I am not a pro bono lawyer. See the PAO or IBP chapter near you for free legal aid.
Monday, September 30, 2024
Estate planning and corporations
"After incorporation, one becomes a stockholder of a corporation by subscription or by purchasing stock directly from the corporation or from individual owners thereof (Salmon, Dexter & Co. v. Unson, 47 Phil, 649, citing Bole v. Fulton [1912], 233 Pa., 609). In the case at bar, in exchange for their properties, the Pachecos acquired 2,500 original unissued no par value shares of stocks of the Delpher Trades Corporation. Consequently, the Pachecos became stockholders of the corporation by subscription "The essence of the stock subscription is an agreement to take and pay for original unissued shares of a corporation, formed or to be formed." (Rohrlich 243, cited in Agbayani, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Commercial Laws of the Philippines, Vol. III, 1980 Edition, p. 430) It is significant that the Pachecos took no par value shares in exchange for their properties.
A no-par value share does not purport to represent any stated proportionate interest in the capital stock measured by value, but only an aliquot part of the whole number of such shares of the issuing corporation. The holder of no-par shares may see from the certificate itself that he is only an aliquot sharer in the assets of the corporation. But this character of proportionate interest is not hidden beneath a false appearance of a given sum in money, as in the case of par value shares. The capital stock of a corporation issuing only no-par value shares is not set forth by a stated amount of money, but instead is expressed to be divided into a stated number of shares, such as, 1,000 shares. This indicates that a shareholder of 100 such shares is an aliquot sharer in the assets of the corporation, no matter what value they may have, to the extent of 100/1,000 or 1/10. Thus, by removing the par value of shares, the attention of persons interested in the financial condition of a corporation is focused upon the value of assets and the amount of its debts. (Agbayani, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Commercial Laws of the Philippines, Vol. III, 1980 Edition, p. 107).
Moreover, there was no attempt to state the true or current market value of the real estate. Land valued at P300.00 a square meter was turned over to the family's corporation for only P14.00 a square meter.
It is to be stressed that by their ownership of the 2,500 no par shares of stock, the Pachecos have control of the corporation. Their equity capital is 55% as against 45% of the other stockholders, who also belong to the same family group.
In effect, the Delpher Trades Corporation is a business conduit of the Pachecos. What they really did was to invest their properties and change the nature of their ownership from unincorporated to incorporated form by organizing Delpher Trades Corporation to take control of their properties and at the same time save on inheritance taxes.
As explained by Eduardo Neria:
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. LINSANGAN:
Q Mr. Neria, from the point of view of taxation, is there any benefit to the spouses Hernandez and Pacheco in connection with their execution of a deed of exchange on the properties for no par value shares of the defendant corporation?
A Yes, sir.
COURT:
Q What do you mean by "point of view"?
A To take advantage for both spouses and corporation in entering in the deed of exchange.
ATTY. LINSANGAN:
Q (What do you mean by "point of view"?) What are these benefits to the spouses of this deed of exchange?
A Continuous control of the property, tax exemption benefits, and other inherent benefits in a corporation.
Q What are these advantages to the said spouses from the point of view of taxation in entering in the deed of exchange?
A Having fulfilled the conditions in the income tax law, providing for tax free exchange of property, they were able to execute the deed of exchange free from income tax and acquire a corporation.
Q What provision in the income tax law are you referring to?
A I refer to Section 35 of the National Internal Revenue Code under par. C-sub-par. (2) Exceptions regarding the provision which I quote: "No gain or loss shall also be recognized if a person exchanges his property for stock in a corporation of which as a result of such exchange said person alone or together with others not exceeding four persons gains control of said corporation."
Q Did you explain to the spouses this benefit at the time you executed the deed of exchange?
A Yes, sir
Q You also, testified during the last hearing that the decision to have no par value share in the defendant corporation was for the purpose of flexibility. Can you explain flexibility in connection with the ownership of the property in question?
A There is flexibility in using no par value shares as the value is determined by the board of directors in increasing capitalization. The board can fix the value of the shares equivalent to the capital requirements of the corporation.
Q Now also from the point of taxation, is there any flexibility in the holding by the corporation of the property in question?
A Yes, since a corporation does not die it can continue to hold on to the property indefinitely for a period of at least 50 years. On the other hand, if the property is held by the spouse the property will be tied up in succession proceedings and the consequential payments of estate and inheritance taxes when an owner dies.
Q Now what advantage is this continuity in relation to ownership by a particular person of certain properties in respect to taxation?
A The property is not subjected to taxes on succession as the corporation does not die.
Q So the benefit you are talking about are inheritance taxes?
A Yes, sir. (pp. 3-5, tsn., December 15, 1981)
The records do not point to anything wrong or objectionable about this "estate planning" scheme resorted to by the Pachecos. "The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise could be his taxes or altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted." (Liddell & Co., Inc. v. The collector of Internal Revenue, 2 SCRA 632 citing Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 7 L. ed. 596).
The "Deed of Exchange" of property between the Pachecos and Delpher Trades Corporation cannot be considered a contract of sale. There was no transfer of actual ownership interests by the Pachecos to a third party. The Pacheco family merely changed their ownership from one form to another. The ownership remained in the same hands. Hence, the private respondent has no basis for its claim of a light of first refusal under the lease contract."
G.R. No. L-69259, January 26, 1988
DELPHER TRADES CORPORATION, and DELPHIN PACHECO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and HYDRO PIPES PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents.
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1988/jan1988/gr_l_69259_1988.html
Co-ownership of real property
"Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and that each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of the Code states that whenever the thing is essentially, indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be, allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly distributed. This is resorted to (1) when the right to partition the property is invoked by any of the co-owners but because of the nature of the property it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the interests of the co-owners, and (b) the co-owners are not in agreement as to who among them shall be allotted or assigned the entire property upon proper reimbursement of the co-owners. In one case,8 this Court upheld the order of the trial court directing the holding of a public sale of the properties owned in common pursuant to Art. 498 of the Civil Code.
However, being a co-owner respondent has the right to use the house and lot without paying any compensation to petitioner, as he may use the property owned in common long as it is in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in a manner not injurious to the interest of the other co-owners.9 Each co-owner of property held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners, the reason being that until a division is made, the respective share of each cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the
same. 10
Since petitioner has decided to enforce his right in court to end the co-ownership of the house and lot and respondent has not refuted the allegation that he has been preventing the sale of the property by his continued occupancy of the premises, justice and equity demand that respondent and his family vacate the property so that the sale can be effected immediately. In fairness to petitioner, respondent should pay a rental of P1,200.00 per month, with legal interest; from the time the trial court ordered him to vacate, for the use and enjoyment of the other half of the property appertaining to petitioner.
When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property and the trial court granted the petition and ordered the ejectment of respondent, the co-ownership was deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the possession jointly also ceased. Thereafter, the continued stay of respondent and his family in the house prejudiced the interest of petitioner as the property should have been sold and the proceeds divided equally between them. To this extent and from then on, respondent should be held liable for monthly rentals until he and his family vacate."
G.R. No. 76351, October 29, 1993
VIRGILIO B. AGUILAR, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SENEN B. AGUILAR, respondents.
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1993/oct1993/gr_76351_1993.html
Friday, September 20, 2024
Cross Examination
Ask one fact per question.
Avoid long and compounded cross examination questions.
Be simple.
Be direct to the point.
Limit your cross examination questions to "yes" or "no" format.
Tie the hands of the hostile witness to "yes or no questions".
Ask only questions where you know the answers.
Do not let the hostile witness explain his answer.
(Let his own lawyer do that on his re-direct examination).
Unless absolutely necessary, do not ask questions that start with "who", "what", "when", "where", "why" and "how".
These question's are good only for direct and re-direct examination questions (case build-up questions).
Know when not to cross examine a truthful witness.
Know when to shut up and sit down.
The goals of cross examination are to seek the Truth and to test the credibility of the witness and his testimony.
Cross examination is not intended to massage your ego as a trial lawyer or as an investigating legislator.
The secret of successful cross examination is PREPARATION.
Master your case.
Know the Applicable Law and Jurisprudence.
Organize your evidence.
Know the eccentricities and character traits of the Judge and the adverse counsel.
Destroy the credibility of the hostile witness without necessarily quarreling with him in open court.
Destroy the hostile witness by the quality of your cross examination questions, not by the volume of your voice or your bloated ego.
Be well-rested and well-fed before the trial/hearing.
Let your mind be calm, peaceful, aware, mindful, balance and equanimous.
Just be yourself.
And be a good person.
To be a good lawyer/legislator, first you must be a good person.
Relax.
The Universe favors the Truth and the Truthful.
###
Manuel Laserna Jr.
https://www.facebook.com/share/p/X41w68yxEkkrL7ei/?mibextid=oFDknk
Related:
https://www.facebook.com/share/p/wK7LH3NBQRza4cbG/?mibextid=oFDknk
https://www.facebook.com/share/p/rmjeE6j8mWP4Htkd/?mibextid=oFDknk
Saturday, August 31, 2024
Executive agreements vs. Treaties
"The President may generally enter into executive agreements subject to limitations defined by the Constitution and may be in furtherance of a treaty already concurred in by the Senate.
We discuss in this section why the President can enter into executive agreements.
It would be helpful to put into context the contested language found in Article XVIII, Section 25. Its more exacting requirement was introduced because of the previous experience of the country when its representatives felt compelled to consent to the old MBA.[191] They felt constrained to agree to the MBA in fulfilment of one of the major conditions for the country to gain independence from the U.S.[192] As a result of that experience, a second layer of consent for agreements that allow military bases, troops and facilities in the country is now articulated in Article XVIII of our present Constitution.
This second layer of consent, however, cannot be interpreted in such a way that we completely ignore the intent of our constitutional framers when they provided for that additional layer, nor the vigorous statements of this Court that affirm the continued existence of that class of international agreements called "executive agreements."
The power of the President to enter into binding executive agreements without Senate concurrence is already well-established in this jurisdiction.[193] That power has been alluded to in our present and past Constitutions,[194] in various statutes,[195] in Supreme Court decisions,[196] and during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.[197] They cover a wide array of subjects with varying scopes and purposes,[198] including those that involve the presence of foreign military forces in the country.[199]
As the sole organ of our foreign relations[200] and the constitutionally assigned chief architect of our foreign policy,[201] the President is vested with the exclusive power to conduct and manage the country's interface with other states and governments. Being the principal representative of the Philippines, the Chief Executive speaks and listens for the nation; initiates, maintains, and develops diplomatic relations with other states and governments; negotiates and enters into international agreements; promotes trade, investments, tourism and other economic relations; and settles international disputes with other states.[202]
As previously discussed, this constitutional mandate emanates from the inherent power of the President to enter into agreements with other states, including the prerogative to conclude binding executive agreements that do not require further Senate concurrence. The existence of this presidential power[203] is so well-entrenched that Section 5(2)(a), Article VIII of the Constitution, even provides for a check on its exercise. As expressed below, executive agreements are among those official governmental acts that can be the subject of this Court's power of judicial review:
Executive agreements may dispense with the requirement of Senate concurrence because of the legal mandate with which they are concluded. As culled from the afore-quoted deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, past Supreme Court Decisions, and works of noted scholars,[208] executive agreements merely involve arrangements on the implementation of existing policies, rules, laws, or agreements. They are concluded (1) to adjust the details of a treaty;[209] (2) pursuant to or upon confirmation by an act of the Legislature;[210] or (3) in the exercise of the President's independent powers under the Constitution.[211] The raison d'etre of executive agreements hinges on prior constitutional or legislative authorizations.
