Estafa, modified penalty under RA 10951

 "Penalty modifications

Republic Act No. 10951 (RA 10951) adjusted the amount or value of the property and damage upon which the penalties for crimes and offenses are based, and the fines imposed therefor. Section 85 thereof specifically provides for violations of Article 315, Paragraph 2(a) of the RPC:

SECTION 85. Article 315 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, Presidential Decree No. 1689, and Presidential Decree No. 818, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

x x x x

"3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión correccional in its minimum period, if such amount is over Forty thousand pesos (P40,000) but does not exceed One million two hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000).

Seguritan v. People62 and People v. Dejolde, Jr.63 involved the application of RA 10951 on the third paragraph of Article 315, as amended. Both meted out the following penalty:

[I]n view of the recent enactment of RA 10951, there is a need to modify the penalties imposed by the CA insofar as the two counts of estafa, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 27592-R and 27602-R, are concerned. For committing estafa involving the amounts of P440,000.00 and P350,000.00, Article 315 of the RPC, as amended by RA 10951, now provides that the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximun period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed if the amount involved is over P40,000.00 but does not exceed P1,200,000.00. There being no mitigating and aggravating circumstance, the maximum penalty should be one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence is: arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, the range of which is one (1) month and one (1) day to four (4) months. Thus, the indeterminate penalty for each count of estafa should be modified to a prison term of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum.

The RTC held Arriola criminally liable for Estafa under Article 315, Paragraph 2(a) for the amount of P437,000.00 and initially imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. In light of RA 10951 and the aforementioned recent pronouncements, Arriola's penalty is hereby modified to arresto mayor in its minimum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, further narrowed down to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed August 5, 2011 Decision and January 3, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31338 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Petitioner Luis T. Arriola is ORDERED to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum.

SO ORDERED."

G.R. No. 199975, February 24, 2020 

LUIS T. ARRIOLA, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/feb2020/gr_199975_2020.html

Equipoise Rule in Appreciation of Evidence

 "The equipoise rule is inapplicable in this case

Arriola maintains that he possessed a valid authority to sell the subject lot, which Candelaria denied. While hearsay, Arriola asserts his position that Candelaria only withheld such authority because they had a subsequent disagreement. There being a conflict between the versions of the prosecution and the defense, Arriola insists that the courts should have favored that of the latter, citing the equipoise rule.59 We differ.

The equipoise rule is inapplicable here. This criminal law principle is explained in brief in Tin v. People,60 a case relied on by Arriola:

Under this rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. The equipoise rule finds application if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, arid does not suffice to produce a conviction. Briefly stated, the needed quantum of proof to convict the accused of the crime charged is found lacking. x x x61

Conviction rests not on the frailty of the defense but on the strength and sufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution. In this case, however, the scales of the evidence had already tilted heavily against the defense. We perceive no conflicting versions, as Arriola technically failed to set forth his own version in the first place. His guilt was finely established with the required quantum of proof, which is proof beyond reasonable doubt.

More importantly, this factual argument by Arriola is too bare and was raised too belatedly to be considered at this point. To recall, Arriola's direct testimony was stricken off the record for his consistent absences at the scheduled dates for his cross-examination. It was not even tendered as excluded evidence. Only on appeal that he advanced this argument. Even if time and procedure permitted it, Arriola, by his own admission, grounded his case solely and purely on hearsay. This is wholly insufficient to counter the already-compelling evidence presented against him by the prosecution."

G.R. No. 199975, February 24, 2020 

LUIS T. ARRIOLA, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/feb2020/gr_199975_2020.html

Good faith as a defense in Estafa

 "Good faith is "an elusive idea, taking on different meanings and emphases as we move from one context to another."56 It is, in general, a state of mind consisting in honesty in belief or purpose, faithfulness to one's duty or obligation, observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in a given trade or business, absence of intent to defraud or seek unconscionable advantage,57 or a belief in one's legal title or right.58 Being malum in se, and depending on the proven circumstances, good faith and lack of criminal intent are indeed available defenses against a prosecution for Estafa.

However, all-encompassing this definition is, good faith still cannot be appreciated in favor of Arriola. As earlier expounded, Arriola, a real estate broker, presented to Del Rosario an Authorization and a fax transmission clearly conveying mere permission from Candelaria to receive payment from Del Rosario. Despite knowledge of such information, and even going so far as to disclose the same to Del Rosario, Arriola continued to wield his ultra vires power to sell Candelaria's lot. This smacks of overt thoughtlessness, gross negligence, and fraudulent intentions in his professional dealings, imperiling the welfare of both his principal and the latter's client and culminating in the actual damage to Del Rosario. To attribute good faith to Arriola under these facts is to uphold injustice."

