Technicality vs. Merits of the Case. Doctrine of Liberality in Litigation.

 "Under the circumstances, the failure to file the appellant’s brief on time rightly deserved the outright rejection of the appeal. The acts of his counsel bound Diaz like any other client. It was, of course, only the counsel who was well aware that the Rules of Court fixed the periods to file pleadings and equally significant papers like the appellant’s brief with the lofty objective of avoiding delays in the administration of justice.

Yet, we have before us an appeal in two criminal cases in which the appellant lost his chance to be heard by the CA on appeal because of the failure of his counsel to serve and file the appellant’s brief on time despite the grant of several extensions the counsel requested. Diaz was convicted and sentenced to suffer two indeterminate sentences that would require him to spend time in detention for each conviction lasting two years, as minimum, to five years, as maximum, and to pay fines totaling ₱100,000.00 (with subsidiary imprisonment in case of his insolvency). His personal liberty is now no less at stake. This reality impels us to look beyond the technicality and delve into the merits of the case to see for ourselves if the appeal, had it not been dismissed, would have been worth the time of the CA to pass upon. After all, his appellant’s brief had been meanwhile submitted to the CA. While delving into the merits of the case, we have uncovered a weakness in the evidence of guilt that cannot be simply ignored and glossed over if we were to be true to our oaths to do justice to everyone.

We feel that despite the CA being probably right in dismissing the excuses of oversight and excusable negligence tendered by Diaz’s counsel to justify the belated filing of the appellant’s brief as unworthy of serious consideration, Diaz should not be made to suffer the dire consequence. Any accused in his shoes, with his personal liberty as well as his personal fortune at stake, expectedly but innocently put his fullest trust in his counsel’s abilities and professionalism in the handling of his appeal. He thereby delivered his fate to the hands of his counsel. Whether or not those hands were efficient or trained enough for the job of handling the appeal was a learning that he would get only in the end. Likelier than not, he was probably even unaware of the three times that his counsel had requested the CA for extensions. If he were now to be left to his unwanted fate, he would surely suffer despite his innocence. How costly a learning it would be for him! That is where the Court comes in. It is most important for us as dispensers of justice not to allow the inadvertence or incompetence of any counsel to result in the outright deprivation of an appellant’s right to life, liberty or property.13

We do not mind if this softening of judicial attitudes be mislabeled as excessive leniency. With so much on the line, the people whose futures hang in a balance should not be left to suffer from the incompetence, mindlessness or lack of professionalism of any member of the Law Profession. They reasonably expect a just result in every litigation. The courts must give them that just result. That assurance is the people’s birthright. Thus, we have to undo Diaz’s dire fate."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EUGENIO RELLON alias "GENIO", accused-appellant. G.R. No. 74051, November 8, 1988.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

EUGENIO RELLON alias "GENIO", accused-appellant.

G.R. No. 74051, November 8, 1988. 

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-appellant.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1988/nov1988/gr_74051_1988.html

GENERAL SEARCH WARRANTS

G.R. No. 213875, July 15, 2020 MERLINA R. DIAZ, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

"We deny the Petition.

The requirements of a valid search warrant are laid down in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution27 and in Rule 126, Section 428 of the Rules Court, viz.: "(1) probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized."29 The absence of any of these requisites will cause the downright nullification of the search warrant.30

There is no question that the search warrant was issued after judicial determination of probable cause. This Court is thus confined in determining the presence or absence of the fifth requisite element as stated above, i.e., whether the subject warrant specifically described the place to be searched.

"A search warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized in order for it to be valid, otherwise, it is considered as a general warrant which is proscribed by both jurisprudence and the 1987 Constitution."31 The particularity of the place described is essential in the issuance of search warrants to avoid the exercise by the enforcing officers of discretion to decide on their own where to search and whom and what to seize.32 "Additionally, the requisite of particularity is related to the probable cause requirement in that, at least under some circumstances, the lack of a more specific description will make it apparent that there has not been a sufficient showing to the [court] that the described items are to be found in a particular place."33

Notably, it is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can ascertain and identify with reasonable effort the place intended, and distinguish it from other places in the community. Hence, "[a] designation that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness."34

Simply put, the test of whether the requirement of definiteness or particularity has been met is whether the description of the place to be searched under the warrant is sufficient and descriptive enough to prevent a search of other premises located within the surrounding area or community. A "place" may refer to a single building or structure, or a house or residence,35 such as in the case at bar.

Thus, it has been held that a designation of a place to be searched as "MASAGANA compound located at Governor's Drive, Barangay Lapidario, Trece Martires, Cavite City ";36 "the house of the accused Estela Tuan at Brgy. Gabriela Silang, Baguio City ";37 or "premises of Felix Gumpal Compound located at Ipil Junction, Echague, Isabela"38 is sufficient description of the premises to be searched.

The search warrant in the instant case clearly complied with the foregoing standard since it particularly described the place to be searched, which is petitioner's "house at Gitna, Brgy. Cuyab, San Pedro, Laguna." The subject search warrant sufficiently described the place to be searched with clear indication that the same was intended to authorize a search of the entire house of petitioner, albeit confined to the area of her house, to the exclusion of the other two structures or buildings similarly located along the street of Gitna. Simply put, the constitutional requirement of definiteness has been met. We therefore agree with the CA when it held, viz.:

In this case, although the house number of petitioner's house was not indicated in Search Warrant No. 97 (12), the description of the place to be searched was sufficient as the police officers who served the same were able, with reasonable effort, to ascertain and identify the house of petitioner at Gitna, Barangay Cuyab, San Pedro, Laguna, as stated in the search warrant. It bears emphasis that informant Jericho Labrador, when asked by Executive Judge Morga, also drew sketches where petitioner's house was located as well [as] the floor plan of her house, which were used by the searching team.39

This notwithstanding, petitioner argued that the warrant was issued on a mistaken belief that the house was a single dwelling unit occupied by petitioner alone. Petitioner thus insisted that the inaccurate depiction of the house's floor plan, and the consequent search of the entire premises of a supposed multiple-occupancy structure, invalidated the warrant.

In this regard, the records would confirm that the house described in the warrant was composed of and divided into five separate units or rooms each occupied by petitioner, and her four siblings and their families. Petitioner explained that although the units or rooms were contiguous to each other, each unit was a complete household independent of the other and may be entered only through their respective front doors. Considering the foregoing, petitioner stressed that the central issue in the instant case is not whether the police officers who enforced the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place to be searched, but rather, whether the description of the place to be searched set out in the warrant was sufficient which would prevent the officers from exercising discretion.

From the foregoing, it would appear that the issue on the requirement of definiteness raised by petitioner is two-tiered – that of the place to be searched, i.e., her home at No. 972, Gitna, Brgy. Cuyab, San Pedro, Laguna, and the interior description thereof. Petitioner persists on the lack of sufficient definiteness of the latter.

While petitioner did not deny that the place actually searched by the police officers is her home in Gitna, Brgy. Cuyab, San Pedro, Laguna, she argued, however, that it was incumbent upon PO2 Avila and Labrador to infonn Judge Morga of an accurate description or floor plan of the house so as to confine the scope of the search within the unit where petitioner actually resided. Considering PO2 Avila's and Labrador's failure to provide Judge Morga a full and accurate description of the house described in the warrant, i.e., that the same was partitioned into five separate units, and that there were other families living in the other units of the house, Judge Morga was led to believe that the area to be searched comprised of the whole house.

