Whenever I read decisions of the Philippine Supreme Court showing the vigilance and moral courage of ordinary (underpaid and overworked) court personnel in exposing and opposing the corrupt and abusive behavior of egocentric, deluded and selfish judges, I regain and salvage my sagging faith in our much-maligned justice system. The system is not hopeless.
In the case of CONCERNED EMPLOYEES OF THE RTC OF DAGUPAN CITY vs. JUDGE ERNA FALLORAN-ALIPOSA, En Banc & Per Curiam, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1446. March 9, 2000, the Court dismissed the respondent Judge Erna Falloran-Aliposa (a law professor in law schools in the City of Manila and Dagupan City, Pangasinan) from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and leave credits and with prejudice to re-employment in any government agency or instrumentality for various acts of gross dishonesty and grave misconduct.
Let me quote the salient parts of the said decision for purposes of legal research of the visitors of this blog. Thus:
X x x.
In a Resolution dated June 22, 1999 the Court En Banc x x x referred the matter to Appellate Court Associate Justice Marina Buzon for investigation. X x x.
The Investigating Justice, acting accordingly, conducted the investigation and thereafter submitted her report and recommendation. In her Report dated January 12, 2000, Justice Buzon stated that:
In their memorandum, complainants confined their discussion on the alleged corrupt practices of respondent in demanding money from Leo Tandoc in connection with the case of his brother and from Atty. Mario Cera after the ex-parte presentation of evidence and who likewise gave P500.00 for the snacks of judges during the dialogue with the Chief Justice, as well as respondent’s claim that the telephone calls of her son, Jason, were official in order to be able to charge the same against the funds of the city government.
1.....Leo Tandoc testified that on August 3, 1993, respondent demanded P5,000.00 from him in order that his brother, Orlando, a detention prisoner, would not stay longer in jail, and that he gave the money to respondent the following day. It appears that a demurrer to evidence was filed by the counsel of Orlando Tandoc, who was prosecuted for theft, in view of the insufficiency of the evidence against him. In an order dated August 3, 1998, respondent dismissed the case against Orlando Tandoc on the ground that the evidence of the prosecution was insufficient to sustain a conviction. However, said Order did not contain a directive to the Jail Warden to release Orlando Tandoc from detention, unless he is being held for another lawful cause. Upon clarificatory questions by the undersigned Investigator, respondent admitted that she does not state in the order granting demurrer to evidence that the accused, who is a detention prisoner, be released unless held in confinement for another lawful cause, and that the defense counsel has to file a motion for the release of the accused. It is elementary that upon acquittal of a detention prisoner or the dismissal of the case against him by way of demurrer to evidence, he is entitled to be released from detention in connection with said particular case, considering that there is no more reason to deprive him of his liberty. A judge need not wait for a motion to be filed by the defense counsel praying for the release of the detention prisoner, especially considering that an order granting demurrer to evidence is not promulgated in open court and it might take some time before the defense counsel could receive a copy thereof through the mails. Notwithstanding a judgment of acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case, the Jail Warden will not release a detention prisoner without an order of release from the court which ordered the latter's detention. In view thereof, the order directing the release from detention of an accused upon his acquittal or dismissal of the case against him is usually included in the dispositive portion of the decision or order, a copy of which is furnished the Jail Warden.
The admission by respondent that it is not her policy to incorporate in the order granting demurrer to evidence and dismissing the case against the accused, who is a detention prisoner, that the latter be released unless held for another lawful cause, and that she only issued the order of release upon the filing of a motion to that effect does not speak well of respondent who has been a judge since 1992 and is also a professor handling Criminal Law Review. The fact that respondent delayed the issuance of the order of release of Orlando Tandoc supports the claim of Leo Tandoc that she demanded money from him, which he was forced to give, in order that his brother, Orlando, would not stay longer in jail.
X x x,
2. Atty. Mario Cera affirmed that on March 25, 1999, he was approached by Gloria Ydia who told him that she was instructed by respondent to solicit money for the snacks for the dialogue of RTC Judges of Region I. He gave P500.00 to Gloria Ydia and the latter entered the chambers of respondent. Gloria Ydia testified that she handed to respondent the P500.00 given to her by Atty. Cera and that she likewise approached Attys. Albino Gonzales and Fernando Cabrera and informed them that she was asked by respondent to solicit money from lawyers for the snacks of judges from Region I who would attend the dialogue with the Chief justice on March 26, 1999, after which said lawyers proceeded to the chambers of respondent. Attys. Gonzales and Cabrera did not testify to refute said allegations to Gloria Ydia. Thus, the affidavit of Atty. Gonzales denying that he gave something for the dialogue with the Chief Justice was denied admission as evidence for being hearsay.
Atty. Cera further stated that after he presented evidence ex-parte before respondent in her chambers in the case of Rural Bank of San Jacinto, Inc. vs. Armando Chan, respondent told him to give her P1,500.00, which he did, and that the stenographer did not demand anything from him and he thought that the amount of P1,500.00, included the fees for the transcript of stenographic notes.