G.R. No. 199975, February 24, 2020 

LUIS T. ARRIOLA, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/feb2020/gr_199975_2020.html

Return of the amount owed will not cancel criminal liability for Estafa

 "Return of the amount owed to Del Rosario will not cancel Arriola's criminal liability for Estafa

Arriola insists that he manifested good faith when he returned Del Rosario's money, and that good faith is a defense against a charge for Estafa. Citing this Court's ruling in Salazar v. People,53 he also maintains that the transaction between Del Rosario and Candelaria was that of a sale, and his failure to deliver the title of the property in question only gave rise to a civil liability. We disagree.

The return by the accused of money belonging to the private complainant will not reverse a consummated act of Estafa. Quite the contrary, such action may even uphold a conviction. Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that in criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or criminal negligence or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. In this case, Arriola's initial attempts to reimburse Del Rosario through checks, coupled with the actual return of the latter's money after the RTC issued its judgment of conviction, may all be considered as unequivocal gestures to compromise and which can be measured against Arriola as his implied admission of guilt.

Moreover, Salazar v. People,54 which exonerated accused therein upon reconsideration and contemplated Estafa by misappropriation under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC, finds no application here, as the present case involves Estafa by false pretenses under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the same law.

Even if so similarly situated, Salazar v. People55 declared that the transaction between the parties therein was simply that of sale, and a delay in the performance by a party to the contract entailed only a civil obligation to return the advance payment made by the other. No such sale of a piece of land transpired in this case due to Arriola's lack of authority to sell. There was no contract in the first place. Also, unlike in Salazar v. People, evidence of false pretenses and the resultant damage to Del Rosario clearly obtains against Arriola. This creates not just a civil obligation on Arriola to return Del Rosario's money, but also a correlative criminal liability for the perpetration of fraud on Del Rosario."

G.R. No. 199975, February 24, 2020 

LUIS T. ARRIOLA, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/feb2020/gr_199975_2020.html

Elements of ESTAFA by means of deceit

 "All the other elements of the crime also are undisputed. As laid down by jurisprudence, the elements of Estafa by means of deceit under Article 315, Paragraph 2(a) of the RPC are as follows:

(1) That there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to the offender's power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business, or imaginary transactions;

(2) That such false pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud;

(3) That the offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money or property; and

(4) That, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.50

The first and second elements are already extant from the records. Anent the third and fourth elements, the CA succinctly concluded the same in the following manner:

Convinced of [Arriola]'s authority to sell the subject property, [Del Rosario] was induced by [Arriola]'s false pretenses to continue with the sale transaction though she had never met Candelaria personally. [Del Rosario] trusted [Arriola], prompting her to part with her money. She also signed the Deed of Absolute Sale, secure in the belief that she was engaged in an honest deal brokered by appellant on behalf of his principal, Candelaria.

As a result of the fraudulent transaction, [Del Rosario] lost a total amount of P437,000.00. x x x51

Case law instructs that "the gravamen of the [crime of Estafa] is the employment of fraud or deceit to the damage or prejudice of another."52 With the foregoing, Arriola's actuations toward Del Rosario snugly encapsulated this description." 

G.R. No. 199975, February 24, 2020 

LUIS T. ARRIOLA, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/feb2020/gr_199975_2020.html

Incomplete cross examination

 "When cross-examination is not and cannot be done or completed due to causes attributable to the party offering the witness, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent and inadmissible in evidence.47 From the record, Arriola had been granted sufficient opportunities to complete his cross-examination. He had been fairly warned and notified in the September 5, 2006 Order48 of the RTC that his cross-examination shall be reset for the last time, and that another failure to appear for cross-examination shall be cause for the striking off of his direct testimony. Due to causes known only to Arriola, he failed to even begin the same. Add to this that prior to his cross-examination, Arriola was already remiss in his attendance for various reasons in the hearings before the trial court.49"

G.R. No. 199975, February 24, 2020 

LUIS T. ARRIOLA, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/feb2020/gr_199975_2020.html

When the sale of a piece of land or any interest thereon is through an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing; otherwise, the sale shall be void.

 "When the sale of a piece of land or any interest thereon is through an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing; otherwise, the sale shall be void.29

This authority must be contained in a special power of attorney, that is, a specific written grant of authority in favor of an agent to sell a piece of land belonging to the principal. This is so because a special power of attorney is necessary to enter into any contract by which the ownership of an immovable is transmitted or acquired either gratuitously or for a valuable consideration.30 For the principal to confer the right upon an agent to sell real estate, a power of attorney must so express the powers of the agent in clear and unmistakable language. When there is any reasonable doubt that the language so used conveys such power, no such construction shall be given the document.31

The Authorization contained no such authority in favor of Arriola to sell Candelaria's lot. Assuming that the Authorization was genuine, its wordings gave Arriola nothing more than an authority to receive the payment for the supposed sale of Candelaria's lot. There was no explicit mention of any sale to be facilitated by Arriola. Despite such a patently defective Authorization, Arriola still volunteered information to Del Rosario that he was also the broker of Candelaria's lot and could negotiate the sale of the property.32

An authority to receive the payment cannot be impliedly construed as an authority to sell a piece of real property. Here, the Authorization was not in any way the special power of attorney contemplated and required by law. Being a real estate broker by profession, Arriola should be well-equipped with the basic knowledge on the technicalities in conveyances of real property for another person. This pretense can only be perceived as misleading, false, and fraudulent, as Arriola acted before Del Rosario as though there was an express grant of authority to sell Candelaria's lot in his name, when in fact there was none."