Petitioner thus argued that the coverage of the warrant was broader than appropriate considering that the search covered the whole house and was not limited to the unit actually occupied by petitioner. To petitioner's mind, this gave the police officers undue discretion in enforcing the warrant, which they allegedly did when they searched the units occupied by petitioner's siblings, namely, Leomer and Leonora.

In support of her argument, petitioner cited People v. Estrada40 (Estrada) and Paper Industries Corp. of the Philippines v. Asuncion41 (Asuncion). In Estrada,42 this Court invalidated the search warrant because it merely indicated the address of the compound where the place to be searched was located, without, however, pinpointing the specific house to be searched from the other buildings or structures which were also situated within the same compound. Along the same lines, this Court, in Asuncion,43 characterized the search warrant as a general warrant since it authorized a search of a compound, which, however, was made up of "200 offices/building, 15 plants, 84 staff houses, 1 airstrip, 3 piers/wharves, 23 warehouses, 6 POL depots/quick service outlets and some 800 miscellaneous structure, all of which are spread out over some one hundred fifty-five hectares."

Petitioner's reliance on the said cases, however, was misplaced as the factual milieus therein are not in all fours with the case at bench. The ruling in these cases were, on one hand, premised on the fact that the subject warrants gave the police officers unbridled discretion to search several, if not all, structures found inside the compounds – enclosed areas of land containing clusters of structures and/or buildings – while probable cause existed in only one of the several structures located in the compounds. Clearly, the warrants in these cases gave the police officers unbridled discretion and, therefore, illegal authority to search all the structures found inside the compounds. On the other hand, the instant case involved a single structure, and, unlike in the Estrada and Asuncion cases, was readily identifiable to the police officers serving the warrant from the other structures similarly located along the street where petitioner's house was located. In other words, the description of petitioner's house was sufficient and descriptive enough to prevent a search of other structures located within the surrounding area or community.

What is therefore involved in this case is a singular structure containing multiple family dwellings or units therein – a fact which was discovered only after the search warrant was enforced and the search of petitioner's house was conducted by the police officers. The pith of the issue therefore lies in the validity of a warrant which appears to have authorized the search of the entire premises of a supposed multiple-occupancy structure containing several units occupied by other persons other than petitioner.

This Court finds that the omission of the warrant to (a) indicate that the place to be searched contained five rooms which were separately occupied by petitioner and her siblings; and (b) confine the search to petitioner's unit is inconsequential and, therefore, does not affect the warrant's validity for the following reasons:

First, the units or rooms where petitioner and her siblings lived all form an integral part of the house, which, as already discussed, was sufficiently described with particularity under the warrant. The rooms inside the house, which were in fact occupied by family members of petitioner, cannot be treated separately as they form part of the house where petitioner actually resided.

Prudente v. Dayrit44 is instructive on this point, viz.:

Petitioner also assails the validity of the search warrant on the ground that it failed to particularly describe the place to be searched, contending that there were several rooms at the ground floor and the second floor of the PUP.

The rule is, that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended. In the case at bar, the application for search warrant and the search warrant itself described the place to be searched as the premises of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, located at Anonas St., Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila more particularly, the offices of the Department of Military Science and Tactics at the ground floor, and the Office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente, at PUP, Second Floor and other rooms at the second floor. The designation of the places to be searched sufficiently complied with the constitutional injunction that a search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched, even if there were several rooms at the ground floor and second floor of the PUP.

People v. Tuan45 also teaches that the description of the place to be searched under the warrant described as the "house of the accused Estela Tuan at Brgy. Gabriela Silang, Baguio City," which contained several rooms, was specific enough and, therefore, satisfied the constitutional requirement of definiteness:

In the case at bar, the address and description of the place to be searched in the Search Warrant was specific enough.1âшphi1 There was only one house located at the stated address, which was accused-appellant's residence, consisting of a structure with two floors and composed of several rooms.46

Second, even assuming that an ambiguity or inaccuracy in the interior description of the place to be searched may affect the validity of the warrant,47 such finding, which only emerged after the warrant was issued, has no bearing on its validity or invalidity.

That the house of petitioner was composed of several units separately occupied by her siblings was discovered only after the search warrant was enforced and the search of petitioner's house was conducted by the police officers. Notably, PO2 Avila could not have known or detected the multi-unit character of petitioner's house prior to the actual search.

On this point, it has been held that the requirement of particularity as to the things to be seized does not require technical accuracy in the description of the property to be seized, and that a search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow it to be described.48 The same principle should be applied in the case at bench. It would be unreasonable to expect PO2 Avila, or an outsider such as Labrador for that matter, to have extensive knowledge of the interior set-up or floor plan of petitioner's house without, however, having apparent authority or opportunity to access the premises prior to the search.

In this regard, the Court holds that the validity of the warrant must be assessed on the basis of the pieces of information made available to Judge Morga at the time PO2 Avila applied for the issuance of the search warrant which, in this case, were sufficiently supported by the sketches of Labrador, and the testimonies of PO2 Avila and Labrador, who were, in fact, personally examined by Judge Morga in the form of searching questions and answers. Quoting Justice John Paul Stevens' opinion in Maryland v. Garrison49:

Those items of evidence that emerge after the warrant is issued have no bearing on whether or not a warrant was validly issued. Just as a discovery of the contraband cannot validate a warrant invalid when issued, so is it equally clear that the discovery of facts demonstrating that a valid warrant was unnecessarily broad does not retroactively invalidate the warrant. The validity of the warrant must be assessed on the basis of the information that the officers disclosed, or had a duty to discover and disclose, to the issuing Magistrate."

G.R. No. 213875, July 15, 2020

MERLINA R. DIAZ, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/jul2020/gr_213875_2020.html

SEARCH WARRANTS

"In the present petition, Ogayon raises the following assignment of errors:

I.

The CA erred in finding that Ogayon had waived his right to question the legality of the search warrant.

II.

Even granting without admitting that Ogayon had already waived his right to question the legality of the search warrant, the search conducted was still highly irregular, thereby rendering the seized articles as inadmissible in evidence.

Ogayon primarily argues that there was a violation of his constitutional right to be secure in his person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. He denies waiving the right through his supposed failure to assail the search warrant’s validity during the trial. On the contrary, he claims to have objected to the prosecution’s formal offer of the search warrant.

Even assuming that he questioned the search warrant’s validity only during appeal, Ogayon contends that this should not be interpreted as a waiver of his right. Since an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for review, any objection made on appeal, though not raised before the trial court, should still be considered.

Ogayon next argues that the search conducted by the police team on his premises, pursuant to an already defective search warrant, was highly irregular. He and his spouse were in their house when SPO4 Caritos allegedly discovered the shabu in the comfort room located outside their house, so they were not able to witness the search. Moreover, he claimed that there were other persons near the premises of his house (and the comfort room) when the search was conducted. Hence, it could not indubitably be concluded that the seized items were under his actual and effective control and possession.

The Court’s Ruling

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is one of the fundamental constitutional rights. Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, reads:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. [emphasis ours]

This right has been included in our Constitution since 1899 through the Malolos Constitution20 and has been incorporated in the various organic laws governing the Philippines during the American colonization,21 the 1935 Constitution,22 and the 1973 Constitution.23

The protection afforded by the right is reinforced by its recognition as a fundamental human right under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,24 to both of which the Philippines is a signatory.25 Both the Covenant and the Declaration recognize a person’s right against arbitrary or unlawful interference with one’s privacy and property.26

Given the significance of this right, the courts must be vigilant in preventing its stealthy encroachment or gradual depreciation and ensure that the safeguards put in place for its protection are observed.

