see - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/july2013/191566.pdf
"x x x.
The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense.37 It has been held in a number of cases that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.38
What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.39 Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of
competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared
can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the
presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.40 If we allow
respondent’s line of defense and the CA’s ratiocination, a person who
commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by immediately filing a
petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him.41
Respondent, likewise, claims that there are more reasons to quash the
information against him, because he obtained the declaration of nullity of
marriage before the filing of the complaint for bigamy against him. Again,
we cannot sustain such contention. In addition to the discussion above,
settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law and that the time of filing of the
criminal complaint or information is material only for determining
prescription.42
x x x."
Monday, August 12, 2013
Concurrent jurisdiction of Comelec and DOJ in prosecuting election offenses - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/july2013/199082.pdf
see - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/july2013/199082.pdf
"x x x.
This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with the issue of
whether the Comelec has the exclusive power to investigate and prosecute
cases of violations of election laws. In Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Party-List v. Commission on
Elections,38 the constitutionality of Section 4339 of RA 936940 had already been raised by petitioners therein and addressed by the Court.
While recognizing the Comelec’s exclusive power to investigate and prosecute cases under Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 or the Omnibus Election Code, the Court pointed out that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not have such intention. This exclusivity is thus a legislative enactment that can very well be amended by Section 43 of RA 9369. Therefore, under the present law, the Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the government, such as the DOJ, now exercise concurrent jurisdiction in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses.
x x x."
"x x x.
This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with the issue of
whether the Comelec has the exclusive power to investigate and prosecute
cases of violations of election laws. In Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Party-List v. Commission on
Elections,38 the constitutionality of Section 4339 of RA 936940 had already been raised by petitioners therein and addressed by the Court.
While recognizing the Comelec’s exclusive power to investigate and prosecute cases under Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 or the Omnibus Election Code, the Court pointed out that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not have such intention. This exclusivity is thus a legislative enactment that can very well be amended by Section 43 of RA 9369. Therefore, under the present law, the Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the government, such as the DOJ, now exercise concurrent jurisdiction in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses.
x x x."
When subcontracting og non-core bank functions allowed - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/july2013/174912.pdf
see - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/july2013/174912.pdf
"x x x.
In one case, the Court held that it is management prerogative to farm out any of its activities, regardless of whether such activity is peripheral or
core in nature.44 What is of primordial importance is that the service
agreement does not violate the employee's right to security of tenure and
payment of benefits to which he is entitled under the law. Furthermore, the outsourcing must not squarely fall under labor-only contracting where the contractor or sub-contractor merely recruits, supplies or places workers to perform a job, work or service for a principal or if any of the following
elements are present:
i) The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment which relates to the job, work or service to be performed and the employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are performing activities which are directly related to the main business of the principal; or
ii) The contractor does not exercise the right to control over the performance of the work of the contractual employee.45 ."
"x x x.
In one case, the Court held that it is management prerogative to farm out any of its activities, regardless of whether such activity is peripheral or
core in nature.44 What is of primordial importance is that the service
agreement does not violate the employee's right to security of tenure and
payment of benefits to which he is entitled under the law. Furthermore, the outsourcing must not squarely fall under labor-only contracting where the contractor or sub-contractor merely recruits, supplies or places workers to perform a job, work or service for a principal or if any of the following
elements are present:
i) The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment which relates to the job, work or service to be performed and the employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are performing activities which are directly related to the main business of the principal; or
ii) The contractor does not exercise the right to control over the performance of the work of the contractual employee.45 ."
When privileged character of evidence deemed waived - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/july2013/179786.pdf
see - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/july2013/179786.pdf
"x x x.
3. Josielene argues that since Johnny admitted in his answer to the petition before the RTC that he had been confined in a hospital against his
will and in fact attached to his answer a Philhealth claim form covering that confinement, he should be deemed to have waived the privileged character of its records. Josielene invokes Section 17, Rule 132 of the Rules of Evidence that provides:
SEC. 17. When part of transaction, writing or record given in evidence, the remainder admissible.— When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and when a detached act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation, writing or record necessary to its understanding may also be given in evidence.
But, trial in the case had not yet begun. Consequently, it cannot be said that Johnny had already presented the Philhealth claim form in evidence, the act contemplated above which would justify Josielene into requesting an inquiry into the details of his hospital confinement. Johnny was not yet bound to adduce evidence in the case when he filed his answer.
