Stare decisis

Source - https://www.manilatimes.net/2022/08/25/business/top-business/certainty-in-judicial-practice/1855846


"CERTAINTY IN JUDICIAL PRACTICE

By NICA MARSHA GASAPO
August 25, 2022
Manila Times

‌
STARE decisis et non quieta movere, meaning "stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled," is a doctrine rooted in the necessity of stability, certainty and predictability in judicial decisions. Stare decisis is based on the rule that "once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument" (De Mesa v Pepsi Cola Products Phils. Inc., GR Nos. 153063-70, Aug. 19, 2005). It stems from the principle of justice that "absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike" (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v The Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd., GR 197192, June 4, 2014).


Under the Constitution, the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of controversies involving rights that are legally demandable and enforceable. Article 8 of the New Civil Code, meanwhile, provides that "judicial decisions applying to or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines." To be clear, stare decisis applies only to cases decided by the Supreme Court.


The doctrine contemplates a situation where the Supreme Court has settled a controversy, and the conclusion made should be applied to those with substantially similar facts although involving different parties. This means that when the same questions are raised involving substantially similar factual backgrounds, like cases should be decided and settled the same way. As jurisprudence puts it, "the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue" (Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of the Philippine Islands v Remington Steel Corporation, GR 159422, March 28, 2008).


In a dissenting opinion in Lambino v Commission on Elections (GR Nos. 174153 and 174299, Oct. 25, 2006), former chief justice Reynato S. Puno outlined the historical development of stare decisis. He discussed that the doctrine first appeared in English Courts; that observance with precedents wherein the same issues come again in litigation was the rule; that precedents would not be adhered to if they were "plainly unreasonable" or where courts of equal level have conflicting decisions; and where "the binding force of the decision was the actual principle or principles necessary for the decision."


The principle of stare decisis then found application in the United States. Two types evolved: vertical stare decisis, which involves the duty of lower courts to adhere to and apply the decisions of higher courts to cases that have the same facts and horizontal stare decisis, which involves the duty of high courts to follow and adhere to their own precedents.


Stare decisis thus instructs observance of judicial precedents. However, based on jurisprudence, a doctrine established by the Supreme Court may be abandoned but only on "strong and compelling reasons." Otherwise, predictability and stability expected from the Supreme Court will be affected (Pepsi-Cola Products, Phil. Inc. v Pagdanganan, GR 167866, Oct. 12, 2006).


In the case of Carpio-Morales v Court of Appeals (GR Nos. 217126-27, Nov. 10, 2015), the Supreme Court abandoned a doctrine previously laid down in the case of Aguinaldo v Santos (GR 94115, Aug. 21, 1992). In the 2015 case, the Supreme Court en banc abandoned the condonation doctrine, which provides that public officials cannot be removed from their elective posts for acts and/or misconduct committed during a previous term because their reelection operates as extinguishment of their liabilities. In abandoning the condonation doctrine, the Supreme Court emphasized its duty to uphold and defend the Constitution in light of the doctrine's infirmities. It said the present Constitution "mandates that public office is a public trust and public officials shall be accountable to the people at all times."


Further, the doctrine of stare decisis aligns with the preservation of public confidence in the stability of Supreme Court decisions. Such decisions become precedents that should be followed and observed in subsequent cases by all other courts.


As enshrined in the Constitution, a doctrine or principle of law established by the Supreme Court in a decision may be modified or reversed only by the Supreme Court sitting en banc. This means that a decision or ruling rendered by a division cannot overturn that which has been decided or ruled upon by the court en banc. Hence, in Secretary of Justice v Lantion (GR 139465, Oct. 17, 2000), the Supreme Court en banc, upon motion for reconsideration, overturned its own decision (GR 139465, Jan.18, 2000) that a probable ex traditee was entitled to be notified of intended extradition and allowed to participate during the evaluation of the extradition process. In its resolution, the court en banc held that a probable extraditee was bereft of any right of notice and hearing during the evaluation of the extradition process.


Lower courts are accordingly enjoined to follow the rules and principles established by the Supreme Court. Lower court decisions, while logically and legally correct and sound, are not considered judicial precedents. At most, these decisions only have a persuasive effect. Hence, lower courts must adhere to the Supreme Court's applications of law and not go against the doctrines previously settled by the latter.


NICA MARSHA V. GASAPO is a junior associate of Mata-Perez, Tamayo and Francisco (MTF Counsel). This article is for general information only and is not a substitute for professional advice where the facts and circumstances warrant. If you have any question or comment, you can email the author at [email protected] or visit the MTF website at www.mtfcounsel.com."

