Section 5(i)5 in relation to Section 6(f)6 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 (VAWC Law). - This means that the mere failure or one's inability to provide financial support is not sufficient to rise to the level of criminality under Section 5(i), even if mental or emotional anguish is experienced by the woman. In other words, even if the woman were to suffer mental or emotional anguish due to the lack of financial support, but the accused merely failed or was unable to so provide support, then criminal liability would not arise. A contrary interpretation to the foregoing would result in absurd, if not outright unconstitutional, consequences.

 "The Court's Ruling

The Court grants the Petition and acquits Calingasan of the crime charged.

In all criminal cases, the Court has always adhered to the fundamental policy that when the guilt of the accused is not proven with moral certainty, the constitutional presumption of innocence must be upheld, and the exoneration of the accused must be granted as a matter of right.29 Thus, to warrant a finding of guilt for the crime charged, the prosecution must establish, beyond reasonable doubt, each and every element of the crime charged in the information or for any other crime necessarily included therein.30

In the case at bar, upon careful review of the case records, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden. 

Calingasan cannot be held liable for violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262.

Calingasan was charged and convicted by the courts a quo for violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262, which provides:

SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. — The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

x x x x

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or denial of access to the woman's child/children.

Based on the Information filed against him, Calingasan is accused of willfully denying private complainant and their child of the financial support legally due them, which allegedly caused them mental and emotional anguish, public ridicule and humiliation.31

In the very recent case of Acharon v. People32 (Acharon), the Court en banc clarified that the failure or inability to provide financial support per se is not a criminal act punishable under Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262. What Section 5(i) penalizes is the act of inflicting psychological violence against women and children by willfully or consciously denying them the financial support legally due to them. The Court ratiocinated as follows:

The Court stresses that Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262 uses the phrase "denial of financial support" in defining the criminal act. The word "denial" is defined as "refusal to satisfy a request or desire" or "the act of not allowing someone to do or have something." The foregoing definitions connote willfulness, or an active exertion of effort so that one would not be able to have or do something. This may be contrasted with the word "failure," defined as "the fact of not doing something [which one] should have done," which in turn connotes passivity. From the plain meaning of the words used, the act punished by Section 5(i) is, therefore, dolo in nature — there must be a concurrence between intent, freedom, and intelligence, in order to consummate the crime.

x x x x

It is not enough, therefore, for the woman to experience mental or emotional anguish, or for her partner to deny financial support that is legally due her. In order for criminal liability to arise under Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262, insofar as it deals with "denial of financial support," there must, therefore, be evidence on record that the accused willfully or consciously withheld financial support legally due the woman for the purpose of inflicting mental or emotional anguish upon her. x x x

"It bears emphasis that Section 5(i) penalizes some forms of psychological violence that are inflicted on victims who are women and children." In prosecutions under Section 5(i), therefore, "[p]sychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator" with denial of financial support as the weapon of choice. In other words, to be punishable by Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262, it must ultimately be proven that the accused had the intent of inflicting mental or emotional anguish upon the woman, thereby inflicting psychological violence upon her, with the willful denial of financial support being the means selected by the accused to accomplish said purpose.

This means that the mere failure or one's inability to provide financial support is not sufficient to rise to the level of criminality under Section 5(i), even if mental or emotional anguish is experienced by the woman. In other words, even if the woman were to suffer mental or emotional anguish due to the lack of financial support, but the accused merely failed or was unable to so provide support, then criminal liability would not arise. A contrary interpretation to the foregoing would result in absurd, if not outright unconstitutional, consequences.33 (Emphasis and italics in the original)

Proceeding from the foregoing, the Court in Acharon enumerated the elements that need to be proven to hold an accused liable for violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262, viz.:

(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;

(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common child. As for the woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;

(3) The offender willfully refuses to give or consciously denies the woman and/or her child or children financial support that is legally due her and/or her child or children; and

(4) The offender denied the woman and/or her child or children the financial support for the purpose of causing the woman and/or her child or children mental or emotional anguish.34

Applying the foregoing to the instant case, the Court holds that, contrary to the findings of the courts a quo, the prosecution failed to prove the third and fourth elements thereof.

Apart from establishing the relationship of the parties and that Calingasan left home sometime in 1998, not a single evidence was offered by the prosecution to establish that Calingasan deliberately or willfully refused to provide private complainant and their child the financial support legally due them. Also, no proof was adduced showing that Calingasan's supposed failure or refusal to provide financial support caused private complainant and their child mental and emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation.

On the contrary, records of the case evidently showed that Calingasan, for a time, provided private complainant and their child financial support and that his subsequent failure to do so was due to circumstances beyond his control. Calingasan testified under oath and presented documentary evidence showing that he was arrested in Canada and incarcerated for almost six (6) years.35 When he was released from prison, Calingasan tried to look for a permanent job but was not able to find one. He had since then relied upon the support and help of his siblings.36

These pieces of evidence, unrebutted by the prosecution, belie the accusations that (1) Calingasan deliberately denied private complainant and BBB financial support and (2) the denial of financial support was intended to cause private complainant and BBB mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation. Therefore, Calingasan cannot be convicted for violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262. 

Neither is Calingasan guilty of violating Section 5(e) of R.A. 9262.

Similar to Section 5(i), Section 5(e) also involves the denial of financial support legally due the woman and her child, viz.:

SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. — The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

x x x x

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or to desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or her child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:

x x x x

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support[.]

In the cases of Melgar v. People37 (Melgar) and Reyes v. People38 (Reyes), the Court, applying the variance doctrine, had previously ruled that an accused may be convicted of violating Section 5(e), instead of Section 5(i), as long as the denial or deprivation of financial support by the accused has been established by the prosecution; because the former specifically penalizes the deprivation of financial support by itself, even in the absence of psychological violence.39

However, in Acharon, the Court en banc abandoned its ruling in Melgar and Reyes. The Court clarified that Section 5(e) and Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262 penalize two distinct crimes. Section 5(i) punishes the willful infliction of psychological violence upon the woman and her child by denying them the financial support that is legally due them. Section 5(e), on the other hand, penalizes the deprivation of financial support "for the purpose of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct."40 Thus, while both provisions indeed involve the denial or deprivation of financial support, each of these provisions punishes entirely different acts. As such, the variance doctrine does not apply to convict an accused for the other crime.

Further, the Court reiterated that mere failure or inability to provide financial support is insufficient to warrant a finding of guilt for violation of either provision. There must be both an allegation and proof of the existence of the requisite specific intent penalized under each of these provisions: for Section 5(i), that the denial of financial support was for the purpose of inflicting psychological violence upon the woman and her child; while for Section 5(e), that the deprivation of financial support was for the purpose of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's actions or decisions.

Therefore, for Calingasan to be held liable for violating Section 5(e), it must be alleged and proved that he deprived private complainant and their child the financial support legally due them, for the purpose of controlling their actions and decisions, which clearly are all wanting in this case. Again, to recall, what the evidence of the prosecution simply proved in this case is that Calingasan failed to provide financial support, and nothing more. This is also insufficient to warrant a guilty verdict for violation of Section 5(e) of R.A. 9262.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated December 15, 2017 and Resolution dated May 10, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 39417 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Cesar M. Calingasan is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Let an entry of final judgment be issued immediately.

SO ORDERED."

FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 239313. February 15, 2022 ]

CESAR M. CALINGASAN,* PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2022/feb2022/gr_239313_2022.html

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.

"Essentially, the question before us is whether or not the evidence presented during the trial proves the existence of the marriage of Tecla to Eustaquio.