X x x.
The acts of respondent in demanding and receiving money from Leo Tandoc as a condition for the release from detention of his brother, Orlando, although the case against the latter had already been dismissed, and also from Atty. Cera after the reception of the latter's evidence ex-parte constitute serious misconduct in office. A judge should always be a symbol of rectitude and propriety, comporting himself in a manner that will raise no doubt whatsoever about his honesty. It is this kind of gross and flaunting misconduct, no matter how nominal the amount involved on the part of those who are charged with the responsibility of administering the law and rendering justice quickly, which erodes the respect for law and the courts.
Furthermore, the undersigned has noted irregularities in the proceedings in the following cases involving ex-parte presentation of evidence, as borne out by the records brought by complainants, to wit:
a) Civil Case No. 97-01545-D
On August 5, 1998, respondent rendered, a decision wherein it is stated that at the ex-parte hearing, plaintiff's witness testified and identified the promissory note, chattel mortgage and demand letter, marked as Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", respectively. However, the formal offer of exhibits was received by the court only on August 18, 1998 and the documents attached thereto do not appear to have been marked as Exhibits "A", "B" and "C".
b) Civil Case No. 97-01963-D
The decision is dated August 11, 1998 whereas the formal offer of exhibits was received by the court only on August 18, 1998, without any exhibit attached thereto.
c) Civil Case No. 95-02306-D
The decision is dated September 14, 1998 whereas the offer of evidence was received by the court only on September 16, 1998 with only the promissory, note, allegedly marked. as Exhibit "A", attached thereto but the same was not so marked.
d) Civil Case No. 97-02012-D
The decision is dated August 10, 1998 whereas the formal offer of exhibits was received by the court only on August 18, 1998 without any exhibits attached thereto.
e) Civil Case No. 98-02205
The documents attached to the formal offer of exhibits do not bear any exhibit marking.
f) Civil Case No. 98-02177-D
The presentation of ex-parte evidence was originally set on July 29, 1998 but was reset to July 31, 1998 and thereafter to August 12, 1998 but the formal offer of exhibits is dated July 30, 1998, although it was received by the court only on August 18, 1998, without any exhibit attached thereto.
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. In Civil Cases Nos. 97-01545-D, 97-01963-D, 98-02306-D and 97-02012-D, respondent rendered judgment even before the evidence allegedly presented during the ex-parte proceedings were formally offered. Inasmuch as respondent required the plaintiff to present evidence, she should have waited for the formal offer of said evidence before rendering judgment.
Moreover, respondent admitted that she conducted the ex-parte presentation of evidence inside her chambers with only the plaintiff's representative and counsel present and without the attendance of any member of her staff; that she merely jotted down in a yellow pad the manifestations made by counsel and that she asked plaintiff's representative to show the documents in support of the complaint. Respondent did not testify that she marked the documents shown by plaintiff's representative, which probably explains why the documents attached to the formal offer of exhibits filed in some of the cases do not bear any marking.
Respondent apparently had forgotten that she was presiding in a court of record where the attendance of the court interpreter and stenographer in all proceedings is required. Under the Manual for Clerks of Court, the interpreter has the duty to attend all court hearings, administer oath to witnesses, mark all exhibits introduced in evidence, prepare and sign all minutes of session, maintain and keep in custody a record book of cases calendared for hearing; while the stenographer is charged with taking stenographic notes on all matters that transpire during court hearings and transcribing them. One can only surmise what transpired inside the chambers of respondent during the ex-parte presentation of evidence which she did not want her interpreter and stenographer to witness. Respondent argued that there was no need for a stenographer during the ex-parte presentation of evidence because there were only three or four statements made by counsel, which she jotted down in a yellow pad, and that her stenographers were demanding P500.00 for a single-paged transcript of stenographic notes. Respondent did not explain, however, why she did not ask her interpreter to attend the hearing for the purpose of administering oath to plaintiff's witness and marking the exhibits to be introduced in evidence. Consequently, the documents allegedly introduced in evidence in said proceeding were not marked. In Contreras vs. Solis, it was stressed that the duty of a judge is not only to administer justice but also to conduct himself in a manner that would avoid any suspicion of irregularity. He has the avowed duty of promoting confidence in the judicial system. Any act which would give the appearance of impropriety is in itself reprehensible. This is the price which must be paid by one who joins the judiciary. Such practice of respondent in conducting ex-parte presentation of evidence inside her chambers, without the attendance of her interpreter and stenographer, is not only improper but also gives rise to questions on her integrity.
X x x.
However, the undersigned does not believe that complainants were motivated by ill-will against respondent for being strict with them and for disciplining them. Thus, Ever Mejia explained that she wants respondent to be removed from Branch 41, not because the latter was strict and had reprimanded her, but because she cannot stand respondent's practices, she pities the litigants who cannot obtain justice and she wants to help cleanse the judiciary. Besides, complainants cannot be sure that if respondent is removed from their Branch, the latter's replacement will not be as strict with them. In the case of Gloria Ydia, she had the courage to testify against respondent despite her awareness that the latter was imputing immoral, illegal and corrupt practices against her, as detailed in the Answer. In fact, respondent subsequently filed an administrative case against Gloria Ydia and Judge Deodoro Sison for grave misconduct and immorality.
