Quantum of evidence to convict. Circumstantial evidence.

 "It is axiomatic in criminal law that the quantum of evidence required for conviction of an accused is that which produces moral certainly in an unprejudiced mind that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. If the evidence is susceptible of two (2) interpretations, one inconsistent with the innocence of the accused and the other inconsistent with his guilt, the accused must be acquitted. 23

Accordingly, circumstantial evidence would only be sufficient if there is a concurrence of the following elements: (a) there is more than one circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inference was derived are proven and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances must be "an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion, which points to the defendant, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person."24 The Constitution demands no less than "proof beyond reasonable doubt", consistent with the demands of justice and due process.

In sum, we rule that while accused-appellant's alibi may have been weak, the evidence presented by the prosecution was much weaker. A broken chain of circumstances cannot overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the accused which entitles him to an ACQUITTAL."

G.R. Nos. 110991-92 February 24, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

MELCHOR DELA IGLESIA, accused-appellant.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1995/feb1995/gr_110991_92_1995.html

Proof of crime. Carnapping. Direct evidence of crime. Circumstantial evidence. Disputable presumption. Equipoise rule.

"Every criminal conviction requires the prosecution to prove two (2) things: 1. The fact of the crime, i.e. the presence of all the elements of the crime for which the accused stands charged; and (2) the fact that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. The Court finds the prosecution unable to prove both aspects, thus, it is left with no option but to acquit on reasonable doubt.

R.A. No. 6539, or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, defines carnapping as the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation against persons, or by using force upon things.[20] By the amendment in Section 20 of R.A. No. 7659, Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act now reads:

SEC. 14. Penally for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in Section two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of the motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things, and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. (Emphasis supplied)

Three amendments have been made to the original Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act: (1) the penalty of life imprisonment was changed to reclusion perpetua, (2) the inclusion of rape, and (3) the change of the phrase "in the commission of the carnapping" to "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof." This third amendment clarifies the law's intent to make the offense a special complex crime, by way of analogy vis-a-vis paragraphs 1 to 4 of the Revised Penal Code on robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. Thus, under the last clause of Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act, the prosecution has to prove the essential requisites of carnapping and of the homicide or murder of the victim, and more importantly, it must show that the original criminal design of the culprit was carnapping and that the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof." Consequently, where the elements of carnapping are not proved, the provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act would cease to be applicable and the homicide or murder (if proven) would be punishable under the Revised Penal Code.[21]

In the instant case, the Court finds the charge of carnapping unsubstantiated for failure of the prosecution to prove all its elements. For one, the trial court's decision itself makes no mention of any direct evidence indicating the guilt of accused-appellant. Indeed, the CA confirmed the lack of such direct evidence.[22] Both lower courts solely based accused-appellant's conviction of the special complex crime on one circumstantial evidence and that is, the fact of his possession of the allegedly carnapped vehicle.

The Court notes that the prosecution's evidence only consists of the fact of the victim's disappearance, the discovery of his death and the details surrounding accused-appellant's arrest on rumors that the vehicle he possessed had been carnapped. Theres is absolutely no evidence supporting the prosecution's theory that the victim's vehicle had been carnapped, much less that the accused-appellant is the author of the same.

Certainly, it is not only by direct evidence that an accused may be convicted, but for circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction, following are the guidelines: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is as such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[23] Decided cases expound that the circumstantial evidence presented and proved must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. All the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rationale except that of guilt.[24]

In the case at bar, notably there is only one circumstantial evidence. And this sole circumstantial evidence of possession of the vehicle does not lead to an inference exclusively consistent with guilt. Fundamentally, prosecution did not offer any iota of evidence detailing the seizure of the vehicle, much less with accused-appellant's participation. In fact, there is even a variance concerning how accused-appellant was discovered to be in possession of the vehicle. The prosecution's uncorroborated evidence says accused-appellant was apprehended while driving the vehicle at a checkpoint, although the vehicle did not bear any license plates, while the latter testified he was arrested at home. Xxx. 