The trial court, in ruling against Tecla’s claim of her prior valid marriage to Eustaquio relied on Tecla’s failure to present her certificate of marriage to Eustaquio. Without such certificate, the trial court considered as useless the certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that it has no more records of marriages during the period 1900 to 1944. The same thing was said as regards the Certification issued by the National Statistics Office of Manila. The trial court observed:

Upon verification from the NSO, Office of the Civil Registrar General, Manila, it, likewise, issued a Certification (Exhibit "B") stating that:

records from 1932 up to early part of 1945 were totally destroyed during the liberation of Manila on February 4, 1945. What are presently filed in this office are records from the latter part of 1945 to date, except for the city of Manila which starts from 1952. Hence, this office has no way of verifying and could not issue as requested, certified true copy of the records of marriage between [Eustaquio] and [Tecla], alleged to have been married on 30th September 1942, in Talibon, Bohol.27

In the absence of the marriage contract, the trial court did not give credence to the testimony of Tecla and her witnesses as it considered the same as mere self-serving assertions. Superior significance was given to the fact that Tecla could not even produce her own copy of the said proof of marriage. Relying on Section 3 (a) and Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the trial court declared that Tecla failed to prove the existence of the first marriage.

The CA, on the other hand, concluded that there was a presumption of lawful marriage between Tecla and Eustaquio as they deported themselves as husband and wife and begot four (4) children. Such presumption, supported by documentary evidence consisting of the same Certifications disregarded by the trial court, as well as the testimonial evidence especially that of Adelina Avenido-Ceno, created, according to the CA, sufficient proof of the fact of marriage. Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the CA found that its appreciation of the evidence presented by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the trial court. Quite recently, in Añonuevo v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni,28 we said, citing precedents, that:

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.

The error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage certificate, no other proof of the fact can be accepted, has been aptly delineated in Vda de Jacob v. Court of Appeals.29 Thus:

It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus confused the evidence to show due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath, the Court clarified this misconception thus:

x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the execution of the instrument was barred. The court confounded the execution and the contents of the document. It is the contents, x x x which may not be proven by secondary evidence when the

instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or non-existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs of the contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the inroduction of secondary evidence of the contents.

x x x x

Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or primary. It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the document is actually produced, its authencity is not necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital of its contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document, when available, to establish its execution may effect the weight of the evidence presented but not the admissibility of such evidence.

The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete. But even there, we said that "marriage may be prove[n] by other competent evidence.

Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. The Court has also held that "[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s] made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost."

In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence–testimonial and documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.30

As correctly stated by the appellate court:

In the case at bench, the celebration of marriage between [Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO was established by the testimonial evidence furnished by [Adelina] who appears to be present during the marriage ceremony, and by [Tecla] herself as a living witness to the event. The loss was shown by the certifications issued by the NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol. These are relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence – testimonial and documentary – may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage. In PUGEDA v. TRIAS, the

Supreme Court held that "marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. The testimony by one of the parties to the marriage or by one of the witnesses to the marriage has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage."

x x x x

The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of [Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court has disregarded.31

The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.

As early as the case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,32 this Court has elucidated on the rationale behind the presumption:

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.1âwphi1 Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper – praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage.

In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by the testimonies of Adelina, Climaco and Tecla; the unrebutted the certifications of marriage issued by the parish priest of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444 is AFFIRMED. The marriage between petitioner Peregrina Macua Avenido and the deceased Eustaquio Avenido is hereby declared NULL and VOID. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED."

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 173540               January 22, 2014

PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner,

vs.

TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/jan2014/gr_173540_2014.html

Good Conduct Time Allowance Law vis-a-vis reclusion perpetua and heinous crimes - Miguel's argument is two-fold: first, he anchors his claim on the assertion that applying the GCTA Law, he has served a total of "thirty-eight (38) years, ten (10) months, and one (1) day"13 already. Second, he posits that Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) caps the duration of the penalty of reclusion perpetua at thirty (30) years.14 Having served a total of thirty­eight (38) years, which is eight (8) years more than the supposed maximum duration of reclusion perpetua, Miguel concludes that he has fully served his sentence and his detention no longer holds legal basis.

"Procedural considerations aside, the Court still finds the petition wanting in merit.

Miguel's argument is two-fold: first, he anchors his claim on the assertion that applying the GCTA Law, he has served a total of "thirty-eight (38) years, ten (10) months, and one (1) day"13 already. Second, he posits that Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) caps the duration of the penalty of reclusion perpetua at thirty (30) years.14 Having served a total of thirty­eight (38) years, which is eight (8) years more than the supposed maximum duration of reclusion perpetua, Miguel concludes that he has fully served his sentence and his detention no longer holds legal basis.

Miguel's contention is wrong.

On the first point, Miguel assumes that he is entitled to the benefits of the GCTA Law. However, a plain reading of the law would reveal otherwise.

The last paragraph of Section 1 of the GCTA Law reads:

Provided, finally, That recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees and persons charged with heinous crimes are excluded from the coverage of this Act. In case the maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment. (Emphasis supplied)

This disqualification is further echoed in several provisions of the 2019 Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 10592 (2019 Revised IRR) which read:

Rule III, Section 3. Who are Disqualified. -The following shall not be entitled to any credit for preventive imprisonment:

a. Recidivists;

b. An accused who has been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime;

c. An accused who, upon being summoned for the execution of his sentence has failed to surrender voluntarily before a court of law;

d. Habitual Delinquents;

e. Escapees; and

f. PDL charged of Heinous Crimes. (Emphasis supplied)

Rule IV, Section 1. GCTA During Preventive Imprisonment. - The good conduct of a detained PDL qualified for credit for preventive imprisonment shall entitle him to the deductions described in Section 3 hereunder, as GCTA, from the possible maximum penalty.

The following shall not be entitled to any GCTA during preventive imprisonment:

a. Recidivists;

b. An accused who has been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime;

c. An accused who, upon being summoned for the execution of his sentence has failed to surrender voluntarily before a court of law;

d. Habitual Delinquents;

e. Escapees; and

f. PDL charged of Heinous Crimes. (Emphasis supplied)

Rule IV, Section 2. GCTA During Service of Sentence. - The good conduct of a PDL convicted by final judgment in any penal institution, rehabilitation or detention center or any local jail shall entitle him to the deductions described in Section 3 hereunder, as GCTA, from the period of his sentence, pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 10592.

The following shall not be entitled to any GCTA during service of sentence:

a. Recidivists;

b. Habitual Delinquents;

c. Escapees; and

d. PDL convicted of Heinous Crimes. (Emphasis supplied)

Rule V, Section 2. Who are disqualified. - The following shall not be entitled to TASTM (Time Allowance for Study, Teaching and Mentoring):

a. Recidivists;

b. Habitual delinquents;

c. Escapees; and

d. PDL charged and convicted of heinous crimes. (Emphasis supplied)

Rule VI, Section 2. Who are disqualified. - The following are not qualified to be released under this Rule:

a. Recidivists;

b. An accused who has been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime;

c. An accused who, upon being summoned for the execution of his sentence has failed to surrender voluntarily before a court of law;

d. Habitual Delinquents;

e. Escapees; and

f. PDL charged of Heinous Crimes. (Emphasis supplied)

Rule VII, Section 2. Who are disqualified. - The following shall not be entitled to STAL (Special Time Allowance for Loyalty):

a. Recidivists;

b. Habitual Delinquents;

c. Escapees; and

d. PDL charged or convicted of Heinous Crimes. (Emphasis supplied)

The GCTA Law and the 2019 Revised IRR have made it abundantly clear that persons charged with and/or convicted of heinous crimes are not entitled to the benefits under the law. Thus, this begs the question: which crimes are considered heinous? More specifically, is murder considered a heinous crime for purposes of the application of the GCTA Law?

The 2019 Revised IRR defines "heinous crimes" as follows:

"Heinous Crimes" - crimes which are grievous, odious and hateful to the senses and which, by reason of their inherent and or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society, including crimes which are mandatorily punishable by Death under the provisions of RA No. 7659, as amended, otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, and those crimes specifically declared as such by the Supreme Court[.]

While the definition did not expressly enumerate crimes which are considered heinous, it made reference to "crimes which are mandatorily punishable by Death under the provisions of RA 7659, as amended x x x."

Section 6 of RA 7659,15 otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, states:

Section 6. Article 248 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

Art. 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.

3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, deraihnent or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.

4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.

5. With evident premeditation.

6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse."