Under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant is central to the right, and its existence largely depends on the finding of the judge conducting the examination.27 To substantiate a finding of probable cause, the Rules of Court specifically require that –

Rule 126, Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record. – The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statem gether with the affidavits submitted. [emphasis ours]

Ogayon’s appeal of his conviction essentially rests on his claim that the search warrant was defective because "there was no transcript of stenographic notes of the proceedings in which the issuing judge had allegedly propounded the required searching questions and answers in order to determine the existence of probable cause."28 We find that the failure to attach to the records the depositions of the complainant and his witnesses and/or the transcript of the judge’s examination, though contrary to the Rules, does not by itself nullify the warrant. The requirement to attach is merely a procedural rule and not a component of the right. Rules of procedure or statutory requirements, however salutary they may be, cannot provide new constitutional requirements.29

Instead, what the Constitution requires is for the judge to conduct an "examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce," after which he determines the existence of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant. The examination requirement was originally a procedural rule found in Section 98 of General Order No. 58,30 but was elevated as part of the guarantee of the right under the 1935 Constitution.31 The intent was to ensure that a warrant is issued not merely on the basis of the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, but only after examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses. As the same examination requirement was adopted in the present Constitution, we declared that affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are insufficient to establish the factual basis for probable cause.32 Personal examination by the judge of the applicant and his witnesses is indispensable, and the examination should be probing and exhaustive, notmerely routinary or a rehash of the affidavits.33

The Solicitor General argues that the lack of depositions and transcript does not necessarily indicate that no examination was made by the judge who issued the warrant in compliance with the constitutional requirement.

True, since in People v. Tee,34 we declared that –

[T]he purpose of the Rules in requiring depositions to be taken is to satisfy the examining magistrate as to the existence of probable cause.1âwphi1 The Bill of Rights does not make it an imperative necessity that depositions be attached to the records of an application for a search warrant. Hence, said omission is not necessarily fatal, for as long as there is evidence on the record showing what testimony was presented.35

Ideally, compliance with the examination requirement is shown by the depositions and the transcript. In their absence, however, a warrant may still be upheld if there is evidence in the records that the requisite examination was made and probable cause was based thereon. There must be, in the records, particular facts and circumstances that were considered by the judge as sufficient to make an independent evaluation of the existence of probable cause to justify the issuance of the search warrant.36

The Solicitor General claims that, notwithstanding the absence of depositions and transcripts, the records indicate an examination was conducted. In fact, a statement in the search warrant itself attests to this:

Search Warrant

x x x x

GREETINGS:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examination under oath of the applicant and his witnesses that there is probable cause to believe that respondent, without authority of law, has under his possession and control the following articles to wit:

---Methamphetamine Hydrochloride "Shabu" and paraphernalia which are kept and concealed in the premises of his house particularly in the kitchen and in the CR outside his house both encircled with a red ballpen, as described in the sketch attached to the Application for Search Warrant, located at Bgy. Iraya, Guinobatan, Albay.37 (emphasis and underscore ours)

Generally, a judge’s determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is accorded great deference by a reviewing court, so long as there was substantial basis for that determination.38 "Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched."39

Apart from the statement in the search warrant itself, we find nothing in the records of this case indicating that the issuing judge personally and thoroughly examined the applicant and his witnesses. The absence of depositions and transcripts of the examination was already admitted; the application for the search warrant and the affidavits, although acknowledged by Ogayon himself,40 could not be found in the records. Unlike in Tee, where the testimony given during trial revealed that an extensive examination of the applicant’s witness was made by the judge issuing the warrant, the testimonies given during Ogayon’s trial made no reference to the application for the search warrant. SPO4 Caritos testified that he was among those who conducted the surveillance before the application for a search warrant was made. However, he was not the one who applied for the warrant; in fact, he testified that he did not know who applied for it.41

The records, therefore, bear no evidence from which we can infer that the requisite examination was made, and from which the factual basis for probable cause to issue the search warrant was derived. A search warrant must conform strictly to the constitutional requirements for its issuance; otherwise, it is void. Based on the lack of substantial evidence that the search warrant was issued after the requisite examination of the complainant and his witnesses was made, the Court declares Search Warrant No. AEK 29-2003 a nullity.

The nullity of the search warrant prevents the Court from considering Ogayon’s belated objections thereto.

The CA declared that Ogayon had waived the protection of his right against unreasonable searches and seizures due to his failure to make a timely objection against the search warrant’s validity before the trial court. It based its ruling on the procedural rule that any objections to the legality of the search warrant should be made during the trial of the case. Section 14, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides the manner to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence obtained thereby:

Section 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where to file. — A motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. If no criminal action has been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court that issued the search warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a criminal case is subsequently filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved by the latter court. [emphasis ours]

We find the CA’s casual treatment of a fundamental right distressing. It prioritized compliance with a procedural rule over compliance with the safeguards for a constitutional right. Procedural rules can neither diminish nor modify substantial rights;42 their non-compliance should therefore not serve to validate a warrant that was issued in disregard of the constitutional requirements. As mentioned, the existence of probable cause determined after examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is central to the guarantee of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. The ends of justice are better served if the supremacy of the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is preserved over technical rules of procedure.

Moreover, the courts should indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights; we should not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.43 In People v. Decierdo,44 the Court declared that "[w]henever a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the person entitled to that protection, the presumption is always against the waiver." The relinquishment of a constitutional right has to be laid out convincingly.

In this case, the only evidence that Ogayon waived his constitutional right was his failure to make a timely motion during the trial to quash the warrant and to suppress the presentation of the seized items as evidence. This failure alone, to our mind, is not a sufficient indication that Ogayon clearly, categorically, knowingly, and intelligently made a waiver.45 He cannot reasonably be expected to know the warrant’s defect for lack of data in the records suggesting that defect existed. It would thus be unfair to construe Ogayon’s failure to object as a waiver of his constitutional right. In People v. Bodoso,46 the Court noted that "[i]n criminal cases where life, liberty and property are all at stake… The standard of waiver requires that it ‘not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.’"

At this point, we note the purpose for the enactment of Section 14, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court – a relatively new provision incorporated in A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC or the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (effective December 1, 2000). The provision was derived from the policy guidelines laid down by the Court in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals47 to resolve the main issue of where motions to quash search warrants should be filed. In other words, the provision was "intended to resolve what is perceived as conflicting decisions on where to file a motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence seized by virtue thereof…."48 It was certainly not intended to preclude belated objections against the search warrant’s validity, especially if the grounds therefor are not immediately apparent. Thus, Malaloan instructs that "all grounds and objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived," and that "a motion to quash shall consequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress."

A closer reading of the cases where the Court supposedly brushed aside belated objections would reveal that the objections were disregarded because they had been cured or addressed based on the records.

In Demaisip v. Court of Appeals,49 the accused asserted that the search warrant was never produced in court, thus suggesting its absence. The Court, however, noted that "there were supposed testimonies of its existence."

