Children, regardless of their parents’ marital status, can now inherit from their grandparents and other direct ascendants by right of representation.

"SC Revisits ‘Iron Curtain Rule’ in Succession Law, Upholds Best Interest of the Child
March 31, 2022

Children, regardless of their parents’ marital status, can now inherit from their grandparents and other direct ascendants by right of representation.

In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, the Court En Banc reinterpreted Article 992 of the Civil Code, which prohibits nonmarital children from inheriting from their siblings who are marital children, as well as “relatives of [their] father or mother[.]” The Decision used the terms “marital” and “nonmarital” to replace the terms “legitimate” and “illegitimate” when referring to the children, as the latter terms are pejorative terms when used to describe children based on their parents’ marital status.

This case involves a woman who claims to be the nonmarital child of a man who died before she was born. After her alleged paternal grandfather died, she asserted her right to represent her deceased father—a marital child—in inheriting from her grandfather’s estate.

However, in previous cases, the Court had interpreted Article 992 as barring nonmarital children from inheriting from their grandparents and other direct ascendants, as they are covered by the term “relatives.” The Supreme Court had called this prohibition the “iron curtain rule,” inferred from a perceived hostility between the marital and nonmarital sides of a family.

Now, the Court reexamined the iron curtain rule, finding that Article 992 “should be construed to account for other circumstances of birth and family dynamics. Peace within families cannot be encouraged by callously depriving some of its members of their inheritance. Such deprivation may even be the cause of antagonism and alienation that could have been otherwise avoided.”

The Court also recognized that nonmarital children primarily suffer the consequences imposed by laws, despite the status being beyond their power to change. Some children may be nonmarital because their parents choose not to marry; in 2016, the Philippine Statistics Authority reported that, from 2007 to 2016, there was 14.4% decline in registered marriages in the country. Other children may be nonmarital because one or both of their parents are below marriageable age. In 2017 alone, 196,478 children were born to mothers 19 years old and under, and 52,342 children were sired by fathers 19 years old and under. There are also children who are nonmarital when their mother was a survivor of sexual assault who did not marry the perpetrator; or when one parent dies before they can marry the other parent.

Departing from regressive conjectures about family life in favor of the best interests of the child, the Court abandoned the presumption that “nonmarital children are products of illicit relationships or that they are automatically placed in a hostile environment perpetrated by the marital family.”

The Court ruled that grandparents and other direct ascendants are outside the scope of “relatives” under Article 992. “Both marital and nonmarital children, whether born from a marital or nonmarital child, are blood relatives of their parents and other ascendants.” Thus, a nonmarital child’s right of representation should be governed by Article 982 of the Civil Code, which does not differentiate based on the birth status of grandchildren and other direct descendants.

The two amici curiae appointed by the Court, Dean Cynthia Del Castillo and Professor Elizabeth Aguiling-Pangalangan, also contributed insights on the Civil Code, Family Code, and jurisprudential treatment of nonmarital children.

However, because of factual issues with the nonmarital child’s claim of filiation, the Court remanded the case to the Regional Trial Court and ordered it to receive further evidence, including DNA evidence. It emphasized that DNA testing is a valid method of determining filiation in all cases where this is an issue.

A copy of the decision will be uploaded by the SC Public Information Office to the website once it is available.

(G.R. Nos. 208912 and 209018, Aquino v. Aquino, December 7, 2021)."


Read:

https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/25819/

SC Issues Rules on Expedited Procedures in the First Level Courts - March 2, 2022

Rules on Expedited Procedures in First Level Courts (A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC)

"x x x. 

The Supreme Court, during its En Banc deliberation on Tuesday, March 1, 2022, approved the procedural rules EXPEDITING CRIMINAL AND CIVIL ACTIONS filed before the FIRST LEVEL COURTS.

This EFFECTIVELY AMENDED the 1991 Revised Rule on SUMMARY PROCEDURE and 2016 Revised Rules on SMALL CLAIMS CASES.

Entitled Rules on Expedited Procedures in First Level Courts (A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC), the same will take effect after its required publication in two newspapers of general circulation.

The new Rules recalibrates, reconciles, and harmonizes the coverage of the Revised Rule on SUMMARY PROCEDURE and SMALL CLAIMS CASES following the enactment of REPUBLIC ACT (RA) No. 11576, which EXPANDED the JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT cognizable by the FIRST LEVEL COURTS to ₱2,000,000.00 for CIVIL ACTIONS MONETARY CLAIMS.

The Rules provide for a more efficient and expedited procedure GOVERNING BOTH SUMMARY PROCEDURE AND SMALL CLAIMS CASES.

The provisions on PROHIBITED PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS and SERVICE pursuant to INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS under the 2019 AMENDMENTS to the 1997 Rules of CIVIL PROCEDURE have also been INCORPORATED , and VIDEOCONFERENCING HEARINGS have been AUTHORIZED AT ANY STAGE of the proceedings.

The salient features of the Rules include:

RULE ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE

CIVIL CASES covered by the rule on SUMMARY PROCEDURE now consist of:

1) FORCIBLE ENTRY and UNLAWFUL DETAINED cases;

2) CIVIL ACTIONS and complaints for DAMAGES where the claims DO NOT EXCEED ₱2,000,000.00;

3) cases for ENFORCEMENT OF BARANGAY AMICABLE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND ARBITRATION AWARD where the money claim EXCEEDS ₱1,000,000.00;

4) cases SOLELY for the REVIVAL OF JUDGMENT OF ANY FIRST LEVEL COURT; and

5) the CIVIL ASPECT of violations of BATAS PAMBANSA BLG . 22 (BP 22), IF NO CRIMINAL ACTION HAS BEEN INSTITUTED.

Provisions on the evidentiary nature of PLEADINGS, FILING and SERVICE , and PRE-TRIAL from the 2019 AMENDMENTS have likewise been ADOPTED , UNLESS INCONSISTENT.

With respect to CRIMINAL CASES, violation of BP 22 is explicitly included, and the PENALTY THRESHOLD of all other criminal cases is increased to imprisonment NOT EXCEEDING ONE YEAR, or a FINE NOT EXCEEDING ₱50,000.00, or BOTH, and a FINE NOT EXCEEDING ₱150,000.00 for offenses involving DAMAGE TO PROPERTY THROUGH CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE.

ARRAIGNMENT and PRE-TRIAL shall be scheduled and conducted in accordance with the REVISED GUIDELINES FOR CONTINUOUS TRIAL OF CRIMINAL CASES.

The procedure of APPEAL has also been simplified.

Any JUDGMENT, FINAL ORDER, or FINAL RESOLUTION may be APPEALED to the appropriate REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (RTC) exercising jurisdiction over the territory under RULE 40 for CIVIL CASES and RULE 122 for CRIMINAL CASES, of the Rules of Court.

The JUDGMENT OF THE RTC ON THE APPEAL shall be FINAL , EXECUTORY, and UNAPPEALABLE.