Xxx. 

Considering the dearth of evidence, the subject vehicle is at best classified as "missing" since the non-return of the victim and his vehicle on 12 November 2002. Why the check-point had begun before then, as early 3 November 2002, as stated by the prosecution witness raises doubts about the prosecution's version of the case. Perhaps, the check-point had been set up for another vehicle which had gone missing earlier. In any event, accused-appellant's crime, if at all, was being in possession of a missing vehicle whose owner had been found dead. There is perhaps guilt in the acquisition of the vehicle priced so suspiciously below standard. But how this alone should lead to a conviction for the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide/murder, affirmed by the appellate court is downright disturbing.

The application of disputable presumption found in Section 3 (j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and doer of the whole act, in this case the alleged carnapping and the homicide/murder of its owner, is limited to cases where such possession is either unexplained or that the proffered explanation is rendered implausible in view of independent evidence inconsistent thereto.[26] In the instant case, accused-appellant set-up a defense of denial of the charges and adhered to his unrebutted version of the story that the vehicle had been sold to him by the brothers Alex and Ricky Bautista. Though the explanation is not seamless, once the explanation is made for the possession, the presumption arising from the unexplained possession may not anymore be invoked and the burden shifts once more to the prosecution to produce evidence that would render the defense of the accused improbable. And this burden, the prosecution was unable to discharge. Xxx. 

Evidently, the disputable presumption cannot prevail over accused-appellant's explanation for his possession of the missing vehicle. The possession having been explained, the legal presumption is disputed and thus, cannot find application in the instant case. To hold otherwise would be a miscarriage of justice as criminal convictions necessarily require proof of guilt of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt and in the absence of such proof, should not be solely based on legal disputable presumptions.

The carnapping not being duly proved, the killing of the victim may not be treated as an incident of carnapping. Nonetheless, even under the provisions of homicide and murder under the Revised Penal Code, the Court finds the guilt of accused-appellant was not established beyond reasonable doubt.

There were no eyewitnesses to the killing of the victim, Mario Magdato. Again, both courts relied only on the circumstantial evidence of accused-appellant's possession of the missing vehicle for the latter's conviction. Shirley, the widow, testified that her husband and their vehicle went missing on 12 November 2002. Dr. Concepcion gave testimony on the cause of death of Mario Magdato and the injuries he had sustained. Most glaringly, no connection had been established between the victim's gunshot wound which caused his death and the firearm found in the person of accused-appellant. Only SPO2 Figueroa's testimony gave light on how allegedly accused-appellant was found to have been in possession of the missing vehicle of the victim. But even if this uncorroborated testimony was true, it does not link accused-appellant to the carnapping, much less, the murder or homicide of the victim. And it does not preclude the probability of accused-appellant's story that he had merely bought the vehicle from the Bautista brothers who have themselves since gone missing.

The equipoise rule states that where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfil the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. The equipoise rule provides that where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional, presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the accused.[30]

The basis of the acquittal is reasonable doubt, which simply means that the evidence of the prosecution was not sufficient to sustain the guilt of accused-appellant beyond the point of moral certainty. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, however, is a burden particular to the prosecution and does not apply to exculpatory facts as may be raised by the defense; the accused is not required to establish matters in mitigation or defense beyond a reasonable doubt, nor is he required to establish the truth of such matters by a preponderance of the evidence, or even to a reasonable probability.[31]

It is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side with clarity and persuasion, so that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion. What is required of it is to justify the conviction of the accused with moral certainty. Upon the prosecution's failure to meet this test, acquittal becomes the constitutional duty of the Court, lest its mind be tortured with the thought that it has imprisoned an innocent man for the rest of his life.[32] The constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty can be overthrown only by proof beyond reasonable doubt.[33]

In the final analysis, the circumstances narrated by the prosecution engender doubt rather than moral certainty on the guilt of accused-appellant."

G.R. No. 207662. April 13, 2016 

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. FABIAN URZAIS Y LANURIAS, ALEX BAUTISTA, AND RICKY BAUTISTA ACCUSED.

