Change of name, use of surname

"xxx.

Having resolved the question of whether a legitimate child is entitled to use their mother's surname as their own, this Court proceeds to the question of changing petitioner's first name from "Anacleto" to "Abdulhamid."

Whether grounds exist to change one's name is a matter generally left to the trial court's discretion.60 Notably, the Petition is devoid of any legal arguments to persuade this Court that the Regional Trial Court erred in denying him this change. Nonetheless, we revisit the ruling, and petitioner's arguments as stated in his appeal.

The Regional Trial Court correctly cited the instances recognized under jurisprudence as sufficient to warrant a change of name, namely:


... (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.61(Citation omitted)

As summarized in the Record on Appeal, the petition to change name was filed to avoid confusion:


Petitioner has been using the name Abdulhamid Ballaho in all his records and transactions. He is also known to and called by his family and friends by such name. He has never used the name Anacleto Ballaho Alanis III even once in his life. To have the petitioner suddenly use the name Anacleto Ballaho Alanis III would cause undue embarrassment to the petitioner since he has never been known by such name. Petitioner has shown not only some proper or compelling reason but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. A mere correction of his private and public records to conform to the name stated in his Certificate of Live Birth would create more confusion because petitioner has been using the name Abdulhamid Ballaho since enrollment in grade school until finishing his law degree. The purpose of the law in allowing change of name as contemplated by the provisions of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court is to give a person an opportunity to improve his personality and to provide his best interest[.] There is therefore ample justification to grant fully his petition, which is not whimsical but on the contrary is based on a solid and reasonable ground, i.e. to avoid confusion[.]62 (Citations omitted)

These arguments are well taken. That confusion could arise is evident. In Republic v. Bolante,63 where the respondent had been known as "Maria Eloisa" her whole life, as evidenced by scholastic records, employment records, and licenses, this Court found it obvious that changing the name written on her birth certificate would avoid confusion:


The matter of granting or denying petitions for change of name and the corollary issue of what is a proper and reasonable cause therefor rests on the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court; it need not be the best evidence available. What is involved in special proceedings for change of name is, to borrow from Republic v. Court of Appeals, . . . "not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the petition, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the courts."

With the view we take of the case, respondent's submission for a change of name is with proper and reasonable reason. As it were, she has, since she started schooling, used the given name and has been known as Maria Eloisa, albeit the name Roselie Eloisa is written on her birth record. Her scholastic records, as well as records in government offices, including that of her driver's license, professional license as a certified public accountant issued by the Professional Regulation Commission, and the "Quick Count" document of the COMELEC, all attest to her having used practically all her life the name Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante.

The imperatives of avoiding confusion dictate that the instant petition is granted. But beyond practicalities, simple justice dictates that every person shall be allowed to avail himself of any opportunity to improve his social standing, provided he does so without causing prejudice or injury to the interests of the State or of other people.64 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

This Court made a similar conclusion in Chua v. Republic: 65


The same circumstances are attendant in the case at bar. As Eric has established, he is known in his community as "Eric Chua," rather than "Eric Kiat." Moreover, all of his credentials exhibited before the Court, other than his Certificate of Live Birth, bear the name "Eric Chua." Guilty of reiteration, Eric's Certificate of Baptism, Voter Certification, Police Clearance, National Bureau of Investigation Clearance, Passport, and High School Diploma all reflect his surname to be "Chua." Thus, to compel him to use the name "Eric Kiat" at this point would inevitably lead to confusion. It would result in an alteration of all of his official documents, save for his Certificate of Live Birth. His children, too, will correspondingly be compelled to have their records changed. For even their own Certificates of Live Birth state that their father's surname is "Chua." To deny this petition would then have ramifications not only to Eric's identity in his community, but also to that of his children.66

Similarly, in this case, this Court sees fit to grant the requested change to avoid confusion.

The Regional Trial Court itself also recognized the confusion that may arise here. Despite this, it did not delve into the issue of changing "Anacleto" to "Abdulhamid," but instead concluded that granting the petition would create even more confusion, because it "could trigger much deeper inquiries regarding [his] parentage and/or paternity[.]"67

This Court fails to see how the change of name would create more confusion. Whether people inquire deeper into petitioner's parentage or paternity because of a name is inconsequential here, and seems to be more a matter of intrigue and gossip than an issue for courts to consider. Regardless of which name petitioner uses, his father's identity still appears in his birth certificate, where it will always be written, and which can be referred to in cases where paternity is relevant.

Aside from being unduly restrictive and highly speculative, the trial court's reasoning is also contrary to the spirit and mandate of the Convention, the Constitution, and Republic Act No. 7192, which all require that the State take the appropriate measures to ensure the fundamental equality of women and men before the law.

Patriarchy becomes encoded in our culture when it is normalized. The more it pervades our culture, the more its chances to infect this and future generations.68

The trial court's reasoning further encoded patriarchy into our system. If a surname is significant for identifying a person's ancestry, interpreting the laws to mean that a marital child's surname must identify only the paternal line renders the mother and her family invisible. This, in turn, entrenches the patriarchy and with it, antiquated gender roles: the father, as dominant, in public; and the mother, as a supporter, in private.69

Xxx."


G.R. No. 216425, November 11, 2020

ANACLETO BALLAHO ALANIS HI, PTITIONER, V. COURT OF APPEALS, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, AND HON. GREGORIO Y. DE LA PENA III, PRESIDING JUDGE, BR. 12, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ZAMBOANGA CITY, RESPONDENTS

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/nov2020/gr_216425_2020.html

Gender equality and the use of surname

"xxx.

The fundamental equality of women and men before the law shall be ensured by the State. This is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution,51 a statute,52 and an international convention to which the Philippines is a party.

In 1980, the Philippines became a signatory to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and is thus now part of the Philippine legal system. As a state party to the Convention, the Philippines bound itself to the following:

Article 2

. . . .

(f) to take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women;

. . . .

Article 5

. . . .

(a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women[.]53

Non-discrimination against women is also an emerging customary norm. Thus, the State has the duty to actively modify what is in its power to modify, to ensure that women are not discriminated.

Accordingly, Article II, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution reiterated the State's commitment to ensure gender equality:

SECTION 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.

In keeping with the Convention, Article II, Section 14 of the Constitution requires that the State be active in ensuring gender equality. This provision is even more noticeably proactive than the more widely-invoked equal protection and due process clauses under the Bill of Rights. In Racho v. Tanaka,54 this Court observed:

This constitutional provision provides a more active application than the passive orientation of Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution does, which simply states that no person shall "be denied the equal protection of the laws." Equal protection, within the context of Article III, Section 1 only provides that any legal burden or benefit that is given to men must also be given to women. It does not require the State to actively pursue "affirmative ways and means to battle the patriarchy — that complex of political, cultural, and economic factors that ensure women's disempowerment."55 (Citation omitted)

Article II, Section 14 implies the State's positive duty to actively dismantle the existing patriarchy by addressing the culture that supports it.

With the Philippines as a state party to the Convention, the emerging customary norm, and not least of all in accordance with its constitutional duty, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7192, or the Women in Development and Nation Building Act. Reiterating Article II, Section 14, the law lays down the steps the government would take to attain this policy:

SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. — The State recognizes the role of women in nation building and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. The State shall provide women rights and opportunities equal to that of men.

To attain the foregoing policy:

(1) A substantial portion of official development assistance funds received from foreign governments and multilateral agencies and organizations shall be set aside and utilized by the agencies concerned to support programs and activities for women;

(2) All government departments shall ensure that women benefit equally and participate directly in the development programs and projects of said department, specifically those funded under official foreign development assistance, to ensure the full participation and involvement of women in the development process; and

(3) All government departments and agencies shall review and revise all their regulations, circulars, issuances and procedures to remove gender bias therein.56

Courts, like all other government departments and agencies, must ensure the fundamental equality of women and men before the law. Accordingly, where the text of a law allows for an interpretation that treats women and men more equally, that is the correct interpretation.

Thus, the Regional Trial Court gravely erred when it held that legitimate children cannot use their mothers' surnames. Contrary to the State policy, the trial court treated the surnames of petitioner's mother and father unequally when it said:

In the case at bar, what the petitioner wishes is for this Court to allow him to legally change is [sic] his given and registered first name from Anacleto III to Abdulhamid and to altogether disregard or drop his registered surname, Alanis, the surname of his natural and legitimate father, and for him to use as his family name the maiden surname of his mother Ballaho, which is his registered middle name, which petitioner claims and in fact presented evidence to be the name that he has been using and is known to be in all his records.

