sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/august2012/181180.pdf
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Award of Disability Benefits The Labor Code provision material to this case, and the one being challenged, states:
ART. 192. PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY
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(c) The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent:
(1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days, except as otherwise provided for in the Rules.
The rule referred to in the above provision is Rule X, Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations implementing Book IV of the Labor Code. It states:
SEC. 2. Period of entitlement. – (a) The income benefit shall be paid beginning on the first day of such disability. If caused by an injury or sickness it shall not be paid longer than 120 consecutive days except where such injury or sickness still requires medical attendance beyond 120 days but not to exceed 240 days from onset of disability in which case
benefit for temporary total disability shall be paid. However, the System may declare the total and permanent status at any time after 120 days of continuous temporary total disability as may be warranted by the degree of actual loss or impairment of physical or mental functions as determined by the System.
As we said in Vergara, “[t]hese provisions are to be read hand in hand with the POEA [SEC] whose Section 20 [(B)] (3) states”:
“Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.”
Elucidating on the combination of the Labor Code provisions and the POEA SEC, this Court, in Vergara said:
As these provisions operate, the seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable to work. He receives his basic wage
during this period until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA Standard Employment Contract and by applicable Philippine laws. If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made because the
seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within this period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists. The seaman may of course also be
declared fit to work at any time such declaration is justified by his medical condition.
Upon Tomacruz’s return to the country, he underwent medical treatment in accordance with the terms of the POEA SEC. From the time Tomacruz was repatriated on November 18, 2002, until he was declared fit to work on July 25, 2003, he was given extensive medical attention supervised by a company-designated physician. The only time conflict arose
was when despite the fit to work declaration, petitioners refused to hire Tomacruz. This was what prompted Tomacruz to seek a second medical opinion, on which he based his demand for disability and sickness benefits.
As we said in Vergara, “[a]s we outlined above, a temporary total disability only becomes permanent when so declared by the company-designated] physician within the periods he is allowed to do so, or upon the expiration of the maximum 240-day medical treatment period without a declaration of either fitness to work or the existence of a permanent disability.”
Applying the foregoing considerations in the case at bar, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ ruling. While the Court of Appeals held that Tomacruz’s disability was permanent since he was unable to perform his job for more than 120 days,
this Court has clarified in Vergara and likewise in Magsaysay, that this “temporary total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days.”
This clarification, however, does not change the judgment.
The sequence of events is undisputed and uncontroverted. From the time Tomacruz was repatriated on November 18, 2002, he submitted himself to the care and treatment of the company-designated physician. When the company-designated physician made a declaration on July 25, 2003 that Tomacruz was already fit to work, 249 days had already lapsed from the time he was repatriated. As such, his temporary total disability should be deemed total and permanent, pursuant to Article 192 (c)(1) of the Labor Code and its implementing rule.
The ruling in Sarocam v. Interorient Maritime Ent., Inc. being cited by petitioner cannot be applied in this case as the seafarer therein was declared “fit for duty”
only thirteen (13) days from the date of his repatriation. Moreover, he executed a release and quitclaim barely three
months from being pronounced fit to work.
On top of this, he only filed his complaint for benefits and damages roughly eleven months after he was declared fit for work, based on the medical findings of his doctors of choice,
whom he consulted only eight to nine months after he was examined by the company-designated physician.
Neither will petitioners’ argument that Tomacruz’s illness existed even before his employment with them
serve to relieve them of their duty to pay him disability benefits. As the Court of Appeals pronounced, this assertion “deserves scant consideration” since the finding of both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that Tomacruz contracted his illness while on board the M/V Salinga was neither disputed nor controverted.
Even the company-designated physician’s certification that Tomacruz was already fit to work does not make him ineligible to receive permanent total disability benefits. The fact remains that Tomacruz was unable to work for more than 240 days as he was only certified to work on July 25, 2003.
Consequently, Tomacruz’s disability is considered permanent and total, and the fact that he was declared fit to work by the company-designated physician “does not matter.”
On the contention that the opinion of Tomacruz’s doctor of choice should not prevail over that of the company-designated physician, this Court deems this issue now irrelevant as Tomacruz’s entitlement to disability benefits had been decided on the bases of law and contract, and not on the
medical findings of either doctor.
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