Speedy justice

Read. -  https://www.rappler.com/voices/thought-leaders/opinion-sure-trials-policy-suggestions-fast-track-criminal-litigation/


"[OPINION] Sure trials: Policy suggestions to fast-track pace of criminal litigation

AUG 15, 2022 1:17 PM PHT

RAYMUND NARAG

[OPINION] Sure trials: Policy suggestions to fast-track pace of criminal litigation


'Once this system matures and all incoming cases are treated this way, I predict that the pace of litigation will be reduced from the traditional two years to just four months'

The Philippines has one of the longest paces of litigation in the world. Detained accused stay in jail for an average of 528 days before their cases are disposed, with some accused staying in jail for 15-20 years while undergoing trial still unconvicted. This is such a travesty of justice.

There are multiple reasons for the case delay. These include structural reasons, such as lack of judges, prosecutors, and PAO lawyers, which translate to very high case load. Postponements usually happen as well when there are very few forensic experts and medico-legal officers, when internet is not available, and other resource limitations.

However, the piecemeal nature of calendar of hearings induces these postponements. Although the Supreme Court introduced the notion of “continuous trials,” where prosecutors and defense lawyers are given a set number of hearings (e.g. 5 hearing days for prosecutors to accommodate 5 witnesses; and the same with defense lawyers), these hearings are set FAR APART (based on my research, this could be from two months apart to a year apart). By design, the trial process extends to at least a year, and with postponements, can easily lead to two years or more.

There are other multiple disadvantages in the piecemeal approach. One, it forces the witness to go back to court multiple times, translating to added costs for them (transportation, absence at work, etc.). Two, having hearings far apart translates to memory loss on the part of the witnesses and the lawyers. Reviewing the memories of witnesses in previous hearings takes a lot of the court’s time, which could have been used for litigation. Memory loss may also lead to miscarriage of justice, as the accused can be convicted simply because they could not remember their previous responses.

Solution:

Instead of a piecemeal hearing, judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers should adopt the concept of SURE TRIALS. In sure trials:

1. Hearings are set consecutively. All the witnesses line up and are presented in one calendar hearing day (maybe two if there are more witnesses). The court will not hear other cases on that day except the instant case. This is the approach used in many countries in the world.

2. Preparation for the hearings are done in the PRE-TRIAL stage. In this stage, prosecutors and defense lawyers contact their witnesses, prepare their testimonies, and practice their presentations. They also make sure that all witnesses are present on the day of the hearing that is allotted for them. The preparatory stage is usually three months. But once the TRIAL stage starts, it could be concluded in a week.

3. During the pre-trial stage (three months), the judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers can determine whether the accused warrant pre-trial detention or not. This will be done in a custodial hearing which will be done immediately upon arrest. Judges should utilize two basic criteria: what is the risk of offending, and what is the risk of not appearing in court? If the risk is low (a response of NO to both questions), then the accused will be released either on bail or supervision by the community.

If the SURE TRIALs are utilized, the pace of litigation will be faster. There will be fewer postponements of hearings. Witnesses come prepared. There will be a better quality of hearings as the witnesses will not be subject to memory loss. Judges will also have an easier time deciding the cases since the lapsed time is short. It will be less work for all those involved. Finally, it will also save on money and time for the witnesses and their families. Minsanan lang silang luluwas at pupunta sa korte!

At the beginning, it will seem that some inmates will have to wait longer to have a day in court. This is true for those courts with huge backlogs. That is why courts should entertain alternatives to pre-trial detention. For example, if the detained accused are low-risk, they can be released on their own recognizance or on bail.

Once this system matures and all incoming cases are treated this way, I predict that the pace of litigation will be reduced from the traditional two years to just four months. Accused who are guilty will be pronounced guilty as soon as possible and those who are innocent are released as soon as possible.

Who will object to this process?

Private lawyers who rely on appearance fees will object to this process. Private lawyers charge their clients whether the hearings are pushed through or postponed. In fact, postponed hearings will assure that private lawyers will have a steady income. Thus, there is no financial incentive for private lawyers to fast-track the pace of criminal litigation.

To remedy this situation: private lawyers may change their fee structure. Instead of a piecemeal charge or per appearance fee, they can charge a set amount for representation. This is called a “pakyawan” where clients pay a set amount. For example, clients pay P200,000 for murder case. The defense lawyers can arrange a payment fee where their clients can pay incrementally if they cannot pay on a one-time basis. Still, the defense lawyer is already assured of an income.

Having a “pakyawan” fee structure, defense lawyers will have a financial incentive to terminate the case as soon as possible. 