In denying the herein petition, this Court brings to the attention of the petitioner that, our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father. The Family Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the father's surname. Legitimate children, such as the petitioner in this case, has [sic] the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on Surnames, and it is so provided by law that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.57 (Citations omitted)

This treatment by the Regional Trial Court was based on Article 174 of the Family Code, which provides:

ARTICLE 174. Legitimate children shall have the right:

(1) To bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on Surnames[.]

In turn, Article 364 of the Civil Code provides:

ARTICLE 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.

The Regional Trial Court's application of Article 364 of the Civil Code is incorrect. Indeed, the provision states that legitimate children shall "principally" use the surname of the father, but "principally" does not mean "exclusively." This gives ample room to incorporate into Article 364 the State policy of ensuring the fundamental equality of women and men before the law, and no discernible reason to ignore it. This Court has explicitly recognized such interpretation in Alfon v. Republic:58

The only reason why the lower court denied the petitioner's prayer to change her surname is that as legitimate child of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon she should principally use the surname of her father invoking Art. 364 of the Civil Code. But the word "principally" as used in the codal-provision is not equivalent to "exclusively" so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its mother to which it is equally entitled. Moreover, this Court in Haw Liong vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-21194, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 677, 679, said:

"The following may be considered, among others, as proper or reasonable causes that may warrant the grant of a petitioner for change of name; (1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a consequence of a change of status, such as when a natural child is acknowledged or legitimated; and (3) when the change is necessary to avoid confusion (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed., Vol. 1, p. 660)."59

Given these irrefutable premises, the Regional Trial Court patently erred in denying petitioner's prayer to use his mother's surname, based solely on the word "principally" in Article 364 of the Civil Code.

Xxx."


G.R. No. 216425, November 11, 2020

ANACLETO BALLAHO ALANIS HI, PETITIONER, V. COURT OF APPEALS, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, AND HON. GREGORIO Y. DE LA PENA III, PRESIDING JUDGE, BR. 12, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ZAMBOANGA CITY, RESPONDENTS


https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/nov2020/gr_216425_2020.html

Negligence of litigant and lawyer

"xxx.

The Petition was filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, but petitioner did not even attempt to show any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. On this ground alone, the Petition may be dismissed.

It is not disputed that the Record on Appeal was filed out of time. The Court of Appeals could have relaxed the rules for perfecting an appeal, but was not required, by law, to review it.

The Court of Appeals found no reason to warrant any relaxation of the rules, after appreciating the following circumstances: (1) petitioner did not adduce evidence to prove the alleged shooting of his former counsel;43 (2) petitioner was represented by counsel belonging to a law office which had more than one associate;44 and (3) petitioner was a law graduate and should have been more vigilant.45

This Court cannot sidestep the rule on reglementary periods for appealing decisions, except in the most meritorious cases.46

Petitioner claims that the circumstances surrounding the failure to file the appeal are bereft of carelessness or inattention on the part of counsel, and thus, constitute excusable negligence.

This is unconvincing. In Sublay v. National Labor Relations Commission47 the petitioner filed an appeal out of time because the counsel on record did not inform her or her other counsel that a decision had been rendered in her case. This Court affirmed the denial of her appeal for having been filed out of time, explaining that:

The unbroken stream of judicial dicta is that clients are bound by the action of their counsel in the conduct of their case. Otherwise, if the lawyer's mistake or negligence was admitted as a reason for the opening of a case, there would be no end to litigation so long as counsel had not been sufficiently diligent or experienced or learned.48 (Citation omitted)

This Court noted in Sublay that the petitioner was represented by more than one lawyer. The decision she wished to appeal had been duly served on one of her lawyers on record, who failed to inform the more active counsel. This Court ruled that the petitioner was bound by the negligence of her counsel:

Lastly, petitioner's claim for judicial relief in view of her counsel's alleged negligence is incongruous, to say the least, considering that she was represented by more than one (1) lawyer. Although working merely as a collaborating counsel who entered his appearance for petitioner as early as May 1996, i.e., more or less six (6) months before the termination of the proceedings a quo, Arty. Alikpala had the bounden duty to monitor the progress of the case. A lawyer has the responsibility of monitoring and keeping track of the period of time left to file an appeal. He cannot rely on the courts to appraise him of the developments in his case and warn him against any possible procedural blunder. Knowing that the lead counsel was no longer participating actively in the trial of the case several months before its resolution, Atty. Alikpala who alone was left to defend petitioner should have put himself on guard and thus anticipated the release of the Labor Arbiter's decision. Petitioner's lead counsel might have been negligent but she was never really deprived of proper representation. This fact alone militates against the grant of this petition.49

Here, petitioner failed to respond to the assertion that Atty. Dialo's law office, Dialo Darunday & Associates Law Office, is a law firm with more than one lawyer, as well as legal staff, who must have been aware that Atty. Dialo was not reporting to office or receiving his mail sent there. Moreover, Atty. Dialo stopped reporting to office on May 2, 2008, whereas the law firm received the June 2, 2008 Order more than a month later, on June 12, 2008. Without any response to this point, this Court cannot automatically excuse the law office and assume that it could not adjust to Atty. Dialo's absence.

The law firm was certainly negligent in how it dealt with the Order. Given the other circumstances of this case, petitioner would ordinarily be bound by this negligence. Consequently, petitioner had the burden to sufficiently establish, by alleging and arguing, that this case is so meritorious that it warrants the relaxation of the procedural rules. This, petitioner did not bother to do.

Nonetheless, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction,50 this Court may choose to apply procedural rules more liberally to promote substantial justice. Thus, we delve into the substantial issues raised by petitioner.

Xxx."


G.R. No. 216425, November 11, 2020

ANACLETO BALLAHO ALANIS HI, PETITIONER, V. COURT OF APPEALS, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, AND HON. GREGORIO Y. DE LA PENA III, PRESIDING JUDGE, BR. 12, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ZAMBOANGA CITY, RESPONDENTS

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/nov2020/gr_216425_2020.html

Failure to disclose previous employment

"Failure to Disclose Previous Employment Not a Ground for Dismissal

September 21, 2022


The Supreme Court has ruled that omission of past employment is not a just cause to terminate an employment.

In a Decision penned by Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the Court’s Third Division granted the petition of Nancy Claire Pit Celis to reverse and set aside the Decision dated June 7, 2019 and the Resolution dated December 6, 2019 of the Court of Appeals (CA). The assailed CA rulings reversed and set aside the Decision dated July 13, 2018 and the Resolution dated October 26, 2018 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), and held that Celis’ employer, Bank of Makati (A Savings Bank), Inc. (Bank of Makati), validly dismissed Celis.

Petitioner Celis was hired on July 15, 2013 as an Account Officer of Bank of Makati’s Pasay City Branch. On May 23, 2016, the bank assigned her to its Legal and External Agency Department as an Administrative Officer.

By the end of 2017, the Bank of Makati’s Human Resource Department received a report that Celis was previously employed in the Rural Bank of Placer (Bank of Placer), Surigao del Norte and was involved in a case concerning embezzlement of funds. Celis did not disclose this past employment when she applied for a job with the Bank of Makati.

After an investigation and hearing, Celis was dismissed for violating the Bank of Makati’s Code of Conduct and Discipline (Bank’s Code of Conduct), for “knowingly giving false or misleading information in applications for employment as a result of which employment is secured.” Celis’s employment was also terminated on the ground of “serious misconduct, fraud, or willful breach of trust and loss of confidence” under the Labor Code.

This prompted Celis to file a Complaint for illegal dismissal, monetary claims, and damages against the Bank of Makati. She maintained that the omission of her past employment with the Bank of Placer was done in good faith and that the Bank of Makati failed to prove her involvement in the embezzlement case.

The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of Celis and held that she was illegally dismissed, holding that her failure to state her past employment was not a serious offense that would justify suspension and termination. The LA also noted that Celis was never administratively found guilty of the supposed charge of embezzlement against the Rural Bank of Placer, which allowed her to resign without any derogatory record.

The LA’s ruling was upheld by the NLRC, but was subsequently overturned by the CA.

In reversing the CA, the Supreme Court stressed the Constitutional policy that whenever there are doubts in the interpretation of labor legislation and contracts, the former should be resolved in favor of labor.

In Celis’ case, considering that she did not actually state any false information in her job application but merely omitted to reflect her past employment with the Bank of Placer, she could not have committed the alleged infraction of allegedly violating the Bank’s Code of Conduct for concealing her previous employment.

