Exhaustion of administrative remedies vis-a-vis cause of action

"xxx.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The settled rule is before a party may seek the intervention of the courts, he should first avail of all the means afforded by administrative processes. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery is still available, with a procedure prescribed pursuant to law for an administrative officer to decide the controversy, a party should first exhaust such remedy before resorting to the courts. The premature invocation of a court's intervention renders the complaint without cause of action and dismissible on such ground.16

RED Principe of the DENR Region IV Office issued the ECC based on (1) Presidential Decree No. 1586 ("PD No. 1586") and its implementing rules establishing the Environmental Impact Statement System, (2) DAO 96-3717 and (3) the Procedural Manual of DAO 96-37. Section 418 of PD No. 1586 requires a proponent of an environmentally critical project, or a project located within an environmentally critical area as declared by the President, to secure an ECC prior to the project's operation.19 NAPOCOR thus secured the ECC because the mooring facility in Minolo Cove, while not an environmentally critical project, is located within an environmentally critical area under Presidential Proclamation No. 2146, issued on 14 December 1981.20

The rules on administrative appeals from rulings of the DENR Regional Directors on the implementation of PD No. 1586 are found in Article VI of DAO 96-37, which provides:

SECTION 1.0. Appeal to the Office of the Secretary. — Any party aggrieved by the final decision of the RED may, within 15 days from receipt of such decision, file an appeal with the Office of the Secretary. The decision of the Secretary shall be immediately executory.

SECTION 2.0. Grounds for Appeal. — The grounds for appeal shall be limited to grave abuse of discretion and serious errors in the findings of fact which would cause grave or irreparable injury to the aggrieved party. Frivolous appeals shall not be countenanced.

SECTION 3.0. Who May Appeal. — The proponent or any stakeholder, including but not limited to, the LGUs concerned and affected communities, may file an appeal.

The DENR Procedural Manual for DAO 96-37 explains these provisions thus:

Final decisions of the RED may be appealed. These decisions include those relating to the issuance or non-issuance of an ECC, and the imposition of fines and penalties. By inference, the decision of the Secretary on the issuance or non-issuance of the ECC may also be appealed based on this provision. Resort to courts prior to availing of this remedy would make the appellant's action dismissible on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

The right to appeal must be exercised within 15 days from receipt by the aggrieved party of such decision. Failure to file such appeal within the requisite period will result in the finality of the RED's or Secretary's decision(s), which can no longer be disturbed.

An appeal shall not stay the effectivity of the RED's decision, unless the Secretary directs otherwise.

The right to appeal does not prevent the aggrieved party from first resorting to the filing of a motion for reconsideration with the RED, to give the RED an opportunity to re-evaluate his decision. (Emphasis added)

Instead of following the foregoing procedure, petitioners bypassed the DENR Secretary and immediately filed their complaint with the Manila RTC, depriving the DENR Secretary the opportunity to review the decision of his subordinate, RED Principe. Under the Procedural Manual for DAO 96-37 and applicable jurisprudence, petitioners' omission renders their complaint dismissible for lack of cause of action.21 Consequently, the Manila RTC did not err in dismissing petitioners' complaint for lack of cause of action.

Xxx."


FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 131442, July 10, 2003

BANGUS FRY FISHERFOLK, DIWATA MAGBUHOS, ANGELITA BINAY, ELMA GARCIA, VIRGILIO PANGUIO, ARSENIO CASTILLO, ARIEL PANGUIO, ANTONIO PANGUIO, ANTONIO BUNQUIN, GENEROSO BUNQUIN, CHARLIE DIMAYACYAC, RENATO PANGUIO, ATILANO BUNQUIN, CARLOS CHAVEZ, JUAN DIMAYACYAC, FILEMON BUNQUIN, MARIO MAGBUHOS, MAURO MAGBUHOS, NORA MAGBUHOS, JEOVILYN, GENALYN and JORVAN QUIMUEL, minors, represented by their parents FELICIANA and SABINO QUIMUEL, MARICAR MAGBUHOS, minor, represented by her parents CARMELITA and ANTONIO MAGBUHOS, MARLO BINAY, minor, represented by his parents EFRENITA and CHARLITO BINAY, and the BANGUS, BANGUS FRY and other MARINE LIFE OF MINOLO COVE, petitioners,

vs.