From the discussion above, it is evident that the crime of Murder is one that is mandatorily punishable by death, in accordance with the Death Penalty Law. Being a such, it falls within the definition of "heinous crimes" in the 2019 Revised IRR and is therefore considered as a heinous crime.

In sum, Murder is considered a heinous crime in so far as the GCTA Law is concerned, and persons charged with and/or convicted of such are disqualified from availing of the benefits of the law.

On this point alone, the petition should already fail. However, Miguel further argues that Article 70 of the RPC caps the duration of the penalty of reclusion perpetua at thirty (30) years only. He is referring to the last paragraph of said provision, which states:

In applying the provisions of this rule the duration of perpetual penalties (pena perpetua) shall be computed at thirty years. (As amended by Com. Act No. 217.)

Miguel is again mistaken.

Plainly, nowhere in the cited provision does it state that perpetual penalties, such as reclusion perpetua, are capped at thirty (30) years. Instead, what it only provides is that in applying the rules laid out in Article 70, such as the three-fold rule, the duration of perpetual penalties shall be computed at thirty (30) years, thus:

In the case of People v. Mendoza, G.R. L-3271, May 5, 1950, it was held that the accused were guilty of murders and that each of them must be sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua for each of the five murders, although the duration of the aggregate penalties shall not exceed 40 years. In this case, after serving one reclusion perpetua, which is computed at 30 years, the accused will serve 10 years more. All the other penalties will not be served.16 (Emphasis supplied)

In People v. Reyes,17 Article 70 is further explained:

The other applicable reference to reclusion perpetua is found in Article 70 of the Code which, in laying down the rule on successive service of sentences where the culprit has to serve more than three penalties, provides, that 'the maximum duration of the convict's sentence shall not be more than three­fold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him,' and '(i)n applying the provisions of this rule the duration of perpetual penalties (pena perpetual) shall be computed at thirty years.'

The imputed duration of thirty (30) years for reclusion perpetua, therefore, is only to serve as the basis for determining the convict's eligibility for pardon or for the application of the three-fold rule in the service of multiple penalties x x x.18 (Emphasis supplied)

Miguel's position is further negated by the pronouncement in People v. Baguio,19 where the Court similarly held that "[r]eclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years, after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon x x x."20

Guided by the foregoing jurisprudence, it is evident that the penalty of reclusion perpetua requires imprisonment of at least thirty (30) years, after which the convict becomes only eligible for pardon, and not for release. This is in stark contrast to Miguel's claim that a convict meted with the penalty of reclusion perpetua must serve only thirty (30) years.

To recap, Miguel was delivered to the National Bilibid Prison on January 15, 1994. Therefore, as of August 15, 2021, he has only served a total of twenty-seven (27) years and seven (7) months of his sentence. Hence, having been punished to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, Miguel's continued detention is valid and justified. He has utterly failed to show that he is illegally confined or deprived of his liberty.

Accordingly, the Writ of Habeas Corpus may not be issued and the discharge of Miguel from imprisonment should not be authorized.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is  hereby Dismissed."

SECOND DIVISION

[ UDK-15368, September 15, 2021 ]

GIL MIGUEL, PETITIONER, VS. THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2021/sep2021/udk_15368_2021.html

Habeas corpus vis-a-vis hierarchy of courts

 "As to which court may grant the writ, Section 2, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 2. Who may grant the writ. - The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any member thereof, on any day and at any time, or by the Court of Appeals or any member thereof in the instances authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may be made returnable before the court or any member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing and decision on the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only within his judicial district.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the trial court, the appellate court, and this Court exercise concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. However, this does not mean that parties are absolutely free to choose before which court to file their petitions, thus:

[M]ere concurrency of jurisdiction does not afford parties absolute freedom to choose the court with which the petition shall be filed. Petitioners should be directed by the hierarchy of courts. After all, the hierarchy of courts 'serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitioners for the extraordinary writs.'12

In sum, Miguel should have filed the present petition before the RTC, absent any showing of special and important reasons warranting a direct resort to this Court."

SECOND DIVISION

[ UDK-15368, September 15, 2021 ]

GIL MIGUEL, PETITIONER, VS. THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2021/sep2021/udk_15368_2021.html

A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.

 "Preliminarily, we wish to point out that Miguel failed to observe the principle of hierarchy of courts.

In Cruz v. Gingoyon,10 the Court aptly explained the principle, thus:

We also find the necessity to emphasize strict observance of the hierarchy of courts. "A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ('inferior') courts should be filed with the [RTC], and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals (CA). A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition." For the guidance of the petitioner, "[t]his Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive." Its jurisdiction is concurrent with the CA, and with the RTC in proper cases. "However, this concurrence of jurisdiction does not grant upon a party seeking any of the extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file his petition with the court of his choice. This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition." Unwarranted demands upon this Court's attention must be prevented to allow time and devotion for pressing matters within its exclusive jurisdiction.11 (Emphasis supplied)"

SECOND DIVISION

[ UDK-15368, September 15, 2021 ]

GIL MIGUEL, PETITIONER, VS. THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2021/sep2021/udk_15368_2021.html

Transfer of workers; balancing "management prerogative" and "security of tenure of workers": "In the resolution of whether the transfer of the respondents from one area of operation to another was valid, finding a balance between the scope and limitation of the exercise of management prerogative and the employees' right to security of tenure is necessary. We have to weigh and consider, on the one hand, that management has a wide discretion to regulate all aspects of employment, including the transfer and re-assignment of employees according to the exigencies of the business; and, on the other, that the transfer constitutes constructive dismissal when it is unreasonable, inconvenient or prejudicial to the employee, or involves a demotion in rank or diminution of salaries, benefits and other privileges, or when the acts of discrimination, insensibility or disdain on the part of the employer become unbearable for the employee, forcing him to forego her employment."

 

"In the resolution of whether the transfer of the respondents from one area of operation to another was valid, finding a balance between the scope and limitation of the exercise of management prerogative and the employees' right to security of tenure is necessary.[32] We have to weigh and consider, on the one hand, that management has a wide discretion to regulate all aspects of employment, including the transfer and re-assignment of employees according to the exigencies of the business;[33] and, on the other, that the transfer constitutes constructive dismissal when it is unreasonable, inconvenient or prejudicial to the employee, or involves a demotion in rank or diminution of salaries, benefits and other privileges, or when the acts of discrimination, insensibility or disdain on the part of the employer become unbearable for the employee, forcing him to forego her employment.[34]

In this case of constructive dismissal, the burden of proof lies in the petitioner as the employer to prove that the transfer of the employee from one area of operation to another was for a valid and legitimate ground, like genuine business necessity.[35] We are satisfied that the petitioner duly discharged its burden, and thus established that, contrary to the claim of the respondents that they had been constructively dismissed, their transfer had been an exercise of the petitioner's legitimate management prerogative.

To start with, the resignations of the account managers and the director of sales and marketing in the Manila office brought about the immediate need for their replacements with personnel having commensurate experiences and skills. With the positions held by the resigned sales personnel being undoubtedly crucial to the operations and business of the petitioner, the resignations gave rise to an urgent and genuine business necessity that fully warranted the transfer from the Nasugbu, Batangas office to the main office in Manila of the respondents, undoubtedly the best suited to perform the tasks assigned to the resigned employees because of their being themselves account managers who had recently attended seminars and trainings as such. The transfer could not be validly assailed as a form of constructive dismissal, for, as held in Benguet Electric Cooperative v. Fianza,[36] management had the prerogative to determine the place where the employee is best qualified to serve the interests of the business given the qualifications, training and performance of the affected employee.

Secondly, although the respondents' transfer to Manila might be potentially inconvenient for them because it would entail additional expenses on their part aside from their being forced to be away from their families, it was neither unreasonable nor oppressive. The petitioner rightly points out that the transfer would be without demotion in rank, or without diminution of benefits and salaries. Instead, the transfer would open the way for their eventual career growth, with the corresponding increases in pay. It is noted that their prompt and repeated opposition to the transfer effectively stalled the possibility of any agreement between the parties regarding benefits or salary adjustments.

