CREATE MORE law (RA 12066)

Incentives provided under the CREATE MORE law (RA 12066)  - 

Key Incentives under CREATE MORE (RA 12066)

1. Reduced Corporate Income Tax under Enhanced Deductions Regime (EDR)

Registered Business Enterprises (RBEs) that elect the EDR get their corporate income tax (CIT) reduced from 25% to 20%. 

In lieu of all national and local taxes under certain conditions (e.g., when availing the 5% Special CIT). 

2. Special Corporate Income Tax (SCIT) option

RBEs may choose either the SCIT (5%) or EDR from the start of commercial operations in some cases. 

3. Longer Duration of Incentive Availability

The maximum period during which RBEs may avail tax incentives is extended to 27 years (from previously 17 years). 

More precisely, depending on whether approved by Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs) or by the Fiscal Incentives Review Board (FIRB), the duration under SCIT/EDR or EDR alone may be:

14–17 years under IPAs; or

24–27 years under FIRB, for certain high-value/export/refined projects. 

4. Additional Deductions

Power expenses: Additional deduction for power expenses is increased to 100% from 50%. This applies to power used for the registered project/activity. 

Tourism reinvestment, trade fairs / exhibitions / trade missions: 50% additional deduction for such expenses for tourism-related reinvestments and trade promotion until a specified period. 

5. VAT / Duty Incentives

VAT exemption on importation and zero-rating of local purchases for exporters whose export sales amount to at least 70% of total production in the previous year. 

Restoration of “directly attributable” standard (instead of “direct and exclusive use”) for goods and services (including janitorial, security, marketing, HR, legal, consulting etc.) so that more operational inputs qualify for VAT-zero or VAT-exemption status. 

More efficient VAT/duty refund procedures, with clearer timelines and reduced documentary requirements. 

6. Local Tax Simplification

RBEs may opt to pay a single local tax called the Registered Business Enterprise Local Tax (RBELT), not exceeding 2% of gross income, in lieu of all other local taxes, fees, and charges during their Income Tax Holiday (ITH) or Enhanced Deductions regime. 

7. Income Tax Holiday (ITH) / Transition Options

Under the prior CREATE law, ITH of 4–7 years depending on location/industry, followed by either SCIT or EDR for a period (then 10 years under CREATE). CREATE MORE allows RBEs (especially export enterprises) to skip the ITH and immediately avail either SCIT or EDR in some cases. 

For projects still under pre-CREATE, there is a possibility of transferring to CREATE or CREATE MORE incentive schemes under strict rules. 

8. Other Incentives and Reforms

Tax or duty exemption for donations of capital equipment, raw materials, spare parts, or accessories to government agencies, GOCCs, TESDA, SUCs, DepEd or CHED-accredited schools. 

Institutionalization of flexible work arrangements (e.g. work-from-home) for RBEs inside economic zones / freeports without loss of incentives. 

---

Assisted by ChatGPT AI app, October 12, 2025.

Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and baselines, and the pro-Filipino exclusivity rules embodied in Article XII --National Economy and Patrimony -- of the 1987 Constitution

The landmark Philippine Supreme Court (and related international) decisions and instruments that have shaped Philippine law on (1) the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and baselines, and (2) the “pro-Filipino” exclusivity rules embodied in Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) of the 1987 Constitution — together with the controlling tests the Court uses to determine compliance with those constitutional limitations.

Executive summary 

1. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the Philippines’ entitlement to maritime zones (including the EEZ) under UNCLOS and has upheld domestic implementing legislation (the Baselines Law) that enables delimitation of those maritime zones. 

2. The Court enforces the Constitution’s national patrimony provisions vigorously: (a) preference for qualified Filipinos in disposition of national patrimony (e.g., sale of state assets) has been treated as self-executing in key rulings; (b) corporate nationality and foreign participation limitations are tested by practical doctrines (control test; capitalization/“capital” test; and the “grandfather” rule), applied case-by-case. 

3. For natural-resource exploitation in maritime areas the Court has held that the Constitution’s requirement of state control and protection of national patrimony cannot be circumvented by agreements that permit wholly foreign or foreign-dominated entities to exploit Philippine resources (as in the JMSU case). 

---

Detailed decisions, holdings, and legal significance

1. Magallona v. Ermita (G.R. No. 187167, en banc) — Baselines Law / EEZ (2011)

Holding (short): The Supreme Court upheld Republic Act No. 9522 (the Philippine Baselines Law), holding that the law — adopted to implement UNCLOS delimitation rules — is constitutional and does not diminish the national territory; demarcation of baselines is the proper means to delimit maritime zones (territorial sea, contiguous zone, EEZ, continental shelf), and those maritime zones are recognized under international law and protected by domestic law. 

Why this matters: RA 9522 and the Court’s validation give the Philippines the domestic legal basis to identify baseline points from which an EEZ of up to 200 nautical miles is measured; the decision anchors the national legal claim to maritime zones and provides the state and courts the doctrinal tools to assert and defend EEZ rights. 

---

2. The South China Sea Arbitration — The Republic of the Philippines v. People’s Republic of China (PCA Award, 12 July 2016) — (international, but central to EEZ claims)

Holding (short): The Arbitral Tribunal (PCA, Annex VII UNCLOS) ruled for the Philippines on many core issues: China’s “historic rights” claims within the Nine-Dash Line have no legal effect to the extent they exceed entitlements under UNCLOS; many features in the Spratly archipelago are not entitled to generate an EEZ of their own; the Philippines enjoys maritime entitlements (including EEZ) measured from its baselines; and certain Chinese actions violated Philippine sovereign rights in its EEZ and continental shelf. 

Why this matters for domestic law: Although the PCA award is an international instrument (China has rejected it), the award is authoritative on the legal character of maritime features and on the Philippines’ rights under UNCLOS; the award therefore buttresses the domestic legal position adopted in RA 9522 and informs judicial appreciation of EEZ entitlements. 

---

3. Oposa v. Factoran (G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993) — Public trust, intergenerational stewardship, and natural resources (environmental/patrimony doctrine)

Holding (short): The Court recognized the State’s duty to conserve and protect the nation’s natural resources for present and future generations; it endorsed the public-trust concept and allowed citizen suit doctrine (standing for minors acting as guardians of future generations) to vindicate environmental rights. The case articulates that natural resources are part of the national patrimony and that the State must ensure their sustainable and equitable use. 

Why this matters: Oposa supplies the constitutional and doctrinal basis for judicial scrutiny when foreign or domestic agreements threaten the conservation, control, or equitable disposition of natural resources (including offshore resources) — a premise the Court relied upon in cases scrutinizing foreign participation in resource exploitation. 

---

4. Manila Prince Hotel Corporation v. Government Service Insurance System (G.R. No. 122156, 3 February 1997) — “Pro-Filipino” preference and self-execution of Article XII national patrimony provisions

Holding (short): The Court ordered that, in the sale of a national patrimony asset (share sale of a government-owned hotel), the preference right of qualified Filipino buyers under Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) must be recognized; the decision treated the relevant constitutional provision as self-executing — i.e., it could be relied upon immediately to protect Filipino preference even absent implementing legislation. 

Why this matters: Manila Prince is a canonical example where the Court enforces the Constitution’s “Filipino preference” in disposition of national patrimony and confirms judicially enforceable remedies when state dispositions appear to subvert that constitutional policy. 

---

5. Narra Nickel Mining and Development Corp. v. Redmont Consolidated Mines (G.R. No. 195580 et al.; Narra Nickel decisions, 2014–2015) — Tests for corporate nationality and the “grandfather” rule

Holding (short): The Supreme Court applied and harmonized practical tests to determine compliance with constitutional foreign-ownership limits for nationalized sectors (e.g., mining): (a) Control test (who actually controls/benefits from the corporation), (b) Capital test (composition of the capital stock), and (c) where applicable the grandfather rule (that certain pre-existing arrangements may be treated differently). The Court examines substance over form (actual control, financing, interlocking relationships) to determine whether a corporation is effectively foreign-controlled despite nominal Filipino shareholdings. 

Why this matters: The Narra Nickel line clarifies how courts and agencies assess whether a business claiming Filipino status actually complies with the 60/40 (or sectoral) constitutional rules — a practical guide in disputes over mining permits, resource contracts, and state approvals. 

---

6. Ocampo / JMSU cases — Supreme Court review of international or tripartite resource agreements (G.R. No. 182734, JMSU)

Holding (short): In the JMSU litigation the Supreme Court declared the 2005 Tripartite Agreement for the Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (involving Philippine, Vietnamese, and Chinese state firms) unconstitutional and void because it permitted foreign participation that effectively allowed foreign (including wholly foreign) entities to explore Philippine natural resources without conforming to the constitutional safeguards (state supervision and the conservation-for-Filipino-benefit policy). The Court emphasized that constitutional provisions on national patrimony and state control over natural resources are binding constraints on international agreements and commercial arrangements. 

Why this matters: JMSU is the most direct recent Supreme Court application of Article XII to offshore resource agreements: it stands for the proposition that the Philippine Constitution governs who may exploit Philippine maritime resources and that arrangements that dilute or bypass constitutional safeguards will be invalidated. 