THE HONORABLE ENRICO LANZANAS as Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch VII, THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES — Region IV, represented by its Regional Executive Director and its Regional Director for Environment, THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, ORIENTAL MINDORO ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF ORIENTAL MINDORO, herein represented by GOVERNOR RODOLFO VALENCIA, PUERTO GALERA MAYOR GREGORIO DELGADO, VICE MAYOR ARISTEO ATIENZA, and MEMBERS OF THE SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF PUERTO GALERA, JUAN ASCAN, JR., RAFAEL ROMEY, CENON SALCEDO, JERRY DALISAY, SIMON BALITAAN, RENATO CATAQUIS, MARCELINO BANAAG, DANIEL ENRIQUEZ, AMELYN MARCO, GABRIEL ILAGAN, MUNICIPAL ENGINEER RODEL RUBIO, and MUNICIPAL PLANNING and DEVELOPMENT COORDINATOR WILHELMINA LINESES, respondents.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/jul2003/gr_131442_2003.html

Jurisdiction over annulment of environmental compliance certificate

"xxx.

Jurisdiction of the Manila RTC over the Case

Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law. Such jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the reliefs sought.11

A perusal of the allegations in the complaint shows that petitioners' principal cause of action is the alleged illegality of the issuance of the ECC. The violation of laws on environmental protection and on local government participation in the implementation of environmentally critical projects is an issue that involves the validity of NAPOCOR's ECC. If the ECC is void, then as a necessary consequence, NAPOCOR or the provincial government of Oriental Mindoro could not construct the mooring facility. The subsidiary issue of non-compliance with pertinent local ordinances in the construction of the mooring facility becomes immaterial for purposes of granting petitioners' main prayer, which is the annulment of the ECC. Thus, if the court has jurisdiction to determine the validity of the issuance of the ECC, then it has jurisdiction to hear and decide petitioners' complaint.

Petitioners' complaint is one that is not capable of pecuniary estimation. It falls within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts under Section 19(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691. The question of whether petitioners should file their complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Manila or Oriental Mindoro then becomes a matter of venue, to be determined by the residence of the parties.12

Petitioners' main prayer is the annulment of the ECC. The principal respondent, DENR Region IV, has its main office at the L & S Building, Roxas Boulevard, Manila. Regional Executive Director Principe of the DENR Region IV, who issued the ECC, holds office there. Plainly, the principal respondent resides in Manila, which is within the territorial jurisdiction of the Manila RTC. Thus, petitioners filed their complaint in the proper venue.

On the other hand, the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts to issue injunctive writs is limited to acts committed or about to be committed within their judicial region.13 Moreover, Presidential Decree No. 1818 ("PD No. 1818") prohibited14 courts from issuing injunctive writs against government infrastructure projects like the mooring facility in the present case. Republic Act No. 8975 ("RA No. 8975"), which took effect on 26 November 2000, superseded PD No. 1818 and delineates more clearly the coverage of the prohibition, reserves the power to issue such writs exclusively with this Court, and provides penalties for its violation.15 Obviously, neither the Manila RTC nor the Oriental Mindoro RTC can issue an injunctive writ to stop the construction of the mooring facility. Only this Court can do so under PD No. 1818 and later under RA No. 8975. Thus, the question of whether the Manila RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint considering that its injunctive writ is not enforceable in Oriental Mindoro is academic.

Clearly, the Manila RTC has jurisdiction to determine the validity of the issuance of the ECC, although it could not issue an injunctive writ against the DENR or NAPOCOR. However, since the construction of the mooring facility could not proceed without a valid ECC, the validity of the ECC remains the determinative issue in resolving petitioners' complaint.

Xxx."


FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 131442, July 10, 2003

BANGUS FRY FISHERFOLK, DIWATA MAGBUHOS, ANGELITA BINAY, ELMA GARCIA, VIRGILIO PANGUIO, ARSENIO CASTILLO, ARIEL PANGUIO, ANTONIO PANGUIO, ANTONIO BUNQUIN, GENEROSO BUNQUIN, CHARLIE DIMAYACYAC, RENATO PANGUIO, ATILANO BUNQUIN, CARLOS CHAVEZ, JUAN DIMAYACYAC, FILEMON BUNQUIN, MARIO MAGBUHOS, MAURO MAGBUHOS, NORA MAGBUHOS, JEOVILYN, GENALYN and JORVAN QUIMUEL, minors, represented by their parents FELICIANA and SABINO QUIMUEL, MARICAR MAGBUHOS, minor, represented by her parents CARMELITA and ANTONIO MAGBUHOS, MARLO BINAY, minor, represented by his parents EFRENITA and CHARLITO BINAY, and the BANGUS, BANGUS FRY and other MARINE LIFE OF MINOLO COVE, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ENRICO LANZANAS as Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch VII, THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES — Region IV, represented by its Regional Executive Director and its Regional Director for Environment, THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, ORIENTAL MINDORO ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF ORIENTAL MINDORO, herein represented by GOVERNOR RODOLFO VALENCIA, PUERTO GALERA MAYOR GREGORIO DELGADO, VICE MAYOR ARISTEO ATIENZA, and MEMBERS OF THE SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF PUERTO GALERA, JUAN ASCAN, JR., RAFAEL ROMEY, CENON SALCEDO, JERRY DALISAY, SIMON BALITAAN, RENATO CATAQUIS, MARCELINO BANAAG, DANIEL ENRIQUEZ, AMELYN MARCO, GABRIEL ILAGAN, MUNICIPAL ENGINEER RODEL RUBIO, and MUNICIPAL PLANNING and DEVELOPMENT COORDINATOR WILHELMINA LINESES, respondents.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/jul2003/gr_131442_2003.html