Any request for disclosure of his hospital records would again be premature.
x x x."
"x x x.
3. Josielene argues that since Johnny admitted in his answer to the petition before the RTC that he had been confined in a hospital against his
will and in fact attached to his answer a Philhealth claim form covering that confinement, he should be deemed to have waived the privileged character of its records. Josielene invokes Section 17, Rule 132 of the Rules of Evidence that provides:
SEC. 17. When part of transaction, writing or record given in evidence, the remainder admissible.— When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and when a detached act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation, writing or record necessary to its understanding may also be given in evidence.
But, trial in the case had not yet begun. Consequently, it cannot be said that Johnny had already presented the Philhealth claim form in evidence, the act contemplated above which would justify Josielene into requesting an inquiry into the details of his hospital confinement. Johnny was not yet bound to adduce evidence in the case when he filed his answer.
Any request for disclosure of his hospital records would again be premature.
x x x."
Privileged matters excepted from discovery - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/july2013/179786.pdf
see - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/july2013/179786.pdf
"x x x.
2. It is of course possible to treat Josielene’s motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering the hospital records as a motion for production of documents, a discovery procedure available to a
litigant prior to trial. Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:
SEC. 1. Motion for production or inspection; order.— Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control; or (b) order any party to permit entry upon designated land or other property in his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any designated relevant object or operation thereon. The order shall specify the time, place and manner of making the inspection and taking copies and photographs, and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just. (Emphasis supplied)
But the above right to compel the production of documents has a limitation: the documents to be disclosed are “not privileged.”
Josielene of course claims that the hospital records subject of this case are not privileged since it is the “testimonial” evidence of the physician that may be regarded as privileged. Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the
physician “cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be
examined” regarding their professional conversation. The privilege, says
Josielene, does not cover the hospital records, but only the examination of
the physician at the trial.
To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the
hospital records—the results of tests that the physician ordered, the
diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him—
would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the patient’s consent. Physician memorializes all these information in the
patient’s records. Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling
the physician to testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing with
the patient, without the latter’s prior consent.
x x x."
"x x x.
2. It is of course possible to treat Josielene’s motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering the hospital records as a motion for production of documents, a discovery procedure available to a
litigant prior to trial. Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:
SEC. 1. Motion for production or inspection; order.— Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control; or (b) order any party to permit entry upon designated land or other property in his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any designated relevant object or operation thereon. The order shall specify the time, place and manner of making the inspection and taking copies and photographs, and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just. (Emphasis supplied)
But the above right to compel the production of documents has a limitation: the documents to be disclosed are “not privileged.”
Josielene of course claims that the hospital records subject of this case are not privileged since it is the “testimonial” evidence of the physician that may be regarded as privileged. Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the
physician “cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be
examined” regarding their professional conversation. The privilege, says
Josielene, does not cover the hospital records, but only the examination of
the physician at the trial.
To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the
hospital records—the results of tests that the physician ordered, the
diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him—
would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the patient’s consent. Physician memorializes all these information in the
patient’s records. Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling
the physician to testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing with
the patient, without the latter’s prior consent.
x x x."
When to object - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/july2013/179786.pdf
see - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/july2013/179786.pdf
"x x x.
1. The case presents a procedural issue, given that the time to object to the admission of evidence, such as the hospital records, would be at the time they are offered. The offer could be made part of the physician’s testimony or as independent evidence that he had made entries in those records that concern the patient’s health problems.
Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence must be made after the offer of such evidence for admission in court. Thus:
SEC. 36. Objection.— Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the offer unless a different period is allowed by the court.
In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified.
Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielene’s request for
subpoena duces tecum is premature. She will have to wait for trial to begin
before making a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
covering Johnny’s hospital records. It is when those records are produced
for examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not just to their admission in evidence, but more so to their disclosure. Section 24(c), Rule
130 of the Rules of Evidence quoted above is about non-disclosure of
privileged matters.
x x x."
"x x x.
1. The case presents a procedural issue, given that the time to object to the admission of evidence, such as the hospital records, would be at the time they are offered. The offer could be made part of the physician’s testimony or as independent evidence that he had made entries in those records that concern the patient’s health problems.
Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence must be made after the offer of such evidence for admission in court. Thus:
SEC. 36. Objection.— Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the offer unless a different period is allowed by the court.
In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified.
Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielene’s request for
subpoena duces tecum is premature. She will have to wait for trial to begin
before making a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
covering Johnny’s hospital records. It is when those records are produced
for examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not just to their admission in evidence, but more so to their disclosure. Section 24(c), Rule
130 of the Rules of Evidence quoted above is about non-disclosure of
privileged matters.
x x x."
Physician-patient privileged communication - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/july2013/179786.pdf
see - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/july2013/179786.pdf
"x x x.
SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication.— The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
x x x x
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or any information which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity, which information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the patient.
The physician-patient privileged communication rrule essentially means that a physician who gets information while professionally attending
a patient cannot in a civil case be examined without the patient’s consent as to any facts which would blacken the latter’s reputation. This rule is
intended to encourage the patient to open up to the physician, relate to him the history of his ailment, and give him access to his body, enabling the physician to make a correct diagnosis of that ailment and provide the
appropriate cure. Any fear that a physician could be compelled in the future to come to court and narrate all that had transpired between him and the patient might prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting his own health at great risk.4."
x x x."
"x x x.
SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication.— The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
x x x x
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or any information which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity, which information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the patient.
The physician-patient privileged communication rrule essentially means that a physician who gets information while professionally attending
a patient cannot in a civil case be examined without the patient’s consent as to any facts which would blacken the latter’s reputation. This rule is
intended to encourage the patient to open up to the physician, relate to him the history of his ailment, and give him access to his body, enabling the physician to make a correct diagnosis of that ailment and provide the
appropriate cure. Any fear that a physician could be compelled in the future to come to court and narrate all that had transpired between him and the patient might prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting his own health at great risk.4."
x x x."
Thursday, August 8, 2013
Authentication of public vs. private documents as evidence - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/july2013/181163.pdf
see - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/july2013/181163.pdf
"x x x.
"The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be presented as evidence in court. Public documents, as enumerated under Section 19,33 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, are self-authenticating and require no further authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court.34
In contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed or instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication35
in the manner prescribed under Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules:
SEC. 20. Proof of private document. – Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution
and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
The requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in four instances, specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient one within the context of Section 21,36 Rule 132 of the Rules; (b) when the genuineness and authenticity of the actionable document have not been specifically denied under oath by the adverse party; (c) when the genuineness and authenticity of the document have been admitted; or (d) when the document is not being offered as genuine.37
Indubitably, Marine Certificate No. 708-8006717-4 and the Subrogation Receipt are private documents which Philam and the consignee, respectively, issue in the pursuit of their business. Since none of the exceptions to the requirement of authentication of a private document obtains in these cases, said documents may not be admitted in evidence for Philam without being properly authenticated.
x x x."
"x x x.
"The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be presented as evidence in court. Public documents, as enumerated under Section 19,33 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, are self-authenticating and require no further authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court.34
In contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed or instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication35
in the manner prescribed under Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules:
SEC. 20. Proof of private document. – Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution
and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
The requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in four instances, specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient one within the context of Section 21,36 Rule 132 of the Rules; (b) when the genuineness and authenticity of the actionable document have not been specifically denied under oath by the adverse party; (c) when the genuineness and authenticity of the document have been admitted; or (d) when the document is not being offered as genuine.37
Indubitably, Marine Certificate No. 708-8006717-4 and the Subrogation Receipt are private documents which Philam and the consignee, respectively, issue in the pursuit of their business. Since none of the exceptions to the requirement of authentication of a private document obtains in these cases, said documents may not be admitted in evidence for Philam without being properly authenticated.
x x x."
INJUNCTION - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/july2013/188500.pdf
see - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/july2013/188500.pdf
"x x x.
"It is well-settled that a writ of injunction would issue upon the satisfaction of two (2) requisites, namely: (a) the existence of a right to be protected; and (b) acts which are violative of the said right. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive relief constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Where the complainant’s right is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction.25
In order for an entity to legally undertake a quarrying business, he must first comply with all the requirements imposed not only by the national government, but also by the local government unit where his business is situated. Particularly, Section 138(2) of RA 716026 requires that such entity must first secure a governor’s permit prior to the start of his quarrying operations, viz:
SECTION 138. Tax on Sand, Gravel and Other Quarry Resources.
– x x x.