---

Practical doctrinal rules (how the Court approaches disputes)

1. EEZ & baselines: The Court treats delimitation of baselines (RA 9522) and invocation of UNCLOS entitlements as legitimate exercises of state sovereignty/sovereign rights; international awards (PCA) inform legal characterizations but domestic statutes and SC review remain the modes by which the Philippines implements and defends its rights. 

2. National patrimony / pro-Filipino exclusivity: Where the Constitution imposes limits or preferences (Article XII), the Court will enforce them — sometimes by treating those provisions as self-executing (Manila Prince) and sometimes by requiring enabling laws depending on the clause’s text and context. 

3. Foreign ownership tests: Courts look to substance (control) and economic reality (who provides funds, who directs operations) rather than mere share certificates; the “grandfather” rule may preserve past arrangements but only to the extent allowed by precedent and equitable considerations. 

4. Contracts/agreements affecting maritime resources: International agreements or commercial arrangements that effectively cede or permit foreign exploitation of Philippine EEZ resources without complying with Article XII or relevant statutes will be subject to strict constitutional review and may be declared void. 

---

Short concluding note (advice for legal practice)

When litigating or advising on EEZ claims, resource contracts, or disputes about corporate nationality, treat the following as indispensable: (a) RA 9522 and UNCLOS (and PCA award) for maritime delimitation; (b) the Supreme Court precedents summarized above (Magallona, Manila Prince, Narra Nickel, JMSU/Ocampo, Oposa) for constitutional constraints and tests; and (c) documentary proof of actual control, financing, and contractual arrangements (to apply the control/capital/grandfather tests). Where international agreements are concerned, expect the Court to examine whether constitutional safeguards (state control, Filipino benefit) were observed before giving effect to such agreements. 

---

Sources, citations and links (primary authorities and direct texts)

1. Magallona v. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167 (Aug. 16, 2011) — Supreme Court decision upholding RA 9522 (Baselines Law). Full text available at Lawphil / Supreme Court repositories. 

Link: https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/aug2011/gr_187167_2011.html. 

2. The South China Sea Arbitration — Award (The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China), PCA Case No. 2013-19 (July 12, 2016) — Full arbitral award (PCA PDF). 

Link (PCA PDF): https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Award.pdf. 

3. Oposa et al. v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083 (July 30, 1993) — Supreme Court en banc (public trust doctrine; protection of natural resources). Text and syllabus: ELAW / official repositories. 

Link: https://elaw.org/resource/philippines-oposa-et-al-v-fulgencio-s-factoran-jr-et-al-gr-no-101083. 

4. Manila Prince Hotel Corporation v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156 (Feb. 3, 1997) — Supreme Court (pro-Filipino preference; self-execution issues). Full text (Lawphil / eLibrary). 

Link: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1997/feb1997/gr_122156_1997.html. 

5. Narra Nickel Mining & Dev’t Corp. v. Redmont Consolidated Mines (G.R. No. 195580 and related resolutions, 2014–2015) — Supreme Court en banc materials on corporate nationality, control test, capitalization and grandfather rule. Full texts and Lawphil entries. 

Link: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/jan2015/gr_195580_2015.html. 

6. G.R. No. 182734 (Ocampo et al.) — JMSU (Tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking) — Supreme Court announcement/decision (Jan. 10, 2023; follow-on motions 2023) — Supreme Court press release and full text (Lawphil / Supreme Court site). The Court declared the JMSU unconstitutional for violating Article XII and permitting foreign participation in exploitation of natural resources without constitutional safeguards. 

Link (SC press release / case file): https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-declares-unconstitutional-the-joint-marine-seismic-undertaking-among-philippine-vietnamese-and-chinese-oil-firms/ and https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2023/jan2023/gr_182734_2023.html. 

---

ADDENDUM 

Republic Act No. 12064 — The Philippine Maritime Zones Act

Defines and codifies the Philippines’ maritime zones: internal waters, archipelagic waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and continental shelf.

Asserts sovereign rights over living and non-living resources in the EEZ and continental shelf in accordance with UNCLOS.

Strengthens the legal basis for the Philippines’ maritime claims, particularly in the West Philippine Sea, and harmonizes domestic law with the 2016 PCA Award.

Serves as the legislative successor to RA 9522, giving statutory definition to maritime zones and resource jurisdiction.

Republic Act No. 12065 — The Philippine Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act

Designates archipelagic sea lanes and air routes through which foreign ships and aircraft may pass in a continuous and expeditious manner, consistent with UNCLOS provisions on archipelagic states.

Establishes enforcement mechanisms, vessel obligations, and prohibitions to protect national security, environmental integrity, and sovereignty.

Balances the right of innocent and archipelagic sea lanes passage with national regulatory authority over customs, immigration, safety, and environmental concerns.

Together, RA 12064 and RA 12065 reinforce the Magallona doctrine by giving explicit statutory expression to the Philippines’ maritime entitlements under international law and by embedding these entitlements within the constitutional framework of sovereignty and national patrimony.

---

READINGS:

https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/aug2011/gr_187167_2011.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1997/feb1997/gr_122156_1997.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-declares-unconstitutional-the-joint-marine-seismic-undertaking-among-philippine-vietnamese-and-chinese-oil-firms/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/aug2011/gr_187167_2011.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

https://elaw.org/resource/philippines-oposa-et-al-v-fulgencio-s-factoran-jr-et-al-gr-no-101083

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1997/feb1997/gr_122156_1997.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/jan2015/gr_195580_2015.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-declares-unconstitutional-the-joint-marine-seismic-undertaking-among-philippine-vietnamese-and-chinese-oil-firms/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/jan2015/gr_195580_2015.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

https://pllo.gov.ph/index.php/gallery/gallery-2024/2024-11-08-president-ferdinand-r-marcos-jr-signed-into-law-republic-act-ra-no-12064?utm_source=chatgpt.com

https://www.pna.gov.ph/index.php/articles/1237378?utm_source=chatgpt.com

https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2024/11/09/2398754/president-marcos-signs-laws-asserting-philippines-sea-rights-sovereignty?utm_source=chatgpt.com

---

Assisted by ChatGPT, October 12, 2025.

Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), national patrimony, and maritime sovereignty

Landmark Supreme Court Doctrines and the 2024 Maritime Laws (RA 12064 & RA 12065)

---

I. Constitutional Framework

The 1987 Constitution, particularly Article I on the National Territory and Article XII on the National Economy and Patrimony, provides the foundation for the State’s sovereign rights and exclusive control over the country’s maritime zones and resources.

Article XII mandates that the exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State, and that the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos in their use and enjoyment. This pro-Filipino exclusivity rule extends to the nation’s maritime zones, including the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the continental shelf.

---

II. Landmark Supreme Court Decisions

1. Magallona v. Ermita (G.R. No. 187167, July 16, 2011)

The Court upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9522 (Philippine Baselines Law). It ruled that RA 9522 merely adjusted technical baselines to conform to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and did not diminish the national territory. The Court reaffirmed the Philippines’ sovereign rights over its EEZ and continental shelf beyond its territorial sea.

Doctrine:

The Philippines retains sovereignty over its internal and archipelagic waters, and sovereign rights over resources in its EEZ and continental shelf as recognized under UNCLOS.

---

2. Republic v. Sandiganbayan (La Bugal-B’laan case)

(G.R. No. 127882, December 1, 2004; Resolution, December 19, 2006)
This case concerned the constitutionality of the Mining Act of 1995 (RA 7942) and its provisions allowing Financial and Technical Assistance Agreements (FTAAs) with foreign corporations.

Doctrine:

The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources are reserved for Filipinos, but the State may enter into FTAAs with foreign entities provided the State retains control and supervision.

This case expanded the scope of the pro-Filipino rule under Article XII and clarified that the State’s full control must not be diluted by excessive delegation to foreign interests.

---

3. Oposa v. Factoran (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)

While focused on terrestrial resources, Oposa broadened the meaning of national patrimony to include the right of future generations to the country’s natural wealth—land, air, and seas alike.

Doctrine:

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology includes the duty to protect marine and coastal resources as part of the national patrimony.

---

4. Pimentel v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005)

The Court held that foreign participation in resource exploitation and public utilities must comply strictly with constitutional nationality requirements.

Doctrine:

Any contract or joint venture concerning the nation’s natural resources, including offshore or EEZ resources, must observe the 60%-Filipino ownership rule or be under State control.

---

5. The South China Sea Arbitration (PCA Case No. 2013-19, Award of July 12, 2016)

Although an international decision, this arbitral award has been acknowledged domestically as part of the corpus of international obligations of the Philippines. The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruled that China’s “nine-dash line” has no legal basis and affirmed the Philippines’ sovereign rights within its 200-nautical-mile EEZ.

Significance:

The PCA Award serves as the international legal affirmation of the Philippines’ rights under UNCLOS, which domestic law and jurisprudence (e.g., Magallona) have reinforced.

---

III. The 2024 Maritime Laws Signed by President Marcos Jr.

In November 2024, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. signed into law two landmark maritime statutes that codify and strengthen the Philippines’ sovereign rights over its maritime zones:

A. Republic Act No. 12064 — The Philippine Maritime Zones Act

• Defines and codifies the Philippines’ maritime zones: internal waters, archipelagic waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and continental shelf.
• Asserts sovereign rights over living and non-living resources in the EEZ and continental shelf in accordance with UNCLOS.
• Strengthens the legal basis for the Philippines’ maritime claims, particularly in the West Philippine Sea, and harmonizes domestic law with the 2016 PCA Award.
• Serves as the legislative successor to RA 9522, giving statutory definition to maritime zones and resource jurisdiction.

