Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr.: March 2023

Friday, March 31, 2023

Cause of action ; elements of.

"7. ID.; ID.; ELEMENTS OF A CAUSE OF ACTION. — A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the other. Its essential elements are, namely:(1) the existence of a legal right in the plaintiff, (2) a correlative legal duty on the part of the defendant, and (3) an act or omission of the defendant in violation of plaintiff’s right with consequential injury or damage to the plaintiff for which he may maintain an action for the recovery of damages or other appropriate relief."

Source -

[G.R. No. 96921. January 29, 1993.]

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. JUDGE AMIR PUNDOGAR, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, 12th Judicial Region, Branch III, FERNANDO JACINTO, JACINTO STEEL, INC., and ILIGAN INTEGRATED STEEL MILLS, INC., Respondents.

Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for petitioners.

Link - chanrobles.com.

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1993januarydecisions.php?id=68

Existence of cause of action

" 8. ID.; ID.;ID.; A FINDING THAT A COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION DOES NOT IMPLY THAT THE COMPLAINANT IS ASSURED OF A RULING IN HIS FAVOR.— However, a finding that a complaint states a cause of actin does not imply that the complainant is assured of a ruling in his favor. While a motion to dismiss based on failure of the complainant to state a cause of action necessarily carries with it the adminission, for purposes of the motion, of the truth of all material facts pleaded in the complaint, what is submitted for determination therein is the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint. Corrolarily, the denial of a motion to dismiss does not necessarily resolve the issues raised in the complaint in favor of the complainant inasmuch as, after the trial, the defendant might prove to have a better right to the subject matter in litigation."

Source -

[G.R. No. 96921. January 29, 1993.]

Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for petitioners.

Link - chanrobles.com.

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1993januarydecisions.php?id=68

Right to file action

" 9. ID.; ID.;ID.; PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVING THE LEGAL RIGHT TO FILE THE INSTANT CASE, COURT FINDS THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION. — There is no allegation in the complaint that would show that a demand on the board of directors of IISMI was in fact made. But even if the Jacintos and JSI omitted to make the same, they can still file the instant case as a derivative suit. They have alleged that "at this time, IISMI is without a duly or legally constituted board of directors and no election of officers has been held." It would be futile for them to make a demand on the board of directors whose very constitution is being questioned. Private respondents, having the legal right to file the instant case, we find that the complaint states a legal cause of action."

Source -

[G.R. No. 96921. January 29, 1993.]

Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for petitioners.

Link - chanrobles.com.

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1993januarydecisions.php?id=68

Motion to dismiss

"10. ID.; ID.; ID.; A MOTION TO DISMISS MAY BE BASED ON ONLYONE OF THE GROUNDS ENUMERATED IN SEC. 1, RULE 16 OF THE RULES OF COURT. — Moreover, a motion to dismiss may be based on only one of the grounds enumerated in Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. That the petitioners were able to prove the presence of three of the four grounds they raised, viz., res judicata, lack of jurisdiction and prescription, more than warrants the reversal of the Order below denying the petitioner’s motion to dismiss."

Source -

[G.R. No. 96921. January 29, 1993.]

Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for petitioners.

Link - chanrobles.com.

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1993januarydecisions.php?id=68

Martial law years do not interrupt prescriptive period

"6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COURT RULES THAT UNDER THE FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, THE MARTIAL LAW YEARS DID NOT HAVE THE EFFECT OF INTERRUPTING THE RUNNING OF THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.— The allegations regarding their absence, the cancellation of their passports, the seizure of their resources and the incarceration of other IISMI officials had all been raised earlier in the Republic case. Not having been convinced then, neither is this Court convinced now. Raising them for the second time to compel a relitigation will not suffice to make this reverse itself. Thus, we rule that, under the factual circumstances of this case, the martial law years did not have the effect of interrupting the running of the prescriptive period."

Source -

[G.R. No. 96921. January 29, 1993.]

Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for petitioners.

Link - chanrobles.com.

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1993januarydecisions.php?id=68

Prescription; martial law is not force majeure

"5. ID.;ID.; PRESCRIPTION; THE SO-CALLED "SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES" DO NOT CONVINCE THIS COURT THAT IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE, MARTIAL LAW SHOULD BE TREATED AS FORCE MAJEURE THAT SUSPENDS THE RUNNING OF PRESCRIPTION.— If this Court does, then it would be relieving private respondents of their bounden duty to show that during martial law they were so circumstanced that it was impossible for them to commence, continue or even resist an action. And yet a fullblown hearing is not even necessary as the so-called "special circumstances" do not convince this Court that, in this particular case, martial law should be treated as force majeure that suspends the running of presciption. Likewise, petitioners have consistently pointed out that during the hearing of the motion to dismiss, private respondents failed to adduce any proof regarding their allegations on the tolling of the prescriptive period. Private respondents have not, in any of their pleadings, rebutted this."