In People v. Tee,50 the accused claimed that the issuing judge failed to exhaustively examine the complainant and his witnesses, and that the complainant’s witness (a National Bureau of Intelligence operative) had no personal knowledge of the facts comprising probable cause, but the Court brushed these claims aside. It found that the witness’ knowledge of the facts supporting probable case was not based on hearsay as he himself assisted the accused in handling the contraband, and that the issuing judge extensively questioned this witness. In People v. Torres,51 the accused assailed the validity of the search conducted pursuant to a search warrant as it was supposedly made without the presence of at least two witnesses, but the Court found otherwise, citing the testimonies taken during the trial contradicting this claim. A similar objection was made by the accused in People v. Nuñez,52 but the Court noted the testimony of the officer conducting the search who stated that it was made in the presence of the accused himself and two barangay officials.

The rulings in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals,53 People v. Court of Appeals,54 and People v. Correa55 are without significance to the present case. As mentioned, Malaloan v. Court of Appeals involved the question of where motions to quash search warrants should be filed, and the guidelines set therein was applied in People v. Court of Appeals. People v. Correa, on the other hand, involved a warrantless search of a moving vehicle.

We reiterate that the requirement to raise objections against search warrants during trial is a procedural rule established by jurisprudence. Compliance or noncompliance with this requirement cannot in any way diminish the constitutional guarantee that a search warrant should be issued upon a finding of probable cause.1âwphi1 Ogayon’s failure to make a timely objection cannot serve to cure the inherent defect of the warrant. To uphold the validity of the void warrant would be to disregard one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution.

In the light of the nullity of Search Warrant No. AEK 29-2003, the search conducted on its authority is likewise null and void. Under the Constitution, any evidence obtained in violation of a person’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.56 With the inadmissibility of the drugs seized from Ogayon' s home, there is no more evidence to support his conviction. Thus, we see no reason to further discuss the other issues raised in this petition.

WHEREFORE, under these premises, the Decision dated March 31, 2009, and the Resolution dated July 10, 2009, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31154 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction, as stated in the joint judgment dated September 5, 2007, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Lig ity, Albay, in Criminal Case Nos. 4738 and 4739, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and petitioner HONESTO OGA YON y DIAZ is ACQUITTED of the criminal charges against him for violation of Republic Act No. 9165.

SO ORDERED."

G.R. No. 188794, September 2, 2015

HONESTO OGA YON y DIAZ, Petitioner,

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES, Respondent.

September 2, 2015G.R. No. 188794HONESTO OGA YON y DIAZ, Petitioner,vs.PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES, Respondent.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/sep2015/gr_188794_2015.html

Extrajudicial Confession; Admission by Conspirator

 "Accused-appellants must be

acquitted of Murder

In contrast to the above, Antonio's extrajudicial confession as contained in his July 8 Salaysay detailing the abduction and killing of Major Arcega cannot be used to convict accused-appellants in the absence of independent evidence on this charge and on account of the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet expressed in Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which states:

Section 28. Admission by third-party. - The rights of a third party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided.

Expounding on this rule, the Court explained that "[o]n a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man's own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him."48 Thus, as a general rule, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant.49 As an exception, Section 30, Rule 130 of the same Rules allows the admission of a conspirator, provided the conditions therefor are satisfied, viz.:

Section 30. Admission by conspirator. - The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, n1ay be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. (Emphasis supplied)

In this regard, case law states that "in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that: (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; (b) the admission relates to the common object; and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy."50 Here, aside from Antonio's extrajudicial statements in his July 8 Salaysay, there is a glaring dearth of evidence showing the participation of accused-appellants in a plan or conspiracy to abduct and kill Major Arcega. As such, Antonio's statement in his July 8 Salaysay is binding on him alone; it cannot be admitted against his co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them.51

In this light, the Court is constrained to acquit not only herein accused­ appellants, but also their co-accused - except for Antonio who executed the July 8 Salaysay - for the Murder of Major Arcega. This is pursuant to Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads:

Section. 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. -

(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.

While it is true that it was only accused-appellants who successfully perfected their appeal before the Court, it is well to reiterate the rule that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the entire case out in the open, including those not raised by the parties.52 Considering that, under Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as above-quoted, a favorable judgment - as in this case - shall benefit the co-accused who did not appeal or those who appealed from their judgments of conviction but for one reason or another, the conviction became final and executory,53 accused-appellants' acquittal for the crime of Murder is likewise applicable to the rest of the accused, save for Antonio, against whom his confession in his July 8 Salaysay shall be solely binding, and Cortez, who had since died.

Finally, and in light of prevailing jurisprudence, Antonio should pay the heirs of Major Arcega the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages for the crime of Murder, all with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.54"

G.R. No. 242696, November 11, 2020 

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ZALDY BERNARDO Y ESPIRITU, MONROY FLORES Y CORPUZ, JESUS TIME Y CABESA, GILBERT PACPACO Y DIRECTO, GILBERT RAMIREZ Y DUNEGO, DANNY CORTEZ Y DONIETO, ROGELIO ANTONIO Y ABUJUELA, TOMMY CABESA Y VILLEGAS, AND MILA ANDRES GALAMAY, ACCUSED,

ZALDY BERNARDO Y ESPIRITU, MONROY FLORESYCORPUZ, DANNY CORTEZ Y DONIETO, AND MILA ANDRES GALAMAY, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/nov2020/gr_242696_2020.html

Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide

 "Accused-appellants are guilty

of the special complex crime

of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide

The elements of Kidnapping for Ransom under Article 267 of the RPC, as amended, are as follows:(a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his/her liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his/her liberty; and (c) motive of the accused, which is extorting ransom for the release of the victim. In the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought.43

As correctly ruled by the courts a quo, the prosecution had established the existence of the aforementioned elements.Ꮮαwρhi৷ Anent the first and second elements, accused-appellants and their co-accused intended and later on, were able to actually deprive Dr. Andres, Sr. of his liberty when the latter went missing after meeting a group of people in Sta. Lucia Mall on July 2, 1998. Such actual deprivation of Dr. Andres, Sr.'s liberty was confirmed by no less than Galamay who informed Dr. Andres, Jr. of such fact via a phone call. As to the third element, their motive, which is to extort ransom in exchange for Dr. Andres, Sr.'s release was manifest in: (a) Galamay's phone call to Dr. Andres, Jr. in order to demand ransom; (b) Bernardo, Time, Pacpaco, Ramirez, and Cabesa's receipt of the ransom money from Dr. Andres, Jr. on July 4, 1998 at España, Manila as witnessed by the members44 of the PNP­ CIDG; and (c) Cabesa's delivery of the ransom money to Flores, Cortez, and Antonio, who were all caught while counting the same. Finally, the last element is also present as Dr. Andres, Sr. was killed while in detention and his body was found in Mabitac, Laguna.