---

B. Republic Act No. 12065 — The Philippine Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act

• Designates archipelagic sea lanes and air routes through which foreign ships and aircraft may pass in a continuous and expeditious manner, consistent with UNCLOS provisions on archipelagic states.
• Establishes enforcement mechanisms, vessel obligations, and prohibitions to protect national security, environmental integrity, and sovereignty.
• Balances the right of innocent and archipelagic sea lanes passage with national regulatory authority over customs, immigration, safety, and environmental concerns.

Together, RA 12064 and RA 12065 reinforce the Magallona doctrine by giving explicit statutory expression to the Philippines’ maritime entitlements under international law and by embedding these entitlements within the constitutional framework of sovereignty and national patrimony.

---

IV. Synthesis: Doctrine and Statute in Harmony

1. From Constitution to Statute – The national patrimony clauses (Art. XII) remain the supreme domestic rule. The 2024 maritime laws give these provisions operative effect over the EEZ and continental shelf.

2. From Supreme Court to Congress – Judicial doctrine (e.g., Magallona, La Bugal-B’laan) validates legislative efforts such as RA 12064/12065 that safeguard Philippine sovereignty while observing international law.

3. From International Law to Domestic Enforcement – The 2024 laws internalize the UNCLOS regime and the PCA Award, enabling government agencies (e.g., PCG, BFAR, DENR) to enforce rights against incursions, illegal fishing, or environmental violations.

4. Pro-Filipino Rule Extended Offshore – Filipino ownership and control now expressly apply to marine resource development in the EEZ, continental shelf, and archipelagic waters, subject to State supervision.

---

V. Conclusion

The evolving architecture of Philippine maritime sovereignty—rooted in the 1987 Constitution, refined by the Supreme Court, validated by international law, and codified by the 2024 statutes—constitutes a coherent legal regime asserting the Philippines’ identity as an archipelagic and maritime nation.

The Magallona, La Bugal-B’laan, and Pimentel doctrines provide the constitutional and jurisprudential scaffolding; the PCA Award supplies international legitimacy; and RA 12064 and RA 12065 give domestic statutory precision. Together, they safeguard the Filipino people’s dominion over the sea, seabed, and subsoil—our national patrimony for present and future generations.

---

Sources and References 

1. Magallona v. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, July 16, 2011 – Supreme Court of the Philippines.
2. Republic v. Sandiganbayan (La Bugal-B’laan), G.R. No. 127882, December 1, 2004; Resolution, December 19, 2006 – Supreme Court of the Philippines.
3. Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993 – Supreme Court of the Philippines.
4. Pimentel v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005 – Supreme Court of the Philippines.
5. Permanent Court of Arbitration, The South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v. China), Award of July 12, 2016.
6. Republic Act No. 12064 (Philippine Maritime Zones Act) – signed November 8, 2024.
   • Philippine News Agency report
   • Senate Press Release
7. Republic Act No. 12065 (Philippine Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act) – signed November 8, 2024.
   • Philstar News Article
   • Senate Press Release (Tolentino)
8. UNCLOS (1982) – United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
9. 1987 Philippine Constitution, Articles I and XII.

---

Assisted by ChatGPT AI app, October 12, 2025.

Conflict of interest among public officials.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN PUBLIC OFFICE UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND PHILIPPINE LAW

At least five major laws, including the 1987 Constitution, expressly prohibit conflict of interest among public officials. Yet, reports show that some politicians and bureaucrats still engage in private business, cornering public contracts and abusing the powers of their offices. This persistent problem undermines public trust and the constitutional principle that public office is a public trust.

I. CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS

Article XI, Section 1 — Accountability of Public Officers

> Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

Article VII, Section 13 — The President, Vice President, Cabinet Members, and Deputies

> The President, Vice President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government.

Article IX-B, Section 2(4) — Civil Service Commission

> No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any private business, vocation, or profession without the permission required by law.

These provisions create an ethical wall between public service and private gain. Any overlap between a public officer’s duty and personal business interest constitutes a conflict of interest, whether actual or potential.

II. STATUTORY PROHIBITIONS

1. Republic Act No. 6713

(Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees)

Section 7(b) prohibits public officials from having any financial or material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of their office.

Section 7(a) bars them from owning, controlling, or managing any business enterprise regulated, supervised, or licensed by their office.

2. Republic Act No. 3019

(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)

Section 3(h) penalizes any public officer who directly or indirectly has financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity.

Section 3(g) punishes entering into a contract manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.

3. Republic Act No. 9184 (Government Procurement Reform Act)

Bars participation in bidding by public officials or entities with interests in the procurement process.

4. Administrative Code of 1987, Book I, Chapter 9, Section 49

Prohibits government officers from engaging in private business unless expressly allowed by law.

5. Revised Penal Code, Article 208 (Prosecution of Offenses)

Punishes dereliction of duty and favoritism that may accompany conflicts of interest.

III. LANDMARK SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

1. People v. Jaime H. Domingo and Diosdado T. Garcia,

G.R. Nos. 149175 & 149406, October 25, 2005

A municipal mayor and treasurer were convicted under Section 3(h) of RA 3019 for having a pecuniary interest in a government contract. The Court affirmed that a public official cannot act in both a public and private capacity in the same transaction.

Source:

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/oct2005/gr_149175_2005.html

2. Garcia-Diaz and Solis v. Sandiganbayan,

G.R. No. 193236, March 20, 2018

Two government officials were convicted under Section 3(g) of RA 3019 for entering into a manifestly and grossly disadvantageous contract involving public land. The Court ruled that the intent to favor private interests over the government constitutes corrupt practice.

Source:

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64562

3. Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana,

G.R. No. 144458, November 21, 2002

A civil servant who engaged in private business without authorization was dismissed. The Court reiterated that public officials must secure prior permission before engaging in any private enterprise.

Source:

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2002/nov2002/gr_144458_2002.html

4. Pleyto v. Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group,

G.R. No. 169982, September 30, 2008

The Court held that unexplained wealth and business interests inconsistent with modest living standards violate the constitutional principle that public office is a public trust.

Source:

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/sep2008/gr_169982_2008.html

IV. JURISPRUDENTIAL PRINCIPLES

1. Public office demands undivided loyalty.

The Court has consistently held that a public servant’s primary allegiance is to the public, not to personal or familial interests.

2. Conflict of interest need not be proven by actual gain.

Potential or apparent conflicts are already sanctionable under RA 6713 and RA 3019.

3. Integrity and accountability are constitutional duties.

A breach of these duties undermines the legitimacy of governance and erodes citizens’ trust in democratic institutions.

V. CONCLUSION

The Constitution and anti-graft laws form a strict code of conduct that bars politicians and bureaucrats from using public power for private enrichment.

Yet enforcement remains weak.

As media initiatives like Rappler’s “#Politicontractors” show, the real test lies not only in having laws but in applying them consistently, regardless of rank or political color.

Public officials must choose: Serve the people, or serve themselves — but never both.

---

Assisted by ChatGPT AI app, October 10, 2025.

---

News  

https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/investigative/politicians-government-contractors-connections-map/

How to prosecute corrupt infrastructure projects: legal theories, case buildup, evidence, and litigation aspect.

Below I give a focused legal–policy analysis of Senator Gatchalian’s allegation that some ₱10.3 billion was lost to “extremely overpriced” farm-to-market roads (FMRs), together with concrete accountability and remedial measures that are legally available to oversight bodies, prosecutors, and civil society. 

Topics: legal standards, the elements of possible wrongdoing, the evidence needed for prosecution or administrative sanctions, and practical reforms that will reduce recurrence.

Short factual anchoring (key public facts)

• Senator Sherwin Gatchalian told the Senate Finance Committee that 1,653 FMR projects in 2023–2024 were overpriced, totalling an alleged loss of ₱10.34 billion; he singled out a Tacloban FMR listed at ~₱100M for 287 meters (≈₱348,432 per meter) as an extreme example. .
• The Department of Agriculture and DPWH have been using benchmark figures of about ₱10M–₱15M per kilometer for FMR concreting; the DA proposed about ₱16 billion for FMRs in 2026 and reports roughly 70,000 km completed with a 60,000 km backlog. .
  (These five facts are the most load-bearing claims cited in subsequent analysis.)

---

I. Legal issues and potential violations 

1. Possible violations of procurement law (RA No. 9184 and IRR).

   • If contract prices far exceed the independent cost estimate (ICE) and there is inadequate justification or manipulated bidding, responsible officials or contractors could have breached procurement rules (competitive bidding, specification of BOQs, cost reasonableness). Overpricing may be evidence of collusion, bid-rigging, or fraudulent supplementation through Variation Orders. (Procurement irregularities are the usual gateway to graft cases.)

2. Anti-graft and corrupt practices (RA No. 3019) and administrative liability.

   • Unjust enrichment, manifest partiality, or causing undue injury to the government are typical grounds for administrative and criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman and, if warranted, referral for criminal prosecution to the DOJ and Sandiganbayan.