“The labor tribunals aptly held that this is merely a case of an omission to disclose former employment in a job application, a fault which does not justify petitioner’s suspension and eventual termination from employment… [T]he penalty must be commensurate to the offense involved and to the degree of the infraction. To dismiss petition on account of her omission to disclose former employment is just too harsh a penalty,” the Court said.

The Court noted that Celis had been working for the Bank of Makati for almost five years when it raised, out of the blue, the issue regarding her undisclosed past employment. “To the Court, such matter is already water under the bridge. Likewise, the fact that [Bank of Makati] suddenly created an issue about [Celis’] undisclosed past employment lends credence to her allegation that the charge against her was only precipitated by her discovery of the corrupt practices involving her division head and her department head,” it said.

The Court further held that the CA’s reliance on the Principle of Totality of Infractions was misplaced. Under the Principle of Totality of Infractions, previous offenses may be used to aggravate a subsequent infraction to justify an employee’s dismissal only if they are related to the subsequent offense upon which termination is decreed.

According to the Supreme Court, even assuming that Celis’ act of omission did constitute an offense, her two previous infractions, (1) improper conduct and acts of gross discourtesy or disrespect to follow employees, and (2) personal borrowing from the bank’s clients, are not related to the offense that became the basis for her termination. Hence, the Principle of Totality of Infractions does not apply.

While the High Tribunal sustained the NLRC rulings, the Court deemed it best to award Celis separation pay in lieu of reinstatement due to the resultant strained relations between her and the Bank of Makati.

The Court also modified the monetary award with an imposition of a legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of the Decision until full satisfaction. The case was remanded to the Labor Arbiter for the proper computation of the monetary awards.

Full text of G.R. No. 250776 dated June 15, 2022 at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/29851/. "

Read - https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/29927/

Dual citizens by birth

Read - https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/29129/

"SC: Naturalization Does not Apply to Dual Citizens by Birth

August 12, 2022

The Supreme Court has held that Filipinos born to one Filipino parent and one foreign parent are considered dual citizens by birth and not by naturalization, regardless of subsequent acts performed to confirm the foreign citizenship.

In a Decision penned by Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, the Supreme Court En Banc granted the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Mariz Lindsey Tan Villegas Gana-Carait, and annulled and set aside the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc Resolution dated September 23, 2021 which denied Gana-Carait’s Motion for Reconsideration of the COMELEC First Division’s Resolution dated February 27, 2019. The said COMELEC resolutions denied the petition to disqualify Gana-Carait as a candidate for Member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the Lone District of Biñan, Laguna for the May 2019 elections, but granted the petition to deny due course to or cancel her certificate of candidacy (CoC).

On October 17, 2018, Gana-Carait filed her CoC for the May 2019 National and Local Elections. Two petitions were then filed before the COMELEC against her: one for her disqualification, on the ground that she failed to renounce her United States (US) citizenship; the other for the cancellation of her COC, for false representations on her eligibility to run for office given her American citizenship.

The COMELEC’s First Division resolved the consolidated cases in its February 27, 2019 Resolution, dismissing the petition for disqualification but granting the petition for the cancellation of Gana-Carait’s COC, finding that she was a dual citizen by naturalization because of positive acts subsequently performed by her mother to secure a Consular Report of Birth Abroad of a Citizen of the United States of America and a US passport for Gana-Carait.

Thus, the COMELEC held that Gana-Carait must comply with RA No. 9225, or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act, which requires candidates who are dual citizens by naturalization to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to renounce their foreign citizenship. Gana-Carait moved to reconsider the ruling, but was denied by the COMELEC En Banc, prompting Gana-Carait to go to the Supreme Court.

In ruling to set aside COMELEC’s cancellation of Gana-Carait’s COC, the Court held that Gana-Carait, who was born to a Filipino father and an American mother, is a dual citizen by birth, and not by naturalization.

The Court also found that the subsequent positive acts made by Gana-Carait’s mother to request confirmation from the United States Consular Service of Gana-Carait’s US citizenship is not considered a naturalization process but a mere presentation of documentary evidence to establish the fact that Gana-Carait is an American citizen by birth.

The Court held that since Gana-Carait is a dual citizen by birth, and not by naturalization, she is not covered by the provisions of the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act requiring candidates who are dual citizens by naturalization to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to renounce their foreign citizenships in order to become eligible for elective office. As a dual citizen by birth, Gana-Carait is thus considered a Filipino qualified to run for public office. Hence, she could not be said to have made a false representation in her COC, ruled the Court.

The Court also harmonized conflicting provisions under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure (COMELEC Rules) and the Rules of Court on the reckoning point for the 30-day period within which one can challenge a COMELEC ruling before the Supreme Court through a petition for certiorari.

Under Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, which is based on Section 7, Article IX of the Constitution, a petition for certiorari shall be filed within 30 days from notice of the judgment, final order, or resolution to be reviewed. Section 1, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules, however, provides that such petition must be filed within 30 days from the promulgation date. Further, Section 3 of the same Rule declares that decisions in petitions to cancel COCs become final and executory after five days from promulgation, unless restrained by the Court.

The Court held that the COMELEC Rules are merely procedural and thus cannot override substantive law, especially the Constitution. The COMELEC Rules cannot be applied in a way that would shorten the constitutionally mandated period within which aggrieved parties can question an adverse COMELEC ruling.

The Court ruled that to harmonize the COMELEC Rules with the Constitution and the Rules of Court, the proper interpretation of Section 8, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules is that COMELEC rulings, in the absence of a restraining order from the Supreme Court, issued within five days from receipt of the aggrieved party, shall be rendered only executory, but not final.

In the case of Gana-Carait, despite the COMELEC’s issuance of the Certificate of Finality, Entry of Judgment, and Writ of Execution, the challenged COMELEC ruling did not actually attain finality since Gana-Carait was able to file the Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court within 30 days from notice of the COMELEC ruling.

The SC Public Information Office will upload the full text of the Decision on the SC website once available.###"

DISMISSAL of teacher based on GROSS NEGLIGENCE

"xxx.

Simply stated, the sole issue presented for our resolution is whether respondent’s dismissal on the ground of gross negligence resulting to loss of trust and confidence was valid.

The issue of whether a party is negligent is a question of fact. As a rule, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and this applies with greater force in labor cases.13 However, where the issue is shrouded by a conflict of factual perception, we are constrained to review the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. In this case, the findings of facts of the appellate court contradict those of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.14

Under Article 28215 of the Labor Code, gross and habitual neglect of duties is a valid ground for an employer to terminate an employee. Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or a failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them.16 Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform one’s duties for a period of time, depending upon the circumstances.17

Our perusal of the records leads us to conclude that respondent had been grossly negligent. First, it is undisputed that Chiara Mae’s permit form was unsigned. Yet, respondent allowed her to join the activity because she assumed that Chiara Mae’s mother has allowed her to join it by personally bringing her to the school with her packed lunch and swimsuit.

The purpose of a permit form is precisely to ensure that the parents have allowed their child to join the school activity involved. Respondent cannot simply ignore this by resorting to assumptions. Respondent admitted that she was around when Chiara Mae and her mother arrived. She could have requested the mother to sign the permit form before she left the school or at least called her up to obtain her conformity.

Second, it was respondent’s responsibility as Class Adviser to supervise her class in all activities sanctioned by the school.18 Thus, she should have coordinated with the school to ensure that proper safeguards, such as adequate first aid and sufficient adult personnel, were present during their activity. She should have been mindful of the fact that with the number of pupils involved, it would be impossible for her by herself alone to keep an eye on each one of them.

As it turned out, since respondent was the only adult present, majority of the pupils were left unsupervised when she followed the two pupils who sneaked out. In the light of the odds involved, respondent should have considered that those who sneaked out could not have left the school premises since there were guards manning the gates. The guards would not have allowed them to go out in their swimsuits and without any adult accompanying them. But those who stayed at the pool were put at greater risk, when she left them unattended by an adult.1avvphi1

Notably, respondent’s negligence, although gross, was not habitual. In view of the considerable resultant damage, however, we are in agreement that the cause is sufficient to dismiss respondent. This is not the first time that we have departed from the requirements laid down by the law that neglect of duties must be both gross and habitual. In Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. NLRC,19 we ruled that Philippine Airlines (PAL) cannot be legally compelled to continue with the employment of a person admittedly guilty of gross negligence in the performance of his duties although it was his first offense. In that case, we noted that a mere delay on PAL’s flight schedule due to aircraft damage entails problems like hotel accommodations for its passengers, re-booking, the possibility of law suits, and payment of special landing fees not to mention the soaring costs of replacing aircraft parts.20 In another case, Fuentes v. National Labor Relations Commission,21 we held that it would be unfair to compel Philippine Banking Corporation to continue employing its bank teller. In that case, we observed that although the teller’s infraction was not habitual, a substantial amount of money was lost. The deposit slip had already been validated prior to its loss and the amount reflected thereon is already considered as current liabilities in the bank’s balance sheet.22 Indeed, the sufficiency of the evidence as well as the resultant damage to the employer should be considered in the dismissal of the employee. In this case, the damage went as far as claiming the life of a child.