Speedy Trial; Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98, August 11, 1998

CIRCULAR NO. 38-98 August 11, 1998

IMPLEMENTING THE PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8493, ENTITLED "AN ACT TO ENSURE A SPEEDY TRIAL OF ALL CRIMINAL CASES BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES."

SECTION 1. PURPOSE OF CIRCULAR. — This Circular is promulgated for the purpose of implementing the provisions of Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as the "Speedy Trial Act of 1998," as directed in Section 15 hereof.

Sec. 2. TIME LIMIT FOR ARRAIGNMENT AND PRE-TRIAL. — The arraignment and the pre-trial, if the accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged, shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The period of the pendency of a motion to quash, or for a bill of particulars, or other causes justifying suspension of arraignment shall be excluded.

Sec. 3. MANDATORY PRE-TRIAL IN CRIMINAL CASES. — In all criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:

(a) Plea bargaining;

(b) Stipulation of facts;

(c) Marking for identification of evidence of the parties;

(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and

(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of the case.

If the accused has pleaded not guilty to the crime charged, he may state whether he interposes a negative or affirmative defense. A negative defense shall require the prosecution to proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while an affirmative defense may modify the order of trial and require the accused to prove such defense by clear and convincing evidence.

Sec. 4. PRE-TRIAL AGREEMENT. — All agreements or admissions made or entered into during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced to writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise the same shall not be used against the accused. The agreements in relation to matters referred to in Section 3 hereof are subject to the approval of the court; Provided, That the agreement on the please of the accused should be to a lesser offense necessarily included in the offense charged.

Sec. 5. NON-APPEARANCE AT PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE. — Where counsel for the accused or the prosecutor does not appear at the pretrial conference and does not offer an acceptable excuse for his lack of cooperation, the court may impose proper sanctions or penalties.

Sec. 6. PRE-TRIAL ORDER. — After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and the evidence marked. Such order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of and control the course of action during the trial, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice.

Thereafter, where a plea of not guilty is entered, the accused shall have at least fifteen (15) days to prepare for trial which shall commence within thirty (30) days from receipt of the pre-trial order.

Sec. 7. EXTENDED TIME LIMIT. — Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding sections 2 and 6 for the first twelve-calendar-month period following its effectivity, the time limit with respect to the period from arraignment to trial imposed by said provision shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. For the second twelve-month period, the time limit shall be one hundred twenty (120) days, and for the third twelve-month period the time limit shall be eighty (80) days.

Sec. 8. TIME LIMIT FOR TRIAL. — In criminal cases involving persons charged with a crime, except those subject to the Rule of Summary Procedure, or where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed six (6) months imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, the court shall, after consultation with the public prosecutor and the counsel for the accused, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Court Administrator pursuant to Section 2, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court.

Sec. 9. EXCLUSIONS. — The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within which trial must commence:

(a) Any period resulting from other proceedings concerning the accused, including but not limited to the following:

(1) delay resulting from an examination of the physical and mental condition of the accused;

(2) delay resulting from proceedings with respect to other criminal charges against the accused;

(3) delay resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders;

(4) delay resulting from pre-trial proceedings; Provided, that the delay does not exceed thirty (30) days;

(5) delay resulting from orders of inhibition or proceedings relating to change of venue of cases or transfer from other courts;

(6) delay resulting from a finding of the existence of a valid prejudicial question; and

(7) delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty (30) days, during which any proceeding concerning the accused is actually under advisement.

(b) Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of an essential witness.

For purposes of this subparagraph, an essential witness shall be considered absent when his whereabouts are unknown or his whereabouts cannot be determined by due diligence. An essential witness shall be considered unavailable whenever his whereabouts are known but his presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence.