FABIAN URZAIS Y LANURIAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/61917

Conspiracy. Treachery. Evident premeditation. Voluntary surrender.

"We agree that treachery attended the crime and qualified it to murder because the victim was completely taken by surprise when the group attacked him and he was rendred unable to defend himself when they held his arms and stabbed and kicked him. Abuse of superior strength was correctly not appreciated as a separate aggravating circumstance because it is deemed absorbed in treachery.12

But the prosecution failed to prove evident premeditation by Ramilla and his companions. Its essential elements are: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung to his determination; (3) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will.13 These elements have not been established by the People. It has not been shown that Ramilla's group was lying in wait for William and Egay that night to carry out a plan to kill him as earlier agreed upon by them. The plan seems to have been made on the spur of the moment, clearly without premeditation as above defined.

For this reason, we must correct the statement in the decision that "there is no need to discuss whether this qualifying circumstance is present because conspiracy has already been shown and conspiracy denotes premeditation." This generalization is not applicable to the case at bar because, as Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino explained in his book: 14

Under normal conditions, where conspiracy is directly established, with proof of the attendant deliberation and selection of the method, time and means of executing the crime, the existence of evident premeditation can be taken for granted. But in the case of implied conspiracy, evident premeditation may not be appreciated, in the absence of proof as to how and when the plan to kill the victim was hatched or what time elapsed before it was carried out, so that it cannot be determined if the accused had "sufficient time between its inception and its fulfillment dispassionately to consider and accept the consequences." There should be a showing that the accused had the opportunity for reflection and persisted in effectuating his criminal design.

The invocation of voluntary surrender is a mitigating circumstance is not acceptable. Ramilla did not surrender. The police went to his house, where he was found crouching behind a table in the kitchen and was invited to the police station. The fact that he did not resist but peacefully went with the policemen does not mean that he voluntarily surrendered. He did not present himself voluntarily to the police 15 and neither did he ask them to fetch him at his house so he could surrender. 1

6 He was found skulking in the kitchen, after his mother had denied his presence in the house, and was apparently gathering his belongings at that time, possibly for flight."

G.R. No. 101435 November 8, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, paintiff-appellee,

vs.

BENJIE RAMILLA y AUSENTE alias "CHEM-CHEM," accused-appellant.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1993/nov1993/gr_101435_1993.html

Burden of proof vs. Alibi

 "Granting that the defense of alibi is a weak defense, that fact alone does not justify the judgment of conviction against the accuse-appellant. The burden of proof in criminal cases is on the prosecution. 37 Alibi is generally a weak defense since it is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. 38 However, when the identification of the accused as the author of the crime charged is inconclusive or unreliable, alibi assumes importance. 39 Thus, in this case where the proof of the appellant's participation in the crime charged consists only of the uncorroborated testimony of Jennis Castro, and where such testimony lacks details and credibility, the defense of alibi, should be given more weight. Failing in its task to prove that the appellant is the author of the crime, the prosecution cannot rely upon the weakness of the defense of alibi in order to secure a conviction. 40"

G.R. No. 89543 November 13, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALFREDO ARGAWANON y BANTILAN, TEDDY SERICON alias "JUNREY" and ERNIE LAMBUJON y DUBLIN, alias "DANTE", accused. ERNIE LAMBUJON y DUBLIN, alias "DANTE", accused-appellant.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1992/nov1992/gr_89543_1992.html

SC Sets Rules on When Private Offended Party Can Appeal Judgments, Orders in Criminal Proceedings

SC Sets Rules on When Private Offended Party Can Appeal Judgments, Orders in Criminal Proceedings

February 4, 2023

The Supreme Court has laid down guidelines on the legal standing of private offended parties when questioning judgments or orders in criminal proceedings.

In a 36-page Decision penned by Justice Mario V. Lopez, the Supreme Court En Banc denied the Petition for Certiorari filed by Mamerto Austria challenging the ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA) which overturned the Regional Trial Court’s (RTC) acquittal of Austria on criminal charges of acts of lasciviousness.

