Under the rules of succession, the heirs instantaneously became co-owners of the Marcos properties upon the death of the President. The property rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted to another through the decedent's death. In this concept, nothing prevents the heirs from exercising their right to transfer or dispose of the properties that constitute their legitimes, even absent their declaration or absent the partition or the distribution of the estate.

"Xxx.

 
The Marcos siblings are compulsory heirs.

To reiterate, in its third Amended Complaint, petitioner prays that the Marcos respondents be made to (1) pay for the value of the alleged ill-gotten wealth with interest from the date of acquisition; (2) render a complete accounting and inventory of all funds and other pieces of property legally or beneficially held and/or controlled by them, as well as their legal and beneficial interest therein; (3) pay actual damages estimated at P200 billion and additional actual damages to reimburse expenses for the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth estimated at P250 million or in such amount as may be proven during trial; (4) pay moral damages amounting to P50 billion; (5) pay temperate and nominal damages, as well as attorney's fees and litigation expenses in an amount to be proven during the trial; (6) pay exemplary damages in the amount of P1 billion; and (7) pay treble judicial costs.[39]

It must be stressed that we are faced with exceptional circumstances, given the nature and the extent of the properties involved in the case pending with the Sandiganbayan. It bears emphasis that the Complaint is one for the reversion, the reconveyance, the restitution and the accounting of alleged ill-gotten wealth and the payment of damages. Based on the allegations of the Complaint, the court is charged with the task of (1) determining the properties in the Marcos estate that constitute the alleged ill-gotten wealth; (2) tracing where these properties are; (3) issuing the appropriate orders for the accounting, the recovery, and the payment of these properties; and, finally, (4) determining if the award of damages is proper.

Since the pending case before the Sandiganbayan survives the death of Ferdinand E. Marcos, it is imperative therefore that the estate be duly represented. The purpose behind this rule is the protection of the right to due process of every party to a litigation who may be affected by the intervening death. The deceased litigant is himself protected, as he continues to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate.[40] On that note, we take judicial notice of the probate proceedings regarding the will of Ferdinand E. Marcos. In Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos II,[41] we upheld the grant by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of letters testamentary in solidum to Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. and Imelda Romualdez-Marcos as executors of the last will and testament of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos.

Unless the executors of the Marcos estate or the heirs are ready to waive in favor of the state their right to defend or protect the estate or those properties found to be ill-gotten in their possession, control or ownership, then they may not be dropped as defendants in the civil case pending before the Sandiganbayan.

Rule 3, Sec. 7 of the Rules of Court defines indispensable parties as those parties-in-interest without whom there can be no final determination of an action. They are those parties who possess such an interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights, so that the courts cannot proceed without their presence. Parties are indispensable if their interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought is inextricably intertwined with that of the other parties.[42]

In order to reach a final determination of the matters concerning the estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos - that is, the accounting and the recovery of ill-gotten wealth - the present case must be maintained against Imelda Marcos and herein respondent Ferdinand "Bongbong" R. Marcos, Jr., as executors of the Marcos estate pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. According to this provision, actions may be commenced to recover from the estate, real or personal property, or an interest therein, or to enforce a lien thereon; and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against the executors.

We also hold that the action must likewise be maintained against Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Irene Marcos-Araneta on the basis of the non-exhaustive list attached as Annex "A" to the Third Amended Complaint, which states that the listed properties therein were owned by Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos and their immediate family.[43] It is only during the trial of Civil Case No. 0002 before the Sandiganbayan that there could be a determination of whether these properties are indeed ill-gotten or were legitimately acquired by respondents and their predecessors. Thus, while it was not proven that respondents conspired in accumulating ill-gotten wealth, they may be in possession, ownership or control of such ill-gotten properties or the proceeds thereof as heirs of the Marcos couple. Thus, their lack of participation in any illegal act does not remove the character of the property as ill-gotten and, therefore, as rightfully belonging to the State.

Secondly, under the rules of succession, the heirs instantaneously became co-owners of the Marcos properties upon the death of the President. The property rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted to another through the decedent's death.[44] In this concept, nothing prevents the heirs from exercising their right to transfer or dispose of the properties that constitute their legitimes, even absent their declaration or absent the partition or the distribution of the estate. In Jakosalem v. Rafols,[45] we said:


Article 440 of the Civil Code provides that "the possession of hereditary property is deemed to be transmitted to the heir without interruption from the instant of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance be accepted." And Manresa with reason states that upon the death of a person, each of his heirs "becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus formed among the coowners of the estate while it remains undivided." (3 Manresa, 357; Alcala vs. Alcala, 35 Phil. 679.) And according to article 399 of the Civil Code, every part owner may assign or mortgage his part in the common property, and the effect of such assignment or mortgage shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted him in the partition upon the dissolution of the community. Hence, in the case of Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528, where some of the heirs, without the concurrence of the others, sold a property left by their deceased father, this Court, speaking thru its then Chief Justice Cayetano Arellano, said that the sale was valid, but that the effect thereof was limited to the share which may be allotted to the vendors upon the partition of the estate. (Emphasis supplied)

Xxx."


SECOND DIVISION
[ G. R. No. 171701, February 08, 2012 ]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PETITIONER, VS. MA. IMELDA "IMEE" R. MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND "BONGBONG" R. MARCOS, JR., GREGORIO MA. ARANETA III, IRENE R. MARCOS-ARANETA, YEUNG CHUN FAN, YEUNG CHUN HO, YEUNG CHUN KAM, AND PANTRANCO EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PEA)-PTGWO, RESPONDENTS.

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/21716

Petitioner failed to observe the best evidence rule.

"Xxx.

Petitioner failed to observe the
best evidence rule.

It is petitioner's burden to prove the allegations in its Complaint. For relief to be granted, the operative act on how and in what manner the Marcos siblings participated in and/or benefitted from the acts of the Marcos couple must be clearly shown through a preponderance of evidence. Should petitioner fail to discharge this burden, the Court is constrained and is left with no choice but to uphold the Demurrer to Evidence filed by respondents.

First, petitioner does not deny that what should be proved are the contents of the documents themselves. It is imperative, therefore, to submit the original documents that could prove petitioner's allegations.

Thus, the photocopied documents are in violation Rule 130, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court, otherwise known as the best evidence rule, which mandates that the evidence must be the original document itself. The origin of the best evidence rule can be found and traced to as early as the 18th century in Omychund v. Barker,[34] wherein the Court of Chancery said:


The judges and sages of the law have laid it down that there is but one general rule of evidence, the best that the nature of the case will admit.

The rule is, that if the writings have subscribing witnesses to them, they must be proved by those witnesses.

The first ground judges have gone upon in departing from strict rules, is an absolute strict necessity. Secondly, a presumed necessity. In the case of writings, subscribed by witnesses, if all are dead, the proof of one of their hands is sufficient to establish the deed: where an original is lost, a copy may be admitted; if no copy, then a proof by witnesses who have heard the deed, and yet it is a thing the law abhors to admit the memory of man for evidence.


Petitioner did not even attempt to provide a plausible reason why the originals were not presented, or any compelling ground why the court should admit these documents as secondary evidence absent the testimony of the witnesses who had executed them.

In particular, it may not insist that the photocopies of the documents fall under Sec. 7 of Rule 130, which states:


Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. ? When the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved be a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.


Secs. 19 and 20 of Rule 132 provide:


SECTION 19. Classes of documents. ? For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.

Public documents are:


(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.

All other writings are private.

SECTION 20. Proof of private document. -- Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:


(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.


The fact that these documents were collected by the PCGG in the course of its investigations does not make them per se public records referred to in the quoted rule.

Petitioner presented as witness its records officer, Maria Lourdes Magno, who testified that these public and private documents had been gathered by and taken into the custody of the PCGG in the course of the Commission's investigation of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses. However, given the purposes for which these documents were submitted, Magno was not a credible witness who could testify as to their contents. To reiterate, "[i]f the writings have subscribing witnesses to them, they must be proved by those witnesses." Witnesses can testify only to those facts which are of their personal knowledge; that is, those derived from their own perception.[35] Thus, Magno could only testify as to how she obtained custody of these documents, but not as to the contents of the documents themselves.

Neither did petitioner present as witnesses the affiants of these Affidavits or Memoranda submitted to the court. Basic is the rule that, while affidavits may be considered as public documents if they are acknowledged before a notary public, these Affidavits are still classified as hearsay evidence. The reason for this rule is that they are not generally prepared by the affiant, but by another one who uses his or her own language in writing the affiant's statements, parts of which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants. For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.[36]

As to the copy of the TSN of the proceedings before the PCGG, while it may be considered as a public document since it was taken in the course of the PCGG's exercise of its mandate, it was not attested to by the legal custodian to be a correct copy of the original. This omission falls short of the requirement of Rule 132, Secs. 24 and 25 of the Rules of Court.[37]

In summary, we adopt the ruling of the Sandiganbayan, to wit:


Further, again contrary to the theory of the plaintiff, the presentation of the originals of the aforesaid exhibits is not validly excepted under Rule 130, Section 3 (a), (b), and (d) of the Rules of Court. Under paragraph (d), when `the original document is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office,' presentation of the original thereof is excepted. However, as earlier observed, all except one of the exhibits introduced by the plaintiff were not necessarily public documents. The transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) of the proceedings purportedly before the PCGG, the plaintiff's exhibit "Q", may be a public document, but what was presented by the plaintiff was a mere photocopy of the purported TSN. The Rules provide that when the original document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. Exhibit "Q" was not a certified copy and it was not even signed by the stenographer who supposedly took down the proceedings.