The special nature of an executive agreement is not just a domestic variation in international agreements. International practice has accepted the use of various forms and designations of international agreements, ranging from the traditional notion of a treaty - which connotes a formal, solemn instrument - to engagements concluded in modern, simplified forms that no longer necessitate ratification.[212] An international agreement may take different forms: treaty, act, protocol, agreement, concordat, compromis d'arbitrage, convention, covenant, declaration, exchange of notes, statute, pact, charter, agreed minute, memorandum of agreement, modus vivendi, or some other form.[213] Consequently, under international law, the distinction between a treaty and an international agreement or even an executive agreement is irrelevant for purposes of determining international rights and obligations.
However, this principle does not mean that the domestic law distinguishing treaties, international agreements, and executive agreements is relegated to a mere variation in form, or that the constitutional requirement of Senate concurrence is demoted to an optional constitutional directive. There remain two very important features that distinguish treaties from executive agreements and translate them into terms of art in the domestic setting.
First, executive agreements must remain traceable to an express or implied authorization under the Constitution, statutes, or treaties. The absence of these precedents puts the validity and effectivity of executive agreements under serious question for the main function of the Executive is to enforce the Constitution and the laws enacted by the Legislature, not to defeat or interfere in the performance of these rules.[214] In turn, executive agreements cannot create new international obligations that are not expressly allowed or reasonably implied in the law they purport to implement.
Second, treaties are, by their very nature, considered superior to executive agreements. Treaties are products of the acts of the Executive and the Senate[215] unlike executive agreements, which are solely executive actions.[216] Because of legislative participation through the Senate, a treaty is regarded as being on the same level as a statute.[217] If there is an irreconcilable conflict, a later law or treaty takes precedence over one that is prior.[218] An executive agreement is treated differently. Executive agreements that are inconsistent with either a law or a treaty are considered ineffective.[219] Both types of international agreement are nevertheless subject to the supremacy of the Constitution.[220]
This rule does not imply, though, that the President is given carte blanche to exercise this discretion. Although the Chief Executive wields the exclusive authority to conduct our foreign relations, this power must still be exercised within the context and the parameters set by the Constitution, as well as by existing domestic and international laws. There are constitutional provisions that restrict or limit the President's prerogative in concluding international agreements, such as those that involve the following:
As can be gleaned from the debates among the members of the Constitutional Commission, they were aware that legally binding international agreements were being entered into by countries in forms other than a treaty. At the same time, it is clear that they were also keen to preserve the concept of "executive agreements" and the right of the President to enter into such agreements.
What we can glean from the discussions of the Constitutional Commissioners is that they understood the following realities:
In Bayan Muna v. Romulo, we ruled that the President acted within the scope of her constitutional authority and discretion when she chose to enter into the RP-U.S. Non-Surrender Agreement in the form of an executive agreement, instead of a treaty, and in ratifying the agreement without Senate concurrence. The Court en banc discussed this intrinsic presidential prerogative as follows:
Section 9 of Executive Order No. 459, or the Guidelines in the Negotiation of International Agreements and its Ratification, thus, correctly reflected the inherent powers of the President when it stated that the DFA "shall determine whether an agreement is an executive agreement or a treaty."
Accordingly, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, the Court does not look into whether an international agreement should be in the form of a treaty or an executive agreement, save in cases in which the Constitution or a statute requires otherwise. Rather, in view of the vast constitutional powers and prerogatives granted to the President in the field of foreign affairs, the task of the Court is to determine whether the international agreement is consistent with the applicable limitations."
We discuss in this section why the President can enter into executive agreements.
It would be helpful to put into context the contested language found in Article XVIII, Section 25. Its more exacting requirement was introduced because of the previous experience of the country when its representatives felt compelled to consent to the old MBA.[191] They felt constrained to agree to the MBA in fulfilment of one of the major conditions for the country to gain independence from the U.S.[192] As a result of that experience, a second layer of consent for agreements that allow military bases, troops and facilities in the country is now articulated in Article XVIII of our present Constitution.
This second layer of consent, however, cannot be interpreted in such a way that we completely ignore the intent of our constitutional framers when they provided for that additional layer, nor the vigorous statements of this Court that affirm the continued existence of that class of international agreements called "executive agreements."
The power of the President to enter into binding executive agreements without Senate concurrence is already well-established in this jurisdiction.[193] That power has been alluded to in our present and past Constitutions,[194] in various statutes,[195] in Supreme Court decisions,[196] and during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.[197] They cover a wide array of subjects with varying scopes and purposes,[198] including those that involve the presence of foreign military forces in the country.[199]
As the sole organ of our foreign relations[200] and the constitutionally assigned chief architect of our foreign policy,[201] the President is vested with the exclusive power to conduct and manage the country's interface with other states and governments. Being the principal representative of the Philippines, the Chief Executive speaks and listens for the nation; initiates, maintains, and develops diplomatic relations with other states and governments; negotiates and enters into international agreements; promotes trade, investments, tourism and other economic relations; and settles international disputes with other states.[202]
As previously discussed, this constitutional mandate emanates from the inherent power of the President to enter into agreements with other states, including the prerogative to conclude binding executive agreements that do not require further Senate concurrence. The existence of this presidential power[203] is so well-entrenched that Section 5(2)(a), Article VIII of the Constitution, even provides for a check on its exercise. As expressed below, executive agreements are among those official governmental acts that can be the subject of this Court's power of judicial review:
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:In Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, executive agreements are defined as "international agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-established national policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature."[204] In Bayan Muna v. Romulo, this Court further clarified that executive agreements can cover a wide array of subjects that have various scopes and purposes.[205] They are no longer limited to the traditional subjects that are usually covered by executive agreements as identified in Eastern Sea Trading. The Court thoroughly discussed this matter in the following manner:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. (Emphases supplied)
The categorization of subject matters that may be covered by international agreements mentioned in Eastern Sea Trading is not cast in stone, x x x.One of the distinguishing features of executive agreements is that their validity and effectivity are not affected by a lack of Senate concurrence.[206] This distinctive feature was recognized as early as in Eastern Sea Trading (1961), viz:
As may be noted, almost half a century has elapsed since the Court rendered its decision in Eastern Sea Trading. Since then, the conduct of foreign affairs has become more complex and the domain of international law wider, as to include such subjects as human rights, the environment, and the sea. In fact, in the US alone, the executive agreements executed by its President from 1980 to 2000 covered subjects such as defense, trade, scientific cooperation, aviation, atomic energy, environmental cooperation, peace corps, arms limitation, and nuclear safety, among others. Surely, the enumeration in Eastern Sea Trading cannot circumscribe the option of each state on the matter of which the international agreement format would be convenient to serve its best interest. As Francis Sayre said in his work referred to earlier:... It would be useless to undertake to discuss here the large variety of executive agreements as such concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those entered into under the trade-agreement act, have been negotiated with foreign governments. . . . They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil air craft, custom matters and commercial relations generally, international claims, postal matters, the registration of trademarks and copyrights, etc.... (Emphases Supplied)
Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of two-thirds of the Senate. Executive agreements become binding through executive action without the need of a vote by the Senate or by Congress.That notion was carried over to the present Constitution. In fact, the framers specifically deliberated on whether the general term "international agreement" included executive agreements, and whether it was necessary to include an express proviso that would exclude executive agreements from the requirement of Senate concurrence. After noted constitutionalist Fr. Joaquin Bernas quoted the Court's ruling in Eastern Sea Trading, the Constitutional Commission members ultimately decided that the term "international agreements" as contemplated in Section 21, Article VII, does not include executive agreements, and that a proviso is no longer needed. Their discussion is reproduced below:[207]
x x x x
[T]he right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history we have entered into executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most-favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts. (Emphases Supplied)
MS. AQUINO: Madam President, first I would like a clarification from the Committee. We have retained the words "international agreement" which I think is the correct judgment on the matter because an international agreement is different from a treaty. A treaty is a contract between parties which is in the nature of international agreement and also a municipal law in the sense that the people are bound. So there is a conceptual difference. However, I would like to be clarified if the international agreements include executive agreements.The inapplicability to executive agreements of the requirements under Section 21 was again recognized in Bayan v. Zamora and in Bayan Muna v. Romulo. These cases, both decided under the aegis of the present Constitution, quoted Eastern Sea Trading in reiterating that executive agreements are valid and binding even without the concurrence of the Senate.
MR. CONCEPCION: That depends upon the parties. All parties to these international negotiations stipulate the conditions which are necessary for the agreement or whatever it may be to become valid or effective as regards the parties.
MS. AQUINO: Would that depend on the parties or would that depend on the nature of the executive agreement? According to common usage, there are two types of executive agreement: one is purely proceeding from an executive act which affects external relations independent of the legislative and the other is an executive act in pursuance of legislative authorization. The first kind might take the form of just conventions or exchanges of notes or protocol while the other, which would be pursuant to the legislative authorization, may be in the nature of commercial agreements.
MR. CONCEPCION: Executive agreements are generally made to implement a treaty already enforced or to determine the details for the implementation of the treaty. We are speaking of executive agreements, not international agreements.
MS. AQUINO: I am in full agreement with that, except that it does not cover the first kind of executive agreement which is just protocol or an exchange of notes and this would be in the nature of reinforcement of claims of a citizen against a country, for example.
MR. CONCEPCION: The Commissioner is free to require ratification for validity insofar as the Philippines is concerned.
MS. AQUINO: It is my humble submission that we should provide, unless the Committee explains to us otherwise, an explicit proviso which would except executive agreements from the requirement of concurrence of two-thirds of the Members of the Senate. Unless I am enlightened by the Committee I propose that tentatively, the sentence should read. "No treaty or international agreement EXCEPT EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS shall be valid and effective."
FR. BERNAS: I wonder if a quotation from the Supreme Court decision [in Eastern Sea Trading] might help clarify this:The right of the executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history, we have entered into executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most favored nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of this has never been seriously questioned by our Courts.MR. ROMULO: Is the Commissioner, therefore, excluding the executive agreements?
Agreements with respect to the registration of trademarks have been concluded by the executive of various countries under the Act of Congress of March 3, 1881 (21 Stat. 502) . . . International agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and those involving international agreements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties. But international agreements embodying adjustments of detail, carrying out well established national policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature usually take the form of executive agreements.
FR. BERNAS: What we are referring to, therefore, when we say international agreements which need concurrence by at least two-thirds are those which are permanent in nature.
