thus, she perverted the truth. Said act constitutes malice on her part negating her claim of good faith.35 [Emphasis supplied] Granting arguendothat Salvador had no criminal intent to injure a third person, the same is immaterial as such intent is not an essential element of the crime of falsification of public document. It is jurisprudentially settled that in the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officers or private persons, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person for the reason that, in contradistinction to private documents,the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faithand the destruction of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. In falsification of public documents, therefore, the controlling consideration is the public character of a document; and the existence of any prejudice caused to third persons or, at least, the intent to cause such damage becomes immaterial.36

Salvador did not appeal from the said judgment and, instead, filed an application for probation which was granted.1âwphi1 It has been held that an application for probation is an admission of guilt.37 Logically then, when Salvador applied for probation, she admitted the making of an untruthful statement in her PDS. In Lumancas v. Intas,38 the Court held that "the accomplishment of the Personal Data Sheet being a requirement under the Civil Service Rules and Regulations in connection with employment in the government, the making of an untruthful statement therein was, therefore, intimately connected with such employment."39 The filing of a PDS is required in connection with the promotion to a higher position and contenders for promotion have the legal obligation to disclose the truth. Otherwise, enhancing their qualifications by means of false statements will prejudice other qualified aspirants to the same position.40

As early as 1961, in the case of De Jesus-Paras vs. Vailoces,41 the Court disbarred a lawyer on the ground of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, after having found that the said lawyer was convicted of the crime of falsification of public documents. Similarly, in In Re - Attorney Jose Avanceña,42 the said lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law due to a conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude after being convicted of the crime of falsification of public documents. Lastly, in RE: SC Decision dated May 20, 2008 in G.R. No. 161455 under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court v. Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin,43 the Court reiterated that the crime of falsification of public document is contrary to justice, honesty and good morals and, therefore, involves moral turpitude.44

Following the Court's disposition in the aforecited cases, the CSC and the CA therefore erred in reaching a conclusion to the contrary, especially that Salvador's conviction for such crime already attained finality. Both tribunals were of the view that Salvador merely committed a mere error of judgment and, thus, no moral turpitude was involved. Their position was based on the finding previously made by the CSC-RO II in the first administrative complaint. That could not a valid basis because, as earlier pointed out, the second case was separate and distinct from the first one.

Although the CSC itself recognized that it was for the Court to determine what crime involved moral turpitude, it ruled that Salvador's commission of the crime of falsification of public document did not involve moral turpitude. Both the CSC and the CA strayed away from the settled jurisprudence on the matter. It will beabsurd to insist that Salvador committed a mere error of judgment when the very basis of the second administrative charge against her was a final judgment of conviction where the trial court found otherwise.

Considering that the principal act punished in the crime of falsification of public document is the violation of the public faithand the destruction of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed, the elements of the administrative offense of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude clearly exist in this case. The Court does not have to look beyond what is simply apparent from the surrounding circumstances.

Xxx."

CECILIA PAGADUAN, Petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and REMA MARTIN SALVADOR, Respondents. G.R. No. 206379, November 19, 2014.

The respondent's conviction for libel shows his propensity to speak ill of others.

"xxx.

The evidence of record supports the findings of the investigating judge.

It is a fact that the respondent was convicted of libel in Criminal Case No. Q-7171 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV, at Quezon City. 7 While this fact alone is not sufficient to warrant disciplinary action, the respondent's conviction for libel shows his propensity to speak ill of others. His letter dated March 11, 1976 to Judge Minerva C. Genovea, then Executive Judge of the City Court of Quezon City 8 contains defamatory and uncalled for language.

The handwritten notes of the respondent regarding different cases pending in Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City, presided by the complainant, Judge Remigio E. Zari, show that the respondent had exerted undue influence in the disposition of the cases mentioned therein. 9

It is true that conviction for libel does not automatically justify removal of a public officer. 10 However, the fact of conviction for libel of the respondent, taken together with the letter he wrote to then Executive City Judge of the City Court of Quezon City, Judge Minerva C. Genovea, shows the tendency of the respondent to malign people.

Respondent's act of interfering in the cases pending before Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City presided by the complainant is inimical to the service. This alone warrants severe disciplinary measures.

In his affidavit subscribed and sworn to before then City Judge Oscar A. Inocentes on June 10, 1969, the respondent stated "That I am a person of good moral character and integrity and have no administrative, criminal or police record. " 

This averment is not true because the respondent had been convicted of libel in Criminal Case No. Q-7171, of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV, in a sentence dated April 28, 1967. This prevarication in a sworn statement is another ground for serious disciplinary action.

The removal from the service of the respondent is warranted by the evidence adduced during the investigation conducted by Judge Sergio A. F. Apostol of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVI, Quezon City.

WHEREFORE, the respondent, Diosdado S. Flores, is hereby DISMISSED as Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City, with forfeiture of all retirement privileges and with prejudice to reinstatement in the national and local governments, as well as, in any government instrumentality or agency including government owned or controlled corporations effective upon the finality of this decision.

Let a copy of this decision be attached to his personal record.

SO ORDERED.

Xxx."

HON. REMIGIO E. ZARI, complainant, vs. DIOSDADO S. FLORES, respondent. A.M. No. (2170-MC) P-1356, November 21, 1979.