(c) Any period of delay resulting from the fact that the accused is mentally incompetent or physically unable to stand trial.

(d) If the information is dismissed upon motion of the prosecution and thereafter a charge is filed against the accused for the same offense, any period of delay from the date the charge was dismissed to the date the time limitation would commence to run as to the subsequent charge had there been no previous charge.

(e) A reasonable period of delay when the accused is mentally incompetent or physically unable to stand trial.

(f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any court motu propio or on motion of either the accused for the same offense, any period of delay from the date the charge was dismissed to the date the time limitation would commence to run as to the subsequent charge had there been no previous charge.

Sec. 10. FACTORS FOR GRANTING CONTINUANCE. — The following factors, among others, shall be considered by a court in determining whether to grant a continuance under subparagraph (f) of Section 9 hereof:

(a) Whether or not the failure to grant a continuance in the proceeding would be like to make a continuation of such proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice; and

(b) Whether or not the case taken as a whole is so novel, unusual and complex, due to the number of accused or the nature of the prosecution or otherwise, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation within the periods of time established herein.

No continuance under subparagraph (f) Section 9 hereof shall be granted because of congestion of the court’s calendar, or lack of diligent preparation or failure to obtain available witnesses on the part of the public prosecutor.

Sec. 11. TIME LIMIT FOLLOWING AN ORDER FOR NEW TRIAL. — If the accused is to be tried again pursuant to an order of a court for a new trial, the trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from notice of that order, except that the court retrying the case may extend such period but not to exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from notice of said order for a new trial if unavailability of witnesses or other factors make trial within thirty (30) days impractical.

Sec. 12. PUBLIC ATTORNEY’S DUTIES WHERE ACCUSED IS IMPRISONED. — If the public attorney assigned to defend a person charged with a crime knows that the latter is preventively detained, either because he is charged with a bailable crime and has no means to post bail, or is charged with a non-bailable crime, or is serving a term of imprisonment in any penal institution:

(a) The public attorney shall promptly undertake to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial, or cause a notice to be served on the person having custody of the prisoner requiring such person to so advise the prisoner of his right to demand trial.

(b) Upon receipt of that notice, the person having custody of the prisoner shall promptly advise the prisoner of the charge and of his right to demand trial, If at any time thereafter the prisoner informs his custodian that he demands such trial, the latter shall cause notice to that effect to be sent promptly to the public attorney.

(c) Upon receipt of such notice, the public attorney shall promptly seek to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial.

(d) When the person having custody of the prisoner receives from the public attorney a properly supported request for the availability of the prisoner for purposes of the trial, the prisoner shall be made available accordingly.

Sec. 13. SANCTIONS. — In any case in which private counsel for the accused, the public attorney or the public prosecutor:

(a) knowingly allows the case to be set for trial without disclosing the fact that a necessary witness would be unavailable for trial;

(b) files a motion solely for the purpose of delay which he knows is totally frivolous and without merit;

(c) makes a statement for the purpose of obtaining continuance which he know to be false and which is material to the granting of a continuance; or

(d) otherwise willfully fails to proceed to trial without justification consistent with the provisions hereof, the court may punish any such counsel, attorney or prosecutor, as follows:

(1) in the case of a counsel privately retained in connection with the defense of an accused, by imposing a fine of not exceeding twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00);

(2) by imposing on any appointed counsel de oficio, public attorney or public prosecutor a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00); and

(3) by denying any defense counsel or public prosecutor the right to practice before the court considering the case for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days.

The authority to punish provided for by this section shall be without prejudice to any appropriate criminal action or any other sanction authorized under the Rules of Court.

Sec. 14. REMEDY WHERE ACCUSED IS NOT BROUGHT TO TRIAL WITHIN THE TIME LIMIT. — If the accused is not brought to trial within the time limit required by Sections 2 and 6 hereof, as extended by Section 7, the information may be dismissed on motion of the accused on the ground of denial of his right to speedy trial. The accused shall have the burden of proving such motion by the prosecution shall have the burden of going forward with the evidence in connection with the exclusion of time under Section 9 hereof. The dismissal shall be subject to the rules on double jeopardy.

Failure of the accused to move for dismissal prior to trial shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismiss under this section.

Sec. 15. REPUBLIC ACT NO 8493 NOT A BAR TO PROVISION ON SPEEDY TRIAL IN THE CONSTITUTION. — No provision of Republic Act No. 8493 shall be interpreted as a bar to any charge of denial of speedy trial as provided by Article III, Section 14(2), of the 1987 Constitution.