3. Falsification / documentary fraud and conspiracy.

   • If documents (BOQ, delivery receipts, inspection reports) were falsified to authorize higher payments, elements of falsification under the Revised Penal Code and related statutes may be present.

4. Criminal liability of private contractors.

   • Private actors who participate in kickbacks, overbilling, or collusion may be criminally liable as principals or accomplices under RA 3019 and related penal provisions; civil liability (restitution or disgorgement) for damages to the government will also be available.

5. Constitutional and fiscal accountability questions.

   • Misuse of appropriated funds implicates the Constitution’s public-funds accountability mandates and COA’s mandate to audit government expenditures.

---

II. Evidence map — what investigators must obtain & why

For a credible administrative or criminal case, investigators must compile a tightly-documented chain of proof. Key documentary and physical evidence:

1. Procurement records and bidding documents

   • Invitation to bid, bid abstracts, bid envelopes, BAC resolutions, post-qualification reports, Notice of Award, Notice to Proceed, contracts, ICE, and BAC minutes. These show whether competitive bidding requirements and ICE benchmarks were respected.

2. Bill of Quantities (BOQ) and technical specifications

   • Compare BOQ unit rates to ICE and standard DPWH/DA unit rates. Discrepancies here prove overvaluation per unit.

3. Change orders / Variation Orders

   • Frequent or unexplained variation orders are red flags for post-award padding.

4. Payment vouchers, official receipts, disbursement vouchers, supporting invoices

   • Trace actual payments and compare to work performed.

5. Site inspection reports, geotagged photographs, materials delivery receipts and laboratory test results

   • Corroborate whether the physical work matches what was paid for (e.g., thickness of concrete, compaction, materials used).

6. Time sheets, contractor payrolls, subcontractor agreements

   • Identify front companies or sham subcontracting.

7. Communications (emails, text messages, memoranda)

   • Evidence of collusion with public officials.

8. Independent forensic cost estimate and expert engineering report

   • To establish a reasonable market cost and technical deficiencies.

Collecting the above allows prosecutors and COA auditors to quantify the overpayment and to link it to culpable persons.

---

III. Pathways for accountability (administrative, audit, criminal, and civil)

1. Immediate audit and forensic review (COA and/or independent forensic audit).

   • COA has constitutional authority to audit government funds and may issue a Notice of Disallowance or Charge. A forensic audit will quantify losses and identify irregular transactions. (Recommend COA be requested to prioritize the top-ten projects flagged.)

2. Administrative complaint to the Office of the Ombudsman.

   • File a formal complaint (with compiled evidence) against responsible contracting officers, BAC members, project engineers, and approving officials for administrative penalties and fines; Ombudsman can suspend, dismiss, disqualify from public office, and seek restitution.

3. Criminal complaint to the DOJ / Sandiganbayan referral.

   • If evidence shows manifest partiality, undue injury, or conspiracy, the Ombudsman or DOJ can file charges under RA 3019 and related penal statutes—prosecution in the Sandiganbayan for graft and corrupt practices.

4. Civil recovery and injunctions.

   • The government (through the Solicitor General or agency counsel) may file civil actions to recover amounts and seek injunctive relief to stop similar disbursements; private citizens may file quo warranto or citizen’s suits in certain circumstances (subject to standing).

5. Blacklisting and debarment of contractors.

   • If contractors are proven to have engaged in fraud, the procuring entity (and DBM/PhilGEPS/PCAB as relevant) can debar them from future public contracts.

6. Legislative oversight and budgetary remedies.

   • The Senate (via Finance or Blue Ribbon) can require suspension of certain disbursements, summon officials for inquiry, and propose conditional budget cuts or reallocation pending audit results. Senatorial hearings create public record and political pressure.

(Each of these pathways may proceed in parallel; audit findings strengthen combative administrative and criminal actions.)

---

IV. Practical legal standards and likely defenses

• Legitimate causes of higher cost: contractors and officials will cite special site conditions (right-of-way issues, difficult terrain, increased material costs, typhoon damage, additional utility relocations), emergency procurement justifications, or higher standard specifications as reasons for higher unit costs. Investigators must test these defenses by inspecting site reports, approved change orders and whether extraordinary costs were duly documented and approved before payment.
• Standard of proof: administrative cases require preponderance of evidence; criminal graft requires proof beyond reasonable doubt. For successful criminal prosecution, the chain of documentary and testimonial evidence must be strong.

---

V. Recommendations — immediate, medium term, and reform measures

A. Immediate investigative steps (to be taken now)

1. Prioritize top anomalies — instruct COA, DA and DPWH to immediately audit the top-ten projects Gatchalian identified and freeze further disbursements pending audit explanations (Senate/DOF direction or Ombudsman request advisable). .
2. Order independent forensic cost estimates for the flagged projects (external engineering firm) to compare ICE and actual unit costs.
3. Secure original procurement files, vouchers, and communications—preserve evidence and issue subpoenas where necessary.
4. Prepare an Ombudsman complaint package (evidence-rich) for prompt administrative and criminal screening.

B. Medium-term prosecutorial and remedial actions

1. Administrative sanctions and criminal referrals where COA / Ombudsman findings indicate misconduct.
2. Civil recovery suits for amounts found disallowed by COA.
3. Debarment of contractors and disciplinary action against BAC members/project engineers with findings of culpability.

C. Structural reforms (policy/legal reforms to prevent recurrence)

1. Adopt and publish clear FMR unit cost benchmarks based on region, terrain, and standard design—make the ICE and benchmark publicly available on PhilGEPS/agency portals. (Benchmarks should be indexed to material cost indices.) .
2. Mandatory independent cost estimates and external peer review for projects exceeding a material threshold (e.g., any FMR >₱5M per km above benchmark).
3. Enhanced transparency — require geotagged progress photos, digital BOQ, and real-time contract dashboards accessible to COA, Senate, and civil society.
4. E-Procurement and e-inspection strengthening — tie progress claims to geotagged verification and third-party inspection.
5. Criminalize and sanction abuse of Variation Orders through procurement manual amendments to require stricter approval and reporting of VO rationale.
6. Community monitoring and participatory audits — involve farmer organizations and local Sangguniang Bayan resolution as third-party observers during implementation.

---

Xxx.

---

VII. Short risk assessment and likelihoods (legal pragmatism)

• Probability of administrative sanctions: high, if COA audit confirms documentary mismatches (COA routinely issues suspensions/notice of disallowance).
• Probability of criminal indictment: medium — depends on ability to show manifest partiality, conspiracy, or clear quid pro quo beyond pricing anomalies. Pricing alone, without communications or documentary proof of corrupt intent, may not secure criminal conviction.
• Political constraints: high—regions and local patrons implicated may generate political resistance; sustained legislative and civil society pressure is crucial.

---

Concluding observation

The reported ₱10.3B aggregate overpricing allegation is legally serious and fits the pattern that initially triggered other infrastructure probes. The legal response should be two-pronged: (1) immediate forensic audit and administrative/criminal triage focused on the most anomalous projects; and (2) medium-term statutory and procurement reforms that institutionalize independent costing, geotagged verification, and transparency to prevent recurrence. The architecture for enforcement already exists (COA, Ombudsman, DOJ/Sandiganbayan, procurement law); success will turn on disciplined evidence collection, technical cost verification, and political will to follow the paper-trail to its logical conclusions.

---

Assisted by ChatGPT AI, October 9, 2025.

---

News:

https://manilastandard.net/news/314652803/p10b-overpriced-farm-to-market-roads-flagged.html?fbclid=IwdGRjcANT6VdjbGNrA1PpUGV4dG4DYWVtAjExAAEeQQti9CgJoNgfAOBTEL_985TqPLd12OPxLoFP3TKHe5ajNZRyqFocrTujr8U_aem_OfFeyWa3HBlHXY1YWRP2Eg

In defense of the Philippine territorial claims over the Kalayaan (Spratly) group and related features (Scarborough / Bajo de Masinloc, etc.), focusing on the three treaties invoked (Paris 1898, Washington 1900, and the U.S.–U.K. (1930) boundary convention) plus supplementary legal arguments.

Below is a two-part response. First, a summary of the news article and its central claims. (West PH Sea: DFA cites Treaty of Paris to assert PH territorial rights | INQUIRER.net https://share.google/IKEIRO2Zz5F492ZaN)

Second, a legal-memorandum style analysis and defense of the Philippine territorial claims over the Kalayaan (Spratly) group and related features (Scarborough / Bajo de Masinloc, etc.), focusing on the three treaties invoked (Paris 1898, Washington 1900, and the U.S.–U.K. (1930) boundary convention) plus supplementary legal arguments.