Thirdly, the respondents did not show by substantial evidence that the petitioner was acting in bad faith or had ill-motive in ordering their transfer. In contrast, the urgency and genuine business necessity justifying the transfer negated bad faith on the part of the petitioner.

Lastly, the respondents, by having voluntarily affixed their signatures on their respective letters of appointment, acceded to the terms and conditions of employment incorporated therein. One of the terms and conditions thus incorporated was the prerogative of management to transfer and re-assign its employees from one job to another "as it may deem necessary or advisable," to wit:

The company reserves the right to transfer you to any assignment from one job to another, or from one department/section to another, as it may deem necessary or advisable.

Having expressly consented to the foregoing, the respondents had no basis for objecting to their transfer. According to Abbot Laboratories (Phils.), Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[37] the employee who has consented to the company's policy of hiring sales staff willing to be assigned anywhere in the Philippines as demanded by the employer's business has no reason to disobey the transfer order of management. Verily, the right of the employee to security of tenure does not give her a vested right to her position as to deprive management of its authority to transfer or re-assign her where she will be most useful.[38]

In view of the foregoing, the NLRC properly appreciated the evidence and merits of the case in reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. As such, the CA gravely erred in declaring that the NLRC had gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES AND SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on January 10, 2011; REINSTATES the decision issued on December 14, 2009 by the National Labor Relations Commission; and ORDERS the respondents to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED."

G.R. No. 197492, January 18, 2017. 

CHATEAU ROYALE SPORTS AND COUNTRY CLUB, INC., PETITIONER, VS. RACHELLE G. BALBA AND MARINEL N. CONSTANTE, RESPONDENTS.

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/62724

Torts and Damages: "In order for Rico to maintain an action for the injuries which he claims to have sustained, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which Union Bank owed to him. In other words, there must be a concurrence of injury to Rico and the legal responsibility of the person causing it, i.e. Union Bank.64 "The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law; thus there must first be a breach before damages may be awarded and the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury."

"A credit card is a form of credit accommodation granted by the credit card company to the card holder for the latter's use in the purchase of goods and services. The contract between the card company and the credit card holder is a simple loan arrangement. Although the relationship between the card company and the card holder is that of creditor-debtor28 which exists upon the acceptance by the cardholder of the terms of the card membership agreement, We explained in Pantaleon v. American Express International, Inc.29 that this creditor-debtor relationship arises only after the credit card issuer has approved the cardholder's purchase request. In other words, when the cardholder uses his or her credit card to pay for purchases, an offer to enter into loan agreement with the credit card company is made. Only when the card company approves the purchase request that the parties enter into a binding loan agreement in line with Article 1319 of the Civil Code.

The question now, therefore, is whether Union Bank has the obligation to approve all the purchase requests of Rico by virtue of the issuance of the credit card. Consequently, when the bank disapproved Rico's purchase request on November 20, 2005 at Gourdo's Restaurant, is Union Bank liable to pay moral damages allegedly due to the embarrassment and humiliation resulting from the credit card's dishonor?

To reiterate, "the use of a credit card to pay for a purchase is only an offer to the credit card company to enter into a loan agreement with the credit card holder. Before the credit card issuer accepts this offer, no obligation relating to the loan agreement exists between them."30 Thus, Union Bank has no obligation to enter into a loan agreement with Rico when the latter tendered his offer by using his Union Bank Visa credit card to pay for his purchase at Gourdo's Restaurant. Rico, cannot, therefore demand from Union Bank to loan him or to pay for his purchase at Gourdo's Restaurant by virtue of the issued Visa credit card. "A demand presupposes the existence of an obligation between the parties."31

While it is true that with the issuance of the credit card to Rico, Union Bank granted him a credit facility or a pre-approved amount which the card holder may use in his purchase of goods and services, this is not a demandable right which the card holder may hold against the credit card company as if he is entitled to be granted a loan whenever he or she wants to, or that the bank owes him or her money by the mere issuance of a credit card. Hence, Union Bank may or may not approve Rico's purchase requests based on the latter's credit standing, credit card history, and financial capability. Rico cannot demand that Union Bank should pay for his purchase in Gourdo's Restaurant through the use of the Visa credit card as if the bank is obliged to do so. The disapproval of the credit card transaction which allegedly caused him embarrassment and humiliation worthy of moral damages cannot be solely attributed to Union Bank when there is no demandable right to begin with. In the same manner, Rico is not compelled nor obliged to use his Union Bank Visa credit card to pay for any of his purchases.

However, We recognize that when Union Bank issued a Visa credit card to Rico, the parties entered into a contractual relationship governed by the terms and conditions found in the card membership agreement which constitute as the law between the parties.32 Hence, in case of breach thereof, moral damages may be recovered if any of the party is shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith.33 "Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.34 However, a conscious or intentional design need not always be present because negligence may occasionally be so gross as to amount to malice or bad faith."35 Article 2220 of the Civil Code contemplates gross negligence as bad faith which would justify an award of moral damages.

The Terms and Conditions36 did not expressly state that Union Bank would honor all purchase requests of Rico at all times. Nonetheless, with the issuance of the credit card, Union Bank granted Rico credit card privileges which the latter may use in payment for goods and services. Thus, although the credit card company may disapprove the card holder's credit card transaction, it shall do so justifiably and within the bounds of laws and the credit card membership agreement. Otherwise, it would be futile to procure a credit card without a reasonable expectation that the card company will approve the card holder's purchase requests despite being in good credit standing and abiding by the terms and conditions.

A perusal of the records would show that Union Bank disapproved Rico's use of credit card on November 20, 2005 due to the latter's failure to pay the minimum amount due of his SOA dated October 16, 2005.37 However, Rico countered that he paid all his purchases in the total amount of P347.00, and that he was not liable for the other charges in the SOA dated October 16, 2005.

A further examination of the events that transpired before the disapproval of Rico's credit card transaction on November 20, 2005 would reveal that the cause of the inadvertent late payment charges and interests charged in the SOA dated October 16, 2005 was Rico's use of the credit card to pay for his Tiger Airways airline tickets on June 20, 2005 and June 29, 2005,38 which he allegedly cancelled as he did not want to pursue his travel anymore. As per Rico's letter dated June 30, 200539 addressed to Tiger Airways, he did not want to proceed with his flight to Singapore due to the absence of available seats when he tried to modify or change his return flight to Manila. Hence, even when the said airline tickets were already posted in his SOA dated July 15, 2005,40 Rico insisted that he cancelled the same and demanded Union Bank to refund the amount.41

However, as per Rico's letter dated July 4, 200542 to Tiger Airways, the airline refused to grant his demand to cancel the airline tickets because they were non-refundable. Thus, he stated in his letter that he would not pay his credit card for the allegedly cancelled tickets nor any change fees. In another letter dated July 7, 200543 to Tiger Airways, Rico insisted that he was not liable for any cancellation charges and change fees, and that he was not considering any option of flight change. He reiterated the same stance against Tiger Airways in his letter dated July 12, 2005.44

As a result, Rico did not pay Union Bank for the amount corresponding to the Tiger Airways airline tickets charged to his account. He even demanded from Union Bank to refund or reverse the amount charged in his credit card despite knowledge that the said transaction successfully pushed through and was not yet cancelled by Tiger Airways as per his letters dated July 4, 2005, July 7, 2005, and July 12, 2005. Clearly, he did not want to proceed with his flight but Tiger Airways refused to cancel his non-refundable tickets. The only option for Rico is to request the bank to cancel the transaction on the pretext of cancelled airline tickets.

In Union Bank's letter dated August 13, 200545 to Rico, the bank noted that Rico disputed the Tiger Airways airline tickets transaction posted in his SOA dated July 15, 2005. However, Union Bank advised him to coordinate the cancellation with Tiger Airways so it could facilitate its request of refund or reversal.46 In reply, Rico, in his letter dated August 25, 2005,47 demanded from the bank to reverse the amount of airline tickets or else he would not use the credit card.1a⍵⍴h!1

Nevertheless, Union Bank continued to charge the amount of the airline tickets in his succeeding SOAs, i.e. August 15, 200548 and September 15, 200549 with interest, charges, and/or other fees. Obviously, in the August 15, 2005 and September 15, 2005 SOAs, the cancellation of the airline tickets was not yet resolved which explains why Union Bank continued to charge Rico's credit card account.