Source -

[G.R. No. 96921. January 29, 1993.]

Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for petitioners.

Link - chanrobles.com.

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1993januarydecisions.php?id=68

Identity of causes of action

"4. ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.; THE TEST OF IDENTITY OF CAUSES OF ACTION LIES NOT IN THE FORM OF THE ACTION BUT ON WHETHER THE SAME EVIDENCE WOULD SUPPORT AND ESTABLISH THE FORMER AND THE PRESENT CAUSES OF ACTION.— As regards identity of causes of action, this requisite is similarly present although the same may not be quite apparent. In Civil Case No. 1701, the caption clearly indicates that the action is one for injunction while in Civil Case No. 111-1549, the caption does not state the title of the action as required by Sec. 1, Rule 7 if the Rules of Court. This omission notwithstanding, the test of identity of causes of action lies, not in form of the action, but on whether the same evidence would support and establish the former and the present causes of action."

Source -

[G.R. No. 96921. January 29, 1993.]

Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for petitioners.

Link - chanrobles.com.

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1993januarydecisions.php?id=68

Res judicata; substantial identity of parties

"3. ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.; FOR RES JUDICATA TO APPLY, ABSOLUTE IDENTITY OF PARTIES IS NOT REQUIRED BECAUSE SUBSTANTIAL IDENTITY IS SUFFICIENT. — For res judicata to apply, absolute identity of parties is not required because substantial identity is sufficient. Inclusion of additional parties will not affect the application of the principle of res judicata. In both cases, the subject matter involved is the Iligan Integrated Steel Mills, Inc."

Source -

[G.R. No. 96921. January 29, 1993.]

Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for petitioners.

Link - chanrobles.com.

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1993januarydecisions.php?id=68

Loss of confidence in the Solicitor General

"11. ID.; ID.; PLEADINGS AND PRACTICE; THE SOLICITOR GENERAL IS NOT ABSOLUTELY REQUIRED TO REPRESENT A GOVERNMENT AGENCY NEITHER IS THE LATTER ABSOLUTELY COMPELLED TO AVAIL OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL’S SERVICES. — Government agencies, including government corporations, must look to the Solicitor General to the Solicitor General, in the first instance, to represent them in legal proceedings. However, in much the same way that the Solicitor General is not absolutely required to represent a government agency, neither is the latter absolutely compelled to avail of the Solicitor General’s services. A justifiable departure from the general rule is when the agency has lost confidence in the Solicitor General, as demonstrated by its past actuations exemplified in the instant case where the DBP would rather rely on its "in house" resources for legal services. In this case, therefore, we grant DBP’s prayer to terminate the services of the OSG.

Source -

[G.R. No. 96921. January 29, 1993.]

Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for petitioners.

Link - chanrobles.com.

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1993januarydecisions.php?id=68

Res judicata

"2. ID.;ACTION; RES JUDICATA; ELEMENTS CONSTITUTING RES JUDICATA AS A GROUND FOR THE DISMISSAL OF A COMPLAINT. — Res judicata is indeed present. Imbedded in Philippine jurisprudence are the elements constituting res judicata as a ground for the dismissal of a complaint: a) the former judgment must be final; b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; c) it must be a judgment on the merits and d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action."

Source -

[G.R. No. 96921. January 29, 1993.]

Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for petitioners.

Link - chanrobles.com.

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1993januarydecisions.php?id=68

Denial of motion to dismiss

"1. REMEDIAL LAW; CERTIORARI; PETITIONERS ARE RIGHTFULLY ENTITLED TO THE RECOURSE AVAILED OF AS IT IS PART OF THE SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY OF THE COURT TO CORRECT THE ERROR COMMITTED. — Private respondents correctly cited the general rule in elevating cases to this Court. The rule, however, admits of exceptions, such as when the court, in denying the motion to dismiss acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. In such an instance, certiorari becomes available in order to relieve the defendant of the trouble of undergoing the ordeal and expense of a useless trial. As will be seen in the subsequent discussion, petitioners are rightfully entitled to the recourse availed of as it is part of the supervisory authority of the Court to correct the error committed."

Source -

[G.R. No. 96921. January 29, 1993.]

Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for petitioners.

Link - chanrobles.com.

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1993januarydecisions.php?id=68

Moot and academic

"The problem in this case is that the President aborted the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao in just eight days. In a real sense, the proclamation and the suspension never took off. The Congress itself adjourned without touching the matter, it having become moot and academic.