RULE ON SMALL CLAIMS

The Rules INCREASES the threshold amount of SMALL CLAIMS CASES to ₱1,000,000.00 and NO LONGER MAKES A DISTINCTION whether the claim is filed before the first level courts WITHIN OR OUTSIDE METRO MANILA .

The claim or demand may be for MONEY OWED under CONTRACTS of LEASE , LOAN and OTHER CREDIT ACCOMMODATIONS, SERVICES , and SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY.

The RECOVERY OF PERSONAL PROPERTY is EXCLUDED , UNLESS made subject of a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT between the parties.

Nevertheless, the ENFORCEMENT of BARANGAY AMICABLE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND ARBITRATION AWARDS where the MONEY CLAIM DOES not EXCEED ₱1,000,000.00 is likewise COVERED.

The Rules ALLOWS the SERVICE OF SUMMONS BY THE PLAINTIFF if RETURNED UNSERVED by the SHERIFF or proper court officer, or if it shall be served OUTSIDE THE JUDICIAL REGION of the court where the case is pending.

If the case is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO SERVE SUMMONS , the case may be RE-FILED WITHIN ONE YEAR from notice of dismissal, subject to the payment of a REDUCED FILING FEE OF ₱2,000.00.

NOTICES may now be served through MOBILE PHONE CALLS , SMS, or INSTANT MESSAGING SOFTWARE APPLICATIONS .

While VIDEOCONFERENCING HEARINGS should be conducted using the Supreme Court-prescribed platform, the court may ALLOW the use of ALTERNATIVE PLATFORMS or INSTANT MESSAGING APPLICATIONS WITH VIDEO CALL FEATURES , under certain CONDITIONS.

The 30-day period within which TO SET THE HEARING was EXTENDED TO 60 DAYS if ONE of the DEFENDANTS RESIDES or is HOLDING BUSINESS OUTSIDE the JUDICIAL REGION of the court.

There shall ONLY BE ONE HEARING DAY , with JUDGMENT RENDERED within 24 HOURS from its termination.

The SMALL CLAIMS FORMS have also been updated and improved for ease of use, with translations in FILIPINO.

The Rules maintained that the DECISION rendered by the first level courts in SMALL CLAIMS shall be FINAL , EXECUTORY and UNAPPEALABLE.

PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF NEW RULES

The Rules shall have a PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION.

Cases covered by these Rules which are currently pending with the first level and second level courts shall remain with and be decided by those same courts, in accordance with the applicable rules at the time of their filing.

The SC Public Information Office will immediately upload a copy of the Rules in the Supreme Court website upon official receipt of the same from the Office of the Clerk of Court En Banc. ###"

DOWNLOAD the new rules from the SC website -

https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/24982/

Homicide, penalty for.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. GREGORIO HERMOSA and GABRIEL ABELINDE, accused-appellants. G.R. No. 131805, September 7, 2001.


"In the ABSENCE of any circumstance that would QUALIFY the killing to MURDER, the appellants should only be held liable for HOMICIDE. ARTICLE 249 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

"Article 249. HOMICIDE. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall KILL another WITHOUT the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of HOMICIDE and punished by RECLUSION TEMPORAL."

RECLUSION TEMPORAL has a range of 12 YEARS AND 1 DAY to 20 YEARS of imprisonment. Applying the INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW, there being NO MITIGATING OR AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE, the MAXIMUM TERM of the penalty shall be imposed in the MEDIUM PERIOD 47 OF RECLUSIO TEMPORAL, ranging from 14 YEARS , 8 months and 1 day to 17 YEARS and 4 months. The MINIMUM TERM of the penalty shall be taken from the penalty NEXT LOWER IN DEGREE or PRISON MAYOR, in ANY of its PERIODS, ranging from six (6) years."

Abuse of superior strength.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. GREGORIO HERMOSA and GABRIEL ABELINDE, accused-appellants. G.R. No. 131805, September 7, 2001.


"NOR can we agree that the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength. This circumstance should be appreciated whenever there is a NOTORIOUS INEQUALITY OF FORCES between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of SUPERIORITY OF STRENGTH NOTORIOUSLY ADVANTAGEOUS FOR THE AGGRESSOR, SELECTED or TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF by him in the commission of the crime.45 MERE superiority in number is NOT ENOUGH to constitute superior strength. There must be CLEAR PROOF OF DELIBERATE INTENT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE of the same. The prosecution did not adduce evidence on these actual issues.46 It is UNCLEAR whether the appellants DELIBERATELY TOOK ADVANTAGE of their combined strength TO FACILITATE the commission of the crime. WHAT Macuibelle saw was just the ONSET of the attack."

NIGHTTIME did not aggravate the crime.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. GREGORIO HERMOSA and GABRIEL ABELINDE, accused-appellants. G.R. No. 131805, September 7, 2001.

"We also hold that the circumstance of NIGHTTIME did not aggravate the crime. There is NO PROOF that the appellants PURPOSELY SOUGHT nighttime TO FACILITATE the commission of the crime. The mere fact that the crime was committed at nighttime DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY MAKE NOCTURNITY an aggravating circumstance.44

TREACHERY was not established.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. GREGORIO HERMOSA and GABRIEL ABELINDE, accused-appellants. G.R. No. 131805, September 7, 2001.

"We also rule that TREACHERY was not established. The essence of treachery is that the attack is DELIBERATE and WITHOUT WARNING — done in a SWIFT and UNEXPECTED manner, affording the hapless and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape.42 The prosecution did not prove the deliberateness of the attack. The evidence shows that Macuibelle peeped through the hole on the wall only after she heard the victim made an outcry. Appellant Hermosa was already at the main door and was then in the act of assaulting the victim. Macuibelle could not give the particulars on HOW the killing of the victim BEGAN and DEVELOPED . Absent any particulars on HOW the aggression COMMENCED or HOW the act which RESULTED in the victim's death unfolded, treachery cannot be appreciated.43 We note, further, that the victim was AWARE of the danger on her life. She was HOLDING A BOLO when she was attacked. She was also ABLE TO SHOUT for help. In light of these circumstances, treachery cannot be appreciated."

DENIAL and ALIBI

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. GREGORIO HERMOSA and GABRIEL ABELINDE, accused-appellants. G.R. No. 131805, September 7, 2001.


“The appellants' defense of DENIAL and ALIBI cannot prevail over their POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION . ALIBI is the weakest defense as it is easy to concoct. For alibi to prosper an accused must not only prove that he was ABSENT at the crime scene at the time of its commission, but also, that it was PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE for him to be so situated at said distance.35

In the case at bar, it was established that, at the time of the incident, appellant Abelinde was residing in San Pedro, a barangay ADJACENT to barangay Gahit (the locus criminis). The distance of his house from the victim's house was about three hundred (300) meters.36 Appellant Hermosa himself admitted that, from the said distance, it would only take him FIVE (5) MINUTES TO REACH the victim's place on foot.37 Thus, even assuming that the appellants went to Abelinde's house after the dance, it was NOT IMPOSSIBLE for them to go to the house of the victim and commit the crime.”