The rest of the above-mentioned exhibits cannot likewise be excepted under paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 3. Section 5 of the same Rule provides that `when the original documents has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.' Thus, in order that secondary evidence may be admissible, there must be proof by satisfactory evidence of (1) due execution of the original; (2) loss, destruction or unavailability of all such originals and (3) reasonable diligence and good faith in the search for or attempt to produce the original. None of these requirements were complied with by the plaintiff. Similar to exhibit `Q', exhibits `P', `R', `S', and `T' were all photocopies. `P', `R', and `T' were affidavits of persons who did not testify before the Court. Exhibit `S' is a letter which is clearly a private document. Not only does it not fall within the exceptions of Section 3, it is also a mere photocopy. As We previously emphasized, even if originals of these affidavits were presented, they would still be considered hearsay evidence if the affiants do not testify and identify them.[38]


Thus, absent any convincing evidence to hold otherwise, it follows that petitioner failed to prove that the Marcos siblings and Gregorio Araneta III collaborated with former President Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos and participated in the first couple's alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth insofar as the specific allegations herein were concerned.

Xxx."


REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PETITIONER, VS. MA. IMELDA "IMEE" R. MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND "BONGBONG" R. MARCOS, JR., GREGORIO MA. ARANETA III, IRENE R. MARCOS-ARANETA, YEUNG CHUN FAN, YEUNG CHUN HO, YEUNG CHUN KAM, AND PANTRANCO EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PEA)-PTGWO, RESPONDENTS. GR. No. 171701, February 08, 2012. 

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/21716

Complaint for REVERSION, RECONVEYANCE , RESTITUTION , ACCOUNTING and DAMAGES against Ferdinand E. Marcos, who was later substituted by his ESTATE upon his death; IMELDA R. Marcos; and herein respondents IMEE Marcos-Manotoc, IRENE Marcos-Araneta, BONGBONG Marcos, Tomas Manotoc, and Gregorio Araneta III. The case involved P200 BILLION of the Marcoses' alleged accumulated ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH

SUMMARY: On 16 July 1987, the PCGG, acting on behalf of the Republic and assisted by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Complaint for REVERSION, RECONVEYANCE , RESTITUTION , ACCOUNTING and DAMAGES against Ferdinand E. Marcos, who was later substituted by his ESTATE upon his death; IMELDA R. Marcos; and herein respondents IMEE Marcos-Manotoc, IRENE Marcos-Araneta, BONGBONG Marcos, Tomas Manotoc, and Gregorio Araneta III. The case involved P200 BILLION of the Marcoses' alleged accumulated ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH. -

SUPREME COURT DECISION:

The 2012 decision of the Supreme Court, written by former Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno, in the case entitled REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PETITIONER, VS. MA. IMELDA "IMEE" R. MARCOS-MANOTOC, et. al., docketed as GR No. 171701 and dated February 08, 2012, involved P200 billion of the Marcoses' alleged accumulated ill-gotten wealth. It also included the alleged use of the media networks IBC-13, BBC-2 and RPN-9 for the Marcos family's personal benefit; the alleged use of De Soleil Apparel for dollar salting; and the alleged illegal acquisition and operation of the bus company Pantranco North Express, Inc. (Pantranco).

After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986, the first executive act of then President Corazon C. Aquino was to create the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). Pursuant to Executive Order No. 1, the PCGG was charged with the task of assisting the President in the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship.

On 16 July 1987, the PCGG, acting on behalf of the Republic and assisted by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Complaint for REVERSION, RECONVEYANCE , RESTITUTION , ACCOUNTING and DAMAGES against Ferdinand E. Marcos, who was later substituted by his ESTATE upon his death; Imelda R. Marcos; and herein respondents Imee Marcos-Manotoc, Irene Marcos-Araneta, Bongbong Marcos, Tomas Manotoc, and Gregorio Araneta III.

The Complaint, inter alia, alleged that the

"defendants Imelda (IMEE) R. Marcos-Manotoc, Tomas Manotoc, Irene R. Manotoc (sic) Araneta, Gregorio Ma. Araneta III, and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., actively collaborated, with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos among others, in confiscating and/or unlawfully appropriating funds and other property, and in concealing the same as described above."

The complaint further alleged that "each of the said Defendants, either by taking undue advantage of their relationship with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, or by reason of the above-described active collaboration, unlawfully acquired or received property, shares of stocks in corporations, illegal payments such as commissions, bribes or kickbacks, and other forms of improper privileges, income, revenues and benefits."

Thus, Republic set forth the following CAUSES OF ACTION in its Complaint:

1. First Cause of Action: BREACH OF PUBLIC TRUST - A public office is a public trust. By committing all the acts described above, Defendants repeatedly breached public trust and the law, making them liable solidarily to Plaintiff. The funds and other property acquired by Defendants following, or as a result of, their breach of public trust, some of which are mentioned or described above, estimated to amount to ?200 billion are deemed to have been acquired for the benefit of Plaintiff and are, therefore, impressed with constructive trust in favor of Plaintiff and the Filipino people. Consequently, Defendants are solidarily liable to restore or reconvey to Plaintiff all such funds and property thus impressed with constructive trust for the benefit of Plaintiff and the Filipino people.

2. Second Cause of Action: ABUSE OF RIGHT AND POWER -

(a) Defendants, in perpetrating the unlawful acts described above, committed abuse of right and power which caused untold misery, sufferings and damages to Plaintiff. Defendants violated, among others Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines;

(b) As a result of the foregoing acts, Defendants acquired the title to the beneficial interest in funds and other property and concealed such title, funds and interest through the use of relatives, business associates, nominees, agents, or dummies. Defendants are, therefore, solidarily liable to Plaintiff to return and reconvey all such funds and other property unlawfully acquired by them estimated at TWO HUNDRED BILLION PESOS, or alternatively, to pay Plaintiff, solidarily, by way of indemnity, the damage caused to Plaintiff equivalent to the amount of such funds or the value of other property not returned or restored to Plaintiff, plus interest thereon from the date of unlawful acquisition until full payment thereof.

3. Third Cause of Action: UNJUST ENRICHMENT -

Defendants illegally accumulated funds and other property whose estimated value is P200 billion in violation of the laws of the Philippines and in breach of their official functions and fiduciary obligations. Defendants, therefore, have unjustly enriched themselves to the grave and irreparable damage and prejudice of Plaintiff. Defendants have an obligation at law, independently of breach of trust and abuse of right and power, and as an alternative, to solidarily return to Plaintiff such funds and other property with which Defendants, in gross evident bad faith, have unjustly enriched themselves or, in default thereof, restore to Plaintiff the amount of such funds and the value of the other property including those which may have been wasted, and/or lost estimated at P200 billion with interest thereon from the date of unlawful acquisition until full payment thereof.

4. Fourth Cause of Action: ACCOUNTING -

The Commission, acting pursuant to the provisions of the applicable law, believe that Defendants, acting singly or collectively, in unlawful concert with one another, and with the active collaboration of third persons, subject of separate suits, acquired funds, assets and property during the incumbency of Defendant public officers, manifestly out of proportion to their salaries, to their other lawful income and income from legitimately acquired property. Consequently, they are required to show to the satisfaction of this Honorable Court that they have lawfully acquired all such funds, assets and property which are in excess of their legal net income, and for this Honorable Court to decree that the Defendants are under obligation to account to Plaintiff with respect to all legal or beneficial interests in funds, properties and assets of whatever kind and wherever located in excess of the lawful earnings or lawful income from legitimately acquired property.

5. Fifth Cause of Action - LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES -

(a) By reason of the unlawful acts set forth above, Plaintiff and the Filipino people have suffered actual damages in an amount representing the pecuniary loss sustained by the latter as a result of the Defendants' unlawful acts, the approximate value and interest of which, from the time of their wrongful acquisition, are estimated at P200 billion plus expenses which Plaintiff has been compelled to incur and shall continue to incur in its effort to recover Defendants' ill-gotten wealth all over the world, which expenses are reasonably estimated at P250 million. Defendants are, therefore, jointly and severally liable to Plaintiff for actual damages in an amount reasonably estimated at P200 Billion Pesos and to reimburse expenses for recovery of Defendants' ill-gotten wealth estimated to cost P250 million or in such amount as are proven during the TRIAL.

The petition filed by the REPUBLIC before the Supreme Court raised the same issues it had earlier raised in its Motion for Reconsideration filed before the Sandiganbayan, to wit:

THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE FILED BY RESPONDENTS MA. IMELDA (IMEE) R. MARCOS AND FERDINAND (BONGBONG) R. MARCOS, JR., CONSIDERING THAT MORE THAN PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE ON RECORD CLEARLY DEMONSTRATES THEIR CONNIVANCE WITH FORMER PRESIDENT FERDINAND E. MARCOS AND OTHER MARCOS DUMMIES AND ABUSED THEIR POWER AND INFLUENCE IN UNLAWFULLY AMASSING FUNDS FROM THE NATIONAL TREASURY.