---

I. Summary of the News Article

• The Inquirer reports that on October 7, 2025, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) of the Philippines publicly reaffirmed that the Philippines’ sovereign claims in the West Philippine Sea (i.e. parts of the South China Sea) rest in part on historic treaty bases, in particular the Treaty of Paris (1898).
• The DFA maintains that the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG, Philippines’ internal name for its claim in the Spratly area) and Bajo de Masinloc (Scarborough Shoal) have long been part of Philippine territory as recognized under these treaties.
• The DFA also refers to other treaties beyond Paris 1898 and Washington 1900, including a 1930 U.S.–Great Britain treaty (i.e. a boundary convention between the U.S. (as sovereign of the Philippines) and the U.K.), which it says “clearly and firmly state the extent of Philippine territory” and binds successor states (e.g. Malaysia, Brunei) to respect the boundaries recognized.
• The DFA rejects interpretations by “some countries” that would narrowly read the Treaty of Paris as a final delimitation that excludes features like Scarborough Shoal or the Kalayaan group.
• The DFA’s position is that Philippine sovereignty over these features is “incontrovertible and firmly founded on international law, legal principles, effective control, and recognition through international treaties and agreements.”

In short, the news conveys that the DFA is reasserting a treaty-based foundation for Philippine claims, pushing back against arguments that the 1898 treaty “box” is constraining, and invoking subsequent treaties (esp. 1900 and the 1930 U.S.–U.K. convention) to buttress its claims.

---

II. Legal Memorandum: Philippine Sovereign Claim over KIG / Spratlys / Scarborough / 

Legal Foundations of Philippine Sovereignty Claims over Kalayaan Group (Spratlys) and Related Features

Issue
Whether the Philippines has a valid and defensible claim of territorial sovereignty over the Kalayaan Island Group (Spratly features) and adjacent features such as Bajo de Masinloc (Scarborough Shoal), based on treaty bases (Paris 1898, Washington 1900, U.S.–U.K. 1930), subsequent state practice, and other international law principles.

Short Answer
Yes, the Philippines can mount a credible legal defense of sovereignty over the Kalayaan group and related features founded on (1) the successive cession treaties (Paris and Washington) that incorporate residual islands, (2) the 1930 U.S.–U.K. convention which delimits boundaries and affirms U.S. (hence Philippine) sovereignty over islands within the delimitation, (3) continuous and consistent exercise of sovereignty (effectivités) by the Philippines, and (4) the doctrine of succession and acquiescence of successor states. While counterarguments exist (especially from China), the treaty record combined with effective control and legal recognition offers a strong basis for the Philippine claim.

Below is a structured analysis.

---

A. Treaty Foundations

1. Treaty of Paris (1898) — The “Treaty Box”

• The Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain (December 10, 1898) is the foundational cession treaty through which Spain relinquished sovereignty over Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippine archipelago to the United States.
• Article III of the Treaty of Paris describes a territorial “box” by reference to specific meridians and parallels — a “line running … 118° to 127° E, then etc.” — which supposedly delimits “the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands” to be ceded to the U.S.
• Critics argue that under that “box,” features lying west (or outside) of that boundary line (e.g. some Spratly features, Scarborough Shoal) were excluded from the cession. Some interpreting states assert that the 1898 treaty is a fixed outer boundary beyond which Philippine claims cannot pass.
• However, the Philippines (via the DFA) and historically Philippine legal scholars argue that the Treaty of Paris was never intended by the parties as a final delimitation, but primarily as a cession of sovereignty over Spanish possessions in the archipelago, subject to clarifications or supplements.
• Indeed, the Treaty of Paris itself includes a protocol (March 29, 1900) extending certain provisions (Article IX) pertaining to Spanish subjects’ nationality.

Thus, while the Treaty of Paris supplies a “framework box,” it is not airtight as a boundary limitation, especially when one considers subsequent clarifications.

2. Treaty of Washington (1900) — Clarification & Supplement (the “Pocket Treaty”)

• To resolve ambiguities or misunderstandings about the cession of “outlying islands” lying outside the lines in the Treaty of Paris, Spain and the United States concluded a supplementary treaty on November 7, 1900: the “Treaty Between Spain and the United States for the Cession of Outlying Islands of the Philippines.”
• The sole Article states that Spain “relinquishes to the United States all title and claim of title … to any and all islands belonging to the Philippine Archipelago, lying outside the lines described in Article III of the Treaty of Paris … and agrees that all such islands shall be comprehended in the cession of the Archipelago as fully as if they had been expressly included within those lines.”
• Particularly, the treaty mentions “Cagayan, Sulu, Sibutu and their dependencies,” but its language is general and sweeping: it reaches all islands belonging to the Philippine archipelago outside the prior box.
• In effect, this “clarificatory” instrument functions as a “pocket treaty” that expands the cession to include residual islands not covered by the geometric lines of the Paris treaty.
• Philippine legal scholars and commentators (notably Justice Antonio Carpio) emphasize that this treaty must be read as a retroactive supplementation of the Paris cession, thereby incorporating many of the features of the Spratlys and Scarborough, assuming they qualified as “islands belonging to the Philippine Archipelago” under Spanish rule.
• The U.S. government thereby treated the 1900 Treaty as confirming U.S. sovereignty (and hence future Philippine sovereignty) over residual and outlying islands beyond the treaty box.
• Some external analyses affirm that the 1898 box was “supplemented retroactively” by the 1900 treaty.

Thus, under a legal reading respectful of pacta sunt servanda and ejusdem generis, the Treaty of Washington should be construed as expanding the cession boundary, not as a mere narrow addendum.

3. Convention between the United States and Great Britain (1930) — Delimitation vis-à-vis British Borneo

• In the colonial era, North Borneo (Sabah) was under British protection. The Philippines (then U.S. territory) shared a maritime adjacency with North Borneo / British possessions across the Sulu and South China Seas.
• To settle boundary issues and recognize sovereignty claims, the U.S. and the U.K. signed the “Convention Delimiting the Boundary between the Philippine Archipelago and the State of North Borneo” on January 2, 1930.
• The convention (with later exchanges of notes in 1932) drew a boundary line between the Philippines and North Borneo. Importantly, Article III of the convention states that “all islands to the north and east of the said line … shall belong to the Philippine Archipelago.”
• In other words, in delimiting the lateral boundary vis-à-vis North Borneo, the U.K. recognized that certain islands (even if lying outside the Paris box) fall to the Philippines by virtue of their position relative to that delimitation.
• The Philippines today inherits that treaty régime as a successor state to U.S. sovereignty over those ceded Philippine archipelago territories.
• This convention thus provides a complementary boundary confirmation by a third party (Britain), which is relevant especially vis-à-vis Malaysia (successor to British Borneo).
• The Philippine DFA explicitly cites this 1930 treaty in the news report, contending that it “clearly and firmly state the extent of Philippine territory” and binds successor states (including Malaysia) to respect the boundary delimitation.

Thus, the 1930 U.S.–U.K. boundary convention reinforces the treaty foundation for Philippine sovereignty over islands lying north/east of the line, which plausibly include many of the claimed KIG / Spratly features (depending on charting).

---

B. Mapping, Historical Cartography, and Spanish Pre-condemnation

• One critical piece is how Spanish-era cartography (particularly the 1734 Murillo Velarde map) depicted the Philippine archipelago. Philippine analysts rely on those maps to show that the Spratly features and Scarborough Shoal (Panacot in the old mapping) historically belonged to the “Las Islas Filipinas” conception under Spain.
• The Murillo Velarde map is often used as a frame of reference to interpret what Spanish sovereignty considered “the Philippines” ante bellum.
• If those maps depict the Spratly features and Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine domain, then the 1900 Treaty’s language “any and all islands belonging to the Philippine Archipelago” may be read to incorporate them.
• Moreover, after 1898–1900, U.S. authorities (as successor to Spanish claims) adopted Spanish official maps and charts (e.g. the 1875 “Carta General del Archipélago Filipino”) and issued internal documents treating those features as part of U.S./Philippine territory.
• In the 1928 Palmas (Miangas) arbitration, the U.S. (representing Philippine territory) invoked those Spanish and U.S. cartographic practices to judicial effect, illustrating that map-based claims have persuasive weight in boundary and sovereignty disputes.

Hence, historical cartography, when coherently linked to treaty texts, bolsters the Philippine interpretive construction of the treaties.

---

C. Effectivités, State Practice, and Recognition

Even if an adversary challenges a treaty reading, a robust sovereignty claim must be supported by effective exercise of authority (effectivités) and acquiescence or recognition by other states. The Philippines has several such arguments:

1. Continuous administration and enforcement

   • The Philippines, since the mid-20th century, has taken steps to occupy, build, and enforce law on many features in the KIG / Spratly group (e.g. military outposts, lighthouse construction, resupply, coast guard patrols).
   • The creation of Presidential Decree 1596 (1978) formally asserted Philippine sovereignty over the Kalayaan group, defining the area and asserting jurisdiction over the seabed, subsoil, and airspace.
   • The Philippines has also protested incursions, maintained a presence, and engaged in resource exploitation (within claim) consistent with sovereign rights.
   • 
     

2. Lack of persistent protest by other states

   • Over decades, competing claimant states (e.g. Malaysia, Vietnam) have not universally and consistently protested every single act of Philippine administration. This relative silence or intermittent protest weakens counterclaims.
   • The U.K., in its capacity as colonial power, having signed the 1930 convention that placed islands north/east of the delimitation under Philippine archipelago sovereignty, is bound by that recognition.
   • Successor states such as Malaysia, as successors to British North Borneo, derive their boundary recognition obligations from the 1930 treaty and its boundary placements.
   • 
     

3. Integration into Philippine legal and constitutional order

   • The 1935 Philippine Constitution, and succeeding constitutions, have incorporated as part of the national territory the islands ceded under the 1898 and 1900 treaties, as well as treaty limits confirmed by the 1930 U.S.–U.K. convention.
   • Philippine statutes, regulations, and administrative acts treat those features as part of the national territory. This internal consistency is relevant under the doctrine of internal coherence in state practice.
   • 
     

4. Recognition by third parties

   • Some third states or international instruments tacitly recognize Philippine claims (for instance, maps, diplomatic correspondence, statements of acquiescence, or silence).
   • The fact that the DFA feels confident citing the treaty bases against “misinterpretation” by other countries suggests the Philippines believes that external actors have contested narrow readings of the treaty lines.