MS. AQUINO: And it may include commercial agreements which are executive agreements essentially but which are proceeding from the authorization of Congress. If that is our understanding, then I am willing to withdraw that amendment.
FR. BERNAS: If it is with prior authorization of Congress, then it does not need subsequent concurrence by Congress.
MS. AQUINO: In that case, I am withdrawing my amendment.
MR. TINGSON: Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT: Is Commissioner Aquino satisfied?
MS. AQUINO: Yes. There is already an agreement among us on the definition of "executive agreements" and that would make unnecessary any explicit proviso on the matter.
x x x
MR. GUINGONA: I am not clear as to the meaning of "executive agreements" because I heard that these executive agreements must rely on treaties. In other words, there must first be treaties.
MR. CONCEPCION: No, I was speaking about the common use, as executive agreements being the implementation of treaties, details of which do not affect the sovereignty of the State.
MR. GUINGONA: But what about the matter of permanence, Madam President? Would 99 years be considered permanent? What would be the measure of permanency? I do not conceive of a treaty that is going to be forever, so there must be some kind of a time limit.
MR. CONCEPCION: I suppose the Commissioner's question is whether this type of agreement should be included in a provision of the Constitution requiring the concurrence of Congress.
MR. GUINGONA: It depends on the concept of the executive agreement of which I am not clear. If the executive agreement partakes of the nature of a treaty, then it should also be included.
MR. CONCEPCION: Whether it partakes or not of the nature of a treaty, it is within the power of the Constitutional Commission to require that.
MR. GUINGONA: Yes. That is why I am trying to clarify whether the words "international agreements" would include executive agreements.
MR. CONCEPCION: No, not necessarily; generally no.
x x x
MR. ROMULO: I wish to be recognized first. I have only one question. Do we take it, therefore, that as far as the Committee is concerned, the term "international agreements" does not include the term "executive agreements" as read by the Commissioner in that text?
FR. BERNAS: Yes. (Emphases Supplied)
Executive agreements may dispense with the requirement of Senate concurrence because of the legal mandate with which they are concluded. As culled from the afore-quoted deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, past Supreme Court Decisions, and works of noted scholars,[208] executive agreements merely involve arrangements on the implementation of existing policies, rules, laws, or agreements. They are concluded (1) to adjust the details of a treaty;[209] (2) pursuant to or upon confirmation by an act of the Legislature;[210] or (3) in the exercise of the President's independent powers under the Constitution.[211] The raison d'etre of executive agreements hinges on prior constitutional or legislative authorizations.
The special nature of an executive agreement is not just a domestic variation in international agreements. International practice has accepted the use of various forms and designations of international agreements, ranging from the traditional notion of a treaty - which connotes a formal, solemn instrument - to engagements concluded in modern, simplified forms that no longer necessitate ratification.[212] An international agreement may take different forms: treaty, act, protocol, agreement, concordat, compromis d'arbitrage, convention, covenant, declaration, exchange of notes, statute, pact, charter, agreed minute, memorandum of agreement, modus vivendi, or some other form.[213] Consequently, under international law, the distinction between a treaty and an international agreement or even an executive agreement is irrelevant for purposes of determining international rights and obligations.
However, this principle does not mean that the domestic law distinguishing treaties, international agreements, and executive agreements is relegated to a mere variation in form, or that the constitutional requirement of Senate concurrence is demoted to an optional constitutional directive. There remain two very important features that distinguish treaties from executive agreements and translate them into terms of art in the domestic setting.
First, executive agreements must remain traceable to an express or implied authorization under the Constitution, statutes, or treaties. The absence of these precedents puts the validity and effectivity of executive agreements under serious question for the main function of the Executive is to enforce the Constitution and the laws enacted by the Legislature, not to defeat or interfere in the performance of these rules.[214] In turn, executive agreements cannot create new international obligations that are not expressly allowed or reasonably implied in the law they purport to implement.
Second, treaties are, by their very nature, considered superior to executive agreements. Treaties are products of the acts of the Executive and the Senate[215] unlike executive agreements, which are solely executive actions.[216] Because of legislative participation through the Senate, a treaty is regarded as being on the same level as a statute.[217] If there is an irreconcilable conflict, a later law or treaty takes precedence over one that is prior.[218] An executive agreement is treated differently. Executive agreements that are inconsistent with either a law or a treaty are considered ineffective.[219] Both types of international agreement are nevertheless subject to the supremacy of the Constitution.[220]
This rule does not imply, though, that the President is given carte blanche to exercise this discretion. Although the Chief Executive wields the exclusive authority to conduct our foreign relations, this power must still be exercised within the context and the parameters set by the Constitution, as well as by existing domestic and international laws. There are constitutional provisions that restrict or limit the President's prerogative in concluding international agreements, such as those that involve the following:
- The policy of freedom from nuclear weapons within Philippine territory[221]
- The fixing of tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts, which must be pursuant to the authority granted by Congress[222]
- The grant of any tax exemption, which must be pursuant to a law concurred in by a majority of all the Members of Congress[223]
- The contracting or guaranteeing, on behalf of the Philippines, of foreign loans that must be previously concurred in by the Monetary Board[224]
- The authorization of the presence of foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country must be in the form of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate.[225]
- For agreements that do not fall under paragraph 5, the concurrence of the Senate is required, should the form of the government chosen be a treaty.
- The President had the choice
to enter into EDCA by way of
an executive agreement or a
treaty.
As can be gleaned from the debates among the members of the Constitutional Commission, they were aware that legally binding international agreements were being entered into by countries in forms other than a treaty. At the same time, it is clear that they were also keen to preserve the concept of "executive agreements" and the right of the President to enter into such agreements.
What we can glean from the discussions of the Constitutional Commissioners is that they understood the following realities:
- Treaties, international agreements, and executive agreements are all constitutional manifestations of the conduct of foreign affairs with their distinct legal characteristics.
- Treaties are formal contracts between the Philippines and other States-parties, which are in the nature of international agreements, and also of municipal laws in the sense of their binding nature.[226]
- International agreements are similar instruments, the provisions of which may require the ratification of a designated number of parties thereto. These agreements involving political issues or changes in national policy, as well as those involving international agreements of a permanent character, usually take the form of treaties. They may also include commercial agreements, which are executive agreements essentially, but which proceed from previous authorization by Congress, thus dispensing with the requirement of concurrence by the Senate.[227]
- Executive agreements are generally intended to implement a treaty already enforced or to determine the details of the implementation thereof that do not affect the sovereignty of the State.[228]
- Treaties are formal contracts between the Philippines and other States-parties, which are in the nature of international agreements, and also of municipal laws in the sense of their binding nature.[226]
- Treaties and international agreements that cannot be mere executive agreements must, by constitutional decree, be concurred in by at least two-thirds of the Senate.
- However, an agreement - the subject of which is the entry of foreign military troops, bases, or facilities - is particularly restricted. The requirements are that it be in the form of a treaty concurred in by the Senate; that when Congress so requires, it be ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose; and that it be recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.
- Thus, executive agreements can continue to exist as a species of international agreements.
In Bayan Muna v. Romulo, we ruled that the President acted within the scope of her constitutional authority and discretion when she chose to enter into the RP-U.S. Non-Surrender Agreement in the form of an executive agreement, instead of a treaty, and in ratifying the agreement without Senate concurrence. The Court en banc discussed this intrinsic presidential prerogative as follows:
Petitioner parlays the notion that the Agreement is of dubious validity, partaking as it does of the nature of a treaty; hence, it must be duly concurred in by the Senate, x x x x. Pressing its point, petitioner submits that the subject of the Agreement does not fall under any of the subject-categories that x x x may be covered by an executive agreement, such as commercial/consular relations, most-favored nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and settlement of claims.Indeed, in the field of external affairs, the President must be given a larger measure of authority and wider discretion, subject only to the least amount of checks and restrictions under the Constitution.[229] The rationale behind this power and discretion was recognized by the Court in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, cited earlier.[230]
The categorization of subject matters that may be covered by international agreements mentioned in Eastern Sea Trading is not cast in stone. There are no hard and fast rules on the propriety of entering, on a given subject, into a treaty or an executive agreement as an instrument of international relations. The primary consideration in the choice of the form of agreement is the parties' intent and desire to craft an international agreement in the form they so wish to further their respective interests. Verily, the matter of form takes a back seat when it comes to effectiveness and binding effect of the enforcement of a treaty or an executive agreement, as the parties in either international agreement each labor under the pacta sunt servanda principle.
xxxx
But over and above the foregoing considerations is the fact that — save for the situation and matters contemplated in Sec. 25, Art. XVIII of the Constitution — when a treaty is required, the Constitution does not classify any subject, like that involving political issues, to be in the form of, and ratified as, a treaty. What the Constitution merely prescribes is that treaties need the concurrence of the Senate by a vote defined therein to complete the ratification process.
x x x x
x x x. As the President wields vast powers and influence, her conduct in the external affairs of the nation is, as Bayan would put it, "executive altogether." The right of the President to enter into or ratify binding executive agreements has been confirmed by long practice.
In thus agreeing to conclude the Agreement thru E/N BFO-028-03, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, represented by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, acted within the scope of the authority and discretion vested in her by the Constitution. At the end of the day, the President — by ratifying, thru her deputies, the non-surrender agreement — did nothing more than discharge a constitutional duty and exercise a prerogative that pertains to her office. (Emphases supplied)
Section 9 of Executive Order No. 459, or the Guidelines in the Negotiation of International Agreements and its Ratification, thus, correctly reflected the inherent powers of the President when it stated that the DFA "shall determine whether an agreement is an executive agreement or a treaty."
Accordingly, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, the Court does not look into whether an international agreement should be in the form of a treaty or an executive agreement, save in cases in which the Constitution or a statute requires otherwise. Rather, in view of the vast constitutional powers and prerogatives granted to the President in the field of foreign affairs, the task of the Court is to determine whether the international agreement is consistent with the applicable limitations."
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016 ]
RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, FRANCISCO "DODONG" NEMENZO, JR., SR. MARY JOHN MANANZAN, PACIFICO A. AGABIN, ESTEBAN "STEVE" SALONGA, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., EVALYN G. URSUA, EDRE U. OLALIA, DR. CAROL PAGADUAN-ARAULLO, DR. ROLAND SIMBULAN, AND TEDDY CASINO, PETITIONERS, VS. EXECUTIVE PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE SECRETARY VOLTAIRE GAZMIN, OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERT DEL ROSARIO, JR., DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO ABAD, AND ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL EMMANUEL T. BAUTISTA, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 212444]
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN), REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M. REYES, JR., BAYAN MUNA PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES NERI J. COLMENARES AND CARLOS ZARATE, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES LUZ ILAGAN AND EMERENCIANA DE JESUS, ACT TEACHERS PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE ANTONIO L. TINIO, ANAKPAWIS PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE FERNANDO HICAP, KABATAAN PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE TERRY RIDON, MAKABAYANG KOALISYON NG MAMAMAYAN (MAKABAYAN), REPRESENTED BY SATURNINO OCAMPO AND LIZA MAZA, BIENVENIDO LUMBERA, JOEL C. LAMANGAN, RAFAEL MARIANO, SALVADOR FRANCE, ROGELIO M. SOLUTA, AND CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, PETITIONERS, VS. DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (DND) SECRETARY VOLTAIRE GAZMIN, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERT DEL ROSARIO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL EMMANUEL T. BAUTISTA, DEFENSE UNDERSECRETARY PIO LORENZO BATINO, AMBASSADOR LOURDES YPARRAGUIRRE, AMBASSADOR J. EDUARDO MALAYA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE UNDERSECRETARY FRANCISCO BARAAN III, AND DND ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR STRATEGIC ASSESSMENTS RAYMUND JOSE QUILOP AS CHAIRPERSON AND MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE NEGOTIATING PANEL FOR THE PHILIPPINES ON EDCA, RESPONDENTS.