Sec. 16. EFFECTIVITY. — This Circular shall be published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation and shall take effect on September 15, 1998.

August 11, 1998.

https://lawphil.net/courts/supreme/cn/cn_38_1998.html

RA 8493, Speedy Trial Act of 1998

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8493

AN ACT TO ENSURE A SPEEDY TRIAL OF ALL CRIMINAL CASES BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Title. – This Act shall be known as the “Speedy Trial Act of 1998.”

SEC. 2. Mandatory Pre-Trial in Criminal Cases. – In all cases cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional Trial Court, and the Sandiganbayan, the justice or judge shall, after arraignment, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:

(a) Plea bargaining;

(b) Stipulation of Facts;

(c) Marking for identification of evidence of parties;

(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and

(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial.

SEC. 3. Pre-Trial Agreement. – All agreements or admissions made or entered into during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced to writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise the same shall not be used in evidence against the accused. The agreements in relation to matters referred to in Sec. 2 hereof is subject to the approval of the court: Provided, That the agreement on the plea of the accused to a lesser offense may only be revised, modified, or annulled by the court when the same is contrary to law, public morals, or public policy.

SEC. 4. Nonappearance at Pre-Trial Conference. – Where counsel for the accused or the prosecutor does not appear at the pre-trial conference and does not offer an acceptable excuse for his/her lack of cooperation, the pre-trial justice or judge may impose proper sanctions or penalties.

SEC. 5. Pre-Trial Order. – After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Such order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of and control the course of action during the trial, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice.

SEC. 6. Time Limit for Trial. – In criminal cases involving persons charged of a crime, except those subject to the Rules on Summary Procedure, or where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed six (6) months imprisonment, or a fine of One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, the justice or judge shall, after consultation with the public prosecutor and the counsel for the accused, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court.

SEC. 7. Time Limit Between Filing of Information and Arraignment and Between Arraignment and Trial. – The arraignment of an accused shall be held within thirty (30) days from the filing of the information, or from the date the accused has appeared before the justice, judge or court in which the charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. Thereafter, where a plea of not guilty is entered, the accused shall have at least fifteen (15) days to prepare for trial. Trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from arraignment as fixed by the court.

If the accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged, he/she shall state whether he/she interposes a negative or affirmative defense. A negative defense shall require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while an affirmative defense may modify the order of trial and require the accused to prove such defense by clear and convincing evidence.

SEC. 8. Time Limit Following an Order for New Trial. – If the accused is to be tried again following an order of a court for a new trial, the trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from the date the order for a new trial becomes final, except that the court retrying the case may extend such period but in any case shall not exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the date the order for a new trial becomes final if unavailability of witnesses or other factors resulting from passage of time shall make trial within thirty (30) days impractical.

SEC. 9. Extended Time Limit. – Notwithstanding the provisions of SEC. 7 of this Act, for the first twelve-calendar-month period following its effectivity, the time limit with respect to the period from arraignment to trial imposed by Sec. 7 of this Act shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. For the second twelve-month period the time limit shall be one hundred twenty (120) days, and for the third twelve-month period the time limit with respect to the period from arraignment to trial shall be eighty (80) days.

SEC. 10. Exclusions. – The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within which trial must commence:

(a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the accused, including but not limited to the following:

(1) delay resulting from an examination of the accused, and hearing on his/her mental competency, or physical incapacity;

(2) delay resulting from trials with respect to charges against the accused;

(3) delay resulting from interlocutory appeals;

(4) delay resulting from hearings on pre-trial motions: Provided, That the delay does not exceed thirty (30) days,

(5) delay resulting from orders of inhibition, or proceedings relating to change of venue of cases or transfer from other courts;

(6) delay resulting from a finding of the existence of a valid prejudicial question; and

(7) delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty (30) days, during which any proceeding concerning the accused is actually under advisement.

(b) Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of the accused or an essential witness.

For purposes of this subparagraph, an accused or an essential witness shall be considered absent when his/her whereabouts are unknown and, in addition, he/she is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution or his/her whereabouts cannot be determined by due diligence. An accused or an essential witness shall be considered unavailable whenever his/her whereabouts are known but his/her presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence or he/she resists appearing at or being returned for trial.

(c) Any period of delay resulting from the fact that the accused is mentally incompetent or physically unable to stand trial.

(d) If the information is dismissed upon motion of the prosecution and thereafter a charge is filed against the accused for the same offense, or any offense required to be joined with that offense, any period of delay from the date the charge was dismissed to the date the time limitation would commence to run as to the subsequent charge had there been no previous charge.