In this relation, the extrajudicial confession executed by Antonio as embodied in his July 6 Salaysay relative to the commission of the kidnapping of Dr. Andres, Sr. is merely corroborative of the prosecution evidence on this particular charge. To be admissible, a confession must comply with the following requirements: it "must be (a) voluntary; (b) made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel; (c) express; and (d) in writing."45 In this case, not only was the prosecution able to establish that these requirements had been complied with, it was also able to show that the contents of Antonio's July 6 Salaysay merely corroborated independent evidence pointing to accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. Indeed, there is sufficient evidence showing the complicity of accused-appellants beyond moral certainty, consisting in the positive identification of Bernardo and Galamay by Dr. Andres, Jr., as well as the in flagrante arrest of Flores. Furthermore, Antonio's July 6 Salaysay was executed after his co­ conspirators had been duly identified and arrested. If at all, aside from the corroboration it lent to the prosecution evidence, it additionally provided details that only persons privy to the kidnapping can supply, i.e., the place where Dr. Andres, Sr. was detained and the fact that his vehicle had been burned and abandoned in Norzagaray, Bulacan.46

Therefore, the Court finds no reason to overturn the courts a quo's findings in relation to accused-appellants' (and their co-accused's) commission of the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, as there was no showing that the courts a quo overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. It bears pointing out that the trial court - whose findings were affirmed by the CA - was in the best position to assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses by both parties.47"

G.R. No. 242696, November 11, 2020 

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ZALDY BERNARDO Y ESPIRITU, MONROY FLORES Y CORPUZ, JESUS TIME Y CABESA, GILBERT PACPACO Y DIRECTO, GILBERT RAMIREZ Y DUNEGO, DANNY CORTEZ Y DONIETO, ROGELIO ANTONIO Y ABUJUELA, TOMMY CABESA Y VILLEGAS, AND MILA ANDRES GALAMAY, ACCUSED,

ZALDY BERNARDO Y ESPIRITU, MONROY FLORESYCORPUZ, DANNY CORTEZ Y DONIETO, AND MILA ANDRES GALAMAY, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/nov2020/gr_242696_2020.html

Award of attorney's fees denied

"As regards attorney's fees, the Court of Appeals correctly held that none may be awarded to petitioner:

Consequently, the award of attorney's fees must also be deleted. Notably, it was not appellee alone who incurred costs to protect her interest. Appellant, too, spent for legal costs to finally settle the issue pertaining to the validity of his marriage with appellee. In the absence of malice and bad faith, the mental anguish suffered by a person for having been made a party in a civil case is not the kind of anxiety which would warrant the award of moral damages. Appellee's emotional suffering and anxiety are only such as are usually caused to a party hauled into [court] as a party in litigation, but is insufficient justification for the award of moral or exemplary damages.69"

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 207324. September 30, 2020 ]

MARY ELIZABETH MERCADO, PETITIONER, VS. RENE V. ONGPIN, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/sep2020/gr_207324_2020.html

Withdrawal of appeal before the Supreme Court

"Once a case has been submitted for a court's decision, the petitioning party cannot, at their election, withdraw their appeal.71 The grant or denial of the withdrawal is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.72

The practice of the courts has always been to the effect that once a case or appeal is submitted for decision, its withdrawal should not be at the discretion of the party, but dependent on the assent thereto of the adjudicating authority.

. . . .

. . . What is important is that once the finality of the questioned judgment has been arrested by a motion for reconsideration, the reviewing officer should be given full opportunity to restudy the records and satisfy himself whether justice has been done; and if convinced that it was not done, to revise and correct the judgment as the interest of justice requires, irrespective of whether the defendant will be favored or prejudiced. The public interest demands no less. As the Spanish proverb goes, justice is "no mas pero no menos".73

Petitioner can no longer elect to withdraw her Petition for Review at this late stage in the proceedings. It is merely incidental that, if we had granted petitioner's motion, it would have had the same result as this resolution on the merits."

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 207324. September 30, 2020 ]

MARY ELIZABETH MERCADO, PETITIONER, VS. RENE V. ONGPIN, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/sep2020/gr_207324_2020.html

Abuse of right; moral damages

 "Moral damages are a form of compensation for the "physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury"50 unjustly sustained by a person.51 They are awarded when: (1) there is a physical, mental or psychological injury clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) a wrongful act or omission is factually established; (3) the act or omission is the proximate cause of the injury; and (4) the award of damages is based on any of the cases stated in Article 221952 of the Civil Code.53

This Court has sanctioned the award of moral damages m cases of bigamy based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.54

Article 19 of the Civil Code sets the standards for the exercise of one's rights and performance of duties:

ARTICLE 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

This provision recognizes that even the exercise of a right may be the source of some illegal act, when done in a manner contrary to the standards it sets, and results in damage to another.55 Meanwhile, Articles 20 and 21 provide for the legal remedy for a violation of Article 19:56

ARTICLE 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

ARTICLE 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

For there to be a finding of an abuse of rights under Article 19, the following elements must concur: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) the right is exercised or the duty is performed in bad faith; and (3) the sole intent of the exercise or performance is to prejudice or injure another.57 It must be shown that the exercise of the right or performance of the duty was done with bad faith. In Dart Philippines, Inc. v. Spouses Calogcog: 58

Malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. It is presumed. Thus, he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence; it involves a dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive.59

In Manuel v. People,60 this Court awarded moral damages to the innocent spouse upon a finding that the bigamous spouse acted deceitfully and fraudulently when he contracted his second marriage:

In the present case, the petitioner courted the private complainant and proposed to marry her. He assured her that he was single. He even brought his parents to the house of the private complainant where he and his parents made the same assurance—that he was single. Thus, the private complainant agreed to marry the petitioner, who even stated in the certificate of marriage that he was single. She lived with the petitioner and dutifully performed her duties as his wife, believing all the while that he was her lawful husband. For two years or so until the petitioner heartlessly abandoned her, the private complainant had no inkling that he was already married to another before they were married.1âшphi1

Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner's chicanery and heartless deception, the fraud consisting not of a single act alone, but a continuous series of acts. Day by day, he maintained the appearance of being a lawful husband to the private complainant, who changed her status from a single woman to a married woman, lost the consortium, attributes and support of a single man she could have married lawfully and endured mental pain and humiliation, being bound to a man who it turned out was not her lawful husband.61

There, this Court found that the bigamous spouse's continuous and collective acts of fraud before, during, and after his marriage were willful, deliberate, and malicious, causing injury to the innocent spouse. It was the bigamous spouse's continuing bad faith that disregarded public policy, undermined and subverted the family as a social institution, and went against good morals, and the interest and general welfare of society.62

Thus, the Regional Trial Court was in error when it held that the mere contracting of a second marriage despite the existence of a first marriage is, by itself, a ground for damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 20 or Article 21. As correctly stressed by the Court of Appeals, the bad faith, or deliberate intent to do a wrongful act, of the bigamous spouse must be established:

Here, it was not convincingly shown that appellant deliberately contracted a second marriage despite knowledge of the subsistence of his first marriage. He believed in good faith that the divorce decree given to his first wife was valid and binding in the Philippines because he thought all along that [his] first wife at that time was already an [American] citizen. Thus, he and Mercado, both consenting adults, freely married each other, both believing that the final divorce decree was valid and binding in the Philippines. Indeed, both appellant and Mercado would not have married each other under pain of indictment for bigamy had they known that appellant's first marriage was still in existence, because it later turned out that Mercado was still a Filipino when the divorce decree was issued. So how could appellant be held liable for damages when he was not shown to have acted in bad faith when he married appellee? It has been consistently held that bad faith does not simply mean negligence or bad judgment. It involves a state of mind dominated by ill-will or motive. It implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity. The person claiming moral damages must prove the existence of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence for the law always presumes good faith. Here, appellee failed to overcome the legal presumption of good faith. Thus, the award of moral damages must be deleted.63

Petitioner has not been able to prove that, at the time she and respondent married, respondent knew that his divorce from his first spouse was invalid. There is no proof that, upon the first spouse's confirmation of her Philippine citizenship at the time she obtained the divorce decree, respondent concealed this knowledge from petitioner or allowed her to continue believing that their marriage was valid. The malice or bad faith necessary to sustain an action based on Article 19 of the Civil Code has not been shown in this case.