Settled is the rule that in administrative proceedings, mere preponderance of evidence suffices to establish the charges against a judge. As thus shown by the evidence, respondent has failed to measure up to the exacting standards of conduct and integrity expected of members of the judiciary, as embodied in the following provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct:
"CANON 2
A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.
Rule 2.01. - A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."
As held in office of the Court Administrator vs. Barron:
"Respondent judge tainted the image of the Judiciary to which he owes fealty and the obligation to keep it at all times unsullied and, worthy 'of the people's trust. There is no place in the Judiciary for those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity. Respondent judge does not deserve to remain in the Judiciary and should accordingly be removed from the service."
X x x.
The Court fully agrees with Justice Buzon in her Report and thus adopts her recommendations. This Court "[h]as repeatedly stressed that a judge is the visible representation of the law and the embodiment of the people's sense of justice and that, accordingly, he should constantly keep away from any act of impropriety, not only in the performance of his official duties but also his everyday actuations. No other position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than perhaps a seat in the judiciary. A judge must be the first to abide by the law and to weave an example for the others to follow." A judge should always be a symbol of rectitude and propriety, comporting himself in a manner that will raise no doubt whatsoever about his honesty. As more emphatically stated in Atty. Lauro Gacayan, et al. v. Hon. Fernando Vil Pamintuan:
...the Court pointed out in Dawa v. De Asa that the (p)eople’s confidence in the judicial system is founded not only on the magnitude of legal knowledge and diligence of the members of the bench, but also on the highest standard of integrity and moral uprightness they are expected to possess. It is towards this sacrosanct goal of ensuring the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary that the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates the following:
‘CANON 2 -- A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.
RULE 2.01. - A judge should so behave at all times to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
CANON 3 - A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE.
RULE 3.01 - A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.
X x x.
The Canons of Judicial Ethics further provides that: `[A] judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also his everyday life should be beyond reproach.' Thus, the Court in taking the respondent to task in Sarah .B. Vedana v. Judge Eudarlo B. Valencia, minced no words when it said:
...his being a public official, holding a position in the Judiciary specifically entrusted with the sacred duty of administering justice, breached Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial conduct and Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which mandate respectively, that `a judge should avoid impropriety in all activities', and that `a judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in everyday life, should be beyond reproach.’ These most exacting standards of decorum are demanded from the magistrates if only, in the language of Rule 2.01 of Canon 2 of the code of Judicial conduct, to ‘promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.’
The spirit and philosophy underlying these Canons is best expressed in Castillo v. Calanog thus:
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of even a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his judicial juties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality; a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As we have very recently explained, a judge’s official life can not simply be detached or separated from his personal existence. Thus:
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion.
Verily, no position is more demanding as regards moral righteousness and uprightness of any individual than a seat with on the Bench. Within the hierarchy of courts, trial courts stand as an important and visible symbol of government, especially considering that as opposed to appellate courts, trial judges are those directly in contact with the parties, their counsel and the communities in which the Judiciary is bound to serve. Occupying as he does an exalted position in the administration of justice, a judge must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him. Thus, the judge must comport himself at all times in such manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice. In insulating the Bench from the unwarranted criticism, thus preserving our democratic way of life, it is essential that judges, like Caesar’s wife, should be above suspicion.
This admonition applies with even more stringence to municipal, metropolitan and regional trial court judges, like herein respondent, because they are judicial front-liners who have direct contact with the litigating parties. They are the intermediaries between conflicting interests and the embodiment of the people’s sense of justice. Verily –
The courts exist to promote justice; accordingly, the judge’s official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of his official duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach. He is the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of justice. He should administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depository [of] power, but a judge under the sanction of Law.
All those who don the judicial robe must always instill in their minds that exhortation that "[T]he administration of justice is a mission. Judges, from the lowest to the highest levels are the gems in the vast government bureaucracy, beacon lights looked upon as the embodiments of all what is right, just and proper, the ultimate weapons against injustice and oppression. The Judiciary hemorrhages every time a Judge himself transgresses the very law he is sworn to uphold and defend at all costs. This should not come to pass."
The evidence before us is a sad testament to respondent’s utter disregard of such a mission as well as an appalling demonstration of gross abuse and misuse of judicial prerogatives. Restating what has been said earlier, a member of the Judiciary is commanded by law to exhibit the highest degree of moral certitude and is bound by the highest standards of honesty and integrity. Life, liberty, and property are defined and molded as judges perform their sworn tasks to uphold the law and to administer justice. There is no place in the Judiciary for those who can not meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity. This court has been watchful of dishonest judges and will not withhold penalty when called for to uphold the people’s faith in the Judiciary.
X x x.
Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr.
lcmlaw@gmail.com