As a result of gross negligence in the present case, petitioners lost its trust and confidence in respondent. Loss of trust and confidence to be a valid ground for dismissal must be based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts. A breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently.23 Otherwise stated, it must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employer’s arbitrariness, whims, caprices or suspicion; otherwise, the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the employer. It should be genuine and not simulated; nor should it appear as a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad faith or a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or unjustified. It has never been intended to afford an occasion for abuse because of its subjective nature. There must, therefore, be an actual breach of duty committed by the employee which must be established by substantial evidence.24

As a teacher who stands in loco parentis to her pupils, respondent should have made sure that the children were protected from all harm while in her company.25 Respondent should have known that leaving the pupils in the swimming pool area all by themselves may result in an accident. A simple reminder "not to go to the deepest part of the pool"26 was insufficient to cast away all the serious dangers that the situation presented to the children, especially when respondent knew that Chiara Mae cannot swim.27 Dismally, respondent created an unsafe situation which exposed the lives of all the pupils concerned to real danger. This is a clear violation not only of the trust and confidence reposed on her by the parents of the pupils but of the school itself.

Finally, we note that based on the criminal complaint filed by Chiara Mae’s parents, the Assistant City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict respondent for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The Assistant City Prosecutor held that respondent "should have foreseen the danger lurking in the waters." By leaving her pupils in the swimming pool, respondent displayed an "inexcusable lack of foresight and precaution."28 While this finding is not controlling for purposes of the instant case, this only supports our conclusion that respondent has indeed been grossly negligent.

All told, there being a clear showing that respondent was culpable for gross negligence resulting to loss of trust and confidence, her dismissal was valid and legal. It was error for the Court of Appeals to reverse and set aside the resolution of the NLRC.

Xxx."


G.R. No. 165565 July 14, 2008

SCHOOL OF THE HOLY SPIRIT OF QUEZON CITY and/or SR. CRISPINA A. TOLENTINO, S.Sp.S., Petitioners,
vs.
CORAZON P. TAGUIAM, Respondent.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/jul2008/gr_165565_2008.html

Court vacancies

"xxx. 

Court vacancy and its its impact to the administration of justice

Court vacancy in the Philippine Lower Courts is a silent menace to the administration of justice. Of the total 2,692 courts authorized by the Philippine Congress, as of September 1, 2021, a total of 308 courts were vacant nationwide (see table). An additional 143 courts are "unorganized" and another 120 judges were "retired", thus resulting to 21% of the courts nationwide being unoccupied. This is particularly acute in the Shariah Courts were 57% of its courts are unoccupied.

Based on my continuing research, it takes at least a year, on average, for court vacancies to be filled up (anectodal reports show that some courts can be vacant for four years). When courts are vacant, hearings are usually postponed. While judges in other courts are paired to the vacant courts as a stop-gap solution, still there is a limited number of hearing days (a judge can only attend to one court hearing at a time), thus leading to inadvertent delays.

In the Regional Trial Courts, where many of the accused in criminal cases are detained, the impact to the administation of justice is severe. Regional Trial Courts, especially in the urban areas, can have as many as 1,000 criminal cases. Using a very conservative estimate that each court has 100 (or 10 percent) of the accused are detained, and each of these accused will languish in jail for a year while waiting for a new judge to be appointed, translates to: 119 vacant courts X 100 accused per vacant court X Php 70.00 for food budget per day per inmate X 365 days of vacancy until the position is filled equals a staggering PhP304,045,000.00 budgetary cost. This PhP304 Million lost on food budget alone is a huge drain to the national coffers. Moreso, this is just the tip of the iceberg: it does not include the other type of courts like Metropolitan Trial Court where many of the accused also stay in jail due to indigency to post bail. Additionally, the human cost of delayed hearings, such as overcrowding in the jails and detention centers, and their eventual exposure to the criminogenic influences of incarceration, makes court vacancy a sillent menace to the Philippine administration of justice.

Proposed solution:

The Judicial Bar Council (JBC) should develop a list of "Judges in Waiting" where meritorious applicants are vetted and selected. The list will be submitted to Malacanang where the President serves as the appointing authority. While waiting for their appointments, the "Judges in Waiting" must undergo rigorous training on court management.

Courts are vacant usually when judges retire, get promoted, resigned or they meet an untimely death. My continuing research suggests that on average, 3 to 5 judges retire every month. Thus, the JBC can easily anticipate the court vacancies 6 months in advance, such that when the courts are vacant, a judge in waiting can take over the following day.

While the JBC currently vets and selects applicants and endorse their applications in Malacanang; those who were not eventually appointed by the President will resubmit their applications and undergo the same rigorous process. For example, 6 names are submitted to the President for final appointment in one vacant court, only one will be successfully chosen, and the 5 will have to resubmit their application to the next round. Applicants from the provinces have to travel to Metro Manila every time they undergo exams and interviews, which adds to the burden of the applicants. Precious resources from the JBC are also spent in developing the list. My ongoing research suggest that once vetted and selected by the JBC, they should be considered judges in waiting. Their names should be automatically resubmitted to the President.

If this proposal is accepted, I guarantee that the Philippine government will save at least PhP 304M a year. This savings can buy tons of sugar that may help our countrymen and women overcome the pains of inflation. It can also be used in building new schools and hospitals.

It is a simple solution to the silent menace posed by court vacancies."

- Atty. Raymund Narag

Xxx."

Source -

https://www.facebook.com/583279973/posts/pfbid05x24vZZnUEfedDNG2KS7APVk6bkT4qFbGFJmuE8vtQJVYau6QUYiPrTiktNGn4owl/

Moral turpitude and Marcos Jr.

ACCORDING to FORMER CHIEF JUSTICE PANGANIBAN, the Supreme Court has ruled in an 83-page decision in the case of "BUENAFE vs. COMELEC " (June 28, 2022), written by JUSTICE RODIL V. ZALAMEDA, that NON-FILING OF INCOME TAX RETURNS, no matter the frequency thereof, is NOT A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE, because, following the logic of the Court, the said act does not necessarily constitute FRAUD and TAX EVASION.

The Supreme Court en banc decision has not yet been posted on the Court's website, per my visit today to the said website.

Recall that on June 28, 2022 the Court issued a PRESS RELEASE announcing the dispositive part of the decision, DISMISSING the two petitions praying (1) for the CANCELATION of the CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY of Narcos Jr. and (2) for his DISQUALIFICATION as a presidential candidate.

Apparently, the press release was urgently issued by the Court two days before the oath-taking ceremony for Narcos Jr. on June 30, 2022 TO REMOVE THE ETHICAL (DELICADEZA) OBSTACLES to the personal appearance of the incumbent Chief Justice as the Administering Officer of the presidential oath of office. It would be ETHICALLY REPULSIVE for the Chief Justice to ADMINISTER (read: to RECOGNIZE ) the oath of office of Narcos Jr. while the two petitions questioning the LEGITIMACY OF HIS ELECTION were PENDING FINAL ADJUDICATION by the Court.

The SOVEREIGN FILIPINO PEOPLE , whose hard-earned taxes fund the hefty salaries and allowances of the Justices, are not in a position, at this time, to scrutinize, examine, review and evaluate the WISDOM OR LACK OF WISDOM of the controversial decision, which, shorn of verbosity and legalese, appears to have merely ECHOED AND ADOPTED the reasoning of the Duterte-controlled Commission on Elections (Comelec).

(The aforementioned DUTERTE-APPOINTED JUSTICE, who wrote the decision for the Court en banc, became NOTORIOUS FOR HIS DDS SEMI NAZI-STYLE SALUTE in honor of the Appointing Authority Duterte during a group photo session with Duterte, BungGu, et. al. in 2019 in Malacañang Palace after his oath-taking ceremony).