Of course, the Court has in exceptional cases passed upon issues that ordinarily would have been regarded as moot. But the present cases do not present sufficient basis for the exercise of the power of judicial review. The proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in this case, unlike similar Presidential acts in the late 60s and early 70s, appear more like saber-rattling than an actual deployment and arbitrary use of political power.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the consolidated petitions on the ground that the same have become moot and academic."

Source -

G. R. No. 190293 March 20, 2012

PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN and ALBERT LEE G. ANGELES, Petitioners,

vs.

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, as Commander-in-Chief and President of the Republic of the Philippines, EDUARDO ERMITA, Executive Secretary, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP), or any of their units, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), or any of their units, JOHN DOES and JANE DOES acting under their direction and control, Respondents.

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G.R. No. 190294

DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN, Petitioner,

vs.

EDUARDO R. ERMITA in his capacity as Executive Secretary, NORBERTO GONZALES in his capacity as Secretary of National Defense, RONALDO PUNO in his capacity as Secretary of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

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G.R. No. 190301

NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLES' LAWYERS (NUPL) SECRETARY GENERAL NERI JAVIER COLMENARES, BAYAN MUNA REPRESENTATIVE SATUR C. OCAMPO, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY REPRESENTATIVE LIZA L. MAZA, ATTY. JULIUS GARCIA MATIBAG, ATTY. EPHRAIM B. CORTEZ, ATTY. JOBERT ILARDE PAHILGA, ATTY. VOLTAIRE B. AFRICA, BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN) SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M. REYES, JR. and ANTHONY IAN CRUZ, Petitioners,

vs.

PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL VICTOR S. IBRADO, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR GENERAL JESUS A. VERZOSA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY AGNES VST DEVANADERA, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES EASTERN MINDANAO COMMAND CHIEF LIEUTENANT GENERAL RAYMUNDO B. FERRER, Respondents.

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G.R. No. 190302

JOSEPH NELSON Q. LOYOLA, Petitioner,

vs.

HER EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL VICTOR IBRADO, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), DIRECTOR GENERAL JESUS VERZOSA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, Respondents.

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G.R. No. 190307

JOVITO R. SALONGA, RAUL C. PANGALANGAN, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL R. BUTUYAN, EMILIO CAPULONG, FLORIN T. HILBAY, ROMEL R. BAGARES, DEXTER DONNE B. DIZON, ALLAN JONES F. LARDIZABAL and GILBERT T. ANDRES, suing as taxpayers and as CONCERNED Filipino citizens, Petitioners,

vs.

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in his (sic) capacity as President of the Republic of the Philippines, HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. ROLANDO ANDAYA in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, GENERAL VICTOR IBRADO, in his capacity as Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff, DIRECTOR JESUS VERZOSA, in his capacity as Chief of the Philippine National Police, Respondents.

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G.R. No. 190356

BAILENG S. MANTAWIL, DENGCO SABAN, Engr. OCTOBER CHIO, AKBAYAN PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES WALDEN F. BELLO and ANA THERESIA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN, THEODORE O. TE and IBARRA M. GUTIERREZ III, Petitioners,

vs.

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, and THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.

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G.R. No. 190380

CHRISTIAN MONSOD and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., Petitioners,

vs.

EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Respondent.

Bigamy in relation to void marriages - batasfilipinas.com

"... The SC ruled in this wise: “After a careful consideration, this Court is constrained to abandon our earlier rulings that a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first, and/or second marriages cannot be raised as a defense by the accused in a criminal prosecution for bigamy. We hold that a judicial declaration of absolute nullity is not necessary to prove a void ab initio prior and subsequent marriages in a bigamy case. Consequently, a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first and/or second marriages presented by the accused in the prosecution for bigamy is a valid defense, irrespective of the time within which they are secured.”

Being inexistent under the eyes of the law, the nullity of a void marriage can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the spouses. A void marriage is ipso facto void without need of any judicial declaration of nullity; the only recognized exception under existing law is Article 40 of the Family Code where a marriage void ab initio is deemed valid for purposes of remarriage, hence necessitating a judicial declaration of nullity before one can contract a subsequent marriage.

Clearly, when the first marriage is void ab initio, one of the essential elements of bigamy is absent, i.e. a prior valid marriage. There can be no crime when the very act which was penalized by the law, i.e. contracting another marriage during the subsistence of a prior legal or valid marriage, is not present. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to begin with. Thus, an accused in a bigamy case should be allowed to raise the defense of a prior void ab initio marriage through competent evidence other than the judicial decree of nullity.

Apropos, with the retroactive effects of a void ab initio marriage, there is nothing to annul nor dissolve as the judicial declaration of nullity merely confirms the inexistence of such marriage. Thus, the second element of bigamy, i.e. that the former marriage has not been legally dissolved or annulled, is wanting in case of void ab initio prior marriage.