PETITION PROVED, BY MORE THAN PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE, THAT RESPONDENT-SPOUSES GREGORIO ARANETA III AND IRENE MARCOS ARANETA CONNIVED WITH FORMER PRESIDENT MARCOS IN UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRING BUSINESS INTERESTS WHICH ARE GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT, AND IN A MANNER PROHIBITED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND ANTI-GRAFT STATUTES.

RESPONDENTS IMEE, BONGBONG, AND IRENE MARCOS ARE COMPULSORY HEIRS OF FORMER PRESIDENT MARCOS AND ARE EQUALLY OBLIGED TO RENDER AN ACCOUNTING AND RETURN THE ALLEGED ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH OF THE MARCOSES.

THERE EXISTS CONCRETE EVIDENCE PROVING THAT RESPONDENTS YEUNG CHUN KAM, YEUNG CHUN FAN, AND YEUNG CHUN HO ACTED AS DUMMIES FOR THE MARCOSES, AND USED THE CORPORATION, GLORIOUS SUN, AS A CONDUIT IN AMASSING THE ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH. ACCORDINGLY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN GRANTING THEIR DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE.

THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE FILED BY INTERVENOR PEA-PTGWO WITH RESPECT TO THE PANTRANCO ASSETS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED SINCE AMPLE EVIDENCE PROVES THAT THE SAID ASSETS INDUBITABLY FORM PART OF THE MARCOS ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH, AS BUTTRESSED BY THE FACT THAT NO JUDICIAL DETERMINATION HAS BEEN MADE AS TO WHOM THESE ASSETS RIGHTFULLY BELONG.

THE SANDIGANBAYAN'S RULING WHICH REJECTED PEITITONER'S DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS ALLEGEDLY FOR BEING "INADMISSIBLE" DIRECTLY CONTRADICTS ITS EARLIER RULING ADMITTING ALL SAID DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE AND WAS RENDERED IN A MANNER THAT DEPRIVED PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

In the instant case, the Supreme Court held that there was "SOME MERIT in petitioner's contention."

The Supreme Court held that closely analyzing petitioner's Complaint and the present Petition for Review, it is clear that the Marcos siblings were being sued in TWO CAPACITIES : first, as CO-CONSPIRATORS in the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth; and second, as the COMPULSORY HEIRS of their father, Ferdinand E. Marcos.

The petitioner accused the Marcos siblings of having collaborated with, participated in, and/or benefitted from their parents' alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth. In particular, as far as Imee Marcos-Manotoc was concerned, she was accused of dollar salting by using Glorious Sun to import denim fabrics from one supplier at prices much higher than those paid by other users of similar materials. It was also alleged that the Marcoses personally benefitted from the sequestered media networks IBC-13, BBC-2, and RPN-9, in which Imee Marcos had a substantial interest.

Irene Marcos-Araneta, on the other hand, was accused of having conspired with her husband, respondent Gregorio Araneta III, in his being President Marcos' conduit to Pantranco, thereby paving the way for the President's ownership of the company in violation of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 2 of the 1973 Constitution.

On the basis of the fact that thr Mar is siblings were COMPULSORY HEIRS of the decedent Ferdinand Marcos Sr., the Republic prayed that they be made to (1) pay for the VALUE OF THE ALLEGED ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH WITH INTEREST from the date of acquisition; (2) render a complete ACCOUNTING and INVENTORY of all funds and other pieces of property legally or beneficially held and/or controlled by them, as well as their legal and beneficial interest therein; (3) pay ACTUAL DAMAGES estimated at P200 BILLION and additional actual damages to REIMBURSE EXPENSES for the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth estimated at P250 million or in such amount as may be proven during trial; (4) pay MORAL DAMAGES amounting to P50 BILLION ; (5) pay TEMPERATE and NOMINAL DAMAGES, as well as ATTORNEY'S FEES and LITIGATION EXPENSES in an amount to be proven during the trial; (6) pay EXEMPLARY DAMAGES in the amount of P1 BILLION ; and (7) pay treble JUDICIAL COSTS.

The Supreme Court held that the Complaint was one for the REVERSION , the RECONVEYANCE , the RESTITUTION and the ACCOUNTING of alleged ill-gotten wealth and the payment of DAMAGES.

Based on the allegations of the Complaint, the court was charged with the tasks of (1) DETERMINING the properties in the Marcos estate that constitute the alleged ill-gotten wealth; (2) TRACING where these properties are; (3) ISSUING the appropriate orders for the accounting, the recovery, and the payment of these properties; and, finally, (4) DETERMINING if the award of damages is proper.

Since the pending case before the Sandiganbayan SURVIVED THE DEATH of Ferdinand E. Marcos, it was imperative therefore that the ESTATE BE DULY REPRESENTED. The purpose behind this rule is the protection of the right to DUE PROCESS of every party to a litigation who may be affected by the intervening death. The deceased litigant is himself protected, as he continues to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE OF HIS ESTATE.

On that note, the Supreme Court took judicial notice of the PROBATE PROCEEDINGS regarding the WILL of Ferdinand E. Marcos. In Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, the Supreme Court upheld the grant by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of LETTERS TESTAMENTARY in solidum to Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. and Imelda Romualdez-Marcos AS EXECUTORS of the LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos.

UNLESS the EXECUTORS of the Marcos estate or the heirs are ready to WAIVE in favor of the state their RIGHT to defend or protect the estate or those properties found to be ill-gotten in their possession, control or ownership, then they may NOT be dropped as defendants in the civil case pending before the Sandiganbayan.

Rule 3, Sec. 7 of the Rules of Court defines INDISPENSABLE PARTIES as those parties-in-interest without whom there can be no FINAL DETERMINATION of an action. They are those parties who possess such an interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights, so that the courts cannot proceed without their presence. Parties are indispensable if their interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought is inextricably intertwined with that of the other parties.

The Supreme Court held that in order to reach a FINAL DETERMINATION of the matters concerning the ESTATE of Ferdinand E. Marcos - that is, the ACCOUNTING and the RECOVERY of ill-gotten wealth - the present case must be MAINTAINED AGAINST IMELDA MARCOS AND FERDINAND "BONGBONG " R. MARCOS, JR. , as EXECUTORS of the Marcos estate, pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court.

According to this provision, actions may be commenced to recover from the estate, real or personal property, or an interest therein, or to enforce a lien thereon; and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced AGAINST THE EXECUTORS .

The Supreme Court also hold that the action must likewise be MAINTAINED against IMEE Marcos-Manotoc and IRENE Marcos-Araneta on the basis of the non-exhaustive list attached as Annex "A" to the Third Amended Complaint, which states that the listed properties therein were owned by Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos AND THEIR IMMEDIATE FAMILY. It is only during the trial of Civil Case No. 0002 before the Sandiganbayan that there could be a determination of whether these properties are indeed ill-gotten or were legitimately acquired by respondents and their predecessors.

Thus, the Supreme Court held that while it was not yet proven at that time that the Marcos siblings-respondents conspired in accumulating ill-gotten wealth, THEY MAY BE IN POSSESSION , OWNERSHIP OR CONTROL OF SUCH ILL-GOTTEN PROPERTIES OR THE PROCEEDS THEREOF AS HEIRS OF THE MARCOS COUPLE. Thus, their lack of participation in any illegal act does NOT remove the character of the property as ill-gotten and, therefore, as rightfully belonging to the State.

Further, the Supreme Court held that under the RULES OF SUCCESSION, the HEIRS INSTANTANEOUSLY BECAME CO-OWNERS OF THE MARCOS PROPERTIES UPON THE DEATH OF THE PRESIDENT. The property rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are TRANSMITTED to another through the DECEDENT'S DEATH. In this concept, nothing prevents the heirs from exercising their RIGHT TO TRANSFER OR DISPOSE of the properties that constitute their legitimes, even absent their declaration or absent the partition or the distribution of the estate.

Lastly, the Supreme Court held that the petitioner's prayer in its Third Amended Complaint DIRECTLY REFERRED to herein respondents, to wit:

1. AS TO THE FIRST SECOND AND THIRD CAUSES OF ACTION - To RETURN and RECONVEY to Plaintiff all funds and other property acquired by Defendants during their incumbency as public officers, which funds and other property are MANIFESTLY OUT OF PROPORTION to their salaries, other lawful income and income from legitimately acquired property which Defendants have failed to establish as having been, in fact, lawfully acquired by them, alternatively, to SOLIDARITY PAY Plaintiff the VALUE thereof with INTEREST thereon from the date of acquisition until full payment.

2. AS TO THE FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION - to individually render to this Honorable Court a complete ACCOUNTING and INVENTORY , subject to evaluation of Court-appointed assessors, of all funds and other property legally or beneficially held and/or controlled by them, as well as their legal and beneficial interest in such funds and other property. (Emphasis supplied)

IN SUM , the Supreme Court MAINTAINED the MARCOS SIBLINGS as RESPONDENTS, because (1) the action pending before the Sandiganbayan was one that SURVIVED DEATH, and, therefore, the rights to the estate must be duly protected; (2) they allegedly CONTROLLED , POSSESSED or OWNED ill-gotten wealth, though their direct involvement in accumulating or acquiring such wealth may not have been proven as of that time.