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON, ELMER LABOG, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE), REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT FERDINAND GAITE, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT JOSELITO USTAREZ, NENITA GONZAGA, VIOLETA ESPIRITU, VIRGINIA FLORES, AND ARMANDO TEODORO, JR., PETITIONERS-IN-INTERVENTION,
RENE A.Q. SAGUISAG, JR., PETITIONER-IN-INTERVENTION.
D E C I S I O N
SERENO, C.J.:
https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/61546
Power of Control of the President as the executor of the laws of the land
"This Court has interpreted the faithful execution clause as an obligation imposed on the President, and not a separate grant of power.[148] Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, expresses this duty in no uncertain terms and includes it in the provision regarding the President's power of control over the executive department, viz:
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016 ]
RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, FRANCISCO "DODONG" NEMENZO, JR., SR. MARY JOHN MANANZAN, PACIFICO A. AGABIN, ESTEBAN "STEVE" SALONGA, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., EVALYN G. URSUA, EDRE U. OLALIA, DR. CAROL PAGADUAN-ARAULLO, DR. ROLAND SIMBULAN, AND TEDDY CASINO, PETITIONERS, VS. EXECUTIVE PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE SECRETARY VOLTAIRE GAZMIN, OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERT DEL ROSARIO, JR., DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO ABAD, AND ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL EMMANUEL T. BAUTISTA, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 212444]
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN), REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M. REYES, JR., BAYAN MUNA PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES NERI J. COLMENARES AND CARLOS ZARATE, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES LUZ ILAGAN AND EMERENCIANA DE JESUS, ACT TEACHERS PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE ANTONIO L. TINIO, ANAKPAWIS PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE FERNANDO HICAP, KABATAAN PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE TERRY RIDON, MAKABAYANG KOALISYON NG MAMAMAYAN (MAKABAYAN), REPRESENTED BY SATURNINO OCAMPO AND LIZA MAZA, BIENVENIDO LUMBERA, JOEL C. LAMANGAN, RAFAEL MARIANO, SALVADOR FRANCE, ROGELIO M. SOLUTA, AND CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, PETITIONERS, VS. DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (DND) SECRETARY VOLTAIRE GAZMIN, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERT DEL ROSARIO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL EMMANUEL T. BAUTISTA, DEFENSE UNDERSECRETARY PIO LORENZO BATINO, AMBASSADOR LOURDES YPARRAGUIRRE, AMBASSADOR J. EDUARDO MALAYA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE UNDERSECRETARY FRANCISCO BARAAN III, AND DND ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR STRATEGIC ASSESSMENTS RAYMUND JOSE QUILOP AS CHAIRPERSON AND MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE NEGOTIATING PANEL FOR THE PHILIPPINES ON EDCA, RESPONDENTS.
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON, ELMER LABOG, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE), REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT FERDINAND GAITE, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT JOSELITO USTAREZ, NENITA GONZAGA, VIOLETA ESPIRITU, VIRGINIA FLORES, AND ARMANDO TEODORO, JR., PETITIONERS-IN-INTERVENTION,
RENE A.Q. SAGUISAG, JR., PETITIONER-IN-INTERVENTION.
D E C I S I O N
SERENO, C.J.:
https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/61546
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
The equivalent provisions in the next preceding Constitution did not explicitly require this oath from the President. In the 1973 Constitution, for instance, the provision simply gives the President control over the ministries.[149] A similar language, not in the form of the President's oath, was present in the 1935 Constitution, particularly in the enumeration of executive functions.[150] By 1987, executive power was codified not only in the Constitution, but also in the Administrative Code:[151]
SECTION 1. Power of Control. — The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, the duty to faithfully execute the laws of the land is inherent in executive power and is intimately related to the other executive functions. These functions include the faithful execution of the law in autonomous regions;[152] the right to prosecute crimes;[153] the implementation of transportation projects;[154] the duty to ensure compliance with treaties, executive agreements and executive orders;[155] the authority to deport undesirable aliens;[156] the conferment of national awards under the President's jurisdiction;[157] and the overall administration and control of the executive department.[158]
These obligations are as broad as they sound, for a President cannot function with crippled hands, but must be capable of securing the rule of law within all territories of the Philippine Islands and be empowered to do so within constitutional limits. Congress cannot, for instance, limit or take over the President's power to adopt implementing rules and regulations for a law it has enacted.[159]
More important, this mandate is self-executory by virtue of its being inherently executive in nature.[160] As Justice Antonio T. Carpio previously wrote,[161]
[i]f the rules are issued by the President in implementation or execution of self-executory constitutional powers vested in the President, the rule-making power of the President is not a delegated legislative power. The most important self-executory constitutional power of the President is the President's constitutional duty and mandate to "ensure that the laws be faithfully executed." The rule is that the President can execute the law without any delegation of power from the legislature.
The import of this characteristic is that the manner of the President's execution of the law, even if not expressly granted by the law, is justified by necessity and limited only by law, since the President must "take necessary and proper steps to carry into execution the law."[162] Justice George Malcolm states this principle in a grand manner:[163]
The executive should be clothed with sufficient power to administer efficiently the affairs of state. He should have complete control of the instrumentalities through whom his responsibility is discharged. It is still true, as said by Hamilton, that "A feeble executive implies a feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be in practice a bad government." The mistakes of State governments need not be repeated here.
x x x x
Every other consideration to one side, this remains certain — The Congress of the United States clearly intended that the Governor-General's power should be commensurate with his responsibility. The Congress never intended that the Governor-General should be saddled with the responsibility of administering the government and of executing the laws but shorn of the power to do so. The interests of the Philippines will be best served by strict adherence to the basic principles of constitutional government.
In light of this constitutional duty, it is the President's prerogative to do whatever is legal and necessary for Philippine defense interests. It is no coincidence that the constitutional provision on the faithful execution clause was followed by that on the President's commander-in-chief powers,[164] which are specifically granted during extraordinary events of lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. And this duty of defending the country is unceasing, even in times when there is no state of lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. At such times, the President has full powers to ensure the faithful execution of the laws.
It would therefore be remiss for the President and repugnant to the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution to do nothing when the call of the moment requires increasing the military's defensive capabilities, which could include forging alliances with states that hold a common interest with the Philippines or bringing an international suit against an offending state.
The context drawn in the analysis above has been termed by Justice Arturo D. Brion's Dissenting Opinion as the beginning of a "patent misconception."[165] His dissent argues that this approach taken in analyzing the President's role as executor of the laws is preceded by the duty to preserve and defend the Constitution, which was allegedly overlooked.[166]
In arguing against the approach, however, the dissent grossly failed to appreciate the nuances of the analysis, if read holistically and in context. The concept that the President cannot function with crippled hands and therefore can disregard the need for Senate concurrence in treaties[167] was never expressed or implied. Rather, the appropriate reading of the preceding analysis shows that the point being elucidated is the reality that the President's duty to execute the laws and protect the Philippines is inextricably interwoven with his foreign affairs powers, such that he must resolve issues imbued with both concerns to the full extent of his powers, subject only to the limits supplied by law. In other words, apart from an expressly mandated limit, or an implied limit by virtue of incompatibility, the manner of execution by the President must be given utmost deference. This approach is not different from that taken by the Court in situations with fairly similar contexts.
Thus, the analysis portrayed by the dissent does not give the President authority to bypass constitutional safeguards and limits. In fact, it specifies what these limitations are, how these limitations are triggered, how these limitations function, and what can be done within the sphere of constitutional duties and limitations of the President.:
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016 ]
RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, FRANCISCO "DODONG" NEMENZO, JR., SR. MARY JOHN MANANZAN, PACIFICO A. AGABIN, ESTEBAN "STEVE" SALONGA, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., EVALYN G. URSUA, EDRE U. OLALIA, DR. CAROL PAGADUAN-ARAULLO, DR. ROLAND SIMBULAN, AND TEDDY CASINO, PETITIONERS, VS. EXECUTIVE PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE SECRETARY VOLTAIRE GAZMIN, OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERT DEL ROSARIO, JR., DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO ABAD, AND ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL EMMANUEL T. BAUTISTA, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 212444]
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN), REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M. REYES, JR., BAYAN MUNA PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES NERI J. COLMENARES AND CARLOS ZARATE, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES LUZ ILAGAN AND EMERENCIANA DE JESUS, ACT TEACHERS PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE ANTONIO L. TINIO, ANAKPAWIS PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE FERNANDO HICAP, KABATAAN PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE TERRY RIDON, MAKABAYANG KOALISYON NG MAMAMAYAN (MAKABAYAN), REPRESENTED BY SATURNINO OCAMPO AND LIZA MAZA, BIENVENIDO LUMBERA, JOEL C. LAMANGAN, RAFAEL MARIANO, SALVADOR FRANCE, ROGELIO M. SOLUTA, AND CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, PETITIONERS, VS. DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (DND) SECRETARY VOLTAIRE GAZMIN, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERT DEL ROSARIO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL EMMANUEL T. BAUTISTA, DEFENSE UNDERSECRETARY PIO LORENZO BATINO, AMBASSADOR LOURDES YPARRAGUIRRE, AMBASSADOR J. EDUARDO MALAYA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE UNDERSECRETARY FRANCISCO BARAAN III, AND DND ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR STRATEGIC ASSESSMENTS RAYMUND JOSE QUILOP AS CHAIRPERSON AND MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE NEGOTIATING PANEL FOR THE PHILIPPINES ON EDCA, RESPONDENTS.
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON, ELMER LABOG, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE), REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT FERDINAND GAITE, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT JOSELITO USTAREZ, NENITA GONZAGA, VIOLETA ESPIRITU, VIRGINIA FLORES, AND ARMANDO TEODORO, JR., PETITIONERS-IN-INTERVENTION,
RENE A.Q. SAGUISAG, JR., PETITIONER-IN-INTERVENTION.
D E C I S I O N
SERENO, C.J.:
https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/61546
Transcendental importance of case and locus standi of petitioners
"Nevertheless, this Court finds that there is basis for it to review the act of the Executive for the following reasons.