(e) A reasonable period of delay when the accused is joined for trial with a co-accused over whom the court has not acquired jurisdiction, or as to whom the time for trial has not run and no motion for severance has been granted.

(f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any justice or judge motu propio or on motion of the accused or his/her counsel or at the request of the public prosecutor, if the justice or judge granted such continuance on the basis of his/her findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. No such period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court in accordance with this subparagraph shall be excludable under this section unless the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the accused in a speedy trial.

SEC. 11. Factors for Granting Continuance. – The factors, among others, which a justice or judge shall consider in determining whether to grant a continuance under subparagraph (f) of Sec. 10 of this Act are as follows:

(a) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in the proceeding would be likely to make a continuation of such proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice.

(b) Whether the case taken as a whole is so novel, so unusual and so complex, due to the number of accused or the nature of the prosecution or otherwise, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation within the periods of time established by this Act.

No continuance under subparagraph (f) of Sec. 10 shall be granted because of general congestion of the court’s calendar, or lack of diligent preparation or failure to obtain available witnesses on the part of the public prosecutor.

SEC. 12. Public Attorney’s Duties Where Accused is Imprisoned. – If the public attorney knows that a person charged of a crime is preventively detained, either because he/she is charged of a bailable crime and has no means to post bail, or is charged of a non-bailable crime, or is serving a term of imprisonment in any penal institution, the public attorney shall promptly:

(a) Undertake to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial, or cause a notice to be served on the person having custody of the prisoner mandating such person to so advise the prisoner of his/her right to demand trial.

(b) Upon receipt of a notice, the person having custody of the prisoner shall promptly advise the prisoner of the charge and of his/her right to demand trial. If at any time thereafter the prisoner informs the person having custody that he/she demands trial, such person shall cause notice to that effect to be sent promptly to the public attorney.

(c) Upon receipt of such notice, the public attorney shall promptly seek to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial.

(d) When the person having custody of the prisoner receives from the public attorney a properly supported request for temporary custody of the prisoner for trial, the prisoner shall be made available to that public attorney.

SEC. 13. Remedy Where Accused is Not Brought to Trial Within the Time Limit. – If an accused is not brought to trial within the time limit required by Sec. 7 of this Act as extended by Sec. 9, the information shall be dismissed on motion of the accused. The accused shall have the burden of proof of supporting such motion but the prosecution shall have the burden of going forward with the evidence in connection with the exclusion of time under Sec. 10 of this Act.

In determining whether to dismiss the case with or without prejudice, the court shall consider, among other factors, the seriousness of the offense, the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal, and the impact of a reprosecution on the implementation of this Act and on the administration of justice. Failure of the accused to move for dismissal prior to trial or entry of a plea of guilty shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismissal under this section.

SEC. 14. Sanctions. – In any case in which counsel for the accused, the public prosecution or public attorney:

(a) knowingly allows the case to be set for trial without disclosing the fact that a necessary witness would be unavailable for trial;

(b) files a motion solely for the purpose of delay which he/she knows is totally frivolous and without merit;

(c) makes a statement for the purpose of obtaining continuance which he/she knows to be false and which is material to the granting of a continuance; or

(d) otherwise willfully fails to proceed to trial without justification consistent with the provisions of this Act, the court may, without prejudice to any appropriate criminal and/or administrative charges to be instituted by the proper party against the erring counsel if and when warranted, punish any such counsel or attorney, as follows:

(1) in the case of a counsel privately retained in connection with the defense of an accused, by imposing a fine not exceeding; fifty percent (50%) of the compensation to which he/she is entitled in connection with his/her defense of the accused;

(2) by imposing on any appointed counsel de officio or public prosecutor a fine not exceeding Ten thousand pesos (10,000.00); and

(3) by denying any defense counsel or public prosecutor the right to practice before the court considering the case for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days.

The authority to punish provided for by this section shall be in addition to any other authority or power available to the court. The court shall follow the procedures established in the Rules of Court in punishing any counsel or public prosecutor pursuant to this section.

SEC. 15. Rules and Regulations. – The Supreme Court shall promulgate rules, regulations, administrative orders and circulars which shall seek to accelerate the disposition of criminal cases. The rules, regulations, administrative orders and circulars formulated shall provide sanctions against justices and judges who willfully fail to proceed to trial without justification consistent with the provisions of this Act.

SEC. 16. Funding. – For the effective implementation of the rules, regulations, administrative orders and circulars promulgated under this Act, the amount of Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) annually shall be appropriated from the allocation of the Supreme Court under the General Appropriations Act. Thereafter, such additional amounts as may be necessary for its continued implementation shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.