These effectivités, combined with treaty bases, strengthen the Philippine sovereignty claim.

---

D. Counterarguments and Rebuttals

1. China’s “historic rights” / nine-dash line

   • The principal counterclaim from China is based on historic maritime claims (nine-dash line), which lack explicit treaty foundation and run contrary to modern principles of territorial sovereignty and the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal ruling (PCA) which rejected China’s expansive historic rights claims insofar as they exceed entitlements under UNCLOS.
   • The Philippines can articulate that its sovereignty claims are grounded in treaty-based title, effective control, and recognition—superior to mere historic rights claims lacking contemporaneous neutral recognition.
   • 
     

2. Rigid “box” interpretation of the Treaty of Paris

   • Opponents may argue that the geometric lines in the Treaty of Paris are binding outer limits of Philippine territory.
   • The Philippine defense, however, is that the Paris treaty was never intended as an immutable delimitation but as a cession of Spanish Philippines, subject to supplementation (e.g. by the Washington 1900 treaty). Indeed, the explicit supplemental wording of Washington 1900 must be construed to amend or enlarge the cession.
   • Treaties are to be interpreted in light of the object and purpose (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31), and ambiguity in Article III of the Paris treaty invites reference to subsequent agreements (the Washington treaty) to clarify parties’ common intent.
   • 
     

3. Interpretative limits of the Washington Treaty

   • Some critics might argue that the Washington treaty was limited to those outlying islands specifically mentioned (Cagayan, Sibutu, Sulu) and should not be stretched to embrace Spratlys or Scarborough.
   • The Philippine counter is that the plain language of the treaty is general (“any and all islands ... lying outside the lines …”) and must be understood in context with Spanish-era maps (Murillo Velarde, etc.). If the Spratlys and Scarborough were historically within the Spanish Philippines domain, they fall within “any and all islands” logic.
   • Moreover, the doctrine of ejusdem generis or generalia specialibus non derogant would require reading the specific named islands as exemplars, not limiting the general formula.
   • 
     

4. Limitations of the 1930 U.S.–U.K. convention scope

   • Some may contend that the 1930 convention’s delimitation applies only to boundary issues vis-à-vis British Borneo (i.e. Sulu Sea, Southeast Philippines) and is irrelevant to features far west in the Spratly seas.
   • That is a valid point. The Philippine legal team must carefully map which Spratly features fall within the sectors north/east of the 1930 boundary line. Only those features that fall on the Philippine side of that line gain direct support from this treaty. For others lying further west, the treaty is less determinative.
   • However, even for western features lying outside the 1930 delimitation, the combined weight of the 1898 + 1900 treaties and effectivités still supports the claim.
   • 
     

5. Acquiescence, contrary state practice, or protest by other states

   • Detractors might argue that other claimant states have consistently protested Philippine acts, which undermines effectivités.
   • The Philippine response is to scrutinize whether protests were timely, consistent, and sufficiently specific, and to demonstrate that certain administrative acts were either not protested or that protests lacked legal specificity. The burden lies on challengers to show effective counter-sovereign administration.
   • Furthermore, counterclaims must themselves bear treaty or customary foundations; mere protest does not displace superior title backed by treaty and continuous control.

---

E. Legal Arguments: Structure of the Philippine Case

Below is a schematic of how a Philippine legal brief or arbitration submission might organize its arguments:

1. Title (legal basis of sovereignty)

   • The Philippines holds the superior treaty title to the claimed islands by virtue of the Treaty of Paris (as an initial cession) and the clarifying supplementary Treaty of Washington, which expanded the cession to residual islands not captured by the original treaty box.
   • In addition, the 1930 U.S.–U.K. convention confirms that islands north/east of the delimitation belong to the Philippine archipelago, further bolstering the treaty title against third-party claims.
   • 
     

2. Interpretive Principles

   • Using the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (or customary analogues), adopt the principle that treaties must be interpreted in light of their ordinary meaning, context, object and purpose, subsequent agreements, and relevant supplementary materials (Vienna Art. 31–32 analogues).
   • Where ambiguity arises, subsequent treaties (Washington 1900) and consistent practice should inform interpretation.
   • 
     

3. Historical Evidence / Cartography

   • Introduce the Murillo Velarde 1734 map, Spanish-era charts, and internal Spanish administrative acts to demonstrate that key features (Spratly and Scarborough) were historically regarded within the Spanish Philippine domain.
   • Show how U.S. authorities, upon taking over, adopted Spanish maps and continued to treat those features as part of U.S. Philippines territory.
   • 
     

4. Effectivités / State Practice

   • Document Philippine acts of occupation, administration, military presence, law enforcement, infrastructure, protests of intrusion, and continual assertion of jurisdiction over the features.
   • Counter or explain protests from other states; show that many Philippine acts occurred without effective protest, or that protests were weak, vague, or not maintained.
   • 
     

5. Recognition and Succession

   • Show that the 1930 U.S.–U.K. convention binds Britain (and thus by succession Malaysia / British North Borneo entities) to the boundary framework recognizing Philippine islands.
   • Demonstrate that successor states (e.g. Malaysia) inherited those treaty obligations and cannot repudiate them unilaterally.
   • 
     

6. Supremacy of Treaty Title over “Historic Rights” Claims

   • Emphasize that treaty-based sovereignty is a superior legal basis compared to competing historic maritime claims not grounded in treaties or recognized by third states.
   • If relevant, rely on the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal ruling (though China does not accept it) which clarified limits of historic rights under UNCLOS.
   • 
     

7. Equitable and Practical Considerations

   • Highlight coherence of Philippine administration in ensuring maritime security, resource management, and regional stability.
   • Emphasize that recognition of Philippine sovereignty over KIG / Spratly features is consistent with stable maritime order and the rule of law.
   • 
     

8. Remedy Sought & Relief

   • Request declaratory affirmation of Philippine sovereignty over the KIG / Spratlys / Scarborough.
   • Seek injunctions against incursions, demand withdrawal of foreign vessels, and request international recognition and enforcement.

---

F. Conclusion & Strategic Recommendations

In conclusion, the Philippine claim to the Kalayaan (Spratly) islands and associated features is defensible on solid treaty foundations (Paris 1898 + Washington 1900) supplemented by the 1930 U.S.–U.K. boundary convention, backed by historical cartography and sustained state practice (effectivités). While adversary claimants may dispute the precise geographic reach, the Philippines’ case is not merely aspirational but based on established legal doctrine.

Nevertheless, prudent diplomacy and careful mapping of each contested feature relative to treaty lines, coupled with rigorous documentation of administrative acts and protest history, will be critical in any future arbitration, negotiation, or court adjudication.

---

Assisted by ChatGPT AI app, October 7, 2025.

Whether retired Philippine military officers and enlisted personnel remain subject to the Articles of War (and therefore to court-martial jurisdiction) if they engage in sedition/rebellion or conspire with active military officers to commit coup d’état

 

I. Under Philippine law the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended) and related statutes treat officers and enlisted men “placed in the retired list” as still subject to the rules and Articles of War and therefore liable to court-martial for breaches of those articles — including mutiny, sedition and related purely-military offenses — provided military jurisdiction lawfully attached (i.e., the person was subject to military law when the offense was committed or jurisdiction otherwise attached under governing rules). The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that, where a military court has properly acquired jurisdiction over a person and offense while the person was subject to military law, that jurisdiction does not ipso facto terminate by subsequent retirement or separation; proceedings may continue to termination. 

II. Governing statutory provisions 

1. Commonwealth Act No. 408 (the Articles of War), Art. 2 — “Persons subject to military law.”

— CA 408 sets out who is “subject to military law” and is the primary source defining military jurisdiction and the scope of the Articles. (See text of CA No. 408.) 

2. Article 105 (Mutiny or Sedition) (Articles of War). Quoting the operative language (short form):

“Article 105. Mutiny or Sedition. — (a) Any person subject to military law who, with intent to usurp or override military authority, refuses, in concert with any other persons, to obey order or otherwise do his duty or creates any violence or disturbance shall be liable for mutiny and punished by life imprisonment; (b) … any person subject to military law who, intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of lawful civil authority creates, in concert with any other person, revolt, violence, or other disturbance against that authority shall be liable for sedition and shall be punished by life imprisonment …” (Articles of War). 

3. Republic Act No. 340 (1948) (amendatory provision on retirement): succinctly provides that “Officers and enlisted men placed in the retired list shall be subject to the rules and articles of war and to trial by court-martial for any breach thereof.” 