In any case, petitioners raise issues
involving matters of transcendental
importance.
Petitioners[138] argue that the Court may set aside procedural technicalities, as the present petition tackles issues that are of transcendental importance. They point out that the matter before us is about the proper exercise of the Executive Department's power to enter into international agreements in relation to that of the Senate to concur in those agreements. They also assert that EDCA would cause grave injustice, as well as irreparable violation of the Constitution and of the Filipino people's rights.
The OSG, on the other hand, insists[139] that petitioners cannot raise the mere fact that the present petitions involve matters of transcendental importance in order to cure their inability to comply with the constitutional requirement of standing. Respondent bewails the overuse of "transcendental importance" as an exception to the traditional requirements of constitutional litigation. It stresses that one of the purposes of these requirements is to protect the Supreme Court from unnecessary litigation of constitutional questions.
In a number of cases,[140] this Court has indeed taken a liberal stance towards the requirement of legal standing, especially when paramount interest is involved. Indeed, when those who challenge the official act are able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, the Court may exercise its sound discretion and take cognizance of the suit. It may do so in spite of the inability of the petitioners to show that they have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act.
While this Court has yet to thoroughly delineate the outer limits of this doctrine, we emphasize that not every other case, however strong public interest may be, can qualify as an issue of transcendental importance. Before it can be impelled to brush aside the essential requisites for exercising its power of judicial review, it must at the very least consider a number of factors: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party that has a more direct and specific interest in raising the present questions.[141]
An exhaustive evaluation of the memoranda of the parties, together with the oral arguments, shows that petitioners have presented serious constitutional issues that provide ample justification for the Court to set aside the rule on standing. The transcendental importance of the issues presented here is rooted in the Constitution itself. Section 25, Article XVIII thereof, cannot be any clearer: there is a much stricter mechanism required before foreign military troops, facilities, or bases may be allowed in the country. The DFA has already confirmed to the U.S. Embassy that "all internal requirements of the Philippines x x x have already been complied with."[142] It behooves the Court in this instance to take a liberal stance towards the rule on standing and to determine forthwith whether there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Executive Department.
We therefore rule that this case is a proper subject for judicial review."
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016 ]
RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, FRANCISCO "DODONG" NEMENZO, JR., SR. MARY JOHN MANANZAN, PACIFICO A. AGABIN, ESTEBAN "STEVE" SALONGA, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., EVALYN G. URSUA, EDRE U. OLALIA, DR. CAROL PAGADUAN-ARAULLO, DR. ROLAND SIMBULAN, AND TEDDY CASINO, PETITIONERS, VS. EXECUTIVE PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE SECRETARY VOLTAIRE GAZMIN, OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERT DEL ROSARIO, JR., DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO ABAD, AND ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL EMMANUEL T. BAUTISTA, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 212444]
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN), REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M. REYES, JR., BAYAN MUNA PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES NERI J. COLMENARES AND CARLOS ZARATE, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES LUZ ILAGAN AND EMERENCIANA DE JESUS, ACT TEACHERS PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE ANTONIO L. TINIO, ANAKPAWIS PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE FERNANDO HICAP, KABATAAN PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE TERRY RIDON, MAKABAYANG KOALISYON NG MAMAMAYAN (MAKABAYAN), REPRESENTED BY SATURNINO OCAMPO AND LIZA MAZA, BIENVENIDO LUMBERA, JOEL C. LAMANGAN, RAFAEL MARIANO, SALVADOR FRANCE, ROGELIO M. SOLUTA, AND CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, PETITIONERS, VS. DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (DND) SECRETARY VOLTAIRE GAZMIN, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERT DEL ROSARIO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL EMMANUEL T. BAUTISTA, DEFENSE UNDERSECRETARY PIO LORENZO BATINO, AMBASSADOR LOURDES YPARRAGUIRRE, AMBASSADOR J. EDUARDO MALAYA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE UNDERSECRETARY FRANCISCO BARAAN III, AND DND ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR STRATEGIC ASSESSMENTS RAYMUND JOSE QUILOP AS CHAIRPERSON AND MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE NEGOTIATING PANEL FOR THE PHILIPPINES ON EDCA, RESPONDENTS.
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON, ELMER LABOG, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE), REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT FERDINAND GAITE, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT JOSELITO USTAREZ, NENITA GONZAGA, VIOLETA ESPIRITU, VIRGINIA FLORES, AND ARMANDO TEODORO, JR., PETITIONERS-IN-INTERVENTION,
RENE A.Q. SAGUISAG, JR., PETITIONER-IN-INTERVENTION.
D E C I S I O N
SERENO, C.J.:
https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/61546
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016 ]
RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, FRANCISCO "DODONG" NEMENZO, JR., SR. MARY JOHN MANANZAN, PACIFICO A. AGABIN, ESTEBAN "STEVE" SALONGA, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., EVALYN G. URSUA, EDRE U. OLALIA, DR. CAROL PAGADUAN-ARAULLO, DR. ROLAND SIMBULAN, AND TEDDY CASINO, PETITIONERS, VS. EXECUTIVE PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE SECRETARY VOLTAIRE GAZMIN, OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERT DEL ROSARIO, JR., DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO ABAD, AND ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL EMMANUEL T. BAUTISTA, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 212444]
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN), REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M. REYES, JR., BAYAN MUNA PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES NERI J. COLMENARES AND CARLOS ZARATE, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES LUZ ILAGAN AND EMERENCIANA DE JESUS, ACT TEACHERS PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE ANTONIO L. TINIO, ANAKPAWIS PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE FERNANDO HICAP, KABATAAN PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE TERRY RIDON, MAKABAYANG KOALISYON NG MAMAMAYAN (MAKABAYAN), REPRESENTED BY SATURNINO OCAMPO AND LIZA MAZA, BIENVENIDO LUMBERA, JOEL C. LAMANGAN, RAFAEL MARIANO, SALVADOR FRANCE, ROGELIO M. SOLUTA, AND CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, PETITIONERS, VS. DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (DND) SECRETARY VOLTAIRE GAZMIN, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERT DEL ROSARIO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL EMMANUEL T. BAUTISTA, DEFENSE UNDERSECRETARY PIO LORENZO BATINO, AMBASSADOR LOURDES YPARRAGUIRRE, AMBASSADOR J. EDUARDO MALAYA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE UNDERSECRETARY FRANCISCO BARAAN III, AND DND ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR STRATEGIC ASSESSMENTS RAYMUND JOSE QUILOP AS CHAIRPERSON AND MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE NEGOTIATING PANEL FOR THE PHILIPPINES ON EDCA, RESPONDENTS.
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON, ELMER LABOG, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE), REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT FERDINAND GAITE, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT JOSELITO USTAREZ, NENITA GONZAGA, VIOLETA ESPIRITU, VIRGINIA FLORES, AND ARMANDO TEODORO, JR., PETITIONERS-IN-INTERVENTION,
RENE A.Q. SAGUISAG, JR., PETITIONER-IN-INTERVENTION.
D E C I S I O N
SERENO, C.J.:
https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/61546
Taxpayer's suit
"The present petitions cannot qualify
as citizens', taxpayers', or legislators'
suits; the Senate as a body has the
requisite standing, but considering that
it has not formally filed a pleading to
join the suit, as it merely conveyed
to the Supreme Court its sense that
EDCA needs the Senate's concurrence
to be valid, petitioners continue to
suffer from lack of standing.
In assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act, petitioners suing as citizens may dodge the requirement of having to establish a direct and personal interest if they show that the act affects a public right.[120] In arguing that they have legal standing, they claim[121] that the case they have filed is a concerned citizen's suit. But aside from general statements that the petitions involve the protection of a public right, and that their constitutional rights as citizens would be violated, they fail to make any specific assertion of a particular public right that would be violated by the enforcement of EDCA. For their failure to do so, the present petitions cannot be considered by the Court as citizens' suits that would justify a disregard of the aforementioned requirements.
In claiming that they have legal standing as taxpayers, petitioners[122] aver that the implementation of EDCA would result in the unlawful use of public funds. They emphasize that Article X(l) refers to an appropriation of funds; and that the agreement entails a waiver of the payment of taxes, fees, and rentals. During the oral arguments, however, they admitted that the government had not yet appropriated or actually disbursed public funds for the purpose of implementing the agreement.[123] The OSG, on the other hand, maintains that petitioners cannot sue as taxpayers.[124] Respondent explains that EDCA is neither meant to be a tax measure, nor is it directed at the disbursement of public funds.
A taxpayer's suit concerns a case in which the official act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.[125] Here, those challenging the act must specifically show that they have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of public money, and that they will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed act.[126] Applying that principle to this case, they must establish that EDCA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers.[127]
We agree with the OSG that the petitions cannot qualify as taxpayers' suits. We emphasize that a taxpayers' suit contemplates a situation in which there is already an appropriation or a disbursement of public funds.[128] A reading of Article X(l) of EDCA would show that there has been neither an appropriation nor an authorization of disbursement of funds. The cited provision reads:
Petitioners Bayan et al. also claim[129] that their co-petitioners who are party-list representatives have the standing to challenge the act of the Executive Department, especially if it impairs the constitutional prerogatives, powers, and privileges of their office. While they admit that there is no incumbent Senator who has taken part in the present petition, they nonetheless assert that they also stand to sustain a derivative but substantial injury as legislators. They argue that under the Constitution, legislative power is vested in both the Senate and the House of Representatives; consequently, it is the entire Legislative Department that has a voice in determining whether or not the presence of foreign military should be allowed. They maintain that as members of the Legislature, they have the requisite personality to bring a suit, especially when a constitutional issue is raised.
The OSG counters[130] that petitioners do not have any legal standing to file the suits concerning the lack of Senate concurrence in EDCA. Respondent emphasizes that the power to concur in treaties and international agreements is an "institutional prerogative" granted by the Constitution to the Senate. Accordingly, the OSG argues that in case of an allegation of impairment of that power, the injured party would be the Senate as an institution or any of its incumbent members, as it is the Senate's constitutional function that is allegedly being violated.
The legal standing of an institution of the Legislature or of any of its Members has already been recognized by this Court in a number of cases.[131] What is in question here is the alleged impairment of the constitutional duties and powers granted to, or the impermissible intrusion upon the domain of, the Legislature or an institution thereof.[132] In the case of suits initiated by the legislators themselves, this Court has recognized their standing to question the validity of any official action that they claim infringes the prerogatives, powers, and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office.[133] As aptly explained by Justice Perfecto in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito:[134]
As correctly argued by respondent, the power to concur in a treaty or an international agreement is an institutional prerogative granted by the Constitution to the Senate, not to the entire Legislature. In Pimentel v. Office of the Executive Secretary, this Court did not recognize the standing of one of the petitioners therein who was a member of the House of Representatives. The petition in that case sought to compel the transmission to the Senate for concurrence of the signed text of the Statute of the International Criminal Court. Since that petition invoked the power of the Senate to grant or withhold its concurrence in a treaty entered into by the Executive Department, only then incumbent Senator Pimentel was allowed to assert that authority of the Senate of which he was a member.