However, in SOA dated October 16, 2005,50 Union Bank classified the airline tickets as disputed items but still continued to charge the said amount in Rico's account. Hence, the total amount due on SOA dated October 16, 2005 is P30,376.79, which includes the price of the airline tickets, with a minimum amount due of P500.00.51 Rico, however, insisting that he is not liable to pay the airline tickets as he claimed to have cancelled the same, only paid P347.00, or less than the minimum amount due.52

Thereafter, Union Bank made a credit adjustment on November 7, 200553 so as not to charge Rico with additional charges for the disputed transaction while undergoing the process of reversal or refund, if entitled. Clearly, in Union Bank's letter dated November 29, 2005,54 the disputed airline tickets transactions were not yet resolved but the bank made the necessary credit adjustment to avoid the running of additional charges or interests. The bank clarified that the said credit adjustment is not considered as payment and that Rico still needs to pay the minimum amount due to prevent the revocation of credit card privileges.55

Hence, even with the credit adjustment on November 7, 2005, Rico's transaction on November 20, 2005 was disapproved as he failed to pay the minimum amount due of P500 as billed in his SOA dated October 16, 2005 which was due on November 8, 2005. Finally, the cancellation of the airline tickets was resolved in Rico's favor. Thus, the SOA dated December 15, 2005 showed that Rico had no outstanding obligation to Union Bank. The bank also reversed all interests and charges charged against Rico's credit card account due to his failure to pay the amount of airline tickets.

Granting that the cancellation of the airline ticket was finally resolved in Rico's favor, it must be stressed that at the time of the purported embarrassing and humiliating incident, i.e., November 20, 2005, the said disputed transaction was not yet resolved. Thus, Union Bank had the right to revoke Rico's credit card privileges, and consequently disapprove the transaction in Gourdo's Restaurant. Union Bank further explained that the reversal of the amount of airline tickets was not considered as payment, and thus the bank system automatically put his account on "past due status" which caused the disapproval of Rico's transaction on November 20, 2005. As far as Union Bank is concerned, the disputed items were not yet resolved, and were part of the total outstanding obligation of the card holder. It is quite unfortunate for Rico to fault Union Bank for its failure to refund or reverse the amount of Tiger Airways airline tickets, when it was clear that the incident arose from his own decision to cancel his flight with Tiger Airways and insistence to refund or reverse the same.

Notably, "every credit card transaction involves three contracts, namely: (a) the sales contract between the credit card holder and the merchant or the business establishment which accepted the credit card; (b) the loan agreement between the credit card issuer and the credit card holder; and lastly, (c) the promise to pay between the credit card issuer and the merchant or business establishment."56

When Rico used his credit card to pay for his purchase of Tiger Airways airline tickets, three contracts were created, namely: (a) sales contract between Rico and Tiger Airways; (b) loan agreement between Rico and Union Bank; and (c) the promise to pay between Union Bank and Tiger Airways. When the said transaction was executed, Union Bank's promise to pay Tiger Airways arose. On the other hand, a creditor-debtor relationship was created between Union Bank and Rico, respectively. Thus, Union Bank had the right to demand the payment of the amount of airline tickets against Rico which the bank did so as indicated in its July, August, September, and October 2005 SOAs.

Rico's claim that the said airline tickets were already cancelled was belied by his own admission in his letters dated June 30, 2005,57 July 4, 2005,58 and July 12, 2005,59 to Tiger Airways demanding from the latter to cancel his non­-refundable flights from Manila to Singapore and vice versa. In return, Union Bank in its letter dated August 13, 2005,60 advised Rico to request the cancellation of the airline tickets from Tiger Airways, in order for Union Bank to process the reversal or refund of the amount charged in his account. Clearly, Union Bank cannot be considered to have breached its contract with Rico when the bank loaned him the money to pay for his purchase of airline tickets from Tiger Airways.

Rico, however, retorted in his letter dated August 13, 2005 to Union Bank, that he would not present any proof of cancellation of the said transaction with Tiger Airways as "the latter insists not to honor my cancellation of my flight reservation."61 Patently, Union Bank cannot be considered to have willfully put Rico's account on "past due status" in bad faith, when it was Rico himself who did not want to proceed with the already perfected and binding: (a) sales contract with Tiger Airways, and (b) loan agreement with Union Bank, from the mere fact that Rico used his credit card to pay for that subject purchase online. Consequently, Union Bank cannot just reverse nor refund the amount charged at the mere whim of the credit card holder who did not want to proceed with the flight he himself purchased from Tiger Airways.

Thus, Union Bank cannot be faulted when it continued to charge Rico with the amount of the airline tickets, pending investigation of the said disputed items. Rico knew fully well that the disputed airline tickets were still under the process of investigation by Union Bank, and that the said transactions were charged against his account as per SOA dated October 16, 2005. He also knew that as per SOA dated October 16, 2005, the minimum amount due to be paid is P500.00. As per the Terms and Conditions, in case of payment default, the right to use the credit card shall automatically be revoked which Union Bank did rightly so.

Regardless of the resolution of the cancellation of the airline tickets and the reversal of the interests and/or charges in Rico's favor, it bears stressing that when the alleged embarrassing situation happened on November 20, 2005, Rico was well aware of the pending dispute involving the airline tickets, and his nonpayment of the minimum amount which was due on or before November 8, 2005. Union Bank made no representation that the disputed items would be resolved in Rico's' favor. Also, it bears stressing that Union Bank is a business, and not a charity. It would be absurd to assume that Union Bank would simply accept Rico's representation that the disputed airline tickets were already cancelled, without conducting its own review and investigation, and thereby, open itself to a possible liability to Tiger Airways, when the debtor, Rico, refuses to pay Union Bank and insists on its cancellation.

Apropos, Union Bank cannot be considered grossly negligent in charging the amount of airline tickets against Rico's credit card account in the July to October SOAs, or prior to the final resolution of the dispute. Union Bank did not violate the Terms and Conditions, nor any legal duty, to pay for Rico's purchases using the credit card. Union Bank cannot also be considered grossly negligent when it automatically revoked Rico's credit card account when the latter failed to pay the minimum amount due pending the resolution of the disputed transactions. Insofar as Union Bank is concerned, Rico offered to enter into a loan agreement with Union Bank to pay for his Tiger Airways airline tickets and Union Bank, when it allowed the said transactions, accepted Rico's offer. Subsequently, a contract between Union Bank and Tiger Airways arose, such that, the former is obliged to pay the latter the amount of airline tickets purchased by Rico. In reviewing and investigating the alleged cancelled sales agreement between Rico and Tiger Airways, Union Bank is justified to protect itself as a business for profit.1âшphi1

Based on the foregoing, we find the disapproval of Rico's credit card on November 20, 2005 as justified and done in good faith. Union Bank neither breached its contract with Rico nor acted with willful intent to cause harm when it revoked Rico's credit card privileges when he failed to pay the minimum amount due on his SOA dated October 16, 2005. Nobody can be faulted for Rico's alleged humiliation or embarrassment in Gourdo's Restaurant but himself. Damnum absque injuria – there can be no damage without injury when the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. As held in BPI Express Card v. Court of Appeals:62

We do not dispute the findings of the lower court that private respondent suffered damages as a result of the cancellation of his credit card. However, there is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.

In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff — a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; and the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury.63

In order for Rico to maintain an action for the injuries which he claims to have sustained, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which Union Bank owed to him. In other words, there must be a concurrence of injury to Rico and the legal responsibility of the person causing it, i.e. Union Bank.64 "The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law; thus there must first be a breach before damages may be awarded and the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury."65

It is not enough that Rico merely suffered humiliation or embarrassment as a result of Union Bank's disapproval of the credit card transaction on November 20, 2005. "It is also required that a culpable act or omission was factually established, that proof that the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is shown as the proximate cause of the damage sustained by the claimant and that the case is predicated on any of the instances expressed or envisioned by Arts. 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code."66

While Rico suffered humiliation or embarrassment from the disapproval of his credit card at Gourdo's Restaurant in front of his two guests, We are constrained to reverse the findings of the RTC and the CA that Union Bank was grossly negligent in revoking Rico's credit card privileges. Rico failed to convince Us that Union Bank breached any obligation that would make it answerable for his humiliation or embarrassment.