G.R. No. 199975, February 24, 2020 

LUIS T. ARRIOLA, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/feb2020/gr_199975_2020.html

Fraud vs. Deceit

"Fraud, in its general sense, is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another. It is a generic term embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity can device, and which are resorted to by one individual to secure an advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth and includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any unfair way by which another is cheated. On the other hand, deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury. (Emphasis supplied)

The deceit and false pretenses committed by Arriola prior to the transfer of money, laid out by Del Rosario in open court, are as follows:

First, Arriola held himself out to Del Rosario as a duly authorized person to sell Candelaria's lot and showed her a letter apparently signed by Candelaria to that effect. However, Candelaria's alleged Authorization28 in favor of Arriola only stated the following:

A U T H O R I Z A T I O N

This is to authorize MR. LUIS T. ARRIOLA to receive for in my behalf any amount [from] MS. INGEBORG V. DEL ROSARIO pertaining to her purchase of my lot in Tag[ay]tay City covered by TCT No. 33184.

Done this 9th day of May, 2001 at Las Piñas City.

PACIENCIA G. CANDELARIA

(Emphasis supplied). "

G.R. No. 199975, February 24, 2020 

LUIS T. ARRIOLA, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/feb2020/gr_199975_2020.html

Hearsay evidence vs. Independently relevant statement

"Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court does declare hearsay as generally inadmissible testimonial evidence:

Section 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. — A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception x x x

Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce it.23 A person who introduces a hearsay statement is not obliged to enter into any particular stipulation, to answer any question, to solve any difficulties, to reconcile any contradictions, to explain any obscurities, to remove any ambiguities; and that he/she entrenches himself/herself in the simple assertion that he/she was told so, and leaves the burden entirely upon the dead or absent author. For this reason, the rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that there was no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.24

The hearsay rule, however, does not apply to independently relevant statements. People v. Umapas25 is instructive on the matter:

[W]hile the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person given for the purpose of establishing the truth of the fact asserted in the statement is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement on the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement, or the tenor of such statement, was made. Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, when what is relevant is the fact that such statement has been made, the hearsay rule does not apply and the statement may be shown. As a matter of fact, evidence as to the making of the statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or is circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact. This is the doctrine of independently relevant statements x x x26 (Emphasis supplied)

Del Rosario's testimony can and will be admitted as evidence only for the purpose of proving that such statements regarding Arriola's lack of authority to sell the subject property were, in fact, made and uttered by Candelaria. This is circumstantially relevant to the instant case and within the competence of Del Rosario to confirm. Also, her perception on the conversation in question was adequately tested when she took the witness stand and was cross-examined by Arriola's counsel in open court. Hence, Del Rosario's account as to the fact of her conversation with Candelaria and the latter's stand against Arriola's authority to sell, irrespective of its veracity, is considered as an independently relevant statement that may properly be received as evidence against Arriola.

Nonetheless, the truth of such declarations by Candelaria, as heard by Del Rosario, is easily disce1nible from the evidence on record. Assessed with other established circumstances, Arriola's fraud is evident. As defined in People v. Balasa:27"

G.R. No. 199975, February 24, 2020 

LUIS T. ARRIOLA, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/feb2020/gr_199975_2020.html

Estafa by means of deceit

 "The courts below held Arriola criminally liable for Estafa by false deceits under Article 315, Paragraph 2(a) of the RPC, which provides:

Article 315. Swindling (estafa). -Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow x x x:

x x x x

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

(a) By using a fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.

Ordinarily, this Court desists from trifling with the findings of facts by the courts below. Findings by trial courts are generally accorded with great respect by the appellate courts, more so that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts but of questions of law.

For this case, however, We defer to one of the prevailing exceptions listed by jurisprudence, that is, when the findings of fact by the trial court were conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based.22 The courts below correctly convicted Arriola, but not much substantial discussion was made on the falsity of his representations and the documentary evidence thereof, which We now address.

The totality of circumstantial evidence sufficiently established Arriola's guilt for Estafa by means of deceit. "

G.R. No. 199975, February 24, 2020 

LUIS T. ARRIOLA, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/feb2020/gr_199975_2020.html