SEC. 17. Act Not a Bar to Speedy Trial Claim Under the Constitution. – No provision of this Act shall be interpreted as a bar to any claim of denial of speedy trial as required by Article III, Sec. 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution.

SEC. 18. Repealing Clause. – All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

SEC. 19. Separability Clause. – In case any provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional, the other provisions shall remain in effect.

SEC. 20. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation: Provided, That Sec. 7 of this Act shall become effective after the expiration of the aforementioned third-calendar-month period provided in Sec. 9 of this Act.

https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1998/02/12/republic-act-no-8493/

Bill of Rights, 1987 Constitution

ARTICLE III

Bill of Rights

SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

SECTION 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

SECTION 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

SECTION 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

SECTION 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

SECTION 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

SECTION 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

SECTION 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

SECTION 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.

SECTION 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.

SECTION 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.

SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

SECTION 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

SECTION 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it.

SECTION 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

SECTION 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

SECTION 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.

(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.

SECTION 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.

SECTION 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.

SECTION 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

SECTION 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.

https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/constitutions/1987-constitution/

FIXERS IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Republic Act 9485, or the "Anti-Red Tape Act of 2007", was amended in 2018 by Republic Act 11032, which re-named the old law as the "Ease of Doing Business and Efficient Government Service Delivery Act of 2018".

A FIXER is defined by Section 4 of RA 9485, as amended by RA 11032, as follows:

"(e) Fixer – any individual whether or not officially involved in the operation of a government office or agency who has access to people working therein, and whether or not in collusion with them, facilitates speedy completion of transactions for pecuniary gain or any other advantage or consideration;"

Section 21 (h) of the law declares "FIXING and/or COLLUSION WITH FIXERS in consideration of economic and/or other gain or advantage" as prohibited and punishable acts.

Section 21 (Violations and Persons Liable)
and Section 22 (Penalties and Liabilities) of the law read as follows:

"Sec. 21. Violations and Persons Liable. – Any person who performs or cause the performance of the following acts shall be liable:

"(a) Refusal to accept application or request with complete requirements being submitted by an applicant or requesting party without due cause;

"(b) Imposition of additional requirements other than those listed in the Citizen’s Charter;

"(c) Imposition of additional costs not reflected in the Citizen’s Charter;

"(d) Failure to give the applicant or requesting party a written notice on the disapproval of an application or request;

"(e) Failure to render government services within the prescribed processing time on any application or request without due cause;

"(f) Failure to attend to applicants or requesting parties who are within the premises of the office or agency concerned prior to the end of official working hours and during lunch break;

"(g) Failure or refusal to issue official receipts; and

"(h) Fixing and/or collusion with fixers in consideration of economic and/or other gain or advantage."

"Sec. 22. Penalties and Liabilities. – Any violations of the preceding actions will warrant the following penalties and liabilities.1âwphi1

"(a) First Offense: Administrative liability with six (6) months suspension: Provided, however, That in the case of fixing and/or collusion with fixers under Section 21(h), the penalty and liability under Section 22(b) of this Act shall apply.

"(b) Second Offense: Administrative liability and criminal liability of dismissal from the service, perpetual disqualification from holding public office and forfeiture of retirement benefits and imprisonment of one (1) year to six (6) years with a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), but not more than Two million pesos (P2,000,000.00).

"CRIMINAL LIABILITY shall also be incurred through the commission of bribery, extortion, or when the violation was done deliberately and maliciously to solicit favor in cash or in kind. In such cases, the pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code and other special laws shall apply."

Further, on the matter of CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY, Section 23 of the law provides:

"Sec. 23. Civil and Criminal Liability, Not Barred.- The finding of administrative liability under this Act SHALL NOT BE A BAR to the filing of criminal, civil or other related charges under existing laws arising from the same act or omission as herein enumerated."

Section 24 of the law vests the ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION on violations of the law either on the CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (CSC) or the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN. It reads as follows:

"Sec. 24. Administrative Jurisdiction. – The administrative jurisdiction on any violation of the provisions of this Act shall be vested in either the CSC, or the Office of the Ombudsman as determined by appropriate laws and issuances."

RA 11032 - https://lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2018/ra_11032_2018.html

News - https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1717967/lto-fixer-in-antique-faces-24-arrest-warrants-total-bail-at-p1-29-m

Periods to file pleadings - Dean Tranquil Salvador III

"The computation of the period prescribed by the Rules of Court before a deadline expires is as follows: “[I]f the last day of the period… falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day” (Section 1, Rule 22, 2019 Rules of Civil Procedure).