Opinion:

"However, in Republic v. Marcos II issued 13 years ago on Aug. 4, 2009, the Court (Third Division) held that the Court of Appeals’ (CA) conviction of Ferdinand Marcos II for his failure to file his income tax returns (ITR) for four years (1982-1985) did not disqualify him to be “the executor of the will of his father” because such failure “is not a crime involving moral turpitude.”

Under the Rules of Court (Rule 78, Section 1), a person convicted “of an offense involving moral turpitude” cannot serve as an executor or administrator of a decedent’s estate.

Penned by Justice (later CJ) Diosdado M. Peralta, the decision explained three different violations relevant to ITRs, namely, “(1) false return, (2) fraudulent return with intent to evade tax, (3) failure to file a return.” It stressed that the first two “entail willfulness and fraudulent intent on the part of the individual and thus fall” under the category of “everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals.”

However, the Court added that the third—failure to file ITRs—“is not a crime involving moral turpitude as the mere omission is already a violation regardless of the fraudulent intent or willfulness of the individual.”

IT MAY NOT BE EASY TO AGREE WITH THIS DECISION. Some may even rage against its cryptic and strained explanation but, as I wrote last Feb. 6, as long as the ruling is not reversed, or modified, or clarified to be merely an obiter dictum (or a side comment) by the Court en banc, it is the prevailing jurisprudence and all of us are duty-bound to follow it, while working to reverse or modify or clarify it.

However, instead of reversing this ruling, the Court en banc affirmed and reiterated it in Buenafe v. Comelec (June 28, 2022). In this 83-page decision carefully written by low profile Justice Rodil V. Zalameda, the Court clarified that while tax evasion—repeat, tax evasion—involves moral turpitude, the “failure to file income tax return does not always amount to tax evasion (bold types in original). Tax evasion connotes fraud through the use of pretenses and forbidden devices to lessen or defeat taxes … Negligence, whether slight or gross, is not equivalent to fraud with intent to evade the tax contemplated by law … the failure to file an (ITR) may be committed by neglect, without any fraudulent intent and/or willfulness … It is not of itself immoral, and neither does it constitute an act of baselessness, vileness, or depravity in the private or social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general.” It then concluded that Marcos II’s failure to file his ITRs was unintentional and borne merely of neglect.

BRUSHING ASIDE PETITIONERS’ SUGGESTION to “reexamine the totality of circumstances surrounding respondent Marcos Jr.’s non-filing of an income tax return, We [referring to the justices] deem it unnecessary to go through the same exercise because of the Court’s Decision involving the same facts. In Republic v. Marcos II, We already declared that respondent Marcos Jr.’s non-filing of an income tax return is not a crime involving moral turpitude.”

With due respect, I believe the Court should have tackled this challenge to “reexamine the totality of circumstances” so it could have added flavor to the, I must admit, already meaty ponencia. It should have explained why a lowly employee had to be dismissed from the DFA while a candidate—who, to quote again the Court, gathered “31,629,783 votes, or 58.77% of the votes cast”—should be treated differently and allowed to sit and enjoy the powers and perks of the presidency.

But the Court has spoken. And as I earlier stated, we all have a duty to follow it, because, to quote the Court once more, “… to undo an election, there must be compelling and unequivocal evidence of the candidate’s disqualification or failure to meet the requirements for filing a certificate of candidacy … Ferdinand Marcos Jr. possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to run for president. Furthermore, his Certificate of Candidacy contains no false material representation and is, therefore, valid.”"

From my FB post - 

https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=pfbid0GSRkDvGvu1yNDwVZ1FW4dGviejkxfGZPxz3Rc6XKFjxxJxFDysrVUzcgTnNJNuCPl&id=100002290961177

Read Chief Justice Panganiban's column - 

https://opinion.inquirer.net/156885/moral-turpitude#ixzz7ecNd3rc3

Follow us: @inquirerdotnet on Twitter | inquirerdotnet on Facebook

BACKWAGES; effect of invalid QUITCLAIM signed under duress

"xxx.

Fifth and Last Issue: Gran is Entitled to Backwages

We reiterate the rule that with regard to employees hired for a fixed period of employment, in cases arising before the effectivity of R.A. No. 804258 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act) on August 25, 1995, that when the contract is for a fixed term and the employees are dismissed without just cause, they are entitled to the payment of their salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of their contract.59 On the other hand, for cases arising after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8042, when the termination of employment is without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term whichever is less.60

In the present case, the employment contract provides that the employment contract shall be valid for a period of two (2) years from the date the employee starts to work with the employer.61 Gran arrived in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and started to work on February 7, 1994;62 hence, his employment contract is until February 7, 1996. Since he was illegally dismissed on July 9, 1994, before the effectivity of R.A. No. 8042, he is therefore entitled to backwages corresponding to the unexpired portion of his contract, which was equivalent to USD 16,150.

Petitioner EDI questions the legality of the award of backwages and mainly relies on the Declaration which is claimed to have been freely and voluntarily executed by Gran. The relevant portions of the Declaration are as follows:

I, ELEAZAR GRAN (COMPUTER SPECIALIST) AFTER RECEIVING MY FINAL SETTLEMENT ON THIS DATE THE AMOUNT OF:

S.R. 2,948.00 (SAUDI RIYALS TWO THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FORTY EIGHT ONLY)
REPRESENTING COMPLETE PAYMENT (COMPENSATION) FOR THE SERVICES I RENDERED TO OAB ESTABLISHMENT.

I HEREBY DECLARE THAT OAB EST. HAS NO FINANCIAL OBLIGATION IN MY FAVOUR AFTER RECEIVING THE ABOVE MENTIONED AMOUNT IN CASH.

I STATE FURTHER THAT OAB EST. HAS NO OBLIGATION TOWARDS ME IN WHATEVER FORM.

I ATTEST TO THE TRUTHFULNESS OF THIS STATEMENT BY AFFIXING MY SIGNATURE VOLUNTARILY.

SIGNED.

ELEAZAR GRAN


Courts must undertake a meticulous and rigorous review of quitclaims or waivers, more particularly those executed by employees. This requirement was clearly articulated by Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in Land and Housing Development Corporation v. Esquillo:

Quitclaims, releases and other waivers of benefits granted by laws or contracts in favor of workers should be strictly scrutinized to protect the weak and the disadvantaged. The waivers should be carefully examined, in regard not only to the words and terms used, but also the factual circumstances under which they have been executed.63 (Emphasis supplied.)

This Court had also outlined in Land and Housing Development Corporation, citing Periquet v. NLRC,64 the parameters for valid compromise agreements, waivers, and quitclaims:

Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking. (Emphasis supplied.)

Is the waiver and quitclaim labeled a Declaration valid? It is not.

The Court finds the waiver and quitclaim null and void for the following reasons:

1. The salary paid to Gran upon his termination, in the amount of SR 2,948.00, is unreasonably low. As correctly pointed out by the court a quo, the payment of SR 2,948.00 is even lower than his monthly salary of SR 3,190.00 (USD 850.00). In addition, it is also very much less than the USD 16,150.00 which is the amount Gran is legally entitled to get from petitioner EDI as backwages.

2. The Declaration reveals that the payment of SR 2,948.00 is actually the payment for Gran's salary for the services he rendered to OAB as Computer Specialist. If the Declaration is a quitclaim, then the consideration should be much much more than the monthly salary of SR 3,190.00 (USD 850.00)—although possibly less than the estimated Gran's salaries for the remaining duration of his contract and other benefits as employee of OAB. A quitclaim will understandably be lower than the sum total of the amounts and benefits that can possibly be awarded to employees or to be earned for the remainder of the contract period since it is a compromise where the employees will have to forfeit a certain portion of the amounts they are claiming in exchange for the early payment of a compromise amount. The court may however step in when such amount is unconscionably low or unreasonable although the employee voluntarily agreed to it. In the case of the Declaration, the amount is unreasonably small compared to the future wages of Gran.

3. The factual circumstances surrounding the execution of the Declaration would show that Gran did not voluntarily and freely execute the document. Consider the following chronology of events:

a. On July 9, 1994, Gran received a copy of his letter of termination;

b. On July 10, 1994, Gran was instructed to depart Saudi Arabia and required to pay his plane ticket;65

c. On July 11, 1994, he signed the Declaration;

d. On July 12, 1994, Gran departed from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; and

e. On July 21, 1994, Gran filed the Complaint before the NLRC.


The foregoing events readily reveal that Gran was "forced" to sign the Declaration and constrained to receive the amount of SR 2,948.00 even if it was against his will—since he was told on July 10, 1994 to leave Riyadh on July 12, 1994. He had no other choice but to sign the Declaration as he needed the amount of SR 2,948.00 for the payment of his ticket. He could have entertained some apprehensions as to the status of his stay or safety in Saudi Arabia if he would not sign the quitclaim.