– Rappler.com

RAYMUND E. NARAG, PhD is an Associate Professor of Criminology and Criminal Justice at the School of Justice and Public Safety, Southern Illinois University Carbondale. "

Period for Final Medical Assessment and Referral to a Third Doctor for Disability Claims

Read. - https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/29033/


"SC Reminds Manning Industry on Period for Final Medical Assessment and Referral to a Third Doctor for Disability Claims

August 1, 2022


The Supreme Court reminded the manning industry to strictly observe the required period in giving final medical assessment in connection with disability claims, and the mandatory procedure on the referral to a third doctor in cases of conflict between the medical opinions of the company-designated physician and the seafarer’s chosen physician.

These reminders were articulated by the Court in a Decision penned by Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo that denied the appeal by certiorari of a shipping firm and affirmed with modification the rulings of the Court of Appeals (CA) that ordered the former employers of a seafarer to pay him total and permanent disability benefits.

Benhur Shipping Corporation (BSC)/Sun Marine Shipping S.A. (SMS) and Edgar B. Bruselas sought to reverse and set aside the rulings of the CA which, in turn, annulled and set aside the July 16, 2015 Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and granted total disability benefits to respondent Alex P. Riego. The NLRC upheld the February 27, 2015 Decision of the Labor Arbiter (LA) which partially granted respondent’s claim for disability benefits and ordered the petitioners to pay respondent Riego the total amount of US$7,465.00 pursuant to Grade 11 Disability Assessment – 1/3 loss of lifting power as determined by the company designated physician plus 10% attorney’s fees.

On October 8, 2013, BSC engaged Riego’s work as Chief Cook on board the vessel MV Hikari I, an ocean-going vessel of its foreign principal, SMS.

On the first week of December 2013, Riego suffered from abdominal and lower back pain while on board the vessel. After he was examined by a doctor in Thailand and given medications, he was recommended for repatriation for further medical evaluation. Riego returned to the Philippines on December 15, 2013 and was endorsed by BSC to Marine Medical Services wherein he was attended to by the company-designated physician, for further medical care and treatment.

On December 16, 2013, the company-designated physician issued the first Medical Report stating that Riego was referred to a gastro-enterologist and orthopedic surgeon. The specialist recommended that Riego undergo laboratory exam, gastroscopy, ultrasound of the whole abdomen and magnetic resonance imaging, or MRI, of the lumbosacral spine. He was requested to come back the following day for reevaluation.

Subsequently, the company-designated physician issued four more Medical Reports until the same issued the final Medical Report on May 26, 2014, stating that on follow-up check-up, Riego still complained of lower back pain radiating to the left lower extremity with no significant improvement with physical therapy, and there was still sensory deficit on his left leg. The company-designated physician further stated that if respondent is entitled to disability benefits, his final disability grading under the POEA schedule of disabilities remains at Grade 11 – 1/3 loss of lifting power. The same issued on May 30, 2014 a certification that Riego “has under medical/surgical evaluation treatment from Dec. 16, 2013 to present due to Hiatal Hernia; L4-L5, L5-S1 Disc Bulge.”

Riego consulted a physician of his choice for a second medical opinion. On June 5, 2014, his physician of choice issued a Medical Report stating that he was permanently disabled and permanently unfit to work in any capacity. Subsequently, on two occasions, he sent a letter-request to the petitioners for referral to a third doctor, but the latter ignored his request. This prompted him to file a case with the LA especially after the shipping firm stopped shouldering his medical treatment.

The LA partially granted Riego’s complaint for disability benefits and gave credence to the medical assessment provided by the company-designated physician. The NLRC affirmed the LA’s ruling and held that Riego’s claim for permanent and total disability benefits was without basis at all. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the NLRC ruling.

The CA held that if the treatment of 120 days is extended to 240 days, but still no medical assessment is given, the finding of permanent and total disability becomes conclusive. It held that respondent Riego should be granted total and permanent disability benefits since no assessment was issued for a disability grade before the lapse of the 120-day period, prompting the shipping firm to elevate the case to the SC.

The SC ruled that the petition lacked merit.

The SC reiterated that for a company-designated physician to avail of the extended 240-day period, he or she must perform some complete or definite medical assessment to show that the illness still requires medical attendance beyond the 120 days, but not to exceed 240 days. In such case, the temporary total disability period is extended to a maximum of 240 days. Without sufficient justification for the extension of the treatment period, a seafarer’s disability shall be conclusively presumed to be permanent and total. Even if the 120-day period was extended to 240 days, if the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the extended period of 240 days, then the seafarer’s disability becomes permanent and total, regardless of any justification.

Petitioners claimed that there was no lapse of the 120-day period, adding that since the final medical report was issued after 156 days from repatriation, then it is within the extended 240-day period.