For example, if the deadline to file a pleading or motion is on December 25, 2022, which is a non-working holiday, the filing will be on the next working day.

The period to file an Answer is within 30 calendar days after the service of summons to the defendant or person sued. If your deadline falls on a day after the holiday, you will have to work through the holidays to meet your deadline.

Only one extension of 30 days to file an Answer is allowed for meritorious reasons (see Section 11, Rule 11).

Before filing an Answer, “a party [defendant] may move for a definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity [in the complaint] to enable him… to prepare [for] his… responsive pleading” (Section 1, Rule 12).

The defendant has 30 calendar days to file a Motion for a Bill of Particulars.

After the motion is granted and the plaintiff serves the bill of particulars, or after notice of the denial of the defendant’s motion, the latter may file his responsive pleading within the remainder of the period he was originally entitled to which shall not be less than five days in any event (see Section 5, Rule 12).

If the plaintiff or complainant amends the complaint before an Answer is filed, the defendant must file an Answer within 30 calendar days from service of the amended complaint.

However, if the amended complaint is filed after an Answer has been filed, the defendant has 15 calendar days from notice to file another Answer (see Section 3, Rule 11).

A Reply, if allowed under Section 10, Rule 6 of the 2019 Rules of Civil Procedure (2019 Rules), may be filed within 15 calendar days from the service of the Answer (Section 6, Rule 11).

The plaintiff may file a Reply only if the defending party attaches an actionable document (basis of the claim) to his answer (Section 10, Rule 6).

A counterclaim or cross-claim (incorporated in the Answer) must be answered within 20 calendar days from service of the same (Section 4, Rule 11).

A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against the opposing party, while a cross-claim is any claim by one party against a co-party out of the transaction or occurrence subject of the action (Section 6, Rule 6).

A third-party (fourth-party) complaint must be answered within 30 calendar days after service of summons since it is governed by the same rule as the Answer to a complaint (Section 5, Rule 11).

A third-party complaint is a claim of a defending party against a person not a party to the action for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief (Section 11, Rule 6).

The period to file a Motion to Dismiss is a bit tricky since the original Rule 16 on Motion to Dismiss has been deleted in the 2019 Rules.

Today, the Motion to Dismiss is only based on four grounds, including lack of subject matter jurisdiction, litis pendentia, res judicata, and statute of limitations.

As there is no express period in which to file a Motion to Dismiss under the 2019 Rules, it is to be filed within 30 calendar days from service of the summons and complaint.

The period to file an Answer will be interrupted by the filing of the Motion to Dismiss and if it is denied, the defendant has only the remainder of the 30 days to file the former (see Section 2, Rule 22).

A Demurrer to Evidence, a litigious motion, can be filed by the defendant after the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence and if he believes that the plaintiff has no right to relief (see Section 1, Rule 33).

It is at that stage of the proceedings wherein the plaintiff has filed his Formal Offer of Evidence and the court has resolved the same.

The Motion for Reconsideration of a Judgment or Motion for New Trial must be filed within 15 calendar days or the period to file an appeal (see Section 1, Rule 37).

While these motions are litigious, they will have to be resolved by the court within 30 calendar days from the time these are submitted for resolution (Section 4, Rule 37).

An ordinary appeal may be taken within 15 days after notice to the appellant of the judgment or final order appealed from.

Where a record on appeal is required, as in special proceedings and multiple appeals, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within 30 days after notice of the judgment or final order (see Section 2, Rule 40 and Section 3, Rule 41).

Petitions for Review to the Court of Appeals “shall be filed and served within 15 days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner’s [appellant’s] motion for new trial or reconsideration… [U]pon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees… [and] before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of 15 days…” (Section 1, Rule 42).

Petition for Review on Certiorari or Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court “shall be filed within 15 days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration… [T]he Supreme Court may for justifiable reasons grant an extension of 30 days only within which to file the petition” (Section 2, Rule 45).

As for special civil actions for certiorari or Petitions for Certiorari, these “may be filed not later than 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court.

“If it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, [it is to be filed] in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area…” (Section 4, Rule 65).

The Petition for Certiorari “may also be filed [within the same period] in the Court of Appeals or … the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the court’s appellate jurisdiction.

“If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals” (Section 4, Rule 65)."

MEETING COURT DEADLINES 

By TRANQUIL G.S. SALVADOR III

JANUARY 6, 2023

MANILA STANDARD 

https://manilastandard.net/opinion/314293600/meeting-court-deadlines.html