Void certificate of candidacy

Part 5

THE AFFIRMATION OF A CANDIDATE'S DISQUALIFICATION, ALTHOUGH MADE LONG AFTER THE ELECTION, REACHES BACK TO THE TIME OF FILING OF HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY. THE RULE ON SUCCESSION DOES NOT APPLY . THE QUALIFIED OR ELIGIBLE CANDIDATE (THE SECOND-RANKING CANDIDATE) WHO GARNERED THE NEXT HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES IS DEEMED THE WINNER.

In the case of CASAN MACODE MAQUILING VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET. AL., G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013, it was held that with Arnado’s DISQUALIFICATION, Maquiling then became the WINNER in the election as he obtained the HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES FROM AMONG THE QUALIFIED CANDIDATES.

The Court has ruled in the cases of ARATEA v. COMELEC54 and JALOSJOS v. COMELEC that A VOID CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY (COC) CANNOT PRODUCE ANY LEGAL EFFECT.

Thus, the votes cast in favor of the INELIGIBLE CANDIDATE are NOT CONSIDERED at all in determining the winner of an election.

Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an INELIGIBLE CANDIDATE do NOT constitute the SOLE AND TOTAL EXPRESSION OF THE SOVEREIGN VOICE. The votes cast in favor of ELIGIBLE AND LEGITIMATE CANDIDATES form part of that voice and must also BE RESPECTED.

As in any contest, elections are GOVERNED BY RULES that determine the QUALIFICATIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS of those who are allowed to participate as players. When there are participants who turn out to be INELIGIBLE, their VICTORY IS VOIDED and the laurel is AWARDED to the NEXT IN RANK WHO DOES NOT POSSESS ANY OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS NOR LACKS ANY OF THE QUALIFICATIONS set in the rules TO BE ELIGIBLE as candidates.

There is no need to apply the rule cited in LABOR V. COMELEC that when the voters are well aware within the realm of notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification and still cast their votes in favor of said candidate, then the ELIGIBLE CANDIDATE obtaining the NEXT HIGHER number of votes may be DEEMED ELECTED. That rule is also a MERE ORBITER that further complicated the rules affecting qualified candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.

The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is NOT a prerequisite for the DISQUALIFICATION to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner. The SECOND-PLACER in the vote count is ACTUALLY THE FIRST-PLACER among the QUALIFIED CANDIDATES.

That the DISQUALIFIED CANDIDATE has already been PROCLAIMED and has ASSUMED OFFICE is of NO MOMENT. The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that EXISTED PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY VOIDS NOT ONLY THE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY (COC) BUT ALSO THE PROCLAMATION.

SECTION 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:

"SECTION 6. EFFECT OF DISQUALIFICATION CASE. - Any candidate who has been DECLARED BY FINAL JUDGMENT to be DISQUALIFIED shall NOT be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall NOT BE COUNTED. If for any reason a candidate is NOT DECLARED by final judgment BEFORE AN ELECTION to be disqualified and he is VOTED FOR and receives the WINNING NUMBER of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall CONTINUE WITH THE TRIAL and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, UPON MOTION of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof ORDER THE SUSPENSION OF THE PROCLAMATION of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong."

There was no chance for Arnado’s proclamation to be suspended under this rule because Arnado failed to file his answer to the petition seeking his disqualification. Arnado only filed his Answer on 15 June 2010, LONG AFTER the ELECTIONS and after he was ALREADY PROCLAIMED as the winner.

The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy involves his CITIZENSHIP. It does not involve the commission of election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been elected, from holding the office.

The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado was both a Filipino and an American citizen when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual citizen disqualified to run for public office based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.

Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position." The prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under any of the enumeration from participating as candidates in the election.

With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY is thus rendered VOID FROM THE BEGINNING. It could not have produced any other legal effect except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his answer to the petition when the elections were conducted already and he was already proclaimed the winner.

To hold that such PROCLAMATION is valid is to NEGATE the PROHIBITORY CHARACTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION which Arnado POSSESSED EVEN PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY. The affirmation of Arnado's disqualification, although made LONG AFTER THE ELECTIONS, REACHES BACK TO THE FILING OF THE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY. Arnado is declared to be NOT A CANDIDATE AT ALL in the May 2010 elections.

Arnado being a NON-CANDIDATE, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves MAQUILING as the QUALIFIED CANDIDATE who obtained the HIGHEST number of votes. Therefore, the RULE ON SUCCESSION under the Local Government Code WILL NOT APPLY.



LAWS AND CASES CITED:

Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.

Sec. 39, Sec. 40(d) and Sec. 44, Local Government Code

Commonwealth Act No. 63

Torayno, Sr. v. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 574 [2000];

Santos v. COMELEC, 103 SCRA 628 [1981];

Sanchez v. Del Rosario, 1 SCRA 1102 [1961];

Reyes v. COMELEC, 97 SCRA 500 [1980].

Mercado vs. Manzano, 367 Phil. 132 (1999).

Sinsuat vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 105919, 6 August 1992, 212 SCRA 309.

AASJS v. Datumanong, G.R. No. 160869, 11 May 2007, 523 SCRA 108.

Cordora v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176947, 19 February 2009, 580 SCRA 12.

Fivaldo v. COMELEC, 255 Phil. 934, 944 (1989).

Velasco vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 180051, 24 December 2008, 575 SCRA 590, 614-615.

Quizon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177927, 15 February 2008, 545 SCRA 635, Saya-ang v. COMELEC, 462 Phil. 373 (2003).

Aratea vs. Comelec, G. R. No. 195229, 9 October 2012.

Jalosjos vs. Comelec, G.R. Nos. 193237/193536, 9 October 2012.

Labo vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 105111, 3 July 3 1992, 211 SCRA 297, 312.

Source:

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/gr_195649_2013.html#rnt45