But the Court was not convinced. Citing the Progress Note on the 106th day of the 120-day period, the specialist noted that Riego was still suffering from lower back pain radiating to leg aggravated by prolonged sitting, standing, and walking.

Noting that after issuance of the said final medical report by the company-designated physician, the same physician issued a Certification indicating that Riego has undergone medical/surgical evaluation treatment to Hiatal Hernia; L4-L5, L5-S1 Disc Bulge from December 16, 2013 until May 30, 2014. “This evidently demonstrates that the assessment of the medical condition of respondent was still continuing and not conclusive even after the company-designated physician issued his May 26, 2014 Final Medical Report,” said the Court.

The SC further added that even if the 120-day period was extended to 240 days, there was still no proper final medical assessment issued. Citing its ruling in the case of Elburg Shipmanagement Phils., Inc. v. Quiogue, the SC said that if the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the extended period of 240 days, then the seafarer’s disability becomes permanent and total, regardless of any justification.

Based on the Medical reports, “The Court finds that respondent is suffering from permanent disability, which renders him unfit to work in any capacity as a seafarer.”

The SC said that the issue of whether Riego’s illness is compensable as total and permanent disability is a question of fact, which the SC would not disturb since, the SC “not being a trier of facts, is not duty-bound to reexamine and calibrate the evidence on record.”

However, the SC said that it was imperative to resolve the case at bar on the merits presented novel issues, such as, the form and content of the request for referral to a third doctor to resolve conflicting medical opinions involving a claim for disability benefits.

The SC noted the failure of petitioners to comply with the respondent’s request of referral to a third doctor, which has been held to be a mandatory procedure as a consequence of the provision under the POEA-SEC that the company-designated doctor’s assessment should prevail.

The SC stressed that it is the duty of the seafarer to notify his employer that he or she intends to refer the conflict to a third doctor. Once notified, the burden shifts to the employer to complete the process of referral to a third doctor so that, finally, the medical assessment of the seafarer will be put to rest.

“Accordingly, petitioners’ obliviousness to the mandatory procedure of referral to a third doctor must be taken against them,” said the SC as it cited Riego’s two letter-request for referral to a third doctor.

Furthermore, it held that when the employer fails to act on the seafarer’s valid request for referral to a third doctor, the tribunals and courts are empowered to conduct its own assessment to resolve the conflicting medical opinions.

The Court stressed that it is only through the strict observance of this compulsory procedure that assessment of the disability of the seafarer can be resolved with finality. “Consequently, the procedure laid down by the [Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract] POEA-SEC requires mandatory fulfilment by both the employer and the seafarer. If either of the parties disregards the good faith compliance of the other, the legal consequences shall be borne by the erring party,” the Court held.

In ruling for respondent Riego, the SC ordered the petitioners to pay him total and permanent disability benefits in the amount of US$60,000.00 at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of payment, as well as attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of the total monetary award. Finally, all monetary awards shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent per annum from finality of this Decision until full payment.

Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion.

FULL TEXT: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/28769/

Xxx."

Dismissal from public service by reason of conviction for Bigamy - "It held that the applicable rules would be CSC Resolution No. 991936, or the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS), which provide that the administrative offense of Conviction of a Crime Involving Moral Turpitude is a grave offense that is punishable with dismissal from service upon first commission."

Read - https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/29036/


"SC Affirms Dismissal of Former DFA Employee for Bigamy

August 4, 2022


The Supreme Court has affirmed the dismissal from service of a former employee of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) who had been previously convicted of the crime of Bigamy.

In her Petition for Review on Certiorari, the petitioner assailed the Court of Appeals (CA) rulings which affirmed the January 5, 2015 Decision and September 28, 2015 Resolution of respondent Civil Service Commission – National Capital Region (CSC-NCR) dismissing her from service for the administrative offense of Conviction of a Crime Involving Moral Turpitude.

The petitioner was a former Secretary in the Passport Division of the DFA.

Her dismissal was spawned by a complaint-affidavit filed before the CSC in September 2002 by a complainant who alleged that petitioner and her husband contracted marriage while complainant was still married to the latter. This prompted the complainant to file a criminal case for Bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City. Petitioner and her husband pleaded guilty, resulting to their conviction for the crime of Bigamy.

In her counter-affidavit, petitioner alleged, among others, that her husband asked her to marry him when she became pregnant with his child, and that she had no knowledge of his previous existing marriage when she agreed to marry him.

The petitioner claimed that on July 29, 2004, the Labo, Camarines Norte RTC rendered a decision declaring the previous marriage of her husband null and void. Subsequently, on September 24, 2004, they contracted marriage in Tokyo, Japan. She said she was a victim herself and that she had no criminal intent in marrying him and did it only for the welfare of her child.