Moreover, petitioner has not established that she has sustained an injury in law due to respondent's acts.

A review of the records shows that petitioner had known that there was some sort of anomaly in the dissolution of respondent's first marriage as early as 1992. As the Regional Trial Court found, within four years of petitioner and respondent's marriage, they found out that the divorce decree between respondent and Mantaring may not be valid because of their citizenship.64 Both petitioner and respondent consulted with a lawyer, who advised them to have the first marriage annulled on the ground of psychological incapacity.65 When respondent withdrew his petition for annulment, petitioner pleaded with him to continue the case.66

Petitioner does not dispute any of these findings made by the trial court.67 She knew, or should have known, that there existed some issue regarding respondent's first marriage which might adversely affect the validity of her marriage to him. Yet, she did not initiate any actions of her own to protect her civil status, and appeared complacent with the uncertainty that hovered over the validity of her marriage with respondent.

There being no entitlement to moral damages, no exemplary damages can likewise be awarded to petitioner.68"

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 207324. September 30, 2020 ]

MARY ELIZABETH MERCADO, PETITIONER, VS. RENE V. ONGPIN, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/sep2020/gr_207324_2020.html

Considering these conflicting conclusions, this Court must now examine the factual findings to resolve whether or not respondent acted in bad faith when he married petitioner despite the subsistence of his first marriage

"In its November 18, 2016 Decision, the Regional Trial Court held that respondent's act of marrying petitioner even though he had an existing first marriage constituted bad faith. The Court of Appeals ruled otherwise because it found that, at the time respondent married petitioner, he believed in good faith that he was validly divorced from his first wife. Further, it found that respondent did not seek to have his second marriage declared null and void only so that he could evade liability in the civil case filed by petitioner.

Considering these conflicting conclusions, this Court must now examine the factual findings to resolve whether or not respondent acted in bad faith when he married petitioner despite the subsistence of his first marriage."

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 207324. September 30, 2020 ]

MARY ELIZABETH MERCADO, PETITIONER, VS. RENE V. ONGPIN, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/sep2020/gr_207324_2020.html

Section 5(i)5 in relation to Section 6(f)6 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 (VAWC Law). - This means that the mere failure or one's inability to provide financial support is not sufficient to rise to the level of criminality under Section 5(i), even if mental or emotional anguish is experienced by the woman. In other words, even if the woman were to suffer mental or emotional anguish due to the lack of financial support, but the accused merely failed or was unable to so provide support, then criminal liability would not arise. A contrary interpretation to the foregoing would result in absurd, if not outright unconstitutional, consequences.

 "The Court's Ruling

The Court grants the Petition and acquits Calingasan of the crime charged.

In all criminal cases, the Court has always adhered to the fundamental policy that when the guilt of the accused is not proven with moral certainty, the constitutional presumption of innocence must be upheld, and the exoneration of the accused must be granted as a matter of right.29 Thus, to warrant a finding of guilt for the crime charged, the prosecution must establish, beyond reasonable doubt, each and every element of the crime charged in the information or for any other crime necessarily included therein.30

In the case at bar, upon careful review of the case records, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden. 

Calingasan cannot be held liable for violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262.

Calingasan was charged and convicted by the courts a quo for violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262, which provides:

SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. — The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

x x x x

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or denial of access to the woman's child/children.

Based on the Information filed against him, Calingasan is accused of willfully denying private complainant and their child of the financial support legally due them, which allegedly caused them mental and emotional anguish, public ridicule and humiliation.31

In the very recent case of Acharon v. People32 (Acharon), the Court en banc clarified that the failure or inability to provide financial support per se is not a criminal act punishable under Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262. What Section 5(i) penalizes is the act of inflicting psychological violence against women and children by willfully or consciously denying them the financial support legally due to them. The Court ratiocinated as follows:

The Court stresses that Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262 uses the phrase "denial of financial support" in defining the criminal act. The word "denial" is defined as "refusal to satisfy a request or desire" or "the act of not allowing someone to do or have something." The foregoing definitions connote willfulness, or an active exertion of effort so that one would not be able to have or do something. This may be contrasted with the word "failure," defined as "the fact of not doing something [which one] should have done," which in turn connotes passivity. From the plain meaning of the words used, the act punished by Section 5(i) is, therefore, dolo in nature — there must be a concurrence between intent, freedom, and intelligence, in order to consummate the crime.

x x x x

It is not enough, therefore, for the woman to experience mental or emotional anguish, or for her partner to deny financial support that is legally due her. In order for criminal liability to arise under Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262, insofar as it deals with "denial of financial support," there must, therefore, be evidence on record that the accused willfully or consciously withheld financial support legally due the woman for the purpose of inflicting mental or emotional anguish upon her. x x x

"It bears emphasis that Section 5(i) penalizes some forms of psychological violence that are inflicted on victims who are women and children." In prosecutions under Section 5(i), therefore, "[p]sychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator" with denial of financial support as the weapon of choice. In other words, to be punishable by Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262, it must ultimately be proven that the accused had the intent of inflicting mental or emotional anguish upon the woman, thereby inflicting psychological violence upon her, with the willful denial of financial support being the means selected by the accused to accomplish said purpose.

This means that the mere failure or one's inability to provide financial support is not sufficient to rise to the level of criminality under Section 5(i), even if mental or emotional anguish is experienced by the woman. In other words, even if the woman were to suffer mental or emotional anguish due to the lack of financial support, but the accused merely failed or was unable to so provide support, then criminal liability would not arise. A contrary interpretation to the foregoing would result in absurd, if not outright unconstitutional, consequences.33 (Emphasis and italics in the original)

Proceeding from the foregoing, the Court in Acharon enumerated the elements that need to be proven to hold an accused liable for violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262, viz.:

(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;

(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common child. As for the woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;

(3) The offender willfully refuses to give or consciously denies the woman and/or her child or children financial support that is legally due her and/or her child or children; and

(4) The offender denied the woman and/or her child or children the financial support for the purpose of causing the woman and/or her child or children mental or emotional anguish.34

Applying the foregoing to the instant case, the Court holds that, contrary to the findings of the courts a quo, the prosecution failed to prove the third and fourth elements thereof.

Apart from establishing the relationship of the parties and that Calingasan left home sometime in 1998, not a single evidence was offered by the prosecution to establish that Calingasan deliberately or willfully refused to provide private complainant and their child the financial support legally due them. Also, no proof was adduced showing that Calingasan's supposed failure or refusal to provide financial support caused private complainant and their child mental and emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation.

On the contrary, records of the case evidently showed that Calingasan, for a time, provided private complainant and their child financial support and that his subsequent failure to do so was due to circumstances beyond his control. Calingasan testified under oath and presented documentary evidence showing that he was arrested in Canada and incarcerated for almost six (6) years.35 When he was released from prison, Calingasan tried to look for a permanent job but was not able to find one. He had since then relied upon the support and help of his siblings.36

These pieces of evidence, unrebutted by the prosecution, belie the accusations that (1) Calingasan deliberately denied private complainant and BBB financial support and (2) the denial of financial support was intended to cause private complainant and BBB mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation. Therefore, Calingasan cannot be convicted for violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262. 

Neither is Calingasan guilty of violating Section 5(e) of R.A. 9262.

Similar to Section 5(i), Section 5(e) also involves the denial of financial support legally due the woman and her child, viz.:

SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. — The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

x x x x

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or to desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or her child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:

x x x x

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support[.]