DOUBLE JEOPARDY - "In criminal cases, a judgment of acquittal is immediately final upon its promulgation. It cannot be recalled for correction or amendment except in the cases already mentioned nor withdrawn by another order reconsidering the dismissal of the case since the inherent power of a court to modify its order or decision does not extend to a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LINO ALEJANDRO Y PIMENTEL, Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 223099, January 11, 2018.

"In our jurisdiction, We adhere to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable.20

The 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of the accused against double jeopardy, thus:

Section 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 and 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure strictly adhere to the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy and provide for the requisites in order for double jeopardy to attach. For double jeopardy to attach, the following elements must concur: (1) a valid information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the crime charged; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent.21

Here, all the elements were present. There was a valid information for two counts of rape over which the RTC had jurisdiction and to which the accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty. After the trial, a judgment of acquittal was thereafter rendered and promulgated on July 25, 2011. What is peculiar in this case is that a judgment of acquittal was rendered based on the mistaken notion that the private complainant failed to testify; allegedly because of the mix-up of orders with a different case involving the same accused-appellant. This, however, does not change the fact that a judgment of acquittal had already been promulgated. Indeed, a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is final, unappealable, and immediately executory upon its promulgation.22

The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions, which are: (1) Where there has been deprivation of due process and where there is a finding of a mistrial, or (2) Where there has been a grave abuse of discretion under exceptional circumstances. We find that these exceptions do not exist in this case.23 Here, there was no deprivation of due process or mistrial because the records show that the prosecution was actually able to present their case and their witnesses.

A mere manifestation also will not suffice in assailing a judgment of acquittal. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules should have been filed. A judgment of acquittal may only be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules. If the petition, regardless of its nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the court a quo, the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy would be violated.24

In People v. Laguio, Jr.,25 this Court stated that the only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion, thus:

x x x The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham. However, while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.26

In this case, the acquittal was not even questioned on the basis of grave abuse of discretion. It was only through a supposed mere manifestation of the prosecutor, a copy of which was not in the records, that the RTC was apprised of the supposed mistake it committed.

A similar instance had been ruled upon by this Court in Argel v. Judge Pascua,27 where the Judge was sanctioned for gross ignorance of the law for recalling a judgment of acquittal, thus:

As stated earlier, complainant was accused of murder in Crim. Case No. 2999-V of the RTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur. On 13 August 1993 judgment was promulgated acquitting him on the ground that there was no witness who positively identified him as the perpetrator of the crime. However after respondent's attention was called by the private complainant's counsel to the fact that there was such a witness and confirmed by respondent upon re-reading her notes, she issued an Order dated 16 August 1993 stating her intention to "revise" the previous judgment of acquittal, branded the same as "uncalled for" and "not final," and reset the case for another "rendering of the decision." The reason given was that the judgment of acquittal was rendered without all the facts and circumstances being brought to her attention.

Respondent Judge explained. that the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimony of eyewitness Tito Retreta was not attached to the records when she wrote her decision. Thus, in a Decision dated 19 August 1993, respondent Judge declared herein complainant Miguel Argel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder on the basis of the eyewitness account of Tito Retreta, sentenced complainant Argel to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P60,000.00 for actual damages.

Too elementary is the rule that a decision once final is no longer susceptible to amendment or alteration except to correct errors which are clerical in nature, to clarify any ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion or to rectify a travesty of justice brought about by a moro-moro or mock trial. A final decision is the law of the case and is immutable and unalterable regardless of any claim of error or incorrectness.

In criminal cases, a judgment of acquittal is immediately final upon its promulgation. It cannot be recalled for correction or amendment except in the cases already mentioned nor withdrawn by another order reconsidering the dismissal of the case since the inherent power of a court to modify its order or decision does not extend to a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case.

Complainant herein was already acquitted of murder by respondent in a decision promulgated on 13 August 1993. Applying the aforestated rule, the decision became final and immutable on the same day. As a member of the bench who is always admonished to be conversant with the latest legal and judicial developments, more so of elementary rules, respondent should have known that she could no longer "revise" her decision of acquittal without violating not only an elementary rule of procedure but also the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy. When the law is so elementary, not to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. (Emphasis Ours)28

Similarly, in this case, the RTC was reminded of the fact that private complainant AAA testified during the trial, only after it had already rendered and promulgated the judgment of acquittal. The RTC then realized that had AAA's testimony been taken into account, the case would have had a different outcome. Consequently, the RTC issued an Order recalling the judgment of acquittal for the purpose of rectifying its error, and thereafter, rendered a Decision convicting the accused-appellant for two counts of rape. This, however, cannot be countenanced for a contrary ruling would transgress the accused-appellant's constitutionally-enshrined right against double jeopardy."

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10368 - AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REPARATION AND RECOGNITION OF VICTIMS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS DURING THE MARCOS REGIME, DOCUMENTATION OF SAID VIOLATIONS, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10368

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REPARATION AND RECOGNITION OF VICTIMS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS DURING THE MARCOS REGIME, DOCUMENTATION OF SAID VIOLATIONS, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

CHAPTER I

PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS

Section 1. Short Title. — This Act shall be known as the "Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act of 2013″. 

Section 2. Declaration of Policy. — Section 11 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines declares that the State values the dignity of every human, person and guarantees full respect for human rights. Pursuant to this declared policy, Section 12 of Article III of the Constitution prohibits the use of torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will and mandates the compensation and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices and their families.

By virtue of Section 2 of Article II of the Constitution adopting generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, the Philippines adheres to international human rights laws and conventions, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment which imposes on each State party the obligation to enact domestic legislation to give effect to the rights recognized therein and to ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms have been violated shall have an effective remedy, even if the violation is committed by persons acting in an official capacity. In fact, the right to a remedy is itself guaranteed under existing human rights treaties and/or customary international law, being peremptory in character (jus cogens) and as such has been recognized as non-derogable.

Consistent with the foregoing, it is hereby declared the policy of the State to recognize the heroism and sacrifices of all Filipinos who were victims of summary execution, torture, enforced or involuntary disappearance and other gross human rights violations committed during the regime of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos covering the period from September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986 and restore the victims’ honor and dignity. The State hereby acknowledges its moral and legal obligation to recognize and/or provide reparation to said victims and/or their families for the deaths, injuries, sufferings, deprivations and damages they suffered under the Marcos regime.

Similarly, it is the obligation of the State to acknowledge the sufferings and damages inflicted upon persons whose properties or businesses were forcibly taken over, sequestered or used, or those whose professions were damaged and/or impaired, or those whose freedom of movement was restricted, and/or such other victims of the violations of the Bill of Rights.

Section 3. Definition of Terms. — The following terms as used in this Act shall mean:

(a) Detention refers to the act of taking a person into custody against his will by persons acting in an official capacity and/or agents of the State.