4. Article 134 (Various Crimes) and related provisions: declares that violations of specified Articles (including mutiny/sedition) are purely military offenses triable exclusively by court-martial. (See CA 408, Arts. 91–136 and Art. 134.) 

III. Legal and doctrinal points (with support)

A. Statutory rule that retirees remain “subject” to military law.

Republic Act No. 340 (and the Articles of War as codified in CA No. 408 and implementing manuals) expressly state that officers and enlisted men placed in the retired list remain subject to the Articles of War and trial by court-martial for breaches thereof. That statutory rule is the anchor of the proposition that retirement does not, ipso facto, create immunity from military jurisdiction for military offenses covered by the Articles. 

B. Attachment of jurisdiction — the “jurisdiction once acquired” principle.

Philippine Supreme Court jurisprudence consistently treats military jurisdiction as following the familiar rule: where a military court lawfully acquires jurisdiction over the person and over the offense (for example, the offense was committed while the accused was in active service and the charge was formally filed/arraignment occurred while the accused was still subject to military law), that jurisdiction is not lost by the subsequent fact of the accused’s retirement, separation, or dropping from the rolls; the proceedings may continue to final judgment. See the Supreme Court’s clear statement to that effect in Garcia v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 198554, July 30, 2012). 

C. Purely military offenses, sedition/mutiny and conspiracy with active officers.

Mutiny and sedition (Article 105), solicitation/solicitation to mutiny (Article 91), failure to suppress mutiny/sedition (Article 68/69) and related articles are framed as “purely military offenses” when they involve persons subject to military law. The Articles of War penalize conspiratorial conduct in concert with others; when retired personnel act in concert with active personnel to overthrow lawful civil authority or to usurp military authority, the statutory language brings such conduct within the scope of Articles 91/105 (and compels court-martial jurisdiction where the accused are persons subject to military law). That statutory framing supports military jurisdiction where the required elements are proven and jurisdictional prerequisites are satisfied. 

D. Limits and interplay with civil courts / constitutional safeguards.

Although military jurisdiction over retirees is recognized statutorily and in practice, the military courts’ exercise of jurisdiction must be lawful (i.e., jurisdictional prerequisites satisfied). Historically—and as developed in jurisprudence—the Court has at times set limits when the case involves persons not properly subject to military law or when civil jurisdiction is exclusive (e.g., offences involving civilians as the offended party under certain circumstances). In other words, statutory language and judicial decisions must be read together to determine whether a particular retired person, in a particular factual pattern, may be tried by court-martial or must be tried by civil courts. See the trove of cases summarized below. 

IV. Three landmark Supreme Court decisions 

1. Jibin Arula v. Brig. Gen. Romeo C. Espino, G.R. No. L-28949, June 23, 1969 (Arula v. Espino).

— Facts (short): The petitioner challenged the assertion of military court jurisdiction in connection with incidents at Corregidor; the question concerned whether the accused was “subject to military law” and whether court-martial jurisdiction could continue.

— Holding (essence): The Court confirmed the scope of CA No. 408 (Articles of War) and explained the circumstances in which persons are subject to military law. The opinion explains that Article 94 et seq. govern concurrent/exclusive jurisdiction between military and civil courts and clarified that where the person is a “person subject to military law,” certain offenses are triable by court-martial. The Court recognized that military jurisdiction may attach under the Articles where the accused was subject to military law at the time of the offense. 

— Legal significance: Arula stands for the proposition that the Articles of War define who is subject to military law and the limits of military courts’ jurisdiction, and supports court-martial jurisdiction where the accused was properly subject to military law when the offense occurred.

2. In re: Abadilla (often reported as In re Abadilla / related petitions, G.R. No. L-79173 / proceedings around 1987).

— Facts (short): Proceedings arose from alleged mutiny / sedition and military authorities’ attempt to exercise court-martial jurisdiction over officers charged with mutiny-related offenses; question arose whether detention and exercise of military jurisdiction were lawful where officers had been dropped from active rolls or absented themselves.

— Holding (essence): The Supreme Court sustained military jurisdiction and detention where the record showed the officer was subject to military law at the time the alleged offense occurred and military jurisdiction had already attached; the fact of later removal/separation/dropping from the rolls did not render the military detention and prosecution unlawful where jurisdiction had attached earlier. 

— Legal significance: The Abadilla line of decisions reinforces the “jurisdiction once acquired” rule: once military jurisdiction properly attaches (offense committed while subject to military law; charge filed/arraignment while still subject), subsequent retirement/separation does not automatically divest the court-martial of jurisdiction.

3. Major General Carlos F. Garcia, AFP (Ret.) v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 198554, July 30, 2012 (Garcia v. Executive Secretary).

— Facts (short): Garcia, a general, was tried by a Special General Court-Martial for Articles of War violations (conduct unbecoming, conduct prejudicial to good order) and ultimately convicted and the sentence confirmed by the President. Garcia argued that his mandatory retirement divested the court-martial of jurisdiction.

— Holding (key points): The Supreme Court denied relief. It expressly held that where the General Court-Martial had jurisdiction over the person and the offense (the petitioner was an officer in active service when the alleged violations were committed and when arraignment occurred), retirement thereafter did not divest the court-martial of jurisdiction. The Court applied the settled rule that “jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated.” The Court furthermore treated military courts as “courts” in the sense necessary to apply certain procedural rules (and discussed application of Article 29 RPC as supplementary in execution matters). 

— Legal significance: Garcia is the modern, clear statement by the High Court that retirement does not automatically extinguish court-martial jurisdiction when jurisdiction had attached earlier. It is frequently cited for that proposition.

V. Practical application  (retiree conspires with active officers to commit coup / sedition)

1. If a retired officer conspires with active duty officers to commit sedition, mutiny, or coup–the key legal questions are: (a) was the retired person, at the time of the offense or at the critical time when jurisdiction must attach, “subject to military law” (statutory definition); (b) did a military court lawfully acquire jurisdiction over the person and offense while that person was still subject to military law (or otherwise as authorized); and (c) is the offense a purely military offense falling squarely under the Articles of War (mutiny/sedition and solicitation are in the Articles)? If the answers are yes, military court jurisdiction may be asserted. 

2. Where the retired person is no longer statutorily within the class of persons “subject to military law” at the time the alleged offense is committed — e.g., the offense occurs long after retirement and there is no statutory predicate to treat the person as subject to military law — civil courts may have exclusive jurisdiction for ordinary crimes (including rebellion/sedition under the Revised Penal Code) depending on facts (offended parties, place of commission, whether the offense is “purely military” or not). The interplay can be fact-sensitive and litigated. See Articles 94/134 of CA 408 and related jurisprudence. 

3. When retirees act in concert with active personnel: the presence of active duty co-conspirators can strengthen the military’s claim of jurisdiction over the entire conspiracy since the offense may be military in character and involve persons already subject to military law; nevertheless, constitutional and jurisdictional limits remain (e.g., where the offending conduct is essentially civilian or where the statutory prerequisites are not satisfied, civil courts may assert jurisdiction). Jurisprudence emphasizes an examination of the facts and the precise legal status of each accused at relevant times. 

VI. Caveats, constraints and constitutional considerations

 • The doctrine “jurisdiction once acquired continues” is powerful but not unlimited. If a person was never lawfully subject to military law with respect to the offense (for example, a long-retired private citizen who committed a purely civilian rebellion without any nexus to military status), civilian courts will likely be the proper forum. The Court has in earlier decisions protected the civil courts’ domain where statutory requisites were not met. 

• Where constitutional protections (e.g., right to jury trial in some systems; Philippine constitutional safeguards) or exclusive civil jurisdiction apply, courts will scrutinize the assertion of military jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has on various occasions delineated boundaries between civil and military jurisdiction. 

VII. Conclusion 

 Statute (CA 408 and RA 340) and Supreme Court jurisprudence (notably Arula, Abadilla-type authorities, and Garcia) support the conclusion that retired military personnel may be subject to the Articles of War and tried by court-martial for mutiny, sedition or conspiracy with active military officers — provided that military jurisdiction lawfully attached (the accused was a person subject to military law when the offense occurred or other statutory requisites were met). The controlling legal touchstones are (1) the statutory definitions (CA No. 408; RA 340), (2) whether the offense is a “purely military offense” under the Articles, and (3) whether jurisdiction attached before service termination; where those are satisfied, retirement does not automatically extinguish court-martial jurisdiction (Garcia). If the facts show the retired person fell outside military jurisdiction at the time, then civil prosecution (Revised Penal Code / regular courts) is the safer recourse.

VIII. Verified primary authorities and links 

Statutes and Articles of War:

Commonwealth Act No. 408 — Articles of War (full text). 

Republic Act No. 340 (1948) — retirement provision: “Officers and enlisted men placed in the retired list shall be subject to the rules and articles of war and to trial by court-martial for any breach thereof.” 

Important Articles (in CA No. 408 / Articles of War):

Article 105 (Mutiny or Sedition) — (text and penalties). 

Article 134 (Various Crimes) and related Articles 91–119 (purely military offenses and scope of court-martial jurisdiction). 

Supreme Court decisions:

Arula v. Espino, G.R. No. L-28949, June 23, 1969 — decision on scope of military jurisdiction and when courts-martial may try persons subject to military law. 