Source :

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PETITIONER, VS. MA. IMELDA "IMEE" R. MARCOS-MANOTOC, et. al., GR No. 171701, February 08, 2012.

Link :

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/21716

THE ILL-GOTTEN MALACAÑANG JEWELRY COLLECTION OF THE MARCOSES

SUMMARY: Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is MANIFESTLY OUT OF PROPORTION TO HIS SALARY as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be PRESUMED PRIMA FACIE TO HAVE BEEN UNLAWFULLY Acquired. 

THE ILL-GOTTEN MALACAÑANG JEWELRY COLLECTION OF THE MARCOSES:

The 2017 resolution of the Supreme Court written by former Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno in the consolidated cases entitled "ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Petitioner vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. Xxx. IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS and IRENE MARCOS ARANETA, Petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent", docketed as G.R. No. 213027 and promulgated on January 18, 2017, referred to the pieces of JEWELRY, known as the MALACAÑANG COLLECTION, which were were labeled as ILL-GOTTEN and were consequently FORFEITED in favor of the Republic.

The underlying SANDIGANBAYAN case was Civil Case No. 0141, a FORFEITURE CASE entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Ferdinand E. Marcos, (represented by his Estate/Heirs) and Imelda R. Marcos", which was filed by the Republic through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), pursuant to Republic Act No. (R.A.) 1379 in relation to Executive Order Nos. 1,8 2,9 1410 and 14-A.

The Sandiganbayan case sought the RECOVERY of the assets and properties pertaining to the Marcoses, who acquired them directly or indirectly through, or as a result of, the IMPROPER OR ILLEGAL USE OF FUNDS OR PROPERTIES OWNED BY THE GOVERNMENT.

Some of the properties were already ADJUDGED AS ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH and consequently FORFEITED in favor of the government.

In Republic v. Sandiganbayan (the Swiss deposits case), the Court en banc in 2003 decreed that the deposits in various Swiss banks, were ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH AND FORFEITED in favor of the State.

Likewise, in Marcos v. Republic (the Arelma case), the Court's Second Division in 2012 declared that the funds, properties, and interests of Arelma were also ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH AND FORFEITED in favor of the State.

Actually, the pieces of jewelry were categorized into THREE COLLECTIONS.

The FIRST was the so-called HAWAII COLLECTION seized by the United States Customs Service and turned over to the Philippine Government. A ruling was made by the United States (U.S.) Hawaii District Court on December 18, 1992 that the Republic of the Philippines was entitled to the possession and control of the said collection.

The SECOND was the ROUMELIOTES COLLECTION, referred to as "MIA Jewelry", which was seized from Roumeliotes at the Manila International Airport on March 1, 1986. Although not covered by the forfeiture proceeding, respondents earlier sought their inclusion in then pending negotiations for settlement.

The THIRD was the MALACAÑANG COLLECTION, which was seized from Malacañang after February 25, 1986 and transferred to the Central Bank on March 1, 1986. This collection was the object of the aforementioned 2017 resolution of the Supreme Court.

Based on the 1991 valuation of auction house Christie, Manson and Woods International, Inc., the Roumeliotes, Malacañang and Hawaii collections were worth between US$5,3 l 3,575 (low estimate) to US$7,112,879 (high estimate).

Invoking the declaration of the Supreme Court in the Swiss deposits case, the Republic stated that the lawful income of the Marcoses amounting to USD 304,372.43 was GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE to the value of the pieces of jewelry in 1991.

The Sandiganbayan issued a PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT dated 13 January 2014 ruling that (1) the MALACAÑANG COLLECTION was part and subject of the forfeiture petition; (2) the Motion for Summary Judgment was proper; and (3) the FORFEITURE of the Malacañang Collection was justified pursuant to R.A. 1379.

The ISSUES for the Supreme Court's resolution in the aforementioned consolidated cases were as follows: (1) whether the Sandiganbayan has JURISDICTION over the properties; (2) whether the MALACAÑANG COLLECTION can be the subject of the FORFEITURE CASE; (3) whether FORFEITURE is justified under R.A. 1379; (4) whether the Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was not inconsistent with the Request for Admission; and (5) whether the Sandiganbayan correctly declared that the forfeiture was not a deprivation of petitioners' right to DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

In disposing of the aforementioned consolidated cases, the Supreme Court held that it FOUND NO REVERSIBLE ERROR in the ruling of the Sandiganbayan.

The Supreme Court held that the Sandiganbayan CORRECTLY ACQUIRED JURISDICTION over the case. The properties were INCLUDED in the 1991 Petition.

According to the Supreme Court, the Sandiganbayan correctly noted the ANNEXES, which were mentioned in and made an INTEGRAL PART of the 1991 Petition, itemizing and enumerating the pieces of jewelry with their estimated values. It ultimately found that the 1991 Petition had categorically alleged that the MALACAÑANG COLLECTION was INCLUDED in the assets, monies and properties sought to be recovered.

The Supreme Court further ruled that the Sandiganbayan CORRECTLY HELD that the FORFEITURE WAS JUSTIFIED and that the Malacañang Collection was subject to forfeiture. The LEGITIMATE INCOME of the Marcoses had been pegged at USD 304,372.43.

The Supreme Court reiterated its earlier rulings in Republic v. Sandiganbayan and in Marcos v. Republic that "whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is MANIFESTLY OUT OF PROPORTION TO HIS SALARY as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be PRESUMED PRIMA FACIE TO HAVE BEEN UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED."

Petitioners FAILED to satisfactorily show that the properties were lawfully acquired; hence, the PRIMA FACIE PRESUMPTION that they were UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED prevails.

Section 2 of R.A. 1379 provides that "[w]henever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is MANIFESTLY OUT OF PROPORTION to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be PRESUMED PRIMA FACIE to have been UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED."

In this regard, the Sandiganbayan had taken JUDICIAL NOTICE of the LEGITIMATE INCOME of the Marcoses during their incumbency as public officers for the period 1966-1986 which was pegged at USD 304,372.43.

The Supreme Court furthermore held that the invocation by petitioners of lack of observance of DUE PROCESS at this stage of the proceedings was rather belated, especially when it was never invoked before the Sandiganbayan.

Needless to say, the VARIOUS PLEADINGS petitioners had filed in this case and in other cases involving the Marcos properties were COUNTLESS OCCASIONS when they could have proven that the Malacañang Collection had indeed been lawfully acquired as claimed.

The allegation of the petitioners that they were DENIED DUE PROCESS by not being given any opportunity to prove their lawful acquisition of the Malacañang Collection could not be given credence for being UTTERLY BASELESS.

IN FINE, the Supreme Court AFFIRMED the assailed PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT dated 13 January 2014 and Resolution dated 11 June 2014 rendered by the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0141.

Source :

ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Petitioner vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS and IRENE MARCOS ARANETA, Petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 213027, January 18, 2017.

https://www.facebook.com/100002290961177/posts/4636535173099469/

Sovereign immunity

"Xxx.

Finally, we take note of the Decision rendered by the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court on 26 June 2012. In Swezey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., the foreign court agreed with the dismissal of the turnover proceeding against the Arelma assets initiated by alleged victims of human rights abuses during the Marcos regime. It reasoned that the Republic was a necessary party, but could not be subject to joinder in light of its assertion of sovereign immunity:

(The Republic's) national interests would be severely prejudiced by a turnover proceeding because it has asserted a claim of ownership regarding the Arelma assets that rests on several bases: the Philippine forfeiture law that predated the tenure of President Marcos; evidence demonstrating that Marcos looted public coffers to amass a personal fortune worth billions of dollars; findings by the Philippine Supreme Court and Swiss Federal Supreme Court that Marcos stole related assets from the Republic; and, perhaps most critically, the recent determination by the Philippine Supreme Court that Marcos pilfered the money that was deposited in the Arelma brokerage account. Consequently, allowing the federal court judgment against the estate of Marcos to be executed on property that may rightfully belong to the citizens of the Philippines could irreparably undermine the Republic's claim to the Arelma assets.

x x x x

The Republic's declaration of sovereign immunity in this case is entitled to recognition because it has a significant interest in allowing its courts to adjudicate the dispute over property that may have been stolen from its public treasury and transferred to New York through no fault of the Republic. The high courts of the United States, the Philippines and Switzerland have clearly explained in decisions related to this case that wresting control over these matters from the Philippine judicial system would disrupt international comity and reciprocal diplomatic self-interests.11

Xxx."

FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government, Respondent. G.R. No. 189434 March 12, 2014. Accompanying case: IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. 189505, March 12, 2014. (Resolution).

Source:

https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/mar2014/gr_189434_2014.html.

Jurisdiction in relation to action "in personam" vs. action "in rem"

"Xxx.

Petitioner Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. acknowledges that "the subject matter of the case (i.e. the power/authority to determine whether an asset may be forfeited under R.A. 1379) is within the (Sandiganbayan’s) jurisdiction."5 However, he objects to the graft court’s purported lack of territorial jurisdiction on the theory that forfeiture is an action in rem. He argues that the Sandiganbayan must first acquire territorial jurisdiction over the Arelma proceeds before the judgment may be enforced.