The CSC-NCR found petitioner guilty of the administrative offense of Conviction of a Crime of Moral Turpitude and meted the penalty of dismissal from service. The finding was affirmed by the CSC Proper. On further appeal, the CA affirmed the CSC’s rulings.

In a Decision penned by Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando, the Court found the petition “not meritorious.”

The Court noted that petitioner did not contest that she was guilty of both the administrative and criminal offenses. What she assailed was the CSC’s imposition of the penalty of dismissal from service upon the finding of her administrative guilty.

It held that the applicable rules would be CSC Resolution No. 991936, or the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS), which provide that the administrative offense of Conviction of a Crime Involving Moral Turpitude is a grave offense that is punishable with dismissal from service upon first commission.

The Court held that the CA was correct in not appreciating the mitigating circumstances ― such as the length of service, first commission, and outstanding performance ― that the petitioner invoked. Length of service cannot be given weight since the subject administrative offense is a grave offense, punishable by dismissal from services.

Said the Court: “Bigamy cannot be taken lightly as its commission reflects the person’s character. It involves moral turpitude as settled in jurisprudence. Petitioner flagrantly disregarded the law in marrying Modesto despite her knowledge of his prior and existing marriage; as the appellate court aptly observed, this ‘shows her moral depravity and cast[s] serious doubt on her fitness and integrity to continue in the public service.”

As for petitioner’s invocation of first offense and outstanding performance, the Court ruled that such had no basis under the URACCS. It stressed that the Rules are clear in stating that a first-time offender shall be dismissed from service.

FULL TEXT: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/28775/

Xxx."

"

Writ of Amparo vs. Extrajudicial Killing related to Tokhang drug war

Read - https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/29098/


"SC Upholds Amparo as Remedy vs Extralegal Killings, Threats

August 9, 2022


The Supreme Court has affirmed the issuance of a writ of amparo in favor of widow Christina Gonzales, whose husband was a victim of a drug-related extralegal killing perpetrated by police officers in Antipolo City.

“The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty, or security,” the Court held.

In a Decision penned by Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez, the High Court’s Second Division unanimously denied the petition for review filed by law enforcement officers from Antipolo City questioning the November 26, 2018 Decision and the April 29, 2019 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) which upheld the writ of amparo issued in favor of Christina. The said CA Decision likewise recommended the filing of appropriate civil, criminal, and administrative charges against petitioner law enforcement officers, and issued a Permanent Protection Order prohibiting them and any of their agents from entering within a radius of one kilometer from Christina’s residences and work addresses.

In denying the petition, the Court explicitly recognized the death of Christina’s husband, Joselito Gonzales, as an extralegal killing, and upheld the finding of the CA that Christina had reason to fear her life would be met with the same fate as that of her slain husband. The couple had been previously arrested for using and selling illegal drugs, but were eventually released after paying the amount of ₱50,000 demanded by the police.

The Supreme Court acknowledged the various threats to Christina’s life, liberty, and security, including the allegations that prior to the issuance of the writ of amparo in 2017, Christina and Joselito were both solicited by law enforcement agents to sell illegal drugs and were threatened on several occasions that they would be entrapped or killed. The Court also gave credence to the claim that following Joselito’s death, there were several unknown and suspicious-looking individuals who attended his funeral asking for Christina’s whereabouts.

On February 17, 2017, Christina filed before the Supreme Court a petition for a writ of amparo and Temporary Protection Order against petitioner law enforcement officers. On January 21, 2017, the Supreme Court En Banc issued a resolution granting Christina a Temporary Protection Order and directing the CA to conduct a hearing on the matter. On November 26, 2018, the CA granted a Permanent Protection Order in favor of Christina, prompting the law enforcement officers to challenge the CA ruling before the Supreme Court.

After examining the totality of evidence, the Supreme Court found that threats to the life of Christina were indeed present, and that the CA’s issuance of the writ of amparo was proper.

The Court also noted major lapses in the conduct of the police operation that resulted in Joselito’s death, raising doubts as to whether a legitimate buy-bust operation really took place. It was also noted by the Court how the law enforcement agents failed to follow several directives to reopen the investigation of Joselito’s case. The High Tribunal further stressed that no documentation was provided to show that the usual procedure under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, was observed when the illegal drugs were seized.

“The fact that respondent (Christina) and Joselito were previously arrested for selling illegal drugs is beside the point. As stated earlier, even if the respondent committed a crime, the petitioners, as law enforcement agents, are not at liberty to disregard the respondent’s constitutionally guaranteed rights to life, liberty, and security,” the Court added.