Hence, as it was Rico's own action, i.e., his resolve to cancel his flight with Tiger Airways, which was the proximate cause of his embarrassing and humiliating experience, We find the award of moral damages by the RTC and the CA clearly unjustified. With the deletion of the award of moral damages, we find no basis for the award of exemplary damages as it can only be awarded if Rico is entitled to moral, temperate, or compensatory damages.67 In the same vein, We must delete the award of attorney's fees and costs of litigation as Rico failed to show that he falls under one of the instances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The June 28, 2013 Decision and January 21, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96400 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint for damages filed by petitioner Rex G. Rico before the Regional Trial Court, Parañaque City, Branch 195 docketed as Civil Case No. 06-0029 against respondent Union Bank of the Philippines, is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED."

G.R. No. 210928, February 14, 2022. 

REX G. RICO, PETITIONER, VS. UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2022/feb2022/gr_210928_2022.html

Insurance; illegitimate children as beneficiaries

 "In this case, it is clear from the petition filed before the trial court that, although petitioners are the legitimate heirs of Loreto, they were not named as beneficiaries in the insurance policies issued by Insular and Grepalife. The basis of petitioners’ claim is that Eva, being a concubine of Loreto and a suspect in his murder, is disqualified from being designated as beneficiary of the insurance policies, and that Eva’s children with Loreto, being illegitimate children, are entitled to a lesser share of the proceeds of the policies. They also argued that pursuant to Section 12 of the Insurance Code,19 Eva’s share in the proceeds should be forfeited in their favor, the former having brought about the death of Loreto. Thus, they prayed that the share of Eva and portions of the shares of Loreto’s illegitimate children should be awarded to them, being the legitimate heirs of Loreto entitled to their respective legitimes.

It is evident from the face of the complaint that petitioners are not entitled to a favorable judgment in light of Article 2011 of the Civil Code which expressly provides that insurance contracts shall be governed by special laws, i.e., the Insurance Code. Section 53 of the Insurance Code states—

SECTION 53. The insurance proceeds shall be applied exclusively to the proper interest of the person in whose name or for whose benefit it is made unless otherwise specified in the policy.

Pursuant thereto, it is obvious that the only persons entitled to claim the insurance proceeds are either the insured, if still alive; or the beneficiary, if the insured is already deceased, upon the maturation of the policy.20 The exception to this rule is a situation where the insurance contract was intended to benefit third persons who are not parties to the same in the form of favorable stipulations or indemnity. In such a case, third parties may directly sue and claim from the insurer.21

Petitioners are third parties to the insurance contracts with Insular and Grepalife and, thus, are not entitled to the proceeds thereof. Accordingly, respondents Insular and Grepalife have no legal obligation to turn over the insurance proceeds to petitioners. The revocation of Eva as a beneficiary in one policy and her disqualification as such in another are of no moment considering that the designation of the illegitimate children as beneficiaries in Loreto’s insurance policies remains valid. Because no legal proscription exists in naming as beneficiaries the children of illicit relationships by the insured,22 the shares of Eva in the insurance proceeds, whether forfeited by the court in view of the prohibition on donations under Article 739 of the Civil Code or by the insurers themselves for reasons based on the insurance contracts, must be awarded to the said illegitimate children, the designated beneficiaries, to the exclusion of petitioners. It is only in cases where the insured has not designated any beneficiary,23 or when the designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the proceeds,24 that the insurance policy proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the estate of the insured.

In this regard, the assailed June 16, 2005 Resolution of the trial court should be upheld. In the same light, the Decision of the CA dated January 8, 2008 should be sustained. Indeed, the appellate court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the appeal; the issue of failure to state a cause of action is a question of law and not of fact, there being no findings of fact in the first place.25

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED."

HEIRS OF LORETO C. MARAMAG, represented by surviving spouse VICENTA PANGILINAN MARAMAG, Petitioners, vs. EVA VERNA DE GUZMAN MARAMAG, ODESSA DE GUZMAN MARAMAG, KARL BRIAN DE GUZMAN MARAMAG, TRISHA ANGELIE MARAMAG, THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., and GREAT PACIFIC LIFE ASSURANCE CORPORATION, Respondents. G.R. No. 181132, June 5, 2009. 

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jun2009/gr_181132_2009.html

Grave oral defamation or slander

"The lone assignment of error (Brief for the Petitioners, p. 91), is as follows:

THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE WORDS UTTERED BY THE PETITIONERS IN CONVERSATION WITH EACH OTHER AND WHILE IN THE HEAT OF ANGER CONSTITUTE GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION INSTEAD OF MERELY LIGHT ORAL DEFAMATION.

In effect, counsel for petitioners abandoned all the assignments of error in the Court of Appeals, confined himself to only one, and practically admitted that the accused committed the crime charged although of a lesser degree that of slight oral defamation only, instead of grave oral defamation.

There is no dispute regarding the main facts that had given rise to the present case. Appellant-petitioner in this instant appeal, does not deny that the accused, on the occasion in question, uttered the defamatory words alleged in the information. Thus, the sole issue that the Court has to resolve is whether or not the defamatory words constitute serious oral defamation or simply slight oral defamation.

The term oral defamation or slander as now understood, has been defined as the speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood (33 Am. Jur. 39). Article 358, Revised Penal Code, spells out the demarcation line, between serious and slight oral defamations, as follows: "Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if it is of a serious and insulting nature, otherwise, the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos." (Balite v. People, 18 SCRA 280 [1966]).

To determine whether the offense committed is serious or slight oral defamation, the Court adopted the following guidelines:

. . . We are to be guided by a doctrine of ancient respectability that defamatory words will fall under one or the other, depending upon, as Viada puts it, '...upon their sense and grammatical meaning judging them separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time: ... Balite v. People, Ibid., quoting Viada, Codigo Penal, Quinta edicion, page 494).

Thus, in the same case cited where scurrilous words imputed to the offended party the crime of estafa, the Court ruled:

The scurrilous words imputed to the offended party the crime estafa. The language of the indictment strikes deep into the character of the victim; He 'has sold the union; he 'has swindled the money of the vendees; he 'received bribe money in the amount of P10,000.00 ... and another P6,000.00'; He 'is engaged in racketeering and enriching himself with the capitalists'; He 'has spent the funds of the union for his personal use.'

No amount of sophistry will take these statements out of the compass of grave oral defamation. They are serious and insulting. No circumstances need to be shown to upgrade the slander. . . .

In another case where a woman of violent temper hurled offensive and scurrilous epithets including words imputing unchastity against a respectable married lady and tending to injure the character of her young daughters, the Court ruled that the crime committed was grave slander:

The language used by the defendant was deliberately applied by her to the complainant. The words were uttered with evident intent to injure complainant, to ruin her reputation, and to hold her in public contempt, for the sake of revenge. One who will thus seek to impute vice or immorality to another, the consequences of which might gravely prejudice the reputation of the person insulted, in this instance apparently an honorable and respectable lady and her young daughters, all prominent in social circles, deserves little judicial sympathy. Certainly, it is time for the courts to put the stamp of their disapproval on this practice of vile and loud slander. (U.S. v. Tolosa, 37 Phil. 166 [1917]).

In a case where the accused, a priest, called the offended party a gangster, in the middle of a sermon, the court affirmed the conviction of the accused for slight slander (People v. Arcand 68 Phil. 601 [1939]). There was no imputation of a crime nor a vice or immorality in said case.

In the instant case, appellant-petitioner admitted having uttered the defamatory words against Atty. Vivencio Ruiz. Among others he called Atty. Ruiz, "estapador", which attributes to the latter the crime of estafa, a serious and insulting imputation. As stated by the Court in Balite v. People, supra, "no amount of sophistry will take these statements out of the compass of grave oral defamation . . . No circumstances need to be shown to upgrade the slander."