At the outset, this theory fails to make a distinction between the issuance of a judgment, and its execution. It is basic that the execution of a Court’s judgment is merely a ministerial phase of adjudication.6 The authority of the Sandiganbayan to rule on the character of these assets as ill-gotten cannot be conflated with petitioner’s concerns as to how the ruling may be effectively enforced.

More importantly, petitioner should be reminded of his earlier insistence that R.A. 1379 is penal, therefore petitions for forfeiture filed under this law are actions in personam, not in rem.7 We reiterate our observations in the Swiss Deposits case: "Petitioner Republic has the right to a speedy disposition of this case. It would readily be apparent to a reasonable mind that respondent Marcoses have been deliberately resorting to every procedural device to delay the resolution hereof…The people and the State are entitled to favorable judgment, free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays x x x."8

In any case, we find that the Sandiganbayan did not err in granting the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, despite the fact that the Arelma account and proceeds are held abroad. To rule otherwise contravenes the intent of the forfeiture law, and indirectly privileges violators who are able to hide public assets abroad: beyond the reach of the courts and their recovery by the State. Forfeiture proceedings, as we have already discussed exhaustively in our Decision, are actions considered to be in the nature of proceedings in rem or quasi in rem, such that:

Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective. In the latter condition, the property, though at all times within the potential power of the court, may not be in the actual custody of said court.9

The concept of potential jurisdiction over the res, advanced by respondent, is not at all new. As early as Perkins v. Dizon, deciding a suit against a non-resident, the Court held: "In order that the court may exercise power over the res, it is not necessary that the court should take actual custody of the property, potential custody thereof being sufficient. There is potential custody when, from the nature of the action brought, the power of the court over the property is impliedly recognized by law."10

Xxx."

FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government, Respondent. G.R. No. 189434 March 12, 2014. Accompanying case: IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. 189505, March 12, 2014. (Resolution).

Source:

https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/mar2014/gr_189434_2014.html.

A separate judgment is allowed by the Rules of Court under Section 5 of Rule 36

"Xxx.

The Swiss Deposits Decision, G.R. No. 152154, dealt only with the summary judgment as to the five Swiss accounts, because the 2000 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated 7 March 2000 specifically identified the five Swiss accounts. It did not include the Arelma account. To subscribe to the view of petitioners is to forever bar the State from recovering the assets listed above, including the properties it had specifically identified in its petition for forfeiture. As we have discussed in our Decision, the ruling of the Sandiganbayan is rightly characterized as a separate judgment, and allowed by the Rules of Court under Section 5 of Rule 36:

Separate judgments.—When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, the court, at any stage, upon a determination of the issues material to a particular claim and all counterclaims arising out of the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the claim, may render a separate judgment disposing of such claim. The judgment shall terminate the action with respect to the claim so disposed of and the action shall proceed as to the remaining claims. In case a separate judgment is rendered, the court by order may stay its enforcement until the rendition of a subsequent judgment or judgments and may prescribe such conditions as may be necessary to secure the benefit thereof to the party in whose favor the judgment is rendered.

Xxx."

FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government, Respondent. G.R. No. 189434, March 12, 2014. Accompanying case: IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. 189505, March 12, 2014. (Resolution). 

 Source:

https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/mar2014/gr_189434_2014.html.

A 2014 Supreme Court resolution on the Marcos ill-gotten wealth

In the resolution of Supreme Court in the consolidated cases of (1) "FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government, Respondent", G.R. No. 189434, March 12, 2014, and (2) "IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent" , G.R. No. 189505, March 12, 2014, which resolution was written by former Chief Justice Maria Lores Sereno, it was stated that on 25 April 2012, the Court rendered a Decision affirming the 2 April 2009 Decision of the Sandiganbayan and declaring all the assets of Arelma, S.A., an entity created by the late Ferdinand E. Marcos, forfeited in favor of the Republic of the Philippines.

The anti-graft court found that the totality of assets and properties acquired by the Marcos spouses was manifestly and grossly disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as public officials, and that petitioners were unable to overturn the prima facie presumption of ill-gotten wealth, pursuant to Section 2 of Republic Act No. (RA) 1379.

The petitioners Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and Imelda Romualdez-Marcos sought reconsideration of the denial of their petition. The Court denied with finality the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners.

The corporate entity by the name "Arelma, Inc.," maintained an account and portfolio in Merrill Lynch, New York, and was purportedly organized for the purpose of hiding ill-gotten wealth.

The earlier Decision of the Court in G.R. No. 152154 affirmed the partial summary judgment only over the Swiss deposits which the Sandiganbayan declared as forfeited in favor of the Republic of the Philippines.

The Court however held that Respondent Republic’s success in obtaining summary judgment over the Swiss accounts did not mean its preclusion from seeking partial summary judgment over a different subject matter covered by the same petition for forfeiture.

The Court stated that the underlying forfeiture case docketed as Civil Case No. 0141 before the Sandiganbayan pertained to the recovery of all the assets enumerated therein, such as (1) holding companies, agro-industrial ventures and other investments; (2) landholdings, buildings, condominium units, mansions; (3) New York properties; (4) bills amounting to Php 27,744,535, time deposits worth Php 46.4 million, foreign currencies and jewelry seized by the United States customs authorities in Honolulu, Hawaii; (5) USD 30 million in the custody of the Central Bank in dollar-denominated Treasury Bills; shares of stock, private vehicles, and real estate in the United States, among others.

The Swiss Deposits Decision, G.R. No. 152154, dealt only with the summary judgment as to the five Swiss accounts, because the 2000 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated 7 March 2000 specifically identified the five Swiss accounts. It did not include the Arelma account.

The Court held that to subscribe to the view of petitioners would be to forever bar the State from recovering the assets listed above, including the properties it had specifically identified in its petition for forfeiture.

Petitioner Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. acknowledged that "the subject matter of the case (i.e. the power/authority to determine whether an asset may be forfeited under R.A. 1379) was within the (Sandiganbayan’s) jurisdiction."

However, he objected to the graft court’s purported lack of territorial jurisdiction on the theory that forfeiture is an action in rem. He argued that the Sandiganbayan must first acquire territorial jurisdiction over the Arelma proceeds before the judgment may be enforced.

At the outset, the Court stated that the theory of Ferdinand Marcos Jr. failed to make a distinction between the issuance of a judgment, and its execution.

The Court further stated that it was basic that the execution of a Court’s judgment was merely a ministerial phase of adjudication. The authority of the Sandiganbayan to rule on the character of these assets as ill-gotten could not be conflated with petitioner’s concerns as to how the ruling might be effectively enforced.

More importantly, petitioner Ferdinand Marcos Jr. was reminded by the Court of his earlier insistence that R.A. 1379 was penal, therefore petitions for forfeiture filed under this law were actions in personam, not in rem.

In the aforementioned Swiss Deposits case, the Court held that Petitioner Republic had the right to a speedy disposition of this case. The Court stated that it was apparent that respondent Marcoses had been deliberately resorting to every procedural device to delay the resolution thereof. The people and the State were entitled to favorable judgment, free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.

The Court held that the Sandiganbayan did not err in granting the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, despite the fact that the Arelma account and proceeds were held abroad. To rule otherwise would contravene the intent of the forfeiture law, and would indirectly privilege violators who were able to hide public assets abroad: beyond the reach of the courts and their recovery by the State.

The Court held that forfeiture proceedings were actions considered to be in the nature of proceedings in rem or quasi in rem, such that jurisdiction over the res was acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it was brought into actual custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court was recognized and made effective. In the latter condition, the property, though at all times within the potential power of the court, might not be in the actual custody of said court.

The concept of potential jurisdiction over the res provides that in order that the court may exercise power over the res, it is not necessary that the court should take actual custody of the property, potential custody thereof being sufficient. There is potential custody when, from the nature of the action brought, the power of the court over the property is impliedly recognized by law.

Finally, the Court took note of the Decision rendered by the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court on 26 June 2012. In Swezey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., the foreign court agreed with the dismissal of the turnover proceeding against the Arelma assets initiated by alleged victims of human rights abuses during the Marcos regime. It reasoned that the Republic was a necessary party, but could not be subject to joinder in light of its assertion of sovereign immunity.

In the foregoing US decision, the New York Supreme Court held that the Republic of the Philippines' national interests would be severely prejudiced by a turnover proceeding because it had asserted a claim of ownership regarding the Arelma assets that rests on several bases: the Philippine forfeiture law that predated the tenure of President Marcos; evidence demonstrating that Marcos looted public coffers to amass a personal fortune worth billions of dollars; findings by the Philippine Supreme Court and Swiss Federal Supreme Court that Marcos stole related assets from the Republic; and, perhaps most critically, the recent determination by the Philippine Supreme Court that Marcos pilfered public funds.


Read:

https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/mar2014/gr_189434_2014.html

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner - which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law - in order to exceptionally warrant judicial intervention.

"Xxx.

In closing, the Court refers to Dichaves v . Office of the Ombudsman,51 viz:

As a general rule, this Court does not interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman's exercise of its constitutional mandate. Both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) give the Ombudsman wide latitude to act on criminal complaints against public officials and government employees. The rule on non-interference is based on the "respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman[.]"

An independent constitutional body, the Office of the Ombudsman is "beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people [,] and [is] the preserver of the integrity of the public service." Thus, it has the sole power to determine whether there is probable cause to warrant the filing of a criminal case against an accused. This function is executive in nature.