(b) Human rights violation refers to any act or omission committed during the period from September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986 by persons acting in an official capacity and/or agents of the State, but shall not be limited to the following:

(1) Any search, arrest and/or detention without a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest issued by a civilian court of law, including any warrantless arrest or detention carried out pursuant to the declaration of Martial Law by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos as well as any arrest., detention or deprivation of liberty carried out during the covered period on the basis of an "Arrest, Search and Seizure Order (ASSO)", a "Presidential Commitment Order {PCO)" or a "Preventive Detention Action (PDA)" and such other similar executive issuances as defined by decrees of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, or in any manner that the arrest, detention or deprivation, of liberty was effected;

(2) The infliction by a person acting in an official capacity and/or an agent of the State of physical injury, torture, killing, or violation of other human rights, of any person exercising civil or political rights, including but not limited to the freedom of speech, assembly or organization; and/or the right to petition the government for redress of grievances, even if such violation took place during or in the course of what the authorities at the time deemed an illegal assembly or demonstration: Provided, That torture in any form or under any circumstance shall be considered a human rights violation;

(3) Any enforced or involuntary disappearance caused upon a person who was arrested, detained or abducted against one’s will or otherwise deprived of one’s liberty, as defined in Republic Act No. 10350 1, otherwise known as the "Anti-Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance Act of 2012″;

(4) Any force or intimidation causing the involuntary exile of a person from the Philippines;

(5) Any act of force, intimidation or deceit causing unjust or illegal takeover of a business, confiscation of property, detention of owner/s and or their families, deprivation of livelihood of a person by agents of the State, including those caused by Ferdinand E. Marcos, his spouse Imelda R. Marcos, their immediate relatives by consanguinity or affinity, as well as those persons considered as among their close relatives, associates, cronies and subordinates under Executive Order No. 1, issued on February 28, 1986 by then President Corazon C. Aquino in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution;

(6) Any act or series of acts causing, committing and/or conducting the following:

(i) Kidnapping or otherwise exploiting children of persons suspected of committing acts against the Marcos regime;

(ii) Committing sexual offenses against human rights victims who are detained and/or in the course of conducting military and/or police operations; and

(iii) Other violations and/or abuses similar or analogous to the above, including those recognized by international law.

(c) Human Rights Violations Victim (HRVV) refers to a person whose human rights were violated by persons acting in an official capacity and/or agents of the State as defined herein. In order to qualify for reparation under this Act, the human rights violation must have been committed during the period from September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986: Provided, however, That victims of human rights violations that were committed one (1) month before September 21, 1972 and one (1) month after February 25, 1986 shall be entitled to reparation, under this Act if they can establish that the violation was committed:

(1) By agents of the State and/or persons acting in an official capacity as defined hereunder;

(2) For the purpose of preserving, maintaining, supporting or promoting the said regime; or

(3) To conceal abuses during the Marcos regime and/or the effects of Martial Law.

(d) Persons Acting in an Official Capacity and/or Agents of the State.—The following persons shall be deemed persons acting in an official capacity and/or agents of the State under this Act:

(1) Any member of the former Philippine Constabulary (PC), the former Integrated National Police (INP), the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) from September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986 as well as any civilian agent attached thereto; and any member of a paramilitary group even if one is not organically part of the PC, the INP, the AFP or the CHDF so long as it is shown that the group was organized, funded, supplied with equipment, facilities and/or resources, and/or indoctrinated, controlled and/or supervised by any person acting in an official capacity and/or agent of the State as herein defined;

(2) Any member of the civil service, including persons who held elective or appointive public office at any time from September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986;

(3) Persons referred to in Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 1, creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), issued on February 28, 1986 and related laws by then President Corazon C. Aquino in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution, including former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, spouse Imelda R. Marcos, their immediate relatives by consanguinity or affinity, as well as their close relatives, associates, cronies and subordinates; and

(4) Any person or group/s of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State during the Marcos regime.

(e) Torture refers to any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on any person under the custody of persons acting in an official capacity and/or agents of the State, as defined by law, jurisprudence, international conventions and Republic Act No. 9745, otherwise known as the "Anti-Torture Act of 2009″.

Section 4. Entitlement to Monetary Reparation. — Any HRVV qualified under this Act shall receive reparation from the State, free of tax, as herein prescribed: Provided, That for a deceased or involuntary disappeared HRVV, the legal heirs as provided for in the Civil Code of the Philippines, or such other person named by the executor or administrator of the deceased or involuntary disappeared HRVV’s estate in that order, shall be entitled to receive such reparation: Provided, further, That no special power of attorney shall be recognized in the actual disbursement of the award, and only the victim or the aforestated successor(s)-in-interest shall be entitled to personally receive said reparation form the Board, unless the victim involved is shown to be incapacitated to the satisfaction of the Board: Provided, furthermore, That the reparation received under this Act shall be without prejudice to the receipt of any other sum by the HRVV from any other person or entity in any case involving violations of human rights as defined in this Act.

Section 5. Nonmonetary Reparation. — The Department of Health (DOH), the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the Department of Education (DepED), the Commission on Higher Education (CHED), the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA), and such other government agencies shall render the necessary services as nonmonetary reparation for HRVVs and/or their families, as may be determined by the Board pursuant to the provisions of this Act. The amount necessary for this purpose shall be sourced from the budget of the agency concerned in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).

Section 6. Amount of Reparation. — The amount of reparation under this Act shall be in proportion to the gravity of the human rights violation committed on the HRVV and in accordance with the number of points assigned to the individual under Section 19 hereof.

Section 7. Source of Reparation. — The amount of Ten billion pesos (P10,000,000,000.00) plus accrued interest which form part of the funds transferred to the government of the Republic of the Philippines by virtue of the December 10, 1997 Order of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, adjudged by the Supreme Court of the Philippines as final and executory in Republic vs. Sandiganbayan on July 15, 2003 (G.R. No. 152154) as Marcos ill-gotten wealth and forfeited in favor of the Republic of the Philippines, shall be the principal source funds for the implementation of this Act.

CHAPTER II

THE HUMAN RIGHTS VICTIMS’ CLAIMS BOARD

Section 8. Creation and Composition of the Human Rights Victims’ Claims Board. — There is hereby created an independent and quasi-judicial body to be known as the Human Rights Victims’ Claims Board, hereinafter referred to as the Board. It shall be composed of nine (9) members, who shall possess the following qualifications:

(a) Must be of known probity, competence and integrity;

(b) Must have a deep and thorough understanding and knowledge of human rights and involvement in efforts against human rights violations committed during the regime of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos;

(c) At least three (3) of them must be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years; and

(d) Must have a clear and adequate understanding and commitment to human rights protection, promotion and advocacy.

The Human Rights Victims’ Claims Board shall be attached to but shall not be under the Commission on Human Rights (CHR).

The Board shall organize itself within thirty (30) days from the completion of appointment of all nine (9) members and shall thereafter organize its Secretariat.