Defamatory words uttered specifically against a lawyer when touching on his profession are libelous per se. Thus, in Kleeberg v. Sipser (191 NY 845 [1934]), it was held that "where statements concerning plaintiff in his professional capacity as attorney are susceptible, in their ordinary meaning, of such construction as would tend to injure him in that capacity, they are libelous per se and (the) complaint, even in the absence of allegation of special damage, states cause of action." Oral statements that a certain lawyer is 'unethical,' or a false charge, dealing with office, trade, occupation, business or profession of a person charged, are slanderous per se (Kraushaar v. LaVin, 42 N.Y.S. 2d 857 [1943]; Mains v. Whiting 49 NW 559 [1891]; Greenburg v. De Salvo, 216 So. 2d 638 [1968]).

In Pollard v. Lyon (91 US 225 [1876]), the court there had occasion to divide oral slander, as a cause of action, into several classes, as follows:

(1) Words falsely spoken of a person which impute to the party the commission of some criminal offense involving moral turpitude for which the party, if the charge is true, may be indicted and punished;

(2) Words falsely spoken of a person which impute that the party is infected with some contagious disease, where, if the charge is true, it would exclude the party from society;

(3) Defamatory words falsely spoken of a person which impute to the party unfitness to perform the duties of an office or employment, or the want of integrity in the discharge of the duties of such office or employment;

(4) Defamatory words falsely spoken of a party which prejudice such party in his or her profession or trade; and

(5) Defamatory words falsely spoken of a person, which, though not in themselves actionable, occasion the party special damage."

In the instant case, appellant-petitioner imputed the crime of estafa against a prominent lawyer one-time Justice of the Peace and member of the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, a professor of law and for sometime a president of the Nueva Ecija Bar Association. As the scurrilous imputation strikes deep into the character of the victim, no special circumstance need be shown for the defamatory words uttered to be considered grave oral defamation Balite v. People, supra. In addition, the fact that the offended party is a lawyer, the totality of such words as "kayabang", "tunaw ang utak", "swapang at estapador", imputed against him has the import of charging him with dishonesty or improper practice in the performance of his duties, hence, actionable per se.

Petitioner argues that this Court in People v. Doronila (40 O.G. No. 15, Supp. 11, p. 231 [1941]) and People v. Modesto (40 O.G. No. 15, Supp. 11, p. 128 [1941]) ruled that defamatory words uttered in the heat of anger could only give rise to slight oral defamation (Rono, p. 13).

We disagree.

An examination of the rulings relied upon by petitioner showed that said cases were decided not by this Court but by the respondent court. Suffice it to say that said decisions do not bind this Court.

Nevertheless, the cases adverted to by petitioner would not in any manner help his cause. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, there was no reason for the petitioner to be angry at the offended party who was merely performing his duties as a lawyer in defense of his client. Petitioner's anger was not lawfully caused. (Brief for the Appellee, p. 7). The fact that the defamatory words were uttered by the petitioner without provocation by private respondent and taken seriously by the latter, renders inapplicable the cases relied upon by petitioner.

As a matter of fact, the scurrilous remarks were found by the respondent court to have been uttered in a loud voice, in the presence of at least ten (10) persons, taken seriously by the offended party and without provocation on his part.

WHEREFORE, the petition is Denied for lack of merit and the appealed decision Affirmed in toto.

SO ORDERED."

DANIEL VICTORIO and EXEQUIEL VICTORIO, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. G.R. Nos. L-32836-37, May 3, 1989. 

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/may1989/gr_l32836_37_1989.html

Damages against a party in default

"To adjudge damages, paragraph (d) of Section 3 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides that a judgment against a party in default "shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated damages." The proscription against the award of unliquidated damages is significant, because it means that the damages to be awarded must be proved convincingly, in accordance with the quantum of evidence required in civil cases.

Unfortunately for petitioners, the grant of damages was not sufficiently supported by the evidence for the following reasons.

First, petitioners were not deprived of their property without cause. As correctly pointed out by the CA, Act No. 3135, as amended, does not require personal notice to the mortgagor.53 In the present case, there has been no allegation -- much less, proof -- of noncompliance with the requirement of publication and public posting of the notice of sale, as required by Áct No. 3135. Neither has there been competent evidence to show that the price paid at the foreclosure sale was inadequate.54 To be sure, there was no ground to invalidate the sale.

Second, as previously stated, petitioners have not convincingly established their right to damages on the basis of the purported agreement to repurchase. Without reiterating our prior discussion on this point, we stress that entitlement to actual and compensatory damages must be proved even under Section 3 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. The same is true with regard to awards for moral damages and attorney’s fees, which were also granted by the trial court.

In sum, petitioners have failed to convince this Court of the cogency of their position, notwithstanding the advantage they enjoyed in presenting their evidence ex parte. Not in every case of default by the defendant is the complainant entitled to win automatically.

WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED."

ERLINDA GAJUDO, FERNANDO GAJUDO, JR., ESTELITA GAJUDO, BALTAZAR GAJUDO and DANILO ARAHAN CHUA, Petitioners, vs. TRADERS ROYAL BANK,1Respondent. G.R. No. 151098, March 21, 2006.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/gr_151098_2006.html

Quantum of proof

 "First Issue: Quantum of Proof

Petitioners challenge the CA Decision for applying Section 3 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, rather than Section 1 of Rule 133 of the same Rules. In essence, petitioners argue that the quantum of evidence for judgments flowing from a default order under Section 3 of Rule 9 is not the same as that provided for in Section 1 of Rule 133.

For ease of discussion, these two rules will be reproduced below, starting with Section 3 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court:

"Sec. 3. Default; declaration of. – If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court.

"(a) Effect of order of default. – A party in default shall be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings but not to take part in the trial.

"(b) Relief from order of default. – A party declared in default may at any time after notice thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of default may be set aside on such terms and conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of justice.

"(c) Effect of partial default. – When a pleading asserting a claim states a common cause of action against several defending parties, some of whom answer and the others fail to do so, the court shall try the case against all upon the answers thus filed and render judgment upon the evidence presented.

"(d) Extent of relief to be awarded. – A judgment rendered against a party in default shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated damages.

"(e) Where no defaults allowed. – If the defending party in an action for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or nor a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated."

We now quote Section 1 of Rule 133:

"SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. – In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number."

Between the two rules, there is no incompatibility that would preclude the application of either one of them. To begin with, Section 3 of Rule 9 governs the procedure which the trial court is directed to take when a defendant fails to file an answer. According to this provision, the court "shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant," subject to the court’s discretion on whether to require the presentation of evidence ex parte. The same provision also sets down guidelines on the nature and extent of the relief that may be granted. In particular, the court’s judgment "shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated damages."

As in other civil cases, basic is the rule that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence.19 Moreover, parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence, not upon the weakness of the defense offered by their opponent.20 This principle holds true, especially when the latter has had no opportunity to present evidence because of a default order. Needless to say, the extent of the relief that may be granted can only be as much as has been alleged and proved21 with preponderant evidence required under Section 1 of Rule 133.

Regarding judgments by default, it was explained in Pascua v. Florendo22 that complainants are not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for, once the defendants are declared in default. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court has ascertained that the relief is warranted by the evidence offered and the facts proven by the presenting party. In Pascua, this Court ruled that "x x x it would be meaningless to require presentation of evidence if every time the other party is declared in default, a decision would automatically be rendered in favor of the non-defaulting party and exactly according to the tenor of his prayer. This is not contemplated by the Rules nor is it sanctioned by the due process clause."23

The import of a judgment by default was further clarified in Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete.24 The following disquisition is most instructive:

"Unequivocal, in the literal sense, as these provisions [referring to the subject of default then under Rule 18 of the old Rules of Civil Procedure] are, they do not readily convey the full import of what they contemplate. To begin with, contrary to the immediate notion that can be drawn from their language, these provisions are not to be understood as meaning that default or the failure of the defendant to answer should ‘be interpreted as an admission by the said defendant that the plaintiff’s cause of action find support in the law or that plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed for.’ x x x.

x x x x x x x x x

"Being declared in default does not constitute a waiver of rights except that of being heard and of presenting evidence in the trial court. x x x.