In the cases of Melgar v. People37 (Melgar) and Reyes v. People38 (Reyes), the Court, applying the variance doctrine, had previously ruled that an accused may be convicted of violating Section 5(e), instead of Section 5(i), as long as the denial or deprivation of financial support by the accused has been established by the prosecution; because the former specifically penalizes the deprivation of financial support by itself, even in the absence of psychological violence.39

However, in Acharon, the Court en banc abandoned its ruling in Melgar and Reyes. The Court clarified that Section 5(e) and Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262 penalize two distinct crimes. Section 5(i) punishes the willful infliction of psychological violence upon the woman and her child by denying them the financial support that is legally due them. Section 5(e), on the other hand, penalizes the deprivation of financial support "for the purpose of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct."40 Thus, while both provisions indeed involve the denial or deprivation of financial support, each of these provisions punishes entirely different acts. As such, the variance doctrine does not apply to convict an accused for the other crime.

Further, the Court reiterated that mere failure or inability to provide financial support is insufficient to warrant a finding of guilt for violation of either provision. There must be both an allegation and proof of the existence of the requisite specific intent penalized under each of these provisions: for Section 5(i), that the denial of financial support was for the purpose of inflicting psychological violence upon the woman and her child; while for Section 5(e), that the deprivation of financial support was for the purpose of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's actions or decisions.

Therefore, for Calingasan to be held liable for violating Section 5(e), it must be alleged and proved that he deprived private complainant and their child the financial support legally due them, for the purpose of controlling their actions and decisions, which clearly are all wanting in this case. Again, to recall, what the evidence of the prosecution simply proved in this case is that Calingasan failed to provide financial support, and nothing more. This is also insufficient to warrant a guilty verdict for violation of Section 5(e) of R.A. 9262.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated December 15, 2017 and Resolution dated May 10, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 39417 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Cesar M. Calingasan is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Let an entry of final judgment be issued immediately.

SO ORDERED."

FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 239313. February 15, 2022 ]

CESAR M. CALINGASAN,* PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2022/feb2022/gr_239313_2022.html

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.

"Essentially, the question before us is whether or not the evidence presented during the trial proves the existence of the marriage of Tecla to Eustaquio.

The trial court, in ruling against Tecla’s claim of her prior valid marriage to Eustaquio relied on Tecla’s failure to present her certificate of marriage to Eustaquio. Without such certificate, the trial court considered as useless the certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that it has no more records of marriages during the period 1900 to 1944. The same thing was said as regards the Certification issued by the National Statistics Office of Manila. The trial court observed:

Upon verification from the NSO, Office of the Civil Registrar General, Manila, it, likewise, issued a Certification (Exhibit "B") stating that:

records from 1932 up to early part of 1945 were totally destroyed during the liberation of Manila on February 4, 1945. What are presently filed in this office are records from the latter part of 1945 to date, except for the city of Manila which starts from 1952. Hence, this office has no way of verifying and could not issue as requested, certified true copy of the records of marriage between [Eustaquio] and [Tecla], alleged to have been married on 30th September 1942, in Talibon, Bohol.27

In the absence of the marriage contract, the trial court did not give credence to the testimony of Tecla and her witnesses as it considered the same as mere self-serving assertions. Superior significance was given to the fact that Tecla could not even produce her own copy of the said proof of marriage. Relying on Section 3 (a) and Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the trial court declared that Tecla failed to prove the existence of the first marriage.

The CA, on the other hand, concluded that there was a presumption of lawful marriage between Tecla and Eustaquio as they deported themselves as husband and wife and begot four (4) children. Such presumption, supported by documentary evidence consisting of the same Certifications disregarded by the trial court, as well as the testimonial evidence especially that of Adelina Avenido-Ceno, created, according to the CA, sufficient proof of the fact of marriage. Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the CA found that its appreciation of the evidence presented by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the trial court. Quite recently, in Añonuevo v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni,28 we said, citing precedents, that:

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.

The error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage certificate, no other proof of the fact can be accepted, has been aptly delineated in Vda de Jacob v. Court of Appeals.29 Thus:

It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus confused the evidence to show due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath, the Court clarified this misconception thus:

x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the execution of the instrument was barred. The court confounded the execution and the contents of the document. It is the contents, x x x which may not be proven by secondary evidence when the

instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or non-existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs of the contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the inroduction of secondary evidence of the contents.

x x x x

Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or primary. It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the document is actually produced, its authencity is not necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital of its contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document, when available, to establish its execution may effect the weight of the evidence presented but not the admissibility of such evidence.

The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete. But even there, we said that "marriage may be prove[n] by other competent evidence.

Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. The Court has also held that "[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s] made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost."

In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence–testimonial and documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.30

As correctly stated by the appellate court:

In the case at bench, the celebration of marriage between [Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO was established by the testimonial evidence furnished by [Adelina] who appears to be present during the marriage ceremony, and by [Tecla] herself as a living witness to the event. The loss was shown by the certifications issued by the NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol. These are relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence – testimonial and documentary – may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage. In PUGEDA v. TRIAS, the

Supreme Court held that "marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. The testimony by one of the parties to the marriage or by one of the witnesses to the marriage has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage."

x x x x

The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of [Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court has disregarded.31

The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.

As early as the case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,32 this Court has elucidated on the rationale behind the presumption:

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.1âwphi1 Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper – praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage.

In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by the testimonies of Adelina, Climaco and Tecla; the unrebutted the certifications of marriage issued by the parish priest of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444 is AFFIRMED. The marriage between petitioner Peregrina Macua Avenido and the deceased Eustaquio Avenido is hereby declared NULL and VOID. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED."

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 173540               January 22, 2014

PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner,

vs.

TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/jan2014/gr_173540_2014.html

Good Conduct Time Allowance Law vis-a-vis reclusion perpetua and heinous crimes - Miguel's argument is two-fold: first, he anchors his claim on the assertion that applying the GCTA Law, he has served a total of "thirty-eight (38) years, ten (10) months, and one (1) day"13 already. Second, he posits that Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) caps the duration of the penalty of reclusion perpetua at thirty (30) years.14 Having served a total of thirty­eight (38) years, which is eight (8) years more than the supposed maximum duration of reclusion perpetua, Miguel concludes that he has fully served his sentence and his detention no longer holds legal basis.

"Procedural considerations aside, the Court still finds the petition wanting in merit.

Miguel's argument is two-fold: first, he anchors his claim on the assertion that applying the GCTA Law, he has served a total of "thirty-eight (38) years, ten (10) months, and one (1) day"13 already. Second, he posits that Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) caps the duration of the penalty of reclusion perpetua at thirty (30) years.14 Having served a total of thirty­eight (38) years, which is eight (8) years more than the supposed maximum duration of reclusion perpetua, Miguel concludes that he has fully served his sentence and his detention no longer holds legal basis.

Miguel's contention is wrong.

On the first point, Miguel assumes that he is entitled to the benefits of the GCTA Law. However, a plain reading of the law would reveal otherwise.