Section 9. Appointment to the Board. — The President shall appoint the Chairperson and the other eight (8) members of the Board: Provided, That human rights organizations such as, but not limited to, the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines (TFDP), the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG), the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism (MABINI), the Families of Victims of Involuntary Disappearance (FIND) and the Samahan ng mga Ex-Detainees Laban sa Detensyon at Aresto (SELDA) may submit nominations to the President.

Section 10. Powers and Functions of the Board. — The Board shall have the following powers and functions:

(a) Receive, evaluate, process and investigate applications for claims under this Act;

(b) Issue subpoena/s ad testificandum and subpoena/s duces tecum;

(c) Conduct independent administrative proceedings and resolve disputes over claims;

(d) Approve with finality all eligible claims under this Act;

(e) Deputize appropriate government agencies to assist it in order to effectively perform its functions;

(f) Promulgate such rules as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act, including rules of procedure in the conduct of its proceedings, with the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines having suppletory application;

(g) Exercise administrative control and supervision over its Secretariat;

(h) The Board, at its discretion, may consult the human rights organizations mentioned in Section 9 herein; and

(i) Perform such other duties, functions and responsibilities as may be necessary to effectively attain the objectives of this Act.

Section 11. Resolution, of Claims. — The Board shall be composed of three (3) divisions which shall function simultaneously and independently of each other in the resolution of claims for reparation. Each division shall be composed of one (1) Chairperson, who shall be a member of the Philippine Bar and two (2) members to be appointed by the Board en banc.

Section 12. Emoluments. — The Chairperson and members of the Board shall have the rank, salary, emoluments and allowances equivalent to s Presiding Justice and Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, respectively.

Section 13. Secretariat of the Board. — The Board shall be assisted by a Secretariat which may come from the existing personnel of the CHR, without prejudice to the hiring of additional personnel as determined by the Board to accommodate the volume of required work. The following shall be the functions of the Secretariat:

(a) Receive, evaluate, process and investigate applications for claims under this Act;

(b) Recommend to the Board the approval of applications for claims;

(c) Assist the Board in technical functions; and

(d) Perform other duties that may be assigned by the Board.

The Chairperson of the Board shall appoint a Board Secretary who shall head the Secretariat for the duration of the existence of the Board. There shall be a Technical Staff Head assisted by five (5) Legal Officers and three (3) Paralegal Officers; and an Administrative Staff Head assisted by three (3) Administrative Support Staff.

When necessary, the Board may hire additional contractual employees or contract a service provider to provide services of counselors, psychologists, social workers and public education specialists, among others, to augment the services of the Secretariat: Provided, That the maximum contract amount per year shall not exceed more than fifteen percent (15%) of the total annual operating budget of the Board.

Section 14. Operating Budget of the Board.— The operating budget of the Board shall be funded from the Ten billion peso {P10,000,000,000.00) fund, with Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) as its initial operating budget: Provided, That it shall not exceed Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) a year

Section 15. Proper Disposition of Funds. — The Board shall ensure that funds appropriated or those which may become available as reparation for HRVVs are properly disbursed in accordance with the policies stated by Congress and relevant government rules, regulations and accounting procedures.

CHAPTER III

CLAIMANTS, REPARATION AND RECOGNITION

Section 16. Claimants. — Any person who is an HRVV may file a claim with the Board for reparation and/or recognition in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

Section 17. Conclusive Presumption That One is an HRVV Under This Act. — The claimants in the class suit and direct action plaintiffs in the Human Rights Litigation Against the Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos (MDL No. 840, CA No. 88-0390) in the US Federal District Court of Honolulu, Hawaii wherein a favorable judgment has been rendered, shall be extended the conclusive presumption that they are HRVVs: Provided, That the HRVVs recognized by the Bantayog Ng Mga Bayani Foundation shall also be accorded the same conclusive presumption: Provided, further, That nothing herein shall be construed to deprive the Board of its original jurisdiction and its inherent power to determine the extent of the human rights violations and the corresponding reparation and/or recognition that may be granted.

Section 18. Motu Proprio Recognition. — The Board may take judicial notice motu proprio of individual persons who suffered human rights violations as defined herein and grant such persons recognition as HRVVs and included in the Roll of Victims as provided for in Section 26 hereof.

Section 19. Determination of Award. — (a) The Board shall follow the point system in the determination of the award. The range shall be one (1) to ten (10) points, as follows:

(1) Victims who died or who disappeared and are still missing shall be given ten (10) points;

(2) Victims who were tortured and/or raped or sexually abused shall he given six (6) to nine (9) points:

(3) Victims who were detained shall be given three (3) to five (5) points; and

(4) Victims whose rights were violated under Section 3, paragraph (b), nos. (4), (5) and (6) under this Act shall be given one (1) to two (2) points.

The Board shall exercise its powers with due discretion in the determination of points for each victim, which shall be based on the type of violation committed against the HRVV, frequently and duration of the violation. In each category, HRVVs who had suffered more would receive more points. In instances where a victim is classified in more than one category, one shall be awarded the points in the higher category: Provided, That in cases where there are several eligible claims filed for reparation by or on behalf of a particular HRVV, the Board shall award only one (1) valid claim which corresponds to the category obtaining the highest number of points for each eligible claimant.

(b) The Board shall proceed to determine the award for each claimant classified under Sections 16, 17 and 18 of this Act.

(c) The Board shall then compute the final monetary value of one’s award that is equivalent to the numerical value of one point multiplied by the number of points that a claimant is entitled to, as previously determined by the Board.

(d) Within thirty (30) days after the Board has approved with finality each eligible claim pending before it and after due publication of such legitimate claim, the award of monetary compensation shall take effect: Provided., That any pending appeal filed by an aggrieved claimant or opposite before the Board en banc must resolved by it sixty (60) days before the Board becomes functus officio.

CHAPTER IV

GENERAL- PROVISIONS

Section 20. Transfer of Funds. — Pursuant to the judgment mentioned in Section 7 hereof, the amount of Ten billion pesos (P10,000,000,000.00) plus the accrued interest are hereby set aside and appropriated to fund the purposes of this Act.

Section 21. Documentation of Human — Rights Violations Committed by the Marcos Regime. — In the implementation of this Act and without prejudice to any other documentary or other evidence that may be required for the award of any reparation, any HRVV seeking reparation shall execute a detailed sworn statement narrating the circumstances of the pertinent human rights violation/s committed.

Section 22. Publication. — Consistent with Section 23 herein, the Board, after having been duly convened, shall set the period for the commencement and termination of applications by HRVVs and cause the publication of the same: Provided, That such period shall only become operative fifteen (15) days after its last publication, which shall be once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

Section 23. Period for Filing of Claims; Waiver. — An HRVV shall file an application for reparation with the Board within six (6) months from the effectivity of the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of this Act: Provided, That failure to file an application within said period is deemed a waiver of the right to file the same: Provided, further, That for HRVVs who are deceased, incapacitated, or missing due to enforced disappearance, their legal heir/s or representatives, shall be entitled to file an application for reparation on their behalf.