What Article 349 of the RPC contemplates is contracting a subsequent marriage when a voidable or valid first marriage is still subsisting. As expounded by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, Article 349 of the RPC was patterned after the Codigo Penal, which was enacted when the law governing marriages was the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, which provides that marriages may be dissolved either through annulment or divorce. The term “former marriage”, therefore, in the second element of bigamy refers to voidable or valid marriages which may be dissolved by annulment or divorce, respectively. Hence, Article 349 should be construed to pertain only to valid and voidable marriages.

In effect, when the accused contracts a second marriage without having the first marriage dissolved or annulled, the crime of bigamy is consummated as the valid or voidable first marriage still subsists without a decree of annulment by a competent court, In contrast, when the first marriage is void ab initio, the accused cannot be held liable for bigamy as the judicial declaration of its nullity is not tantamount to annulment nor dissolution but merely a declaration of a status or condition that no such marriage exists.

In the same manner, when the accused contracts a second or subsequent marriage that is void ab initio, other than it being bigamous, he/she cannot be held liable for bigamy as the effect of a void marriage signifies that the accused has not entered into a second or subsequent marriage, being inexistent from the beginning. Thus, the element, “that he or she contracts a second or subsequent marriage” is lacking. A subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the second marriage merely confirms its inexistence and shall not render the accused liable for bigamy for entering such void marriage while the first marriage still subsists. Consequently, the accused in bigamy may validly raise a void ab initio second or subsequent marriage even without a judicial declaration of nullity.

True, a marriage is presumed to be valid even if the same is void ab initio without a judicial declaration of its absolute nullity in view of Article 40 of the Family Code. However, the accused in a bigamy case should not be denied the right to interpose the defense of a void ab initio marriage, which effectively retroacts to the date of the celebration of the first marriage.

Miscellaneous

Article 40 of the Family Code does not categorically withhold from the accused the right to invoke the defense of a void ab initio marriage even without a judicial decree of absolute nullity in criminal prosecution for bigamy. To adopt a contrary stringent application would defy the principle that penal laws are strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. Granted, the State has the right to preserve and protect the sanctity of marriage; this should not, however, be done at the expense of the presumption of innocence of the accused. What is penalized under Article 349 of the RPC is the act of contracting a subsequent marriage while the prior marriage was valid and subsisting. This simply connotes that this provision penalizes contracting of a voidable or valid marriage and not a void ab initio marriage.

Nothing in Article 40 mentions the effect thereof on the criminal liability of the accused in bigamy cases. It would indeed be unfair to withhold from the accused in a bigamy case the right and the opportunity to raise the defense of nullity of a void ab initio marriage when the law does not explicitly say so. Thus, to borrow Justice Caguioa5 s opinion, even with the enactment of Article 40, a void ab initio marriage remains a valid defense in bigamy, and a prior and separate judicial declaration of absolute nullity is not indispensable to establish the same."

Source -

https://batasfilipinas.com/case-digest-luisito-pulido-v-people-of-the-philippines-g-r-no-220149-july-27-2021/

Sunday, March 12, 2023

Retired Chief Justices

A RETIRED CHIEF JUSTICE of the Philippines who wishes to maintain his PERSONAL DIGNITY and the INSTITUTIONAL DIGNITY of the JUDICIARY as an INDEPENDENT AND CO-EQUAL BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT should not be employed as a SALARIED BUREAUCRAT of the EXECUTIVE, regardless of the high rank and salary grade accruing to the position.

I REJECT the hypocrisy that the retired Chief Justice merely desires "to continue serving his country" as a civil servant and as a legal expert under the day-to-day supervision and control of the Executive. Let us face it, their real motives are the maintenance of POWER AND WEALTH as aristocrats in the government hierarchy.

The honorable ways for a retired Chief Justice to serve his Nation, in general, and the Bench and the Bar, in particular, aside from enjoying the retirement phase of his remaining lifespan with his grandchildren, are by being a LEGAL SCHOLAR, LEGAL ACADEMICIAN, LEGAL AND SOCIAL CRITIC, LEGAL AUTHOR, and LEGAL ELDER OF SOCIETY in general.

Retired Justices should be happy with their retirement status and should live modest lives within the amounts of the retirement benefits granted to them by government (the gross amounts of which are not really that "modest" compared to the amounts of the retirement benefits received by regular government officials and personnel).

They should preserve the NOBILITY of their positions, names and memories as RETIRED HIGHEST RANKING ADMINISTRATORS AND DISPENSERS OF JUSTICE by refusing regular active employment in the Executive Branch as SALARIED INFERIORS OF THE EXECUTIVE.