The executive determination of probable cause is a highly factual matter. It requires probing into the "existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he [or she] was prosecuted."

The Office of the Ombudsman is armed with the power to investigate. It is, therefore, in a better position to assess the strengths or weaknesses of the evidence on hand needed to make a finding of probable cause. As this Court is not a trier of facts, we defer to the sound judgment of the Ombudsman.

Practicality also leads this Court to exercise restraint in interfering with the Office of the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause. Republic v. Ombudsman Desierto explains:

[T]he functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complaint.

Invoking an exception to the rule on non-interference, petitioner alleges that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion. According to him: (a) he was not given the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, (b) the Ombudsman considered pieces of evidence not presented during the preliminary investigation, and (c) there is no probable cause to charge him with plunder.

While, indeed, this Court may step in if the public prosecutor gravely abused its discretion in acting on the case, such grave abuse must be substantiated, not merely alleged. In Casing v. Hon. Ombudsman, et al.:

Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner - which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law - in order to exceptionally warrant judicial intervention.

As in Dichaves,52 there is here no showing that the OMB gravely abused its discretion in finding probable cause against petitioners for violation of Section 7 of RA 3019, in relation to Section 8 of RA 6713 and for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties under RA 1379. The Court, therefore, adheres to the rule of judicial restraint or non-interference with the OM B's exercise of its constitutional investigative power and its consequent finding of probable cause.

Accordingly, the petition is DISMISSED and the Joint Resolution dated August 12, 2016 and Joint Order dated October 2, 2017, in Case Nos. OMB-V-C-15-0115 and OMB-V-F-15-0001, AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Xxx."

G.R. Nos. 238103 & 238223, January 06, 2020 ]
FLORENCIO TUMBOCON MIRAFLORES AND MA. LOURDES MARTIN MIRAFLORES, PETITIONERS, VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE, Respondents. 
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/jan2020/gr_238103_2020.html

Rape of minors - "[R.A. No.] 8353 amending the RPC should now be uniformly applied in cases involving sexual intercourse committed against minors, and not Section 5 (b) of [R.A. No.] 7610."

"Xxx.

In People v. Ejercito,35 the Court explained that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 or the Anti-rape Law, amending the Revised Penal Code (RPC), should be uniformly applied in rape cases against minors. The Ejercito case was reiterated in the more recent case of People v. Tulagan.36

Between Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended by [R.A. No.] 8353, x x x and Section 5 (b) of [R.A. No.] 7610, the Court deems it apt to clarify that Ejercito should be convicted under the former. Verily, penal laws are crafted by legislature to punish certain acts, and when two (2) penal laws may both theoretically apply to the same case, then the law which is more special in nature, regardless of the time of enactment, should prevail. In Teves v. Sandiganbayan:

It is a rule of statutory construction that where one statute deals with a subject in general terms, and another deals with a part of the same subject in a more detailed way, the two should be harmonized if possible; but if there is any conflict, the latter shall prevail regardless of whether it was passed prior to the general statute. Or where two statutes are of contrary tenor or of different dates but are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefor specially should prevail over the other. (Emphases in the original)

After much deliberation, the Court herein observes that [R.A. No.] 8353 amending the RPC should now be uniformly applied in cases involving sexual intercourse committed against minors, and not Section 5 (b) of [R.A. No.] 7610. Indeed, while [R.A. No. 7610 has been considered as a special law that covers the sexual abuse of minors, [R.A. No.] 8353 has expanded the reach of our already existing rape laws. These existing rape laws should not only pertain to the old Article 335 of the RPC but also to the provision on sexual intercourse under Section 5 (b) of (R.A. No.] 7610 which, applying Quimvel's characterization of a child "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other abuse," virtually punishes the rape of a minor. (Emphasis supplied)

Article 266-A of the RPC states that rape through sexual intercourse is committed as follows:

ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed.—Rape is committed:

1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;

c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. (Emphasis supplied)

The elements necessary to sustain a conviction for statutory rape are: (1) the offender is a man; (2) he had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (3) the offended party is under 12 years old.

First, it is undeniable that the accused is a man. Second, the records do not show that the accused questioned the victim's age. In fact, the parties stipulated during pre-trial that the victim was seven years old at the time of the commission of the crime. Third, the fact of carnal knowledge was proven through the AAA's Sinumpaang Salaysay and testimony in court. BBB's Sinumpaang Salaysay and testimony, the Initial Medico-Legal Report, Medico-Legal Report R09-874, and the medico-legal officer's testimony all corroborate that Gratela had carnal knowledge of AAA.

Xxx."

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. PAOLO LUIS GRATELA Y DAVILLO, Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 225961, January 06, 2020. https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/jan2020/gr_225961_2020.html

LEGAL CAPACITY TO INHERIT. -

"Xxx. 

Xxx. Under the law, specifically Article 1025 of Republic Act 386, otherwise known as the New Civil Code of the Philippines, the rules regarding a person's capacity to inherit are provided, viz:

"Article 1025. In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in case of representation, when it is proper.

A child already conceived at the time of the death of the decedent is capable of succeeding provided it be born later under the conditions prescribed in Article 41. (n) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Pertinent to the above provision, the following are considered as compulsory heirs:

"Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and descendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287.

Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.

In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.

The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent established by this Code. (807a)" (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Succinctly, a reading of the cited laws dictate that a child, regardless of status and physical condition, is deemed capacitated to inherit. In fact, aside from such capacity, a legitimate child is also considered as a compulsory heir who is entitled to receive his or her inheritance. To reiterate, the only condition required by law is for an heir, devisee or legatee to be living at the moment the succession opens.

For your guidance, there is nothing in the law which says that a person's disability, physical condition and special needs constitute a ground for disinheritance under Article 919 nor as a cause for incapacity as stated under Article 1027 of the same law.

At most, it must be noted that a person's physical incapacity and special needs may be considered as restrictions on his or her capacity to act for being akin to minority, insanity or imbecility. But the same must not be interpreted and construed to deny a child of his or her rightful inheritance. For your reference, Article 38 and Article 39 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines state the meaning of restrictions and indicate some grounds, which limit a person's capacity to act, thus:

"Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements. (32a)

Article 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity to act: age, insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family relations, alienage, absence, insolvency and trusteeship. The consequences of these circumstances are governed in this Code, other codes, the Rules of Court, and in special laws. Capacity to act is not limited on account of religious belief or political opinion.

A married woman, twenty-one (21) years of age or over, is qualified for all acts of civil life, except in cases specified by law." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

At any rate, it is worth emphasizing that a person must never be discriminated against on the sole basis of his or her mental capacity or deficiency. To elucidate, a person with special needs stands on an equal footing with any other person and is entitled to his civil rights including the right to receive inheritance. Precisely, in Section 5 of Republic Act 11036, otherwise known as the Mental Health Act, it is stated that:

"Section 5. Rights of Service Users. - Service users shall enjoy, on an equal and nondiscriminatory basis, all rights guaranteed by the Constitution as well as those recognizes under the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and all other relevant international and regional human rights conventions and declarations, including the right to:

(a) Freedom from social economic, and political discrimination and stigmatization, whether committed by public or private actors;

(b) Exercise all their inherit civil, political, economic, social, religious, educational, and cultural rights respecting individual qualities, abilities and diversity of background, without discrimination on the basis of physical disability, age, gender, sexual orientation, race, color, language, religion or nationality, ethnic, or social origin; x x x." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Xxx. "

Source:

https://www.manilatimes.net/2021/11/29/legal-advice/child-with-special-needs-can-inherit/1824021

Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy

"A Brief Primer on Petitions to Deny Due Course or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy in Philippine Elections

By: Nicolas & De Vega Law Offices 

The information provided by a candidate in his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) cannot be taken lightly. Should a candidate make false statements of a material representation in the COC, his COC may be cancelled or denied due course. Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, provides the remedy of filing a verified petition to deny due course or to cancel a COC on the ground that any material representation contained in the COC is false. The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the COC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. (Tagolino vs. HRET, G.R. No. 202202, 19 March 2013)

It must be emphasized that not all matters stated in the COC are considered material to warrant the invocation of a Section 78 petition. The material misrepresentation referred to in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code pertains to qualifications for elective office. The misrepresentation must be material, i.e. misrepresentation regarding age, residence and citizenship or non-possession of natural-born Filipino status. (Gonzalez vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 192856, 8 March 2011). Thus, the COC of a former Filipino citizen who failed to reacquire her Filipino citizenship under Republic Act 9225 can be cancelled for failure to meet the citizenship and residency requirements. (Ongsiako Reyes vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 207264) Similarly, the candidate’s status as a registered voter falls under this classification as it is a legal requirement which must be reflected in the COC. (Hayudini vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 207900, 12 April 2014). Furthermore, as held in Talaga vs. Comelec (G.R. No. 196804, 9 October 2012), violation of the three-term limit by a local official candidate can be questioned by filing a petition to deny due course or cancel COC.