The SC Public Information Office will upload the full text of the decision on the SC website once available."

Dual citizen by birth, not by naturalization

Read - https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/29129/


"SC: Naturalization Does not Apply to Dual Citizens by Birth

August 12, 2022


The Supreme Court has held that Filipinos born to one Filipino parent and one foreign parent are considered dual citizens by birth and not by naturalization, regardless of subsequent acts performed to confirm the foreign citizenship.

In a Decision penned by Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, the Supreme Court En Banc granted the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Mariz Lindsey Tan Villegas Gana-Carait, and annulled and set aside the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc Resolution dated September 23, 2021 which denied Gana-Carait’s Motion for Reconsideration of the COMELEC First Division’s Resolution dated February 27, 2019. The said COMELEC resolutions denied the petition to disqualify Gana-Carait as a candidate for Member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the Lone District of Biñan, Laguna for the May 2019 elections, but granted the petition to deny due course to or cancel her certificate of candidacy (CoC).

On October 17, 2018, Gana-Carait filed her CoC for the May 2019 National and Local Elections. Two petitions were then filed before the COMELEC against her: one for her disqualification, on the ground that she failed to renounce her United States (US) citizenship; the other for the cancellation of her COC, for false representations on her eligibility to run for office given her American citizenship.

The COMELEC’s First Division resolved the consolidated cases in its February 27, 2019 Resolution, dismissing the petition for disqualification but granting the petition for the cancellation of Gana-Carait’s COC, finding that she was a dual citizen by naturalization because of positive acts subsequently performed by her mother to secure a Consular Report of Birth Abroad of a Citizen of the United States of America and a US passport for Gana-Carait.

Thus, the COMELEC held that Gana-Carait must comply with RA No. 9225, or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act, which requires candidates who are dual citizens by naturalization to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to renounce their foreign citizenship. Gana-Carait moved to reconsider the ruling, but was denied by the COMELEC En Banc, prompting Gana-Carait to go to the Supreme Court.

In ruling to set aside COMELEC’s cancellation of Gana-Carait’s COC, the Court held that Gana-Carait, who was born to a Filipino father and an American mother, is a dual citizen by birth, and not by naturalization.

The Court also found that the subsequent positive acts made by Gana-Carait’s mother to request confirmation from the United States Consular Service of Gana-Carait’s US citizenship is not considered a naturalization process but a mere presentation of documentary evidence to establish the fact that Gana-Carait is an American citizen by birth.

The Court held that since Gana-Carait is a dual citizen by birth, and not by naturalization, she is not covered by the provisions of the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act requiring candidates who are dual citizens by naturalization to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to renounce their foreign citizenships in order to become eligible for elective office. As a dual citizen by birth, Gana-Carait is thus considered a Filipino qualified to run for public office. Hence, she could not be said to have made a false representation in her COC, ruled the Court.

The Court also harmonized conflicting provisions under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure (COMELEC Rules) and the Rules of Court on the reckoning point for the 30-day period within which one can challenge a COMELEC ruling before the Supreme Court through a petition for certiorari.

Under Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, which is based on Section 7, Article IX of the Constitution, a petition for certiorari shall be filed within 30 days from notice of the judgment, final order, or resolution to be reviewed. Section 1, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules, however, provides that such petition must be filed within 30 days from the promulgation date. Further, Section 3 of the same Rule declares that decisions in petitions to cancel COCs become final and executory after five days from promulgation, unless restrained by the Court.

The Court held that the COMELEC Rules are merely procedural and thus cannot override substantive law, especially the Constitution. The COMELEC Rules cannot be applied in a way that would shorten the constitutionally mandated period within which aggrieved parties can question an adverse COMELEC ruling.

The Court ruled that to harmonize the COMELEC Rules with the Constitution and the Rules of Court, the proper interpretation of Section 8, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules is that COMELEC rulings, in the absence of a restraining order from the Supreme Court, issued within five days from receipt of the aggrieved party, shall be rendered only executory, but not final.

In the case of Gana-Carait, despite the COMELEC’s issuance of the Certificate of Finality, Entry of Judgment, and Writ of Execution, the challenged COMELEC ruling did not actually attain finality since Gana-Carait was able to file the Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court within 30 days from notice of the COMELEC ruling.

The SC Public Information Office will upload the full text of the Decision on the SC website once available."

Recognition of foreign divorce

Read - https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/29120/

"SC Reiterates Rule in Judicial Recognition of Foreign Divorce

August 10, 2022


The Supreme Court has reiterated the rule that in petitions for judicial recognition of foreign divorce, one must prove not only the fact of divorce but also the national law of the foreign spouse for the divorce ruling to be legally recognized in the Philippines.