"In other words, a defaulted defendant is not actually thrown out of court. While in a sense it may be said that by defaulting he leaves himself at the mercy of the court, the rules see to it that any judgment against him must be in accordance with law. The evidence to support the plaintiff’s cause is, of course, presented in his absence, but the court is not supposed to admit that which is basically incompetent. Although the defendant would not be in a position to object, elementary justice requires that only legal evidence should be considered against him. If the evidence presented should not be sufficient to justify a judgment for the plaintiff, the complaint must be dismissed. And if an unfavorable judgment should be justifiable, it cannot exceed in amount or be different in kind from what is prayed for in the complaint."25

In sum, while petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex parte under Section 3 of Rule 9, they were not excused from establishing their claims for damages by the required quantum of proof under Section 1 of Rule 133. Stated differently, any advantage they may have gained from the ex parte presentation of evidence does not lower the degree of proof required. Clearly then, there is no incompatibility between the two rules."

ERLINDA GAJUDO, FERNANDO GAJUDO, JR., ESTELITA GAJUDO, BALTAZAR GAJUDO and DANILO ARAHAN CHUA, Petitioners, vs. TRADERS ROYAL BANK,1Respondent. G.R. No. 151098, March 21, 2006.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/gr_151098_2006.html

Estafa, modified penalty under RA 10951

 "Penalty modifications

Republic Act No. 10951 (RA 10951) adjusted the amount or value of the property and damage upon which the penalties for crimes and offenses are based, and the fines imposed therefor. Section 85 thereof specifically provides for violations of Article 315, Paragraph 2(a) of the RPC:

SECTION 85. Article 315 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, Presidential Decree No. 1689, and Presidential Decree No. 818, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

x x x x

"3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión correccional in its minimum period, if such amount is over Forty thousand pesos (P40,000) but does not exceed One million two hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000).

Seguritan v. People62 and People v. Dejolde, Jr.63 involved the application of RA 10951 on the third paragraph of Article 315, as amended. Both meted out the following penalty:

[I]n view of the recent enactment of RA 10951, there is a need to modify the penalties imposed by the CA insofar as the two counts of estafa, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 27592-R and 27602-R, are concerned. For committing estafa involving the amounts of P440,000.00 and P350,000.00, Article 315 of the RPC, as amended by RA 10951, now provides that the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximun period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed if the amount involved is over P40,000.00 but does not exceed P1,200,000.00. There being no mitigating and aggravating circumstance, the maximum penalty should be one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence is: arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, the range of which is one (1) month and one (1) day to four (4) months. Thus, the indeterminate penalty for each count of estafa should be modified to a prison term of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum.

The RTC held Arriola criminally liable for Estafa under Article 315, Paragraph 2(a) for the amount of P437,000.00 and initially imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. In light of RA 10951 and the aforementioned recent pronouncements, Arriola's penalty is hereby modified to arresto mayor in its minimum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, further narrowed down to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed August 5, 2011 Decision and January 3, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31338 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Petitioner Luis T. Arriola is ORDERED to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum.

SO ORDERED."

G.R. No. 199975, February 24, 2020 

LUIS T. ARRIOLA, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/feb2020/gr_199975_2020.html

Equipoise Rule in Appreciation of Evidence

 "The equipoise rule is inapplicable in this case

Arriola maintains that he possessed a valid authority to sell the subject lot, which Candelaria denied. While hearsay, Arriola asserts his position that Candelaria only withheld such authority because they had a subsequent disagreement. There being a conflict between the versions of the prosecution and the defense, Arriola insists that the courts should have favored that of the latter, citing the equipoise rule.59 We differ.

The equipoise rule is inapplicable here. This criminal law principle is explained in brief in Tin v. People,60 a case relied on by Arriola:

Under this rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. The equipoise rule finds application if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, arid does not suffice to produce a conviction. Briefly stated, the needed quantum of proof to convict the accused of the crime charged is found lacking. x x x61

Conviction rests not on the frailty of the defense but on the strength and sufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution. In this case, however, the scales of the evidence had already tilted heavily against the defense. We perceive no conflicting versions, as Arriola technically failed to set forth his own version in the first place. His guilt was finely established with the required quantum of proof, which is proof beyond reasonable doubt.

More importantly, this factual argument by Arriola is too bare and was raised too belatedly to be considered at this point. To recall, Arriola's direct testimony was stricken off the record for his consistent absences at the scheduled dates for his cross-examination. It was not even tendered as excluded evidence. Only on appeal that he advanced this argument. Even if time and procedure permitted it, Arriola, by his own admission, grounded his case solely and purely on hearsay. This is wholly insufficient to counter the already-compelling evidence presented against him by the prosecution."

G.R. No. 199975, February 24, 2020 

LUIS T. ARRIOLA, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/feb2020/gr_199975_2020.html

Good faith as a defense in Estafa

 "Good faith is "an elusive idea, taking on different meanings and emphases as we move from one context to another."56 It is, in general, a state of mind consisting in honesty in belief or purpose, faithfulness to one's duty or obligation, observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in a given trade or business, absence of intent to defraud or seek unconscionable advantage,57 or a belief in one's legal title or right.58 Being malum in se, and depending on the proven circumstances, good faith and lack of criminal intent are indeed available defenses against a prosecution for Estafa.

However, all-encompassing this definition is, good faith still cannot be appreciated in favor of Arriola. As earlier expounded, Arriola, a real estate broker, presented to Del Rosario an Authorization and a fax transmission clearly conveying mere permission from Candelaria to receive payment from Del Rosario. Despite knowledge of such information, and even going so far as to disclose the same to Del Rosario, Arriola continued to wield his ultra vires power to sell Candelaria's lot. This smacks of overt thoughtlessness, gross negligence, and fraudulent intentions in his professional dealings, imperiling the welfare of both his principal and the latter's client and culminating in the actual damage to Del Rosario. To attribute good faith to Arriola under these facts is to uphold injustice."

G.R. No. 199975, February 24, 2020 

LUIS T. ARRIOLA, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/feb2020/gr_199975_2020.html

Return of the amount owed will not cancel criminal liability for Estafa

 "Return of the amount owed to Del Rosario will not cancel Arriola's criminal liability for Estafa

Arriola insists that he manifested good faith when he returned Del Rosario's money, and that good faith is a defense against a charge for Estafa. Citing this Court's ruling in Salazar v. People,53 he also maintains that the transaction between Del Rosario and Candelaria was that of a sale, and his failure to deliver the title of the property in question only gave rise to a civil liability. We disagree.

The return by the accused of money belonging to the private complainant will not reverse a consummated act of Estafa. Quite the contrary, such action may even uphold a conviction. Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that in criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or criminal negligence or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. In this case, Arriola's initial attempts to reimburse Del Rosario through checks, coupled with the actual return of the latter's money after the RTC issued its judgment of conviction, may all be considered as unequivocal gestures to compromise and which can be measured against Arriola as his implied admission of guilt.

Moreover, Salazar v. People,54 which exonerated accused therein upon reconsideration and contemplated Estafa by misappropriation under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC, finds no application here, as the present case involves Estafa by false pretenses under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the same law.

Even if so similarly situated, Salazar v. People55 declared that the transaction between the parties therein was simply that of sale, and a delay in the performance by a party to the contract entailed only a civil obligation to return the advance payment made by the other. No such sale of a piece of land transpired in this case due to Arriola's lack of authority to sell. There was no contract in the first place. Also, unlike in Salazar v. People, evidence of false pretenses and the resultant damage to Del Rosario clearly obtains against Arriola. This creates not just a civil obligation on Arriola to return Del Rosario's money, but also a correlative criminal liability for the perpetration of fraud on Del Rosario."

G.R. No. 199975, February 24, 2020 

LUIS T. ARRIOLA, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/feb2020/gr_199975_2020.html