4. The court a quo is correct in its finding that the Declaration is a contract of adhesion which should be construed against the employer, OAB. An adhesion contract is contrary to public policy as it leaves the weaker party—the employee—in a "take-it-or-leave-it" situation. Certainly, the employer is being unjust to the employee as there is no meaningful choice on the part of the employee while the terms are unreasonably favorable to the employer.66

Thus, the Declaration purporting to be a quitclaim and waiver is unenforceable under Philippine laws in the absence of proof of the applicable law of Saudi Arabia.

In order to prevent disputes on the validity and enforceability of quitclaims and waivers of employees under Philippine laws, said agreements should contain the following:

1. A fixed amount as full and final compromise settlement;

2. The benefits of the employees if possible with the corresponding amounts, which the employees are giving up in consideration of the fixed compromise amount;

3. A statement that the employer has clearly explained to the employee in English, Filipino, or in the dialect known to the employees—that by signing the waiver or quitclaim, they are forfeiting or relinquishing their right to receive the benefits which are due them under the law; and

4. A statement that the employees signed and executed the document voluntarily, and had fully understood the contents of the document and that their consent was freely given without any threat, violence, duress, intimidation, or undue influence exerted on their person.

It is advisable that the stipulations be made in English and Tagalog or in the dialect known to the employee. There should be two (2) witnesses to the execution of the quitclaim who must also sign the quitclaim. The document should be subscribed and sworn to under oath preferably before any administering official of the Department of Labor and Employment or its regional office, the Bureau of Labor Relations, the NLRC or a labor attaché in a foreign country. Such official shall assist the parties regarding the execution of the quitclaim and waiver.67 This compromise settlement becomes final and binding under Article 227 of the Labor Code which provides that:

[A]ny compromise settlement voluntarily agreed upon with the assistance of the Bureau of Labor Relations or the regional office of the DOLE, shall be final and binding upon the parties and the NLRC or any court "shall not assume jurisdiction over issues involved therein except in case of non-compliance thereof or if there is prima facie evidence that the settlement was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, or coercion.

It is made clear that the foregoing rules on quitclaim or waiver shall apply only to labor contracts of OFWs in the absence of proof of the laws of the foreign country agreed upon to govern said contracts. Otherwise, the foreign laws shall apply.

Xxx."


G.R. No. 145587, October 26, 2007

EDI-STAFFBUILDERS INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ELEAZAR S. GRAN, respondents.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/gr_145587_2007.html

Due process in labor cases

"xxx.

Fourth Issue: Gran was not Afforded Due Process

As discussed earlier, in the absence of proof of Saudi laws, Philippine Labor laws and regulations shall govern the relationship between Gran and EDI. Thus, our laws and rules on the requisites of due process relating to termination of employment shall apply.

Petitioner EDI claims that private respondent Gran was afforded due process, since he was allowed to work and improve his capabilities for five months prior to his termination.51 EDI also claims that the requirements of due process, as enunciated in Santos, Jr. v. NLRC,52 and Malaya Shipping Services, Inc. v. NLRC,53 cited by the CA in its Decision, were properly observed in the present case.

This position is untenable.

In Agabon v. NLRC,54 this Court held that:

Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282, the employer must give the employee two written notices and a hearing or opportunity to be heard if requested by the employee before terminating the employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which dismissal is sought a hearing or an opportunity to be heard and after hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal is based on authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284, the employer must give the employee and the Department of Labor and Employment written notices 30 days prior to the effectivity of his separation.

Under the twin notice requirement, the employees must be given two (2) notices before their employment could be terminated: (1) a first notice to apprise the employees of their fault, and (2) a second notice to communicate to the employees that their employment is being terminated. In between the first and second notice, the employees should be given a hearing or opportunity to defend themselves personally or by counsel of their choice.55

A careful examination of the records revealed that, indeed, OAB's manner of dismissing Gran fell short of the two notice requirement. While it furnished Gran the written notice informing him of his dismissal, it failed to furnish Gran the written notice apprising him of the charges against him, as prescribed by the Labor Code.56 Consequently, he was denied the opportunity to respond to said notice. In addition, OAB did not schedule a hearing or conference with Gran to defend himself and adduce evidence in support of his defenses. Moreover, the July 9, 1994 termination letter was effective on the same day. This shows that OAB had already condemned Gran to dismissal, even before Gran was furnished the termination letter. It should also be pointed out that OAB failed to give Gran the chance to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of a representative in accordance with Article 277 of the Labor Code. Clearly, there was no intention to provide Gran with due process. Summing up, Gran was notified and his employment arbitrarily terminated on the same day, through the same letter, and for unjustified grounds. Obviously, Gran was not afforded due process.

Pursuant to the doctrine laid down in Agabon,57 an employer is liable to pay nominal damages as indemnity for violating the employee's right to statutory due process. Since OAB was in breach of the due process requirements under the Labor Code and its regulations, OAB, ESI, and EDI, jointly and solidarily, are liable to Gran in the amount of PhP 30,000.00 as indemnity.

Xxx."


G.R. No. 145587, October 26, 2007

EDI-STAFFBUILDERS INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ELEAZAR S. GRAN, respondents.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/gr_145587_2007.html

Dismissal by reason of incompetence, insubordination and disobedience.

"xxx.

Second and Third Issues: Whether Gran's dismissal is justifiable by reason of incompetence, insubordination, and disobedience

In cases involving OFWs, the rights and obligations among and between the OFW, the local recruiter/agent, and the foreign employer/principal are governed by the employment contract. A contract freely entered into is considered law between the parties; and hence, should be respected. In formulating the contract, the parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.34

In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific causes for termination, termination procedures, etc.). Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to the termination of the employment of Gran.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or forum law.35

Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into play.36 Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours.37 Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented before us.

Petitioner EDI claims that it had proven that Gran was legally dismissed due to incompetence and insubordination or disobedience.

This claim has no merit.

In illegal dismissal cases, it has been established by Philippine law and jurisprudence that the employer should prove that the dismissal of employees or personnel is legal and just.

Section 33 of Article 277 of the Labor Code38 states that:

ART. 277. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS39

(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to be protected against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause and without prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing a statement of the causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he so desires in accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment. Any decision taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the workers to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional branch of the National Labor Relations Commission. The burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause shall rest on the employer. x x x

In many cases, it has been held that in termination disputes or illegal dismissal cases, the employer has the burden of proving that the dismissal is for just and valid causes; and failure to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal was not justified and therefore illegal.40 Taking into account the character of the charges and the penalty meted to an employee, the employer is bound to adduce clear, accurate, consistent, and convincing evidence to prove that the dismissal is valid and legal.41 This is consistent with the principle of security of tenure as guaranteed by the Constitution and reinforced by Article 277 (b) of the Labor Code of the Philippines.42

In the instant case, petitioner claims that private respondent Gran was validly dismissed for just cause, due to incompetence and insubordination or disobedience. To prove its allegations, EDI submitted two letters as evidence. The first is the July 9, 1994 termination letter,43 addressed to Gran, from Andrea E. Nicolaou, Managing Director of OAB. The second is an unsigned April 11, 1995 letter44 from OAB addressed to EDI and ESI, which outlined the reasons why OAB had terminated Gran's employment.

Petitioner claims that Gran was incompetent for the Computer Specialist position because he had "insufficient knowledge in programming and zero knowledge of [the] ACAD system."45 Petitioner also claims that Gran was justifiably dismissed due to insubordination or disobedience because he continually failed to submit the required "Daily Activity Reports."46 However, other than the abovementioned letters, no other evidence was presented to show how and why Gran was considered incompetent, insubordinate, or disobedient. Petitioner EDI had clearly failed to overcome the burden of proving that Gran was validly dismissed.

Petitioner's imputation of incompetence on private respondent due to his "insufficient knowledge in programming and zero knowledge of the ACAD system" based only on the above mentioned letters, without any other evidence, cannot be given credence.

An allegation of incompetence should have a factual foundation. Incompetence may be shown by weighing it against a standard, benchmark, or criterion. However, EDI failed to establish any such bases to show how petitioner found Gran incompetent.

In addition, the elements that must concur for the charge of insubordination or willful disobedience to prosper were not present.