Therefore, none of the initial petitioners in the present controversy has the standing to maintain the suits as legislators."
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016 ]
RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, FRANCISCO "DODONG" NEMENZO, JR., SR. MARY JOHN MANANZAN, PACIFICO A. AGABIN, ESTEBAN "STEVE" SALONGA, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., EVALYN G. URSUA, EDRE U. OLALIA, DR. CAROL PAGADUAN-ARAULLO, DR. ROLAND SIMBULAN, AND TEDDY CASINO, PETITIONERS, VS. EXECUTIVE PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE SECRETARY VOLTAIRE GAZMIN, OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERT DEL ROSARIO, JR., DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO ABAD, AND ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL EMMANUEL T. BAUTISTA, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 212444]
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN), REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M. REYES, JR., BAYAN MUNA PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES NERI J. COLMENARES AND CARLOS ZARATE, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES LUZ ILAGAN AND EMERENCIANA DE JESUS, ACT TEACHERS PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE ANTONIO L. TINIO, ANAKPAWIS PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE FERNANDO HICAP, KABATAAN PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE TERRY RIDON, MAKABAYANG KOALISYON NG MAMAMAYAN (MAKABAYAN), REPRESENTED BY SATURNINO OCAMPO AND LIZA MAZA, BIENVENIDO LUMBERA, JOEL C. LAMANGAN, RAFAEL MARIANO, SALVADOR FRANCE, ROGELIO M. SOLUTA, AND CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, PETITIONERS, VS. DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (DND) SECRETARY VOLTAIRE GAZMIN, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERT DEL ROSARIO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL EMMANUEL T. BAUTISTA, DEFENSE UNDERSECRETARY PIO LORENZO BATINO, AMBASSADOR LOURDES YPARRAGUIRRE, AMBASSADOR J. EDUARDO MALAYA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE UNDERSECRETARY FRANCISCO BARAAN III, AND DND ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR STRATEGIC ASSESSMENTS RAYMUND JOSE QUILOP AS CHAIRPERSON AND MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE NEGOTIATING PANEL FOR THE PHILIPPINES ON EDCA, RESPONDENTS.
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON, ELMER LABOG, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE), REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT FERDINAND GAITE, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT JOSELITO USTAREZ, NENITA GONZAGA, VIOLETA ESPIRITU, VIRGINIA FLORES, AND ARMANDO TEODORO, JR., PETITIONERS-IN-INTERVENTION,
RENE A.Q. SAGUISAG, JR., PETITIONER-IN-INTERVENTION.
D E C I S I O N
SERENO, C.J.:
https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/61546
as citizens', taxpayers', or legislators'
suits; the Senate as a body has the
requisite standing, but considering that
it has not formally filed a pleading to
join the suit, as it merely conveyed
to the Supreme Court its sense that
EDCA needs the Senate's concurrence
to be valid, petitioners continue to
suffer from lack of standing.
In assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act, petitioners suing as citizens may dodge the requirement of having to establish a direct and personal interest if they show that the act affects a public right.[120] In arguing that they have legal standing, they claim[121] that the case they have filed is a concerned citizen's suit. But aside from general statements that the petitions involve the protection of a public right, and that their constitutional rights as citizens would be violated, they fail to make any specific assertion of a particular public right that would be violated by the enforcement of EDCA. For their failure to do so, the present petitions cannot be considered by the Court as citizens' suits that would justify a disregard of the aforementioned requirements.
In claiming that they have legal standing as taxpayers, petitioners[122] aver that the implementation of EDCA would result in the unlawful use of public funds. They emphasize that Article X(l) refers to an appropriation of funds; and that the agreement entails a waiver of the payment of taxes, fees, and rentals. During the oral arguments, however, they admitted that the government had not yet appropriated or actually disbursed public funds for the purpose of implementing the agreement.[123] The OSG, on the other hand, maintains that petitioners cannot sue as taxpayers.[124] Respondent explains that EDCA is neither meant to be a tax measure, nor is it directed at the disbursement of public funds.
A taxpayer's suit concerns a case in which the official act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.[125] Here, those challenging the act must specifically show that they have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of public money, and that they will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed act.[126] Applying that principle to this case, they must establish that EDCA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers.[127]
We agree with the OSG that the petitions cannot qualify as taxpayers' suits. We emphasize that a taxpayers' suit contemplates a situation in which there is already an appropriation or a disbursement of public funds.[128] A reading of Article X(l) of EDCA would show that there has been neither an appropriation nor an authorization of disbursement of funds. The cited provision reads:
All obligations under this Agreement are subject to the availability of appropriated funds authorized for these purposes. (Emphases supplied)This provision means that if the implementation of EDCA would require the disbursement of public funds, the money must come from appropriated funds that are specifically authorized for this purpose. Under the agreement, before there can even be a disbursement of public funds, there must first be a legislative action. Until and unless the Legislature appropriates funds for EDCA, or unless petitioners can pinpoint a specific item in the current budget that allows expenditure under the agreement, we cannot at this time rule that there is in fact an appropriation or a disbursement of funds that would justify the filing of a taxpayers' suit.
Petitioners Bayan et al. also claim[129] that their co-petitioners who are party-list representatives have the standing to challenge the act of the Executive Department, especially if it impairs the constitutional prerogatives, powers, and privileges of their office. While they admit that there is no incumbent Senator who has taken part in the present petition, they nonetheless assert that they also stand to sustain a derivative but substantial injury as legislators. They argue that under the Constitution, legislative power is vested in both the Senate and the House of Representatives; consequently, it is the entire Legislative Department that has a voice in determining whether or not the presence of foreign military should be allowed. They maintain that as members of the Legislature, they have the requisite personality to bring a suit, especially when a constitutional issue is raised.
The OSG counters[130] that petitioners do not have any legal standing to file the suits concerning the lack of Senate concurrence in EDCA. Respondent emphasizes that the power to concur in treaties and international agreements is an "institutional prerogative" granted by the Constitution to the Senate. Accordingly, the OSG argues that in case of an allegation of impairment of that power, the injured party would be the Senate as an institution or any of its incumbent members, as it is the Senate's constitutional function that is allegedly being violated.
The legal standing of an institution of the Legislature or of any of its Members has already been recognized by this Court in a number of cases.[131] What is in question here is the alleged impairment of the constitutional duties and powers granted to, or the impermissible intrusion upon the domain of, the Legislature or an institution thereof.[132] In the case of suits initiated by the legislators themselves, this Court has recognized their standing to question the validity of any official action that they claim infringes the prerogatives, powers, and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office.[133] As aptly explained by Justice Perfecto in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito:[134]
Being members of Congress, they are even duty bound to see that the latter act within the bounds of the Constitution which, as representatives of the people, they should uphold, unless they are to commit a flagrant betrayal of public trust. They are representatives of the sovereign people and it is their sacred duty to see to it that the fundamental law embodying the will of the sovereign people is not trampled upon. (Emphases supplied)We emphasize that in a legislators' suit, those Members of Congress who are challenging the official act have standing only to the extent that the alleged violation impinges on their right to participate in the exercise of the powers of the institution of which they are members.[135] Legislators have the standing "to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers, and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action, which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators."[136] As legislators, they must clearly show that there was a direct injury to their persons or the institution to which they belong.[137]
As correctly argued by respondent, the power to concur in a treaty or an international agreement is an institutional prerogative granted by the Constitution to the Senate, not to the entire Legislature. In Pimentel v. Office of the Executive Secretary, this Court did not recognize the standing of one of the petitioners therein who was a member of the House of Representatives. The petition in that case sought to compel the transmission to the Senate for concurrence of the signed text of the Statute of the International Criminal Court. Since that petition invoked the power of the Senate to grant or withhold its concurrence in a treaty entered into by the Executive Department, only then incumbent Senator Pimentel was allowed to assert that authority of the Senate of which he was a member.
Therefore, none of the initial petitioners in the present controversy has the standing to maintain the suits as legislators."
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016 ]
RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, FRANCISCO "DODONG" NEMENZO, JR., SR. MARY JOHN MANANZAN, PACIFICO A. AGABIN, ESTEBAN "STEVE" SALONGA, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., EVALYN G. URSUA, EDRE U. OLALIA, DR. CAROL PAGADUAN-ARAULLO, DR. ROLAND SIMBULAN, AND TEDDY CASINO, PETITIONERS, VS. EXECUTIVE PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE SECRETARY VOLTAIRE GAZMIN, OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERT DEL ROSARIO, JR., DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO ABAD, AND ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL EMMANUEL T. BAUTISTA, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 212444]
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN), REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M. REYES, JR., BAYAN MUNA PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES NERI J. COLMENARES AND CARLOS ZARATE, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES LUZ ILAGAN AND EMERENCIANA DE JESUS, ACT TEACHERS PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE ANTONIO L. TINIO, ANAKPAWIS PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE FERNANDO HICAP, KABATAAN PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE TERRY RIDON, MAKABAYANG KOALISYON NG MAMAMAYAN (MAKABAYAN), REPRESENTED BY SATURNINO OCAMPO AND LIZA MAZA, BIENVENIDO LUMBERA, JOEL C. LAMANGAN, RAFAEL MARIANO, SALVADOR FRANCE, ROGELIO M. SOLUTA, AND CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, PETITIONERS, VS. DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (DND) SECRETARY VOLTAIRE GAZMIN, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERT DEL ROSARIO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL EMMANUEL T. BAUTISTA, DEFENSE UNDERSECRETARY PIO LORENZO BATINO, AMBASSADOR LOURDES YPARRAGUIRRE, AMBASSADOR J. EDUARDO MALAYA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE UNDERSECRETARY FRANCISCO BARAAN III, AND DND ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR STRATEGIC ASSESSMENTS RAYMUND JOSE QUILOP AS CHAIRPERSON AND MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE NEGOTIATING PANEL FOR THE PHILIPPINES ON EDCA, RESPONDENTS.
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON, ELMER LABOG, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE), REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT FERDINAND GAITE, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT JOSELITO USTAREZ, NENITA GONZAGA, VIOLETA ESPIRITU, VIRGINIA FLORES, AND ARMANDO TEODORO, JR., PETITIONERS-IN-INTERVENTION,
RENE A.Q. SAGUISAG, JR., PETITIONER-IN-INTERVENTION.
D E C I S I O N
SERENO, C.J.:
https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/61546
Legal standing or locus standi
"While petitioners Saguisag et. al,do not have legal standing,they nonetheless raise issuesinvolving matters oftranscendental importance.