Any opposition to the new application/s pursuant to Section 16 hereof shall only be entertained if such is filed within fifteen (15) days from the date of the last publication of the official list of eligible claimants as may be determined by the Board. The Board shall cause the publication of the official list of eligible claimants once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

Section 24 Appeal. — Any aggrieved claimant or oppositor may file an appeal within ten (10) calendar days from the receipt of the Resolution of the Division, to the Board en banc, whose decision shall then become final and executory.

Section 25. Penalties; Applicability of the Revised Penal Code. — Any claimant who is found by the Board, after due hearing, to have filed a fraudulent claim, shall be referred to the appropriate office for prosecution. If convicted, he shall suffer the imprisonment of eight (8) to ten (10) years, shall be disqualified from public office and employment and shall be deprived of the right to vote and be voted for in any national or local election, even after the service of sentence unless granted absolute pardon.

Any member of the Board and its Secretariat, public officer, employee of an agency or any private individual mandated to implement this Act, who shall misuse, embezzle or misappropriate the funds for the reparation of HRVVs or who shall commit fraud in the processing of documents and claims of HRVVs, or shall conspire with any individual to commit the same, shall also be prosecuted,

Any member of the Board and its Secretariat, public officer, employee of an agency or any private individual mandated to implement this Act, who may have been found guilty of committing any or all of the prohibited acts stated in the preceding paragraph, or those acts punishable under the Revised Penal Code, shall be penalized under the pertinent provisions in the Code and relevant special penal laws.

Section 26. Roll of Victims. — Persons who are HRVVs, regardless of whether they opt to seek reparation or not, shall be given recognition by enshrining their names in a Roll of Human Rights Victims to be prepared by the Board.

A Memorial/Museum/Library shall be established in honor and in memory of the victims of human rights violations whose names shall be inscribed in the Roll. A compendium of their sacrifices shall be prepared and may be readily viewed and accessed in the internet. The Memorial/Museum/Library/Compendium shall have an appropriation of at least Five hundred million pesos (P500,000,000.00) from the accrued interest of the Ten billion peso (P10,000,000,000.00) fund.

The Roll may also be displayed in government agencies as maybe designated by the HRVV Memorial Commission as created hereunder.

Section 27. Human, Rights Violations Victims’ Memorial Commission.. — There is hereby created a Commission to be known as the Human Rights Violations Victims’ Memorial Commission, hereinafter referred to as the Commission, primarily for the establishment, restoration, preservation and conservation of the Memorial/Museum/Library/Compendium in honor of the HRVVs during the Marcos regime.

The powers and functions of the Commission shall be assumed by the Board of Trustees which shall be composed of the following; Chairperson of the CHR as Chairperson; Chairperson of the National Historical Commission as Co-Chairperson; and Chairpersons of the CHED, the National Commission on Culture and the Arts (NCCA), the Secretary of the Department of Education and the Head of the University of the Philippines Diliman Main Library, as members.

The Board of Trustees shall have the authority to hire and appoint its officials and employees, receive donations and grants for and on its behalf, and generate revenues for the benefit of the Commission.

The Commission shall be attached to the CHR solely for budgetary and administrative purposes. The operating budget of the Commission shall be appropriated from the General Appropriations Act.

The Commission shall also coordinate and collaborate with the DepED and the CHED to ensure that the teaching of Martial Law atrocities, the lives and sacrifices of HRVVs in our history are included in the basic, secondary and tertiary education curricula.

CHAPTER V

FINAL PROVISIONS

Section 28. Guidelines for the Implementing Rules and Regulations (1RR). — In implementing this Act and in formulating the corresponding rules and regulations, and to ensure that all applications are properly screened for fraudulent claims, the Board must provide for:

(a) Transparency in the processing of the claims;

(b) A procedure that allows any concerned party to oppose an application or claim on the ground that it is fraudulent, fictitious or spurious and gives that party the opportunity to question the same and to present evidence in support thereof; and

(c) A procedure that is speedy and expeditious without sacrificing any of the parties’ fundamental rights.

Within fifteen (15) days from the date of its organization, the Board shall promulgate the necessary IRR and procedures for the effective implementation of this Act. The IRR shall be effective fifteen (15) days after its publication in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

Section 29. Work Period; Sunset Clause. — The Board shall complete its work within two (2) years from the effectivity of the IRR promulgated by it. After such period, it shall become functus officio.

Section 30. Separability Clause. — If, for any reason, any section or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, such other sections or provisions not affected thereby shall remain in full force and effect.

Section 31. Repealing Clause. — All laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Act, including Section 63(b) of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 and Section 40(a) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, are hereby repealed, amended or modified accordingly.1âwphi1

Section 32. Effectivity Clause. — This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

Approved,

(Sgd.) JUAN PONCE ENRILE
President of the Senate (Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker of the House of Representatives


This Act which is a consolidation of House Bill No. 5990 and Senate Bill No. 3334 was finally passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate on January 28, 2013.



(Sgd.) EMMA LIRIO-REYES
Secretary of Senate

(Sgd.) MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP
Secretary General
House of Representatives


Approved: FEB 25 2013

(Sgd.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III
President of the Philippines

The UNPAID ESTATE TAXES due on the MARCOS ESTATE.

JURISPRUDENCE:

In the 1997 case of “FERDINAND R. MARCOS II, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE and HERMINIA D. DE GUZMAN, respondents”, GR No. 120880, June 5, 1997, the petitioner assailed the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 31363, where the said appellate court held that the deficiency income tax assessments and estate tax assessment were already final and unappealable and the subsequent levy of real properties was a tax remedy resorted to by the government, sanctioned by Section 213 and 218 of the National Internal Revenue Code.

This summary tax remedy was distinct and separate from the other tax remedies (such as Judicial Civil actions and Criminal actions), and was not affected or precluded by the pendency of any other tax remedies instituted by the government.

BACKGROUNDER

More than seven years since the demise of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos, the former President of the Republic of the Philippines, the matter of the settlement of his estate, and its dues to the government in estate taxes, were still unresolved.

Specifically, petitioner Ferdinand R. Marcos II, the eldest son of the decedent, questioned the actuations of the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue in assessing, and collecting through the summary remedy of Levy on Real Properties, estate and income tax delinquencies upon the estate and properties of his father, despite the pendency of the proceedings on probate of the will of the late president, which is docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 10279 in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 156.

Petitioner had filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with an application for writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order on June 28, 1993, seeking to: Annul and set aside the Notices of Levy on real property dated February 22, 1993 and May 20, 1993, issued by respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue; Annul and set aside the Notices of Sale dated May 26, 1993; and Enjoin the Head Revenue Executive Assistant Director II (Collection Service), from proceeding with the Auction of the real properties covered by Notices of Sale.

After the parties had pleaded their case, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision 2 on November 29, 1994, ruling that the deficiency assessments for estate and income tax made upon the petitioner and the estate of the deceased President Marcos had already become final and unappealable, and may thus be enforced by the summary remedy of levying upon the properties of the late President, as was done by the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

Unperturbed, petitioner appealed the CA decision before the Supreme Court.