In a 10-page Decision penned by Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando, the Court remanded to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro City, Laguna, Branch 93 for further proceedings and reception of evidence on the Japanese law on divorce the petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce filed by a Filipino citizen who divorced her Japanese husband in 2007.

In 2015, respondent Jocelyn Asusano Kikuchi filed before the RTC a petition for judicial recognition her foreign divorce. She claimed she married Fumio U. Kikuchi in 1993, and in 2007, they jointly filed for divorce before the City Hall of Sakado City, Saitama Prefecture. The Sakado City Mayor issued an Acceptance Certificate stating that her and Fumio’s written notification of divorce had been accepted. The Acceptance Certificate was accompanied by an Authentication from the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, Japan.

The RTC granted Jocelyn’s petition, holding that the latter was able to establish the fact of divorce and the national law of Japan. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, moved to reconsider the RTC decision, but its motion was denied. The Republic then appealed before the Court of Appeals (CA), which denied the same, prompting the former to elevate the matter before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court found the Republic’s petition meritorious.

The Court held that while Jocelyn established the fact of divorce by submitting the Acceptance Certificate as authenticated by the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, Japan, she was not able to establish the law of Japan on divorce.

The Court underscored that for a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce to prosper, the party pleading it must prove the fact of divorce and the national law of the foreign spouse.

Under Article 26 of Executive Order No. 209, series of 1987, as amended, or The Family Code of the Philippines, a divorce between a foreigner and a Filipino may be recognized in the Philippines as long as it was validly obtained according to the foreign spouse’s national law.

Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by the court, the party pleading it must first prove the fact of divorce and its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.

To prove that the divorce was valid under Japanese laws, Jocelyn submitted a photocopy of the English translation of the Civil Code of Japan, published by Eibun-Horei-Sha, Inc. and stamped with “LIBRARY, Japan Information and Culture Center, Embassy of Japan, 2627 Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City.”

The Court was not convinced. It held that such document is devoid of any probative value. “Not being an official translation, the document submitted by Jocelyn does not prove the existing law on divorce in Japan. Unfortunately, without such evidence, there is nothing on record to establish that the divorce between Jocelyn and Fumio was validly obtained and is consistence with the Japanese law on divorce,” it said.

It added: “Given that Jocelyn was able to prove the fact of divorce but not the Japanese law on divorce, a remand of the case rather than its outright dismissal is proper. This is consistent with the policy of liberality that the Court has adopted in cases involving the recognition of foreign decrees to Filipinos in mixed marriage.”

Thus, the Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed November 15, 2018 Decision of the CA.

FULL TEXT: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/29085/. 

Xxx." 

Appeal of decisions of Regional Trial Court in graft cases is to the Sandiganbayan, not the Court of Appeals

"There is no quibble that Sideño, through his counsel, had taken a wrong procedure. Inasmuch as Sideño is a low-ranking public officer, having a salary grade below 27, he should have sought relief on the RTC verdict of conviction from the SB, pursuant to P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 10660,  specifically Section 4 thereof..."

[ G.R. No. 235640, September 03, 2020 ]

ROLANDO S. SIDEÑO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.


https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66331

Deferred implementation of Personal Property Security Act

R.A. No. 11057, approved in 2018, is known as the "PERSONAL PROPERTY SECURITY ACT".

It applies to all transactions of any form that SECURE AN OBLIGATION with MOVABLE COLLATERAL, EXCEPT interests in AIRCRAFTS subject to Republic Act No. 9497, or the "Civil Aviation Authority Act of 2008", and interests in SHIPS subject to Presidential Decree No. 1521, or the "Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978. (Section 4).

Please note SECTION 68 of the law, which provides that notwithstanding the entry into force of the Act under Section 67, the IMPLEMENTATION thereof shall be CONDITIONED UPON THE REGISTRY BEING ESTABLISHED AND OPERATIONAL UNDER SECTION 26.

NOTABLE PROVISIONS:

SECTION 26. ESTABLISHMENT OF ELECTRONIC REGISTRY.—

(a) The Registry shall be established in and administered by the LRA.

(b) The Registry shall provide electronic means for registration and searching of notices.

Section 27. PUBLIC RECORD .—

(a) Information contained in a registered notice shall be considered as a public record.

(b) Any person may search notices registered in the Registry.

(c) The electronic records of the Registry shall be the official records.

SECTION 62. IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS. — Within six (6) months from the passage of this Act, the DOF in coordination with the Department of Justice, through the LRA, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations for’ the effective implementation of this Act.

SECTION 63. RULES ON ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURE.— Subject to Section 47, the expedited hearing/proceedings shall be conducted in a SUMMARY MANNER consistent with the declared policies of this Act and in accordance with the rules of procedure that the SUPREME COURT may promulgate.