The question of locus standi or legal standing focuses on the determination of whether those assailing the governmental act have the right of appearance to bring the matter to the court for adjudication.[114] They must show that they have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that they have sustained or are in immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a consequence of the enforcement of the challenged governmental act.[115] Here, "interest" in the question involved must be material - an interest that is in issue and will be affected by the official act - as distinguished from being merely incidental or general.[116] Clearly, it would be insufficient to show that the law or any governmental act is invalid, and that petitioners stand to suffer in some indefinite way.[117] They must show that they have a particular interest in bringing the suit, and that they have been or are about to be denied some right or privilege to which they are lawfully entitled, or that they are about to be subjected to some burden or penalty by reason of the act complained of.[118] The reason why those who challenge the validity of a law or an international agreement are required to allege the existence of a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy is "to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."[119]."
The question of locus standi or legal standing focuses on the determination of whether those assailing the governmental act have the right of appearance to bring the matter to the court for adjudication.[114] They must show that they have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that they have sustained or are in immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a consequence of the enforcement of the challenged governmental act.[115] Here, "interest" in the question involved must be material - an interest that is in issue and will be affected by the official act - as distinguished from being merely incidental or general.[116] Clearly, it would be insufficient to show that the law or any governmental act is invalid, and that petitioners stand to suffer in some indefinite way.[117] They must show that they have a particular interest in bringing the suit, and that they have been or are about to be denied some right or privilege to which they are lawfully entitled, or that they are about to be subjected to some burden or penalty by reason of the act complained of.[118] The reason why those who challenge the validity of a law or an international agreement are required to allege the existence of a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy is "to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."[119]."
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016 ]
RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, FRANCISCO "DODONG" NEMENZO, JR., SR. MARY JOHN MANANZAN, PACIFICO A. AGABIN, ESTEBAN "STEVE" SALONGA, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., EVALYN G. URSUA, EDRE U. OLALIA, DR. CAROL PAGADUAN-ARAULLO, DR. ROLAND SIMBULAN, AND TEDDY CASINO, PETITIONERS, VS. EXECUTIVE PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE SECRETARY VOLTAIRE GAZMIN, OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERT DEL ROSARIO, JR., DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO ABAD, AND ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL EMMANUEL T. BAUTISTA, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 212444]
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN), REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M. REYES, JR., BAYAN MUNA PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES NERI J. COLMENARES AND CARLOS ZARATE, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES LUZ ILAGAN AND EMERENCIANA DE JESUS, ACT TEACHERS PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE ANTONIO L. TINIO, ANAKPAWIS PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE FERNANDO HICAP, KABATAAN PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE TERRY RIDON, MAKABAYANG KOALISYON NG MAMAMAYAN (MAKABAYAN), REPRESENTED BY SATURNINO OCAMPO AND LIZA MAZA, BIENVENIDO LUMBERA, JOEL C. LAMANGAN, RAFAEL MARIANO, SALVADOR FRANCE, ROGELIO M. SOLUTA, AND CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, PETITIONERS, VS. DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (DND) SECRETARY VOLTAIRE GAZMIN, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERT DEL ROSARIO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL EMMANUEL T. BAUTISTA, DEFENSE UNDERSECRETARY PIO LORENZO BATINO, AMBASSADOR LOURDES YPARRAGUIRRE, AMBASSADOR J. EDUARDO MALAYA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE UNDERSECRETARY FRANCISCO BARAAN III, AND DND ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR STRATEGIC ASSESSMENTS RAYMUND JOSE QUILOP AS CHAIRPERSON AND MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE NEGOTIATING PANEL FOR THE PHILIPPINES ON EDCA, RESPONDENTS.
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON, ELMER LABOG, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE), REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT FERDINAND GAITE, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT JOSELITO USTAREZ, NENITA GONZAGA, VIOLETA ESPIRITU, VIRGINIA FLORES, AND ARMANDO TEODORO, JR., PETITIONERS-IN-INTERVENTION,
RENE A.Q. SAGUISAG, JR., PETITIONER-IN-INTERVENTION.
D E C I S I O N
SERENO, C.J.:
https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/61546
Actual case or controversy, ripe for judicial review.
"Petitioners have shown the presence of an actual case or controversy.
The OSG maintains[107] that there is no actual case or controversy that exists, since the Senators have not been deprived of the opportunity to invoke the privileges of the institution they are representing. It contends that the nonparticipation of the Senators in the present petitions only confirms that even they believe that EDCA is a binding executive agreement that does not require their concurrence.
It must be emphasized that the Senate has already expressed its position through SR 105.[108] Through the Resolution, the Senate has taken a position contrary to that of the OSG. As the body tasked to participate in foreign affairs by ratifying treaties, its belief that EDCA infringes upon its constitutional role indicates that an actual controversy - albeit brought to the Court by non-Senators, exists.
Moreover, we cannot consider the sheer abstention of the Senators from the present proceedings as basis for finding that there is no actual case or controversy before us. We point out that the focus of this requirement is the ripeness for adjudication of the matter at hand, as opposed to its being merely conjectural or anticipatory.[109] The case must involve a definite and concrete issue involving real parties with conflicting legal rights and legal claims admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature.[110] It should not equate with a mere request for an opinion or advice on what the law would be upon an abstract, hypothetical, or contingent state of facts.[111] As explained in Angara v. Electoral Commission:[112]
[The] power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government. (Emphases supplied)
We find that the matter before us involves an actual case or controversy that is already ripe for adjudication. The Executive Department has already sent an official confirmation to the U.S. Embassy that "all internal requirements of the Philippines x x x have already been complied with."[113] By this exchange of diplomatic notes, the Executive Department effectively performed the last act required under Article XII(l) of EDCA before the agreement entered into force. Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution, is clear that the presence of foreign military forces in the country shall only be allowed by virtue of a treaty concurred in by the Senate. Hence, the performance of an official act by the Executive Department that led to the entry into force of an executive agreement was sufficient to satisfy the actual case or controversy requirement."
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016 ]
RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, FRANCISCO "DODONG" NEMENZO, JR., SR. MARY JOHN MANANZAN, PACIFICO A. AGABIN, ESTEBAN "STEVE" SALONGA, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., EVALYN G. URSUA, EDRE U. OLALIA, DR. CAROL PAGADUAN-ARAULLO, DR. ROLAND SIMBULAN, AND TEDDY CASINO, PETITIONERS, VS. EXECUTIVE PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE SECRETARY VOLTAIRE GAZMIN, OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERT DEL ROSARIO, JR., DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO ABAD, AND ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL EMMANUEL T. BAUTISTA, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 212444]
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN), REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M. REYES, JR., BAYAN MUNA PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES NERI J. COLMENARES AND CARLOS ZARATE, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES LUZ ILAGAN AND EMERENCIANA DE JESUS, ACT TEACHERS PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE ANTONIO L. TINIO, ANAKPAWIS PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE FERNANDO HICAP, KABATAAN PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE TERRY RIDON, MAKABAYANG KOALISYON NG MAMAMAYAN (MAKABAYAN), REPRESENTED BY SATURNINO OCAMPO AND LIZA MAZA, BIENVENIDO LUMBERA, JOEL C. LAMANGAN, RAFAEL MARIANO, SALVADOR FRANCE, ROGELIO M. SOLUTA, AND CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, PETITIONERS, VS. DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (DND) SECRETARY VOLTAIRE GAZMIN, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERT DEL ROSARIO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL EMMANUEL T. BAUTISTA, DEFENSE UNDERSECRETARY PIO LORENZO BATINO, AMBASSADOR LOURDES YPARRAGUIRRE, AMBASSADOR J. EDUARDO MALAYA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE UNDERSECRETARY FRANCISCO BARAAN III, AND DND ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR STRATEGIC ASSESSMENTS RAYMUND JOSE QUILOP AS CHAIRPERSON AND MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE NEGOTIATING PANEL FOR THE PHILIPPINES ON EDCA, RESPONDENTS.
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON, ELMER LABOG, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE), REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT FERDINAND GAITE, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT JOSELITO USTAREZ, NENITA GONZAGA, VIOLETA ESPIRITU, VIRGINIA FLORES, AND ARMANDO TEODORO, JR., PETITIONERS-IN-INTERVENTION,
RENE A.Q. SAGUISAG, JR., PETITIONER-IN-INTERVENTION.
D E C I S I O N
SERENO, C.J.:
https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/61546
Power of judicial review
"Even as we are left with no recourse but to bare our power to check an act of a coequal branch of government - in this case the executive - we must abide by the stringent requirements for the exercise of that power under the Constitution. Demetria v. Albam[101] and Francisco v. House of Representatives[102] cite the "pillars" of the limitations on the power of judicial review as enunciated in the concurring opinion of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority.[103] Francisco[104] redressed these "pillars" under the following categories:
These are the specific safeguards laid down by the Court when it exercises its power of judicial review.[105] Guided by these pillars, it may invoke the power only when the following four stringent requirements are satisfied: (a) there is an actual case or controversy; (b) petitioners possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality is raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality is the lis mota of the case.[106] Of these four, the first two conditions will be the focus of our discussion."
- That there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
- That rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of the case
- That judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
- That there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the statute
- That the parties are not in estoppel
- That the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality (Emphases supplied)
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016 ]
RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, FRANCISCO "DODONG" NEMENZO, JR., SR. MARY JOHN MANANZAN, PACIFICO A. AGABIN, ESTEBAN "STEVE" SALONGA, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., EVALYN G. URSUA, EDRE U. OLALIA, DR. CAROL PAGADUAN-ARAULLO, DR. ROLAND SIMBULAN, AND TEDDY CASINO, PETITIONERS, VS. EXECUTIVE PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE SECRETARY VOLTAIRE GAZMIN, OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERT DEL ROSARIO, JR., DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO ABAD, AND ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL EMMANUEL T. BAUTISTA, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 212444]
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN), REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M. REYES, JR., BAYAN MUNA PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES NERI J. COLMENARES AND CARLOS ZARATE, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES LUZ ILAGAN AND EMERENCIANA DE JESUS, ACT TEACHERS PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE ANTONIO L. TINIO, ANAKPAWIS PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE FERNANDO HICAP, KABATAAN PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE TERRY RIDON, MAKABAYANG KOALISYON NG MAMAMAYAN (MAKABAYAN), REPRESENTED BY SATURNINO OCAMPO AND LIZA MAZA, BIENVENIDO LUMBERA, JOEL C. LAMANGAN, RAFAEL MARIANO, SALVADOR FRANCE, ROGELIO M. SOLUTA, AND CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, PETITIONERS, VS. DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (DND) SECRETARY VOLTAIRE GAZMIN, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERT DEL ROSARIO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL EMMANUEL T. BAUTISTA, DEFENSE UNDERSECRETARY PIO LORENZO BATINO, AMBASSADOR LOURDES YPARRAGUIRRE, AMBASSADOR J. EDUARDO MALAYA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE UNDERSECRETARY FRANCISCO BARAAN III, AND DND ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR STRATEGIC ASSESSMENTS RAYMUND JOSE QUILOP AS CHAIRPERSON AND MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE NEGOTIATING PANEL FOR THE PHILIPPINES ON EDCA, RESPONDENTS.