(In re) Abadilla / related Supreme Court rulings (1987 era, G.R. L-79173 / proceedings) — cases upholding military jurisdiction where the accused was subject to military law when allegations arose and jurisdiction had attached. (See the Abadilla materials and summaries.) 

Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 198554, July 30, 2012 — Supreme Court held retirement did not divest the court-martial of jurisdiction once jurisdiction had lawfully attached; also discussed application of Article 29 RPC and the President’s confirming power. 

Secondary / explanatory sources:

Case digests and academic commentary summarizing the cases above and the “jurisdiction once acquired” doctrine. 

---

Read:

https://lawphil.net/statutes/comacts/ca1938/ca_408_1938.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

Commonwealth Act No. 408, September 14, 1938   -- 

AN ACT FOR MAKING FURTHER AND MORE EFFECTUAL PROVISION FOR THE NATIONAL DEFENSE BY ESTABLISHING A SYSTEM OF MILITARY JUSTICE FOR PERSONS SUBJECT TO MILITARY LAW -- ARTICLES of WAR.

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/2/23938?utm_source=chatgpt.com

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/jul2012/gr_198554_2012.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1969/jun1969/gr_l-28949_1969.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/digest/in-re-abadilla-v-ramos?utm_source=chatgpt.com

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/jul2012/gr_198554_2012.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1969/jun1969/gr_l-28949_1969.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1969/jun1969/gr_l-28949_1969.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/digest/in-re-abadilla-v-ramos?utm_source=chatgpt.com

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/jul2012/gr_198554_2012.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

https://batas.org/case/gr-no-198554?tab=brief

---

Assisted by ChatGPT AI app, October 4, 2025.

Judicial clemency or recall of disqualification in lawyer disciplinary proceedings

Spouses Andre and Ma. Fatima Chambon vs. Atty. Christopher S. Ruiz, A.C. No. 11478 (Nov. 26, 2024) (resolution) / earlier decision (Sept. 5, 2017) 

I. Facts

• Parties / background

• Spouses Andre and Ma. Fatima Chambon were creditors of one Suzette Camasura Remoreras, with an obligation secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land (with improvements) covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). 

• When Remoreras defaulted, the Chambons initiated extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property. 

• In the course of that, the Chambons learned that Remoreras had filed a “Notice of Loss / Affidavit of Loss” for the TCT (or duplicate thereof) in connection with a new Owner’s Duplicate Copy. This affidavit was notarized by Atty. Christopher Ruiz. 

• The Chambons contended that (a) the jurat of the affidavit lacked the “competent evidence of identity” of Remoreras; (b) various essential particulars (title/description of instrument, names/addresses, identity evidence, date/time, type of notarial act) were left blank in the instrument; (c) the entries in Ruiz’s notarial register were also left incomplete or blank; (d) there was no showing that Ruiz personally knew Remoreras to dispense with the requirement of competent proof of identity. 

• Ruiz denied having notarized a “Release of Mortgage” document (alleged by the Chambons), attributing any register entries to his office secretary or mislabelling of an instrument (claiming that an entry indicated as “SPA” was actually a deed of absolute sale) and imputing negligence to his staff. 

• In the administrative / disciplinary proceedings (investigated by IBP-CBD), the Investigating Officer recommended revocation of Ruiz’s notarial commission for 4 years; the IBP Board adopted this but modified it to disqualification from reappointment for 3 years and suspension from practice for 3 years. 

• Procedural posture / issue now

• In 2017, the Supreme Court (En Banc) rendered a decision finding Ruiz guilty of violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, revoking his commission, perpetually disqualifying him from being notary, and suspending him from law practice for one (1) year. 

• In 2024 (Nov. 26), in the resolution form (A.C. No. 11478), the Court addressed a petition for judicial clemency filed by Ruiz, seeking recall (or mitigation) of his perpetual disqualification. 

Thus, the 2024 decision is a resolution on judicial clemency / recall of disqualification, rather than a fresh merits judgment on the underlying violation.

II. Issues

The Supreme Court faced principally:

• Whether judicial clemency / recall of perpetual disqualification (from being notary) may be granted in the circumstances (i.e. whether Ruiz is eligible).

• If so, whether the petitioner (Ruiz) satisfactorily established the requisites for clemency (rehabilitation, remorse, time elapsed, good record, etc.).

• Whether, if clemency is granted, the perpetual disqualification should be modified (e.g. to a fixed disqualification period) and under what terms / conditions.

Thus, the core legal issue is the availability, nature, and conditions of judicial clemency in lawyer discipline / notarial disqualification, and whether in Ruiz’s case the clemency petition should prosper.

III. Ruling(s) / Holding(s)

From the 2024 resolution:

• The petition for recall of perpetual disqualification is DENIED. (i.e., Ruiz’s perpetual disqualification stands) 

• The Court reaffirmed the 2017 disciplinary judgment: that Ruiz was guilty of violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice; his notarial commission is revoked; he is perpetually disqualified from holding a notarial commission; and he was suspended from the practice of law for one year (effective immediately at that time). 

• The Court elaborated on the doctrine of judicial clemency: it is not a right, but an extraordinary remedy; courts may consider it but must weigh relevant factors such as the seriousness of the offense, the lawyer’s conduct since, proof of rehabilitation, absence of repeated offenses, etc. 

• In Ruiz’s case, the Court found that he had not met the stringent criteria to warrant lifting or limiting the disqualification. The perniciousness and gravity of his breach of the notarial rules, and insufficient showing of enduring rehabilitation, militated against clemency. 

Thus, the ultimate judgment is: the perpetual disqualification remains; the clemency petition fails.

IV. Ratio Decidendi / Legal Principles

From reading the decision and attendant commentary, the following legal principles and rationales may be distilled (i.e. the ratio decidendi):

• Judicial clemency in lawyer discipline is an extraordinary remedy, not a matter of right.

The Court holds that clemency is not something automatically granted; the disciplinary authority retains discretion, and the petitioner must satisfactorily establish the requisites. 

• Perpetual disqualification arising from serious violation is not lightly recalled; the gravity of the offense is a crucial factor.

In determining whether recall is warranted, the Court must assess the nature, context, and severity of the misconduct (in this case, a notarial act with multiple and fundamental lapses). The more serious and damaging the violation, the harder clemency should be granted. 

• Evidence of genuine, sustained rehabilitation and remorse is essential.

The petitioner must show credible proof that after the disciplinary sanction, he or she has reformed, not committed new violations, maintained good character, and is fit to be restored (at least partially) to the exercise of functions previously barred. Mere passage of time, or general assertion of remorse, is insufficient without demonstrable proof. 

• The disciplinary court must balance public interest and the integrity of the bar / notarial office against the petitioner’s interests.

The decision to grant clemency does not rest solely on mercy toward the petitioner, but must consider the protection of the public, the preservation of trust in the notarial institution, and deterrence of similar misconduct by others. The Court must ensure that clemency does not undermine the sanctity and reliability of notarial acts. 

• Once disqualification is perpetual, the bar is high for its recall.

A perpetual disqualification imposed after a serious violation is not easily undone. The default presumption is that it should remain, absent a compelling showing of change. Hence, the petitioner bears a heavy burden, and clemency should not be granted unless the case is exceptional. (This flows from the Court’s treatment in Ruiz.) 

• The original findings of violation must remain undisturbed in the absence of grave error; clemency does not reopen merits unless exceptional.

In the 2024 resolution, the Court did not reexamine the factual or legal correctness of the 2017 decision (as that was final), but considered only whether the sanction may be relaxed via clemency. The clemency mechanism does not become a de facto appeal of the merits. 

V. Observations & Significance for Legal Practice

• This decision clarifies the standard and boundaries for judicial clemency or recall of disqualification in lawyer disciplinary proceedings — particularly where the sanction is perpetual disqualification from notarial functions.

• It underscores that serious breach of notarial norms (e.g. omission of proof of identity, blank entries, failure to verify) are treated severely, given the centrality of notarial acts to public reliance.

• For lawyers and those supervising notarial acts, the Ruiz case is a caution: non-compliance with the mandatory formalities of notarial practice (as embodied in the 2004 Rules) can yield irrevocable consequences.

• From a doctrinal standpoint, the decision helps delineate the limits of mercy in legal ethics enforcement: the Court remains cautious that clemency not erode accountability or public trust.

EN BANC

[ A.C. No. 11478, November 26, 2024 ]

SPOUSES ANDRE AND MA. FATIMA CHAMBON, COMPLAINANTS, 

VS. 

ATTY. CHRISTOPHER S. RUIZ, RESPONDENT.

References:

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/sep2017/ac_11478_2017.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/decisions/?citationMarker=43dcd9a7-70db-4a1f-b0ae-981daa162054 

https://www.digest.ph/decisions/spouses-chambon-v-ruiz?tab=digests&utm_source=chatgpt.com

https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/digest/chambon-v-ruiz?utm_source=chatgpt.com

https://www.asglawpartners.com/legal-ethics/2024/11/26/judicial-clemency-in-the-philippines-when-can-disqualified-lawyers-be-forgiven/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

* Assisted by ChatGPT AI app, October 1, 2025.