THE FACTS AS FOUND BY THE COURT OF APPEALS

On September 29, 1989, former President Ferdinand Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA.

On June 27, 1990, a Special Tax Audit Team was created to conduct investigations and examinations of the tax liabilities and obligations of the late president, as well as that of his family, associates and "cronies". Said audit team concluded its investigation with a Memorandum dated July 26, 1991. The investigation disclosed that the Marcoses failed to file a written notice of the death of the decedent, an estate tax return, as well as several income tax returns covering the years 1982 to 1986, — all in violation of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).

Subsequently, criminal charges were filed against Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos before the Regional Trial of Quezon City for violations of Sections 82, 83 and 84 (penalized under Sections 253 and 254 in relation to Section 252 — a & b) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue thereby caused the preparation and filing of the Estate Tax Return for the estate of the late president, the Income Tax Returns of the Spouses Marcos for the years 1985 to 1986, and the Income Tax Returns of petitioner Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos II for the years 1982 to 1985.

On July 26, 1991, the BIR issued the following:

(1) Deficiency estate tax assessment no. FAC-2-89-91-002464 (against the estate of the late president Ferdinand Marcos in the amount of P23,293,607,638.00 Pesos);

(2) Deficiency income tax assessment no. FAC-1-85-91-002452 and Deficiency income tax assessment no. FAC-1-86-91-002451 (against the Spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos in the amounts of P149,551.70 and P184,009,737.40 representing deficiency income tax for the years 1985 and 1986);

(3) Deficiency income tax assessment nos. FAC-1-82-91-002460 to FAC-1-85-91-002463 (against petitioner Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos II in the amounts of P258.70 pesos; P9,386.40 Pesos; P4,388.30 Pesos; and P6,376.60 Pesos representing his deficiency income taxes for the years 1982 to 1985).

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue averred that copies of the deficiency estate and income tax assessments were all personally and constructively served on August 26, 1991 and September 12, 1991 upon Mrs. Imelda Marcos (through her caretaker Mr. Martinez) at her last known address at No. 204 Ortega St., San Juan, M.M. (Annexes "D" and "E" of the Petition).

Likewise, copies of the deficiency tax assessments issued against petitioner Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos II were also personally and constructively served upon him (through his caretaker) on September 12, 1991, at his last known address at Don Mariano Marcos St. corner P. Guevarra St., San Juan, M.M. (Annexes "J" and "J-1" of the Petition).

Thereafter, Formal Assessment notices were served on October 20, 1992, upon Mrs. Marcos c/o petitioner, at his office, House of Representatives, Batasan Pambansa, Quezon City.

Moreover, a notice to Taxpayer inviting Mrs. Marcos (or her duly authorized representative or counsel), to a conference, was furnished the counsel of Mrs. Marcos, Dean Antonio Coronel — but to no avail.

The deficiency tax assessments were not protested administratively, by Mrs. Marcos and the other heirs of the late president, within 30 days from service of said assessments.

On February 22, 1993, the BIR Commissioner issued twenty-two notices of levy on real property against certain parcels of land owned by the Marcoses — to satisfy the alleged estate tax and deficiency income taxes of Spouses Marcos.

On May 20, 1993, four more Notices of Levy on real property were issued for the purpose of satisfying the deficiency income taxes.

On May 26, 1993, additional four (4) notices of Levy on real property were again issued. The foregoing tax remedies were resorted to pursuant to Sections 205 and 213 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).

In response to a letter dated March 12, 1993 sent by Atty. Loreto Ata (counsel of herein petitioner) calling the attention of the BIR and requesting that they be duly notified of any action taken by the BIR affecting the interest of their client Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos II, as well as the interest of the late president — copies of the aforesaid notices were, served on April 7, 1993 and on June 10, 1993, upon Mrs. Imelda Marcos, the petitioner, and their counsel of record, "De Borja, Medialdea, Ata, Bello, Guevarra and Serapio Law Office".

Notices of sale at public auction were posted on May 26, 1993, at the lobby of the City Hall of Tacloban City.

The public auction for the sale of the eleven (11) parcels of land took place on July 5, 1993. There being no bidder, the lots were declared forfeited in favor of the government.

SUPREME COURT PETITION FILED BY FERDINAND “BONGBONG“ MARCOS II

On June 25, 1993, petitioner Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos II filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.

SUPREME COURT RULING

The enforcement of tax laws and the collection of taxes is of paramount importance for the sustenance of government. Taxes are the lifeblood of the government and should be collected without unnecessary hindrance.

However, such collection should be made in accordance with law as any arbitrariness will negate the very reason for government itself. It is therefore necessary to reconcile the apparently conflicting interests of the authorities and the taxpayers so that the real purpose of taxation, which is the promotion of the common good, may be achieved.

WHETHER or not the proper avenues of assessment and collection of the said tax obligations were taken by the respondent Bureau was the subject of the Supreme Court's inquiry.

PETITIONER posited that notices of levy, notices of sale, and subsequent sale of properties of the late President Marcos effected by the BIR were null and void for disregarding the established procedure for the enforcement of taxes due upon the estate of the deceased.

The case of Domingo vs. Garlitos was specifically cited to bolster the argument that "the ordinary procedure by which to settle claims of indebtedness against the estate of a deceased, person, as in an inheritance (estate) tax, is for the claimant to present a claim before the probate court so that said court may order the administrator to pay the amount therefor." This remedy is allegedly, exclusive, and cannot be effected through any other means.

PETITIONER further submitted that the probate court was not precluded from denying a request by the government for the immediate payment of taxes, and should order the payment of the same only within the period fixed by the probate court for the payment of all the debts of the decedent.

In this regard, petitioner cited the case of Collector of Internal Revenue vs. The Administratrix of the Estate of Echarri (67 Phil 502), where it was held that the court having control over the administration proceedings has jurisdiction to entertain the claim presented by the government for taxes due and to order the administrator to pay the tax should it find that the assessment was proper, and that the tax was legal, due and collectible; that during the pendency of judicial administration over the estate of a deceased person a claim for taxes is presented by the government, the court has the authority to order payment by the administrator; and that in the same way that it has authority to order payment or satisfaction, it also has the negative authority to deny the same.

ON THE OTHER HAND, it was argued by the BIR, that the state's authority to collect internal revenue taxes was paramount. Thus, the pendency of probate proceedings over the estate of the deceased did not preclude the assessment and collection, through summary remedies, of estate taxes over the same.

According to the respondent, claims for payment of estate and income taxes due and assessed after the death of the decedent need not be presented in the form of a claim against the estate. These can and should be paid immediately. The probate court was not the government agency to decide whether an estate is liable for payment of estate of income taxes. Well-settled was the rule that the probate court was a court with special and limited jurisdiction.