In Micro Sales Operation Network v. NLRC, we held that:

For willful disobedience to be a valid cause for dismissal, the following twin elements must concur: (1) the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful, that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge.47

EDI failed to discharge the burden of proving Gran's insubordination or willful disobedience. As indicated by the second requirement provided for in Micro Sales Operation Network, in order to justify willful disobedience, we must determine whether the order violated by the employee is reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and pertains to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. In the case at bar, petitioner failed to show that the order of the company which was violated—the submission of "Daily Activity Reports"—was part of Gran's duties as a Computer Specialist. Before the Labor Arbiter, EDI should have provided a copy of the company policy, Gran's job description, or any other document that would show that the "Daily Activity Reports" were required for submission by the employees, more particularly by a Computer Specialist.

Even though EDI and/or ESI were merely the local employment or recruitment agencies and not the foreign employer, they should have adduced additional evidence to convincingly show that Gran's employment was validly and legally terminated. The burden devolves not only upon the foreign-based employer but also on the employment or recruitment agency for the latter is not only an agent of the former, but is also solidarily liable with the foreign principal for any claims or liabilities arising from the dismissal of the worker.48

Thus, petitioner failed to prove that Gran was justifiably dismissed due to incompetence, insubordination, or willful disobedience.

Petitioner also raised the issue that Prieto v. NLRC,49 as used by the CA in its Decision, is not applicable to the present case.

In Prieto, this Court ruled that "[i]t is presumed that before their deployment, the petitioners were subjected to trade tests required by law to be conducted by the recruiting agency to insure employment of only technically qualified workers for the foreign principal."50 The CA, using the ruling in the said case, ruled that Gran must have passed the test; otherwise, he would not have been hired. Therefore, EDI was at fault when it deployed Gran who was allegedly "incompetent" for the job.

According to petitioner, the Prieto ruling is not applicable because in the case at hand, Gran misrepresented himself in his curriculum vitae as a Computer Specialist; thus, he was not qualified for the job for which he was hired.

We disagree.

The CA is correct in applying Prieto. The purpose of the required trade test is to weed out incompetent applicants from the pool of available workers. It is supposed to reveal applicants with false educational backgrounds, and expose bogus qualifications. Since EDI deployed Gran to Riyadh, it can be presumed that Gran had passed the required trade test and that Gran is qualified for the job. Even if there was no objective trade test done by EDI, it was still EDI's responsibility to subject Gran to a trade test; and its failure to do so only weakened its position but should not in any way prejudice Gran. In any case, the issue is rendered moot and academic because Gran's incompetency is unproved.

Xxx."


G.R. No. 145587, October 26, 2007

EDI-STAFFBUILDERS INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ELEAZAR S. GRAN, respondents.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/gr_145587_2007.html

Failure to furnish adverse party a copy of appeal memorandum

"xxx.

First Issue: NLRC's Duty is to Require Respondent to Provide Petitioner a Copy of the Appeal

Petitioner EDI claims that Gran's failure to furnish it a copy of the Appeal Memorandum constitutes a jurisdictional defect and a deprivation of due process that would warrant a rejection of the appeal.

This position is devoid of merit.

In a catena of cases, it was ruled that failure of appellant to furnish a copy of the appeal to the adverse party is not fatal to the appeal.

In Estrada v. National Labor Relations Commission,24 this Court set aside the order of the NLRC which dismissed an appeal on the sole ground that the appellant did not furnish the appellee a memorandum of appeal contrary to the requirements of Article 223 of the New Labor Code and Section 9, Rule XIII of its Implementing Rules and Regulations.

Also, in J.D. Magpayo Customs Brokerage Corp. v. NLRC, the order of dismissal of an appeal to the NLRC based on the ground that "there is no showing whatsoever that a copy of the appeal was served by the appellant on the appellee"25 was annulled. The Court ratiocinated as follows:

The failure to give a copy of the appeal to the adverse party was a mere formal lapse, an excusable neglect. Time and again We have acted on petitions to review decisions of the Court of Appeals even in the absence of proof of service of a copy thereof to the Court of Appeals as required by Section 1 of Rule 45, Rules of Court. We act on the petitions and simply require the petitioners to comply with the rule.26 (Emphasis supplied.)

The J.D. Magpayo ruling was reiterated in Carnation Philippines Employees Labor Union-FFW v. National Labor Relations Commission,27 Pagdonsalan v. NLRC,28 and in Sunrise Manning Agency, Inc. v. NLRC.29
Thus, the doctrine that evolved from these cases is that failure to furnish the adverse party with a copy of the appeal is treated only as a formal lapse, an excusable neglect, and hence, not a jurisdictional defect. Accordingly, in such a situation, the appeal should not be dismissed; however, it should not be given due course either. As enunciated in J.D. Magpayo, the duty that is imposed on the NLRC, in such a case, is to require the appellant to comply with the rule that the opposing party should be provided with a copy of the appeal memorandum.

While Gran's failure to furnish EDI with a copy of the Appeal Memorandum is excusable, the abject failure of the NLRC to order Gran to furnish EDI with the Appeal Memorandum constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

The records reveal that the NLRC discovered that Gran failed to furnish EDI a copy of the Appeal Memorandum. The NLRC then ordered Gran to present proof of service. In compliance with the order, Gran submitted a copy of Camp Crame Post Office's list of mail/parcels sent on April 7, 1998.30 The post office's list shows that private respondent Gran sent two pieces of mail on the same date: one addressed to a certain Dan O. de Guzman of Legaspi Village, Makati; and the other appears to be addressed to Neil B. Garcia (or Gran),31 of Ermita, Manila—both of whom are not connected with petitioner.

This mailing list, however, is not a conclusive proof that EDI indeed received a copy of the Appeal Memorandum.

Sec. 5 of the NLRC Rules of Procedure (1990) provides for the proof and completeness of service in proceedings before the NLRC:

Section 5.32 Proof and completeness of service.—The return is prima facie proof of the facts indicated therein. Service by registered mail is complete upon receipt by the addressee or his agent; but if the addressee fails to claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days from the date of first notice of the postmaster, service shall take effect after such time. (Emphasis supplied.)

Hence, if the service is done through registered mail, it is only deemed complete when the addressee or his agent received the mail or after five (5) days from the date of first notice of the postmaster. However, the NLRC Rules do not state what would constitute proper proof of service.

Sec. 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, provides for proofs of service:

Section 13. Proof of service.—Proof of personal service shall consist of a written admission of the party served or the official return of the server, or the affidavit of the party serving, containing a full statement of the date, place and manner of service. If the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with section 7 of this Rule. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee (emphasis supplied).

Based on the foregoing provision, it is obvious that the list submitted by Gran is not conclusive proof that he had served a copy of his appeal memorandum to EDI, nor is it conclusive proof that EDI received its copy of the Appeal Memorandum. He should have submitted an affidavit proving that he mailed the Appeal Memorandum together with the registry receipt issued by the post office; afterwards, Gran should have immediately filed the registry return card.

Hence, after seeing that Gran failed to attach the proof of service, the NLRC should not have simply accepted the post office's list of mail and parcels sent; but it should have required Gran to properly furnish the opposing parties with copies of his Appeal Memorandum as prescribed in J.D. Magpayo and the other cases. The NLRC should not have proceeded with the adjudication of the case, as this constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

The glaring failure of NLRC to ensure that Gran should have furnished petitioner EDI a copy of the Appeal Memorandum before rendering judgment reversing the dismissal of Gran's complaint constitutes an evasion of the pertinent NLRC Rules and established jurisprudence. Worse, this failure deprived EDI of procedural due process guaranteed by the Constitution which can serve as basis for the nullification of proceedings in the appeal before the NLRC. One can only surmise the shock and dismay that OAB, EDI, and ESI experienced when they thought that the dismissal of Gran's complaint became final, only to receive a copy of Gran's Motion for Execution of Judgment which also informed them that Gran had obtained a favorable NLRC Decision. This is not level playing field and absolutely unfair and discriminatory against the employer and the job recruiters. The rights of the employers to procedural due process cannot be cavalierly disregarded for they too have rights assured under the Constitution.

However, instead of annulling the dispositions of the NLRC and remanding the case for further proceedings we will resolve the petition based on the records before us to avoid a protracted litigation.33

Xxx."


G.R. No. 145587, October 26, 2007

EDI-STAFFBUILDERS INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ELEAZAR S. GRAN, respondents.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/gr_145587_2007.html

Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8179 (An Act Amending the Foreign Investments Act of 1991) states: Sec. 10. Other Rights of Natural Born Citizen Pursuant to the Provisions of Article XII, Section 8 of the Constitution. — Any natural born citizen who has lost his Philippine citizenship and who has the legal capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of five thousand (5,000) square meters in the case of urban land or three (3) hectares in the case of rural land to be used by him for business or other purposes. In the case of married couples, one of them may avail of the privilege herein granted: Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the total area acquired shall not exceed the maximum herein fixed.