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON, ELMER LABOG, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE), REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT FERDINAND GAITE, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT JOSELITO USTAREZ, NENITA GONZAGA, VIOLETA ESPIRITU, VIRGINIA FLORES, AND ARMANDO TEODORO, JR., PETITIONERS-IN-INTERVENTION,
RENE A.Q. SAGUISAG, JR., PETITIONER-IN-INTERVENTION.
D E C I S I O N
SERENO, C.J.:
https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/61546
President and Senate vis-a-vis foreign relations
"The relationship between the two major presidential functions and the role of the Senate
Clearly, the power to defend the State and to act as its representative in the international sphere inheres in the person of the President. This power, however, does not crystallize into absolute discretion to craft whatever instrument the Chief Executive so desires. As previously mentioned, the Senate has a role in ensuring that treaties or international agreements the President enters into, as contemplated in Section 21 of Article VII of the Constitution, obtain the approval of two-thirds of its members.
Previously, treaties under the 1973 Constitution required ratification by a majority of the Batasang Pambansa,[19] except in instances wherein the President "may enter into international treaties or agreements as the national welfare and interest may require."[20] This left a large margin of discretion that the President could use to bypass the Legislature altogether. This was a departure from the 1935 Constitution, which explicitly gave the President the power to enter into treaties only with the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.[21] The 1987 Constitution returned the Senate's power[22] and, with it, the legislative's traditional role in foreign affairs.[23]
The responsibility of the President when it comes to treaties and international agreements under the present Constitution is therefore shared with the Senate. This shared role, petitioners claim, is bypassed by EDCA."
Clearly, the power to defend the State and to act as its representative in the international sphere inheres in the person of the President. This power, however, does not crystallize into absolute discretion to craft whatever instrument the Chief Executive so desires. As previously mentioned, the Senate has a role in ensuring that treaties or international agreements the President enters into, as contemplated in Section 21 of Article VII of the Constitution, obtain the approval of two-thirds of its members.
Previously, treaties under the 1973 Constitution required ratification by a majority of the Batasang Pambansa,[19] except in instances wherein the President "may enter into international treaties or agreements as the national welfare and interest may require."[20] This left a large margin of discretion that the President could use to bypass the Legislature altogether. This was a departure from the 1935 Constitution, which explicitly gave the President the power to enter into treaties only with the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.[21] The 1987 Constitution returned the Senate's power[22] and, with it, the legislative's traditional role in foreign affairs.[23]
The responsibility of the President when it comes to treaties and international agreements under the present Constitution is therefore shared with the Senate. This shared role, petitioners claim, is bypassed by EDCA."
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016 ]
RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, FRANCISCO "DODONG" NEMENZO, JR., SR. MARY JOHN MANANZAN, PACIFICO A. AGABIN, ESTEBAN "STEVE" SALONGA, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., EVALYN G. URSUA, EDRE U. OLALIA, DR. CAROL PAGADUAN-ARAULLO, DR. ROLAND SIMBULAN, AND TEDDY CASINO, PETITIONERS, VS. EXECUTIVE PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE SECRETARY VOLTAIRE GAZMIN, OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERT DEL ROSARIO, JR., DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO ABAD, AND ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL EMMANUEL T. BAUTISTA, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 212444]
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN), REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M. REYES, JR., BAYAN MUNA PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES NERI J. COLMENARES AND CARLOS ZARATE, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES LUZ ILAGAN AND EMERENCIANA DE JESUS, ACT TEACHERS PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE ANTONIO L. TINIO, ANAKPAWIS PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE FERNANDO HICAP, KABATAAN PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE TERRY RIDON, MAKABAYANG KOALISYON NG MAMAMAYAN (MAKABAYAN), REPRESENTED BY SATURNINO OCAMPO AND LIZA MAZA, BIENVENIDO LUMBERA, JOEL C. LAMANGAN, RAFAEL MARIANO, SALVADOR FRANCE, ROGELIO M. SOLUTA, AND CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, PETITIONERS, VS. DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (DND) SECRETARY VOLTAIRE GAZMIN, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERT DEL ROSARIO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL EMMANUEL T. BAUTISTA, DEFENSE UNDERSECRETARY PIO LORENZO BATINO, AMBASSADOR LOURDES YPARRAGUIRRE, AMBASSADOR J. EDUARDO MALAYA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE UNDERSECRETARY FRANCISCO BARAAN III, AND DND ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR STRATEGIC ASSESSMENTS RAYMUND JOSE QUILOP AS CHAIRPERSON AND MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE NEGOTIATING PANEL FOR THE PHILIPPINES ON EDCA, RESPONDENTS.
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON, ELMER LABOG, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE), REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT FERDINAND GAITE, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT JOSELITO USTAREZ, NENITA GONZAGA, VIOLETA ESPIRITU, VIRGINIA FLORES, AND ARMANDO TEODORO, JR., PETITIONERS-IN-INTERVENTION,
RENE A.Q. SAGUISAG, JR., PETITIONER-IN-INTERVENTION.
D E C I S I O N
SERENO, C.J.:
https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/61546
Foreign relations and policies
"The power and duty to conduct foreign relations.
The President also carries the mandate of being the sole organ in the conduct of foreign relations.[15] Since every state has the capacity to interact with and engage in relations with other sovereign states,[16] it is but logical that every state must vest in an agent the authority to represent its interests to those other sovereign states.
The President also carries the mandate of being the sole organ in the conduct of foreign relations.[15] Since every state has the capacity to interact with and engage in relations with other sovereign states,[16] it is but logical that every state must vest in an agent the authority to represent its interests to those other sovereign states.
The conduct of foreign relations is full of complexities and consequences, sometimes with life and death significance to the nation especially in times of war. It can only be entrusted to that department of government which can act on the basis of the best available information and can decide with decisiveness, x x x It is also the President who possesses the most comprehensive and the most confidential information about foreign countries for our diplomatic and consular officials regularly brief him on meaningful events all over the world. He has also unlimited access to ultra-sensitive military intelligence data. In fine, the presidential role in foreign affairs is dominant and the President is traditionally accorded a wider degree of discretion in the conduct of foreign affairs. The regularity, nay, validity of his actions are adjudged under less stringent standards, lest their judicial repudiation lead to breach of an international obligation, rupture of state relations, forfeiture of confidence, national embarrassment and a plethora of other problems with equally undesirable consequences.[17]The role of the President in foreign affairs is qualified by the Constitution in that the Chief Executive must give paramount importance to the sovereignty of the nation, the integrity of its territory, its interest, and the right of the sovereign Filipino people to self-determination.[18] In specific provisions, the President's power is also limited, or at least shared, as in Section 2 of Article II on the conduct of war; Sections 20 and 21 of Article VII on foreign loans, treaties, and international agreements; Sections 4(2) and 5(2)(a) of Article VIII on the judicial review of executive acts; Sections 4 and 25 of Article XVIII on treaties and international agreements entered into prior to the Constitution and on the presence of foreign military troops, bases, or facilities."
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016 ]
RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, FRANCISCO "DODONG" NEMENZO, JR., SR. MARY JOHN MANANZAN, PACIFICO A. AGABIN, ESTEBAN "STEVE" SALONGA, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., EVALYN G. URSUA, EDRE U. OLALIA, DR. CAROL PAGADUAN-ARAULLO, DR. ROLAND SIMBULAN, AND TEDDY CASINO, PETITIONERS, VS. EXECUTIVE PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE SECRETARY VOLTAIRE GAZMIN, OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERT DEL ROSARIO, JR., DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO ABAD, AND ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL EMMANUEL T. BAUTISTA, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 212444]
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN), REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M. REYES, JR., BAYAN MUNA PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES NERI J. COLMENARES AND CARLOS ZARATE, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES LUZ ILAGAN AND EMERENCIANA DE JESUS, ACT TEACHERS PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE ANTONIO L. TINIO, ANAKPAWIS PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE FERNANDO HICAP, KABATAAN PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE TERRY RIDON, MAKABAYANG KOALISYON NG MAMAMAYAN (MAKABAYAN), REPRESENTED BY SATURNINO OCAMPO AND LIZA MAZA, BIENVENIDO LUMBERA, JOEL C. LAMANGAN, RAFAEL MARIANO, SALVADOR FRANCE, ROGELIO M. SOLUTA, AND CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, PETITIONERS, VS. DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (DND) SECRETARY VOLTAIRE GAZMIN, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERT DEL ROSARIO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL EMMANUEL T. BAUTISTA, DEFENSE UNDERSECRETARY PIO LORENZO BATINO, AMBASSADOR LOURDES YPARRAGUIRRE, AMBASSADOR J. EDUARDO MALAYA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE UNDERSECRETARY FRANCISCO BARAAN III, AND DND ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR STRATEGIC ASSESSMENTS RAYMUND JOSE QUILOP AS CHAIRPERSON AND MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE NEGOTIATING PANEL FOR THE PHILIPPINES ON EDCA, RESPONDENTS.
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON, ELMER LABOG, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE), REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT FERDINAND GAITE, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT JOSELITO USTAREZ, NENITA GONZAGA, VIOLETA ESPIRITU, VIRGINIA FLORES, AND ARMANDO TEODORO, JR., PETITIONERS-IN-INTERVENTION,
RENE A.Q. SAGUISAG, JR., PETITIONER-IN-INTERVENTION.
D E C I S I O N
SERENO, C.J.:
https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/61546
Monday, August 26, 2024
Preventive suspension
"Petitioner Yabut urges that his preventive suspension of 82 days should be credited to the penalty of 2-month suspension imposed on him. A preventive suspension decreed by the Ombudsman by virtue of his authority under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 6770, in relation to Section 9 of Administrative Order No. 07, is not meant to be a penalty but a means taken to insure the proper and impartial conduct of an investigation. We have ruled, in a number of times before, that a preventive suspension may be ordered even before the charges are heard, as well as before the official concerned is given an opportunity to prove his innocence, being merely a measure that is precisely designed in order not to hamper the normal course of an investigation through the use of influence and authority.8"
Case:
G.R. No. 111304 June 17, 1994
NEMESIO ARTURO S. YABUT and RICARDO M. TAMARGO, petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and DR. PAUL DORAN, respondents.
Balane, Tamase, Alampay Law Office for petitioners.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Peña and Nolaso for Dr. Paul Doran.
R E S O L U T I O N
VITUG, J.:
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/jun1994/gr_111304_1994.html
Public officers and employees
"A public official, more especially an elected one, should not be onion skinned. Strict personal discipline is expected of an occupant of a public office because a public official is a property of the public. He is looked upon to set the example how public officials should correctly conduct themselves even in the face of extreme provocation. Always he is expected to act and serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain accountable for his conduct to the people."
Case:
G.R. No. 111304, June 17, 1994
NEMESIO ARTURO S. YABUT and RICARDO M. TAMARGO, petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and DR. PAUL DORAN, respondents.
Balane, Tamase, Alampay Law Office for petitioners.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Peña and Nolaso for Dr. Paul Doran.
R E S O L U T I O N
VITUG, J.:
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/jun1994/gr_111304_1994.html