In 2006, the RTC convicted Austria, a public school teacher, of five counts of acts of lasciviousness against two 11-year old female students (“private complainants”). Austria’s conviction, however, was reversed when a new presiding judge granted Austria’s motion for reconsideration.

After the private complainants’ own motion for reconsideration was denied, they elevated the case to the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC. The CA ruled in favor of the private complainants, finding that the RTC disregarded the constitutional requirement that a decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. The CA also held that as the assailed RTC orders were void, double jeopardy did not attach. Nullifying the RTC’s orders, the CA ruled that the previous decision convicting Austria be reinstated.

This prompted Austria to challenge the appellate court’s ruling before the Supreme Court, invoking his right against double jeopardy and claiming that the private complainants had no legal personality to question his acquittal. The Supreme Court then required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file a comment on the private complainants’ legal standing in a criminal case.

In denying Austria’s petition, the High Court reviewed existing jurisprudence on the issue of the legal personality of a private offended party in criminal proceedings.

Harmonizing the divergent doctrines laid down in previous decisions, the Court formulated the following guidelines in determining the legal personality of a private offended party in questioning criminal judgments or orders:

As to the civil liability of the accused, the private complainant has the legal personality to appeal. The private offended party’s specific pecuniary interest should be alleged in the appeal or petition for certiorari.

If such appeal or petition necessarily affects the criminal aspect of the case or the right to prosecute, the reviewing court shall require the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file a comment within a non-extendible period of 30 days from notice. The OSG’s comment must state whether it conforms or concurs with the remedy of the private complainant. If the OSG is not given an opportunity to comment, the private complainant’s relief may be set aside.

As to the criminal aspect of the case or the right to prosecute, the private complainant has no legal personality to appeal without the conformity of the OSG, to be requested by the private complainant within the period to appeal or file a petition for certiorari. If the OSG’s conformity is not granted within such period, the private complainant must allege in his or her appeal/petition that the request is still pending with the OSG. If the OSG denies the request for conformity, the reviewing court shall dismiss the private complainant’s appeal/petition for lack of legal personality.

When the petition for certiorari filed by the private complainant challenges the acquittal of the accused, the dismissal of the criminal case, and the interlocutory orders in criminal proceedings on the ground of grave abuse of discretion or denial of due process, the reviewing court shall require the OSG to file a comment within a non-extendible period of 30 days from notice.

These guidelines shall apply prospectively.

In Austria’s case, while the private complainants filed the petition before the CA without the OSG’s prior conformity, the Court held that they cannot be faulted for relying on jurisprudence allowing them to assail the criminal aspect of the case through a petition for certiorari on the grounds of grave abuse of discretion and denial of due process.

The Court also noted that in any event, the OSG later joined the cause of the private complainants and gave its conformity to the petition for certiorari filed before the CA.

The Court held further that the private complainants sufficiently established that the RTC’s acquittal orders were rendered “with grave abuse of discretion that is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or despotic exercise of judgment as when the assailed order is bereft of any factual and legal justification or when the disputed act of the trial court goes beyond the limits of discretion thus effecting an injustice.”

Thus, the CA was correct in nullifying the RTC’s orders, which simply copied the allegations of Austria in his motions for reconsideration and memoranda. “The Joint Orders are mere recital of facts with a dispositive portion. They contained neither an analysis of the evidence nor a reference to any legal basis for the conclusion,” said the Court.

Finally, as to the issue of double jeopardy, the Court ruled that as the RTC’s acquittal orders were void judgments, they have no legal effect and thus did not terminate the case. Hence, Austria’s right against double jeopardy was not violated.

While the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the CA in favor of the private complainants, the case was ordered remanded to the RTC for resolution of Austria’s motion for reconsideration in accordance with the constitutional requirement that a decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

FULL TEXT OF G.R. No. 205275 dated June 28, 2022 at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/32735/

Source -

https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/32794/