SECTION 66. REPEALING CLAUSE .— The following laws, and all laws, decrees, orders, and issuances or portions thereof, which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, are hereby repealed, amended, or modified accordingly:

(a) Sections 1 to 16 of Act No. 1508, otherwise known as "THE CHATTEL MORTGAGE LAW";

(b) Articles 2085-2123, 2127, 2140-2141, 2241, 2243, and 2246-2247 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the "CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES";

(c) Section 13 of Republic Act No. 5980, as amended by Republic Act No. 8556, otherwise known as the "FINANCING COMPANY ACT OF 1998";

(d) Sections 114-116 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the "PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE";

(e) Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, insofar as the provision thereof is inconsistent with this Act; and

(f) Section 5(e) of Republic Act No.36, otherwise known as the "LAND TRANSPORTATION AND TRAFFIC CODE".

SECTION 68. IMPLEMENTATION .— Notwithstanding the entry into force of this Act under Section 67, the IMPLEMENTATION of the Act shall be CONDITIONED UPON THE REGISTRY BEING ESTABLISHED AND OPERATIONAL UNDER SECTION 26.

Read -

https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2019/10/10/implementing-rules-and-regulations-of-republic-act-no-11057/

https://www.dof.gov.ph/advocacies/personal-property-security-act/

http://www.investphilippines.info/arangkada/ra-11057-personal-property-security-act/

Probation law, as amended.

Republic Act No. 10707

AN ACT AMENDING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 968, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE “PROBATION LAW OF 1976”, AS AMENDED

SECTION 1. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

“SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant for a probationable penalty and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best. No application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction: Provided, That when a judgment of conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty is appealed or reviewed, and such judgment is modified through the imposition of a probationable penalty, the defendant shall be allowed to apply for probation based on the modified decision before such decision becomes final. The application for probation based on the modified decision shall be filed in the trial court where the judgment of conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty was rendered, or in the trial court where such case has since been re-raffled. In a case involving several defendants where some have taken further appeal, the other defendants may apply for probation by submitting a written application and attaching thereto a certified true copy of the judgment of conviction.

“The trial court shall, upon receipt of the application filed, suspend the execution of the sentence imposed in the judgment.

“This notwithstanding, the accused shall lose the benefit of probation should he seek a review of the modified decision which already imposes a probationable penalty.

“Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.

“An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.”

SEC. 2. Section 9 of the same Decree, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

“SEC. 9. Disqualified Offenders. — The benefits of this Decree shall not be extended to those:

“a. sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six (6) years;

“b. convicted of any crime against the national security;...

“c. who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of more than six (6) months and one (1) day and/or a fine of more than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00);

“d. who have been once on probation under the provisions of this Decree; and

“e. who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of this Decree became applicable pursuant to Section 33 hereof.”

Illegal termination of OFW - damages to be paid.

RA 8042 or the “Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act” -

Case:

"Under RA 8042 or the “Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act” which was passed on July 15, 1995, an overseas worker who has been terminated from employment without just or valid cause shall be entitled, among others, to his salaries for the unexpired portion of the employment contract or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.

Does this mean that if the three months’ salary is the lesser amount, the overseas worker will get only three months’ salary even if the unexpired portion of his contract is more than three months? This is answered in this case of Jerry.

Xxx.

And true enough, Jerry’s dismissal before the expiration of his contract was found to be in violation of the Standard Employment Contract. The shipping company was ordered to pay the unexpired portion of the contract or $5,100. The company questioned such order of payment, arguing that under RA 8042, they should pay only three months’ salary of Jerry or $1,800 since this is the lesser amount. Is the company correct?

No. The issue of whether the overseas worker is entitled to his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three months’ salary, whichever is less, comes into play only when the employment contract concerned has a term of at least one year or more. This is evident form the words “for every year of the unexpired term” which follows the words “salaries for three months.”

In this case, Jerry’s contract period is less than one year. So he is entitled not only to three months’ salary but for the unexpired portion of his contract. To follow the company’s thinking that Jerry is entitled to three months’ salary only simply because it is the lesser amount is to completely disregard and overlook some words used in the statute while giving effect to some.

This is contrary to the well-established rule in legal hermeneutics that, in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part or word thereof be given effect, since the lawmaking body is presumed to know the meaning of the words employed in the statute and to have used them advisedly."

(Marsaman Manning Agency Inc. et. al. vs. NLRC et. al. GR. No. 127195 Aug. 25, 1999.)

Read - 

- https://www.philstar.com/opinion/2022/08/12/2202133/illegally-terminated