CONCEDEDLY, it was within the JURISDICTION of the PROBATE COURT to approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by his prospective heirs before final adjudication; to determine who are the heirs of the decedent; the recognition of a natural child; the status of a woman claiming to be the legal wife of the decedent; the legality of disinheritance of an heir by the testator; and to pass upon the validity of a waiver of hereditary rights.

The PIVOTAL QUESTION the Supreme Court was tasked to resolve in the instant petition referred to the authority of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to collect by the SUMMARY REMEDY of LEVYING upon, and SALE of real properties of the decedent, estate tax deficiencies, WITHOUT the cognition and authority of the court sitting in probate over the supposed will of the deceased.

STRICTLY SPEAKING, the assessment of an inheritance tax did not directly involve the administration of a decedent's estate, although it may be viewed as an incident to the complete settlement of an estate.

In the Philippine experience, the enforcement and collection of estate tax, was executive in character, as the legislature had seen it fit to ascribe this task to the Bureau of Internal Revenue. (Section 3, oNational Internal Revenue Code).

The Government had two ways of collecting the taxes in question. One, by going after all the heirs and collecting from each one of them the amount of the tax proportionate to the inheritance received. Another remedy, pursuant to the lien created by Section 315 of the Tax Code upon all property and rights to property belong to the taxpayer for unpaid income tax, was by subjecting said property of the estate which was in the hands of an heir or transferee to the payment of the tax due the estate. (Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Pineda, 21 SCRA 105, September 15, 1967.)

From the foregoing, it is discernible that the approval of the court, sitting in probate, or as a settlement tribunal over the deceased was not a mandatory requirement in the collection of estate taxes.

It cannot therefore be argued that the Tax Bureau erred in proceeding with the levying and sale of the properties allegedly owned by the late President, on the ground that it was required to seek first the probate court's sanction.

There was nothing in the Tax Code, and in the pertinent remedial laws that implied the necessity of the probate or estate settlement court's approval of the state's claim for estate taxes, before the same could be enforced and collected.

ON THE CONTRARY, under Section 87 of the NIRC, it is the probate or settlement court which was bidden not to authorize the executor or judicial administrator of the decedent's estate to deliver any distributive share to any party interested in the estate, unless it is shown a Certification by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that the estate taxes have been paid.

This provision disproved the petitioner's contention that it was the probate court which approved the assessment and collection of the estate tax.

If there is any issue as to the validity of the BIR's decision to assess the estate taxes, this should have been pursued through the PROPER ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL AVENUES provided for by law.

Section 229 of the NIRC tells us how:

Sec. 229. Protesting of assessment. — When the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or his duly authorized representative finds that proper taxes should be assessed, he shall first notify the taxpayer of his findings. Within a period to be prescribed by implementing regulations, the taxpayer shall be required to respond to said notice. If the taxpayer fails to respond, the Commissioner shall issue an assessment based on his findings.

Such assessment may be protested administratively by filing a request for reconsideration or reinvestigation in such form and manner as may be prescribed by implementing regulations within (30) days from receipt of the assessment; otherwise, the assessment shall become final and unappealable.

If the protest is denied in whole or in part, the individual, association or corporation adversely affected by the decision on the protest may appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals within thirty (30) days from receipt of said decision; otherwise, the decision shall become final, executory and demandable. (As inserted by P.D. 1773)

Apart from failing to file the required estate tax return within the time required for the filing of the same, petitioner, and the other heirs never questioned the assessments served upon them, allowing the same to lapse into finality, and prompting the BIR to collect the said taxes by levying upon the properties left by President Marcos.

The Notices of Levy upon real property were issued within the prescriptive period and in accordance with the provisions of the present Tax Code. The deficiency tax assessment, having already become final, executory, and demandable, the same could be collected through the summary remedy of distraint or levy pursuant to Section 205 of the NIRC.

The applicable provision in regard to the PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD for the assessment and collection of tax deficiency in this instance was Article 223 of the NIRC:

Sec. 223. Exceptions as to a period of limitation of assessment and collection of taxes. — (a) In the case of a false or fraudulent return with intent to evade tax or of a failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time within ten (10) years after the discovery of the falsity, fraud, or omission: Provided, That, in a fraud assessment which has become final and executory, the fact of fraud shall be judicially taken cognizance of in the civil or criminal action for the collection thereof.

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Any internal revenue tax which has been assessed within the period of limitation above prescribed, may be collected by distraint or levy or by a proceeding in court within three years following the assessment of the tax.

xxx xxx xxx

The omission to file an estate tax return, and the subsequent failure to contest or appeal the assessment made by the BIR is fatal to the petitioner's cause, as under the above-cited provision, in case of failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed at any time within ten years after the omission, and any tax so assessed may be collected by levy upon real property within three years following the assessment of the tax. Since the estate tax assessment had become final and unappealable by the petitioner's default as regards protesting the validity of the said assessment, there is now no reason why the BIR cannot continue with the collection of the said tax. Any objection against the assessment should have been pursued following the avenue paved in Section 229 of the NIRC on protests on assessments of internal revenue taxes.

The Bureau of Internal Revenue was the government agency tasked to determine the amount of taxes due upon the subject estate. It’s determinations and assessments are PRESUMED correct and made in GOOD FAITH. The taxpayer has the duty of proving otherwise.

In the absence of proof of any irregularities in the performance of official duties, an assessment will not be disturbed. Even an assessment based on estimates is prima facie valid and lawful where it does not appear to have been arrived at arbitrarily or capriciously.

The burden of proof is upon the complaining party to show clearly that the assessment is erroneous. Failure to present proof of error in the assessment will justify the judicial affirmance of said assessment.

In the instant case, petitioner had not pointed out one single provision in the Memorandum of the Special Audit Team which gave rise to the questioned assessment, which contained a trace of falsity.

Indeed, the petitioner's attack on the assessment argued mainly on the alleged improbable and unconscionable amount of the taxes charged. But mere rhetoric cannot supply the basis for the charge of impropriety of the assessments made.

Moreover, these objections to the assessments should have been raised, considering the ample REMEDIES afforded the taxpayer by the Tax Code, with the BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE and the COURT OF TAX APPEALS, as described earlier, and could not be belatedly raised now via Petition for Certiorari, under the pretext of grave abuse of discretion.

The course of action taken by the petitioner reflected his disregard or even repugnance of the established institutions for governance in the scheme of a well-ordered society.

The subject tax assessments HAVING BECOME FINAL, EXECUTOR AND ENFORCEABLE, the same could no longer be contested by means of a DISGUISED PROTEST.

In the main, Certiorari may not be used as a substitute for a lost appeal or remedy. This judicial policy becomes more pronounced in view of the absence of sufficient attack against the actuations of government.

There being sufficient service of Notices to herein petitioner (and his mother) and it appearing that petitioner continuously ignored said Notices despite several opportunities given him to file a protest and to thereafter appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals, — the tax assessments subject of this case, upon which the levy and sale of properties were based, could no longer be contested (directly or indirectly) via this instant petition for certiorari.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Supreme Court RESOLVED to DENY the present petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 was thereby AFFIRMED in all respects.