The last paragraph of Section 1 of the GCTA Law reads:

Provided, finally, That recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees and persons charged with heinous crimes are excluded from the coverage of this Act. In case the maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment. (Emphasis supplied)

This disqualification is further echoed in several provisions of the 2019 Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 10592 (2019 Revised IRR) which read:

Rule III, Section 3. Who are Disqualified. -The following shall not be entitled to any credit for preventive imprisonment:

a. Recidivists;

b. An accused who has been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime;

c. An accused who, upon being summoned for the execution of his sentence has failed to surrender voluntarily before a court of law;

d. Habitual Delinquents;

e. Escapees; and

f. PDL charged of Heinous Crimes. (Emphasis supplied)

Rule IV, Section 1. GCTA During Preventive Imprisonment. - The good conduct of a detained PDL qualified for credit for preventive imprisonment shall entitle him to the deductions described in Section 3 hereunder, as GCTA, from the possible maximum penalty.

The following shall not be entitled to any GCTA during preventive imprisonment:

a. Recidivists;

b. An accused who has been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime;

c. An accused who, upon being summoned for the execution of his sentence has failed to surrender voluntarily before a court of law;

d. Habitual Delinquents;

e. Escapees; and

f. PDL charged of Heinous Crimes. (Emphasis supplied)

Rule IV, Section 2. GCTA During Service of Sentence. - The good conduct of a PDL convicted by final judgment in any penal institution, rehabilitation or detention center or any local jail shall entitle him to the deductions described in Section 3 hereunder, as GCTA, from the period of his sentence, pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 10592.

The following shall not be entitled to any GCTA during service of sentence:

a. Recidivists;

b. Habitual Delinquents;

c. Escapees; and

d. PDL convicted of Heinous Crimes. (Emphasis supplied)

Rule V, Section 2. Who are disqualified. - The following shall not be entitled to TASTM (Time Allowance for Study, Teaching and Mentoring):

a. Recidivists;

b. Habitual delinquents;

c. Escapees; and

d. PDL charged and convicted of heinous crimes. (Emphasis supplied)

Rule VI, Section 2. Who are disqualified. - The following are not qualified to be released under this Rule:

a. Recidivists;

b. An accused who has been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime;

c. An accused who, upon being summoned for the execution of his sentence has failed to surrender voluntarily before a court of law;

d. Habitual Delinquents;

e. Escapees; and

f. PDL charged of Heinous Crimes. (Emphasis supplied)

Rule VII, Section 2. Who are disqualified. - The following shall not be entitled to STAL (Special Time Allowance for Loyalty):

a. Recidivists;

b. Habitual Delinquents;

c. Escapees; and

d. PDL charged or convicted of Heinous Crimes. (Emphasis supplied)

The GCTA Law and the 2019 Revised IRR have made it abundantly clear that persons charged with and/or convicted of heinous crimes are not entitled to the benefits under the law. Thus, this begs the question: which crimes are considered heinous? More specifically, is murder considered a heinous crime for purposes of the application of the GCTA Law?

The 2019 Revised IRR defines "heinous crimes" as follows:

"Heinous Crimes" - crimes which are grievous, odious and hateful to the senses and which, by reason of their inherent and or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society, including crimes which are mandatorily punishable by Death under the provisions of RA No. 7659, as amended, otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, and those crimes specifically declared as such by the Supreme Court[.]

While the definition did not expressly enumerate crimes which are considered heinous, it made reference to "crimes which are mandatorily punishable by Death under the provisions of RA 7659, as amended x x x."

Section 6 of RA 7659,15 otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, states:

Section 6. Article 248 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

Art. 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.

3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, deraihnent or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.

4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.

5. With evident premeditation.

6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse."

From the discussion above, it is evident that the crime of Murder is one that is mandatorily punishable by death, in accordance with the Death Penalty Law. Being a such, it falls within the definition of "heinous crimes" in the 2019 Revised IRR and is therefore considered as a heinous crime.

In sum, Murder is considered a heinous crime in so far as the GCTA Law is concerned, and persons charged with and/or convicted of such are disqualified from availing of the benefits of the law.

On this point alone, the petition should already fail. However, Miguel further argues that Article 70 of the RPC caps the duration of the penalty of reclusion perpetua at thirty (30) years only. He is referring to the last paragraph of said provision, which states:

In applying the provisions of this rule the duration of perpetual penalties (pena perpetua) shall be computed at thirty years. (As amended by Com. Act No. 217.)

Miguel is again mistaken.

Plainly, nowhere in the cited provision does it state that perpetual penalties, such as reclusion perpetua, are capped at thirty (30) years. Instead, what it only provides is that in applying the rules laid out in Article 70, such as the three-fold rule, the duration of perpetual penalties shall be computed at thirty (30) years, thus:

In the case of People v. Mendoza, G.R. L-3271, May 5, 1950, it was held that the accused were guilty of murders and that each of them must be sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua for each of the five murders, although the duration of the aggregate penalties shall not exceed 40 years. In this case, after serving one reclusion perpetua, which is computed at 30 years, the accused will serve 10 years more. All the other penalties will not be served.16 (Emphasis supplied)

In People v. Reyes,17 Article 70 is further explained:

The other applicable reference to reclusion perpetua is found in Article 70 of the Code which, in laying down the rule on successive service of sentences where the culprit has to serve more than three penalties, provides, that 'the maximum duration of the convict's sentence shall not be more than three­fold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him,' and '(i)n applying the provisions of this rule the duration of perpetual penalties (pena perpetual) shall be computed at thirty years.'

The imputed duration of thirty (30) years for reclusion perpetua, therefore, is only to serve as the basis for determining the convict's eligibility for pardon or for the application of the three-fold rule in the service of multiple penalties x x x.18 (Emphasis supplied)

Miguel's position is further negated by the pronouncement in People v. Baguio,19 where the Court similarly held that "[r]eclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years, after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon x x x."20

Guided by the foregoing jurisprudence, it is evident that the penalty of reclusion perpetua requires imprisonment of at least thirty (30) years, after which the convict becomes only eligible for pardon, and not for release. This is in stark contrast to Miguel's claim that a convict meted with the penalty of reclusion perpetua must serve only thirty (30) years.

To recap, Miguel was delivered to the National Bilibid Prison on January 15, 1994. Therefore, as of August 15, 2021, he has only served a total of twenty-seven (27) years and seven (7) months of his sentence. Hence, having been punished to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, Miguel's continued detention is valid and justified. He has utterly failed to show that he is illegally confined or deprived of his liberty.

Accordingly, the Writ of Habeas Corpus may not be issued and the discharge of Miguel from imprisonment should not be authorized.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is  hereby Dismissed."

SECOND DIVISION

[ UDK-15368, September 15, 2021 ]

GIL MIGUEL, PETITIONER, VS. THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2021/sep2021/udk_15368_2021.html

Habeas corpus vis-a-vis hierarchy of courts

 "As to which court may grant the writ, Section 2, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 2. Who may grant the writ. - The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any member thereof, on any day and at any time, or by the Court of Appeals or any member thereof in the instances authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may be made returnable before the court or any member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing and decision on the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only within his judicial district.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the trial court, the appellate court, and this Court exercise concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. However, this does not mean that parties are absolutely free to choose before which court to file their petitions, thus:

[M]ere concurrency of jurisdiction does not afford parties absolute freedom to choose the court with which the petition shall be filed. Petitioners should be directed by the hierarchy of courts. After all, the hierarchy of courts 'serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitioners for the extraordinary writs.'12

In sum, Miguel should have filed the present petition before the RTC, absent any showing of special and important reasons warranting a direct resort to this Court."

SECOND DIVISION

[ UDK-15368, September 15, 2021 ]

GIL MIGUEL, PETITIONER, VS. THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2021/sep2021/udk_15368_2021.html