On the other hand, statements that do not refer to the qualifications of a candidate cannot warrant the invocation of Section 78. Wrong entries as to the profession of a candidate is not considered a valid ground to cancel a COC. Thus, a declaration by a candidate for punong barangay in his COC that he was a Certified Public Accountant, but in fact was not, is NOT a ground to cancel the COC because profession is not a qualification for elective office and therefore not a material fact. (Lluz v. Comelec, 523 SCRA 456.) Further, the use of a name other than that stated in the certificate of birth is not a material misrepresentation. (Villafuerte vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 206698, 25 February 2014).

Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must consist of a “deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.” In other words, it must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one’s qualifications for public office. The use of surname, when not intended to mislead, or deceive the public as to one’s identity is not within the scope of the provision. (Villafuerte vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 206698, 25 February 2014).

The petition to deny due course or cancel COC must be filed within five days from the last day of the filing of the COC, but not later than 25 days from the filing thereof. It must be lodged with the Comelec in division. (Ibrahim vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 192289, 08 January 2013). However, when the ground for the petition to deny due course or cancel COC is based on a candidate’s final conviction of a crime, Comelec en banc may assume jurisdiction since it is subsumed under the Comelec’s mandate duty to enforce and administer election laws in cancelling the COC on the basis of the candidate’s perpetual absolute disqualification, the fact of which had already been established by his final conviction. As this pertains to the Comelec’s administrative functions, Comelec en banc will exercise jurisdiction over the said petition. (Jalosjos vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 205033, 18 June 2013)

The person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he never filed a COC. (Munder vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 194076, 19 October 2011). It should be clear, too, that a candidate who does not file a valid COC may not be validly substituted, because a person without a valid COC is not considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed a CoC is not at all a candidate. (Miranda v. Abaya, G.R. No. 136351, 28 July 1999) A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. (Tea vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 195229, 9 October 2012) Therefore, votes cast in favor of a candidate whose COC was cancelled either before or after the elections, are considered as stray votes. Being stray votes, should the candidate whose COC was cancelled garner the highest number of votes, he cannot be proclaimed as the winner. It shall be the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes who will be declared victorious.

Author:

Nicolas & De Vega Law Offices is a full-service law firm in the Philippines. You may visit us at the 16th Flr., Suite 1607 AIC Burgundy Empire Tower, ADB Ave., Ortigas Center, 1605 Pasig City, Metro Manila, Philippines. You may also call us at +632 4706126, +632 4706130, +632 4016392 or e-mail us at info@ndvlaw.com . Visit our website www.ndvlaw.com."

Link:

https://ndvlaw.com/a-brief-primer-on-petitions-to-deny-due-course-or-cancel-a-certificate-of-candidacy-in-philippine-elections/?amp=1

Further, this Court has ruled that "it is not necessary that the person in charge of the defendant's regular place of business be specifically authorized to receive the SUMMONS. It is enough that he appears to be in charge." In this case, Canave, a secretary whose job description necessarily includes receiving documents and other correspondence, would have the semblance of authority to accept the court documents.

"Xxx.The Issue Presented

The sole issue presented in this case is whether the CA correctly ruled that summons had not been properly served on respondent Consulta with the result that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over his person and that the judgment against him was void.

The Ruling of the Court

First of all, only Consulta brought an action for the annulment of the RTC decision. CTC and Sarayba did not. Consequently, the CA had no business deciding whether or not the latter two were properly served with summons. The right to due process must be personally invoked and its circumstances specifically alleged by the party claiming to have been denied such. [18]

Second, there is valid substituted service of summons on Consulta at his place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. According to the sheriff's return, which is prima facie evidence of the facts it states,[19] he served a copy of the complaint on Canave, an authorized representative of both Consulta and Sarayba.[20] Besides Consulta's bare allegations, he did not present evidence to rebut the presumption of regularity on the manner that the sheriff performed his official duty.[21] Nor did Consulta present clear and convincing evidence that Canave was not competent to receive the summons and the attached documents for him.

In fact, in his petition for annulment of judgment, Consulta said that CTC had been apprised of the civil action through Canave.[22] In other words, Canave was a person charged with authority to receive court documents for the company as well as its officers who held office in that company. Absent contrary evidence, the veracity of the return's content and its effectiveness stand.

Further, this Court has ruled that "it is not necessary that the person in charge of the defendant's regular place of business be specifically authorized to receive the summons. It is enough that he appears to be in charge."[23] In this case, Canave, a secretary whose job description necessarily includes receiving documents and other correspondence, would have the semblance of authority to accept the court documents.

It is true that this Court emphasized the importance of strict and faithful compliance in effecting substituted service.[24] It must, however, be reiterated that when the rigid application of rules becomes a conduit for escaping one's responsibility, the Court will intervene to set things right according to the rules.[25]

Further, Consulta does not deny a) that summons had been properly served on Sarayba, his vice-president, through Canave at the company's office; b) that the summons on him was served on the same occasion also through Canave; c) that the sheriff had succeeded in garnishing his company's bank deposits; and d) that his company subsequently made an offer to settle the judgment against it. The Court is not dumb as to believe that Consulta became aware of the suit only when the sheriff served a notice of execution sale covering his house and lot.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court REVERSES the Court of Appeals' Decision in CA-G.R. SP 94817 dated March 17, 2008 and REINSTATES the Regional Trial Court's Decision in Civil Case 70544 dated December 14, 2005.

SO ORDERED.

Xxx."

GENTLE SUPREME PHILIPPINES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. RICARDO F. CONSULTA, Respondent. G.R. No. 183182, September 01, 2010.

Murder, as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is the unlawful killing of a person which is not parricide or infanticide, provided that treachery or evident premeditation, inter alia, attended the killing.

"Xxx.

Crime committed and proper penalty

While the Decision of the trial court recognized the guilt of the petitioners for the offense as charged to have been proven beyond reasonable doubt, the trial court went on to hold them guilty to a lesser offense of homicide citing the Court's ruling in People v. Tapalla.[31] In said case, this Court declared that if the prosecution accepts from any of the defendants charged with conspiracy in the commission of a crime, a plea of guilty to a lesser offense included in the one alleged in the information, such acceptance will benefit his co-defendants. In arriving at this conclusion, the trial court was of the impression that Maramara's plea of guilty to a lesser offense of homicide in Criminal Case No. DU-3721 should benefit the petitioners in this case.

The case of Tapalla,[32] invoked by the trial court as authority in arriving at such conclusion, is not applicable in the present case. The information in Criminal Case No. DU-3721 indicting Maramara alone of murder is distinct and separate from the information charging petitioners for the same offense in the instant case. Moreover, Maramara was neither charged as co-accused of petitioners nor of conspiring to commit a crime in either case. As correctly observed by the trial court, Maramara was only a principal witness in this case[33] though admittedly a conspirator in the commission of the crime. These circumstances provide a distinction from the Tapalla case where the accused Tingzon, who pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide, was a co- accused in the same information charging him along with others of conspiring to commit murder. We therefore cannot agree with the trial court's conclusion drawn from the principle laid down in the Tapalla case and neither can we give imprimatur on the appellate court's affirmation thereof. The basis thus used is, in our opinion, wrong.

As the evidence stands, the crime committed by petitioners is murder in view of the attending circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. Murder, as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is the unlawful lolling of a person which is not parricide or infanticide, provided that treachery or evident premeditation, inter alia, attended the killing. The presence of any one of the enumerated circumstances under Article 248 is enough to qualify a killing as murder punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. When more than one qualifying circumstance is proven, as in this case, the rule is that the other must be considered as generic aggravating.[34] In the present case, the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation will be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance warranting the imposition of the penalty of death in the absence of any mitigating circumstance.[35] Since the imposition of the death penalty has been prohibited by Republic Act No. 9346,[36] a law favorable to petitioners which took effect on June 24, 2006, the penalty that should be imposed on petitioners is reduced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. Sections 2 and 3 of the Act provide:

Section 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:

a) The penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties, of the Revised Penal Code;

xxxx

Section 3. Person convicted of offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103 otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.

Civil Liability

When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and, (6) interest, in proper cases.[37]

The Decision of the trial couit as affirmed by the appellate court only awarded P50,000.00 to the legal heirs of the victim without stating the nature of this grant. As held in People v. Zamorqga, [38] civil indemnity and moral damages, being based on differen jural foundations are separate and distinct from each other. Thus, it becomes imperative for this Court to rectify the error and award additional damages following precedents.

In line with prevailing jurisprudence, we award the fixed amount of P75,000.00 for the death of the victim[39] as civil indemnity ex delicto without any need of proof other than the commission of the crime. An award of moral damages is also in order even though the prosecution did not present any proof of the heirs' emotional suffering apart from the fact of death of the victim, since the emotional wounds from the vicious killing of the victim cannot be denied.[40] The award of P75,000.00 is proper pursuant to established jurisprudence.

Although the prosecution presented evidence that the heirs had incurred actual expenses, no receipts were presented in the trial court. An award of temperate damages in lieu of actual damages in the amount of P25,000.00 to the heirs of the victim is warranted because it is reasonable to presume that when death occurs, the family of the victim suffered pecuniary loss for the wake and funeral of the victim although the exact amount was not proved.[41]

In addition, exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 should be awarded considering the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of treachery that qualified the killing to murder and evident premeditation which served as generic aggravating circumstance. Exemplary damages are awarded when treachery attended the commission of the crime.[42]

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Petitioners Gregorio Manatad, Virgilio Bug-atan and Bernie Labandero are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of murder, not homicide, qualified by treachery, and sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.