"xxx.

Former Filipinos have the limited right to own
public agricultural lands in the Philippines

We next deal with the ownership of lands by aliens.

Properties accumulated by a married couple may either be real or personal. While the RTC awarded herein all personal properties in favor of Angelita pursuant to the "Matrimonial Property Agreement" executed in Germany, it ignored that such agreement was governed by the national law of the contracting parties; and that the forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments should be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.[15]

Angelita did not allege and prove the German law that allowed her to enter into and adopt the regime of complete separation of property through the "Matrimonial Property Agreement." In the absence of such allegation and proof, the German law was presumed to be the same as that of the Philippines.

In this connection, we further point out Article 77 of the Family Code declares that marriage settlements and any modification thereof shall be made in writing and signed by the parties prior to the celebration of the marriage. Assuming that the relevant German law was similar to the Philippine law, the "Matrimonial Property Agreement," being entered into by the parties in 1991, or a few years after the celebration of their marriage on August 30, 1988, could not be enforced for being in contravention of a mandatory law.[16]

Also, with the parties being married on August 30, 1988, the provisions of the Family Code should govern. Pursuant to Article 75 of the Family Code, the property relations between the spouses were governed by the absolute community of property. This would then entitle Georg to half of the personal properties of the community property.

As to the real properties of the parties, several factual considerations were apparently overlooked, or were not established.

Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that: "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." It seems clear, however, that the lower courts were too quick to pronounce that Georg, being a German citizen, was automatically disqualified from owning lands in the Philippines. Without disputing the inherent validity of the pronouncement, we nonetheless opine that the lower courts missed to take note of the fact that Angelita, in view of her having admitted that she herself had been a German citizen, suffered the same disqualification as Georg. Consequently, the lower courts' pronouncement awarding all real properties in favor of Angelita could be devoid of legal basis as to her.

At best, an alien could have enjoyed a limited right to own lands. Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution provides: "Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law." Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8179 (An Act Amending the Foreign Investments Act of 1991) also states:

Sec. 10. Other Rights of Natural Born Citizen Pursuant to the Provisions of Article XII, Section 8 of the Constitution. — Any natural born citizen who has lost his Philippine citizenship and who has the legal capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of five thousand (5,000) square meters in the case of urban land or three (3) hectares in the case of rural land to be used by him for business or other purposes. In the case of married couples, one of them may avail of the privilege herein granted: Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the total area acquired shall not exceed the maximum herein fixed.

In case the transferee already owns urban or rural land for business or other purposes, he shall still be entitled to be a transferee of additional urban or rural land for business or other purposes which when added to those already owned by him shall not exceed the maximum areas herein authorized.

A transferee under this Act may acquire not more than two (2) lots which should be situated in different municipalities or cities anywhere in the Philippines: Provided, That the total land area thereof shall not exceed five thousand (5,000) square meters in the case of urban land or three (3) hectares in the case of rural land for use by him for business or other purposes. A transferee who has already acquired urban land shall be disqualified from acquiring rural land area and vice versa.

As the foregoing indicates, Angelita did not have any unlimited right to own lands. On the other hand, the records were not clear on whether or not she had owned real property as allowed by law. It was imperative for the lower courts to determine so. Hence, remand for further proceedings is called for.

It is true that Angelita stated in her petition that she had meanwhile re-acquired Filipino citizenship.[17] This statement remained unsubstantiated, but the impact thereof would be far reaching if the statement was true, for there would then be no need to determine whether or not Angelita had complied with Section 5 of R.A. No. 8179. Thus, the remand of the case will enable the parties to adduce evidence on this aspect of the case, particularly to provide factual basis to determine whether or not Angelita had validly re-acquired her Filipino citizenship; and, if she had, to ascertain what would be the extent of her ownership of the real assets pertaining to the marriage. If the remand should establish that she had remained a foreigner, it must next be determined whether or not she complied with the limits defined or set by R.A. No. 8179 regarding her land ownership. The trial court shall award her the real property that complied with the limits of the law, and inform the Office of the Solicitor General for purposes of a proper disposition of any excess land whose ownership violated the law.

Xxx."


G.R. No. 202039, August 14, 2019

ANGELITA SIMUNDAC-KEPPEL, PETITIONER, VS. GEORG KEPPEL, RESPONDENT.

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65677

Psychological incapacity

"xxx.

Assuming the remedy was proper, the petitioner did not prove the respondent's psychological incapacity

Even if we were now to adhere to the concept of processual presumption,[11] and assume that the German law was similar to the Philippine law as to allow the action under Article 36 of the Family Code to be brought by one against the other party herein, we would still affirm the CA's dismissal of the petition brought under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Notable from the RTC's disquisition is the fact that the psychiatrists found that both parties had suffered from anti-social behavior that became the basis for the trial court's conclusion that they had been both psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential martial obligations. Therein lay the reason why we must affirm the CA.

Jurisprudentially speaking, psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will. The disorder consists of: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the essential obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, and the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. Proving that a spouse did not meet his or her responsibility and duty as a married person is not enough; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so because of some psychological illness.[12]

Psychological incapacity is unlike any other disorder that would invalidate a marriage. It should refer to a mental incapacity that causes a party to be incognitive of the basic marital covenants such as those enumerated in Article 68 of the Family Code and must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability.[13]

In Republic v. Court of Appeals,[14] the Court issued the following guidelines for the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

Here, however, the petitioner presented no evidence to show that the anti-social behavior manifested by both parties had been grave, and had existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage as to render the parties incapable of performing all the essential marital obligations provided by law. As the records bear out, the medical experts merely concluded that the behavior was grave enough as to incapacitate the parties from the performance of their essential marital relationship because the parties exhibited symptoms of an anti-social personality disorder. Also, the incapacity was not established to have existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage. In short, the conclusion about the parties being psychologically incapacitated was not founded on sufficient evidence.

Xxx."


G.R. No. 202039, August 14, 2019

ANGELITA SIMUNDAC-KEPPEL, PETITIONER, VS. GEORG KEPPEL, RESPONDENT.

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65677

Nationality principle in recognition of foreign divorce

"xxx.

Under the Nationality Principle, the petitioner
cannot invoke Article 36 of the Family Code
unless there is a German law that allows her to do so

A fundamental and obvious defect of Angelita's petition for annulment of marriage is that it seeks a relief improper under Philippine law in light of both Georg and Angelita being German citizens, not Filipinos, at the time of the filing thereof. Based on the Nationality Principle, which is followed in this jurisdiction, and pursuant to which laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad,[7] it was the pertinent German law that governed. In short, Philippine law finds no application herein as far as the family rights and obligations of the parties who are foreign nationals are concerned

In Morisono v. Morisono,[8] we summarized the treatment of foreign divorce judgments in this jurisdiction, thus:

The rules on divorce prevailing in this jurisdiction can be summed up as follows: first, Philippine laws do not provide for absolute divorce, and hence, the courts cannot grant the same; second, consistent with Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code, the marital bond between two (2) Filipino citizens cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad; third, an absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple who are both aliens may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws; and fourth, in mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. [Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis]

Accordingly, the petition for annulment initiated by Angelita fails scrutiny through the lens of the Nationality Principle.

Firstly, what governs the marriage of the parties is German, not Philippine, law, and this rendered it incumbent upon Angelita to allege and prove the applicable German law. We reiterate that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws; hence, the existence and contents of such laws are regarded as questions of fact, and, as such, must be alleged and proved like any other disputed fact.[9] Proof of the relevant German law may consist of any of the following, namely: (1) official publications of the law; or (2) copy attested to by the officer having legal custody of the foreign law. If the official record is not kept in the Philippines, the copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept; and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.[10] Angelita did not comply with the requirements for pleading and proof of the relevant German law.

And, secondly, Angelita overlooked that German and Philippine laws on annulment of marriage might not be the same. In other words, the remedy of annulment of the marriage due to psychological incapacity afforded by Article 36 of the Family Code might not be available for her. In the absence of a showing of her right to this remedy in accordance with German law, therefore, the petition should be dismissed.

Xxx."


[G.R. No. 202039, August 14, 2019

ANGELITA SIMUNDAC-KEPPEL, PETITIONER, VS. GEORG KEPPEL, RESPONDENT.

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65677