Petitioners are ORDERED to pay the heirs of victim Pastor Papauran the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Xxx."

VIRGILIO BUG-ATAN, BERME LABANDERO GREGORIO MANATAD PETITIONERS, VS. THE PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. 175195, September 15, 2010.

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2010septemberdecisions.php?id=319

Treachery and evident premeditation.

"Xxx.

Prosecution's evidence sufficiently
established the presence of treachery
and evident premeditation.

Treachery qualifies the crime to murder. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, method or forms which tend directly and especially to ensure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense that the offended party might make.[29] The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk to himself.[30]

In the present case, the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery was indubitably established. The attack on the unarmed victim was so sudden, unexpected, without preliminaries and provocation. The victim was totally unprepared and oblivious of the attack since he was peacefully resting inside his house. The single shot found its mark at the back portion of his head indicating that he was shot from behind with his back turned to the assailant. This position was disadvantageous to the victim since he was not in a position to defend himself or to retaliate. Moreover, the location of the wound obviously indicates that the assailant deliberately and consciously aimed for the vital part of the victim's body to ensure the commission of the crime. The attack from the rear is treacherous. As has been held many times, treachery exists since the defenseless victim was shot from behind. The fact that Bug-atan furnished the deadly weapon used in the shooting eloquently shows that they made a deliberate and conscious adoption of the means to kill the victim. These facts, established by evidence on record, clearly constitute treachery as defined in Article 14(16) of the Revised Penal Code.

Before evident premeditation may be appreciated, the following elements must be proved: a) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination; and, c) sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.

The foregoing requisites were fulfilled. First, it was on April 14, 1993 when Manatad and Bug-atan gave Maramara a .38 caliber revolver and P500.00 as expenses for transportation, instructing the latter to proceed to Mandaue City and kill the victim. Undisputedly, these presuppose planning. Second, the execution of the crime was done the following morning of April 15, 1993 where Bug-atan and Labandero accompanied Maramara to the house of the victim. Third, the more than one day period, at the very least, was substantial interval of time clearly sufficient to afford a full opportunity for meditation and reflection upon the consequences of their nefarious acts. These proved their premeditated design to end the life of the victim which was accomplished.

Xxx."

VIRGILIO BUG-ATAN, BERME LABANDERO GREGORIO MANATAD PETITIONERS, VS. THE PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. 175195, September 15, 2010.

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2010septemberdecisions.php?id=319

For alibi to prevail, the established doctrine is that the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis or within its immediate vicinity.

"Xxx.

Defense of alibi and denial
was correctly rejected.

For alibi to prevail, the established doctrine is that the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis or within its immediate vicinity.[25] Physical impossibility means that the accused was at such other place for such a length of time that it was impossible for him to have been at the crime scene either before or after the time he was at such other place.[26]

Manatad's alibi is that from April 11 to 15, 1993, he was in Cuyang, San Remigio and Tigbawan, Tabuelan, doing faith healing. His alibi, assuming it to be true, cannot be given merit. He could have easily been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission considering that San Remigio and Tabuelan are municipalities located in the province of Cebu. His presence therein did not, therefore, render impossible his being at the scene of the killing at Labogon, Mandaue City, a place also located in the province of Cebu.

To corroborate his exculpatory tale, Manatad presented, among others, Patrocino Vaflor and Rafaela Maglinte to support his alleged alibi. However, these witnesses were shown to be biased since they have the tendency to falsely testify in Manatad's favor for they admittedly owed him a great debt of gratitude.[27]

For his part, Labandero posits that he was in Manila at the time of the incident because of a previous death threat on him after giving his testimony in Criminal Case No. 24099 such that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis. Considering that his alibi and supposed death threat were uncorroborated and unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, the Court finds the same self-serving and deserving of no weight in law. Moreover, the fact that he has no derogatory record will not affect the outcome of his case since it does not disprove his complicity in the commission of the offense.

Respecting the denial of Bug-atan, suffice it to state that a mere denial constitutes negative evidence and warrants the least credibility or none at all. Absent any strong evidence of non-culpability, a denial crumbles in the face of positive declarations.[28]

In fine, petitioners failed to rebut the prosecution's evidence and their defense of alibi and denial must be rejected.

The foregoing notwithstanding, this Court has perused the lengthy discussion of the trial court and the assailed Decision of the appellate court.

Xxx."

VIRGILIO BUG-ATAN, BERME LABANDERO GREGORIO MANATAD PETITIONERS, VS. THE PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. 175195, September 15, 2010.

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2010septemberdecisions.php?id=319

Evaluation of the witnesses' credibility is a matter best left to the trial court.

"xxx.

Evaluation of the witnesses' credibility
is a matter best left to the trial court.

Indubitably, the credibility of the testimony of prosecution's prime witness Maramara is the meat of the instant controversy. Petitioners postulate that he is not a credible witness. They point out that there were inconsistencies in his testimonies vis-a-vis his confession, and that his declarations should be totally rejected considering his questionable reputation and personal background as evidenced by his previous conviction. Being a confessed conspirator, his testimony was procured from a polluted source. Moreover, he had the ill-motive of revenge against Labandero and Bug-atan considering that Labandero was a witness against Maramara in the killing of Lanogan while Bug-atan was responsible for his arrest on April 21, 1993.

We are not convinced.

Petitioners try to discredit Maramara by highlighting his alleged inconsistent statements in his extrajudicial confession and his testimony in court, i.e., he allegedly averred in his confession that Manatad and Bug-atan went to see him on April 9, 1993 whereas in his direct examination, he merely stated that there was only one person who went to him. Petitioners also invite our attention to the variance regarding the place where the meeting was held, whether it was at the house of Maramara's aunt or at the pier.

These perceived inconsistencies provide no persuasive reason for us to distrust the credibility of Maramara. They refer to minor details and not to the central fact of the crime. They are too trivial to affect his straightforward account of the killing of the victim and the complicity of the petitioners. It is settled that inconsistencies relating to minor details do not affect the creditworthiness of the witness testifying and that minor inconsistencies tend to show that the witnesses were not coached or rehearsed. This is a well- settled doctrine which need not require much documentation. The testimony of a witness must be considered in its entirety instead of in truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a testimony is not to consider only its isolated parts and anchor a conclusion on the basis of said parts.[16] At any rate, Maramara had adequately explained and properly corrected himself regarding these alleged inconsistencies during his examination in court.[17]

Maramara's previous conviction neither detracts his competency as a witness nor necessarily renders his testimony totally untrustworthy and inadmissible. While Maramara admitted to having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. DU-3721, this circumstance does not necessarily make him or his testimony ipso facto incredible. The determination of the character of a witness is not a prerequisite to belief in his testimony.[18] His alleged bad reputation, even if true, should not sway the court in the evaluation of the veracity of his testimony. Other important factors should be considered in determining the inherent probability of his statements for a convicted person is not necessarily a liar. After all, conviction of a crime, unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification of witnesses.[19] More importantly, the testimony of Maramara who undeniably pleaded guilty in killing the victim should definitely be given more weight inasmuch as his testimony pertains in not insignificant points to the specific incident. It is to be noted that Dr. Crisostomo Abbu, the medical officer who conducted the post- mortem examination on the body of the victim, provided collaborating testimony regarding the location of the inflicted wound, thereby rendering more credible the testimonial account of Maramara. In fine, we defer to the trial court's finding, sustained by the appellate court, giving full weight and credit to Maramara's testimony. The trial court's findings regarding the witness's credibility are accorded the highest degree of respect.[20]

The Court finds the supposed enmity of Maramara not sufficient reason to impel him to implicate petitioners in the killing of the victim. While it may be conceded that Labandero was a witness against Maramara in a murder case while Bug-atan was instrumental in Maramara's arrest, still, the defense was unable to conclusively establish that Maramara was ill-motivated in denouncing petitioners as his co-conspirators in the commission of the crime. There is no proof that Maramara had the intention to pervert the truth and prevaricate just to implicate petitioners in so serious a crime as murder. In fact, the trial court did not perceive such improper motivation on his part. All that petitioners had are pure speculation and afterthought. The absence of evidence of improper motive tends to indicate that a witness's testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.[21]

We see no reason to deviate from the trial court's keen observation that the credibility of Maramara as witness has remained intact notwithstanding the attempts of the defense to demolish it. Hence, his testimony should be given full weight and credit. We likewise agree with the appellate court in holding that the trial court did not err in appreciating the testimony of Maramara since it was corroborated by the testimonies of other witnesses and was given unhesitatingly in a straightforward manner and full of details which could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought. His testimony is too rich in details brought out during his examination in court which cannot simply be swept aside as mere fabrication. The declarations of the other prosecution witnesses, individually considered, may have been circumstantial and lacking in full details. But their combined testimonies somehow supplement in no small measure the testimonial account of Maramara. As we and the courts below cautiously determined, they strengthen the prosecution's evidence not only with respect to the fact of killing but also on the conspiracy angle of the case.

Xxx."

VIRGILIO BUG-ATAN, BERME LABANDERO GREGORIO MANATAD PETITIONERS, VS. THE PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. 175195, September 15, 2010.

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2010septemberdecisions.php?id=319