The permit to extract sand, gravel and other quarry resources shall be issued exclusively by the provincial governor, pursuant to the
ordinance of the sangguniang panlalawigan. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
x x x x
In connection thereto, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan promulgated Provincial Ordinance No. 2005-07, Article H, Section 2H.04 of which provides:
SECTION 2H.04. Permit for Gravel and Sand and Quarrying. – No person shall extract ordinary stones, gravel, earth, boulders and quarry resources from public lands or from the beds of seas, rivers, streams, creeks or other public waters unless a permit has been issued by the Governor (or his deputy as provided herein) x x x. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A plain reading of the afore-cited provisions clearly shows that a governor’s permit is a pre-requisite before one can engage in a quarrying business in Cagayan. Records, however, reveal that Lara admittedly failed to secure the same; hence, he has no right to conduct his quarrying operations within the Permit Area. Consequently, he is not entitled to any injunction.
x x x."
"x x x.
"It is well-settled that a writ of injunction would issue upon the satisfaction of two (2) requisites, namely: (a) the existence of a right to be protected; and (b) acts which are violative of the said right. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive relief constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Where the complainant’s right is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction.25
In order for an entity to legally undertake a quarrying business, he must first comply with all the requirements imposed not only by the national government, but also by the local government unit where his business is situated. Particularly, Section 138(2) of RA 716026 requires that such entity must first secure a governor’s permit prior to the start of his quarrying operations, viz:
SECTION 138. Tax on Sand, Gravel and Other Quarry Resources.
– x x x.
The permit to extract sand, gravel and other quarry resources shall be issued exclusively by the provincial governor, pursuant to the
ordinance of the sangguniang panlalawigan. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
x x x x
In connection thereto, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan promulgated Provincial Ordinance No. 2005-07, Article H, Section 2H.04 of which provides:
SECTION 2H.04. Permit for Gravel and Sand and Quarrying. – No person shall extract ordinary stones, gravel, earth, boulders and quarry resources from public lands or from the beds of seas, rivers, streams, creeks or other public waters unless a permit has been issued by the Governor (or his deputy as provided herein) x x x. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A plain reading of the afore-cited provisions clearly shows that a governor’s permit is a pre-requisite before one can engage in a quarrying business in Cagayan. Records, however, reveal that Lara admittedly failed to secure the same; hence, he has no right to conduct his quarrying operations within the Permit Area. Consequently, he is not entitled to any injunction.
x x x."
Tender of payment and judicial consignation - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/july2013/172346.pdf
see - .judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/july2013/172346.pdf
"x x x.
"Tender of payment “is the manifestation by the debtor of a desire to comply with or pay an obligation. If refused without just cause, the tender of payment will discharge the debtor of the obligation to pay but only after a valid consignation of the sum due shall have been made with the proper court.”32 “Consignation is the deposit of the [proper amount with a judicial authority] in accordance with rules prescribed by law, after the tender of payment has been refused or because of circumstances which render direct payment to the creditor impossible or inadvisable.”33 “Tender of payment, without more, produces no effect.”34 “[T]o have the effect of payment and the consequent extinguishment of the obligation to pay, the law requires the companion acts of tender of payment and consignation.”35
As to the effect of tender of payment on interest, noted civilist Arturo M. Tolentino explained as follows:
When a tender of payment is made in such a form that the creditor could have immediately realized payment if he had accepted the tender, followed by a prompt attempt of the debtor to deposit the means of payment in court by way of consignation, the accrual of interest on the obligation will be suspended from the date of such tender. But when the tender of payment is not accompanied by the means of payment, and the debtor did not take any immediate step to make a consignation, then interest is not suspended from the time of such tender. x x x x. 36 (Emphasis supplied)
Here, the subject letter merely states Lourdes’ willingness and readiness to pay but it was not accompanied by payment. She claimed that she made numerous telephone calls to Atty. Carbon reminding the latter to collect her payment, but, neither said lawyer nor Constancia came to collect the payment. After that, the spouses Bonrostro took no further steps to effect payment. They did not resort to consignation of the payment with the proper court despite knowledge that under the contract, non-payment of the installments on the agreed date would make them liable for interest thereon. The spouses Bonrostro erroneously assumed that their notice to pay would excuse them from paying interest. Their claimed tender of payment did not produce any effect whatsoever because it was not accompanied by actual payment or followed by consignation. Hence, it did not suspend the running of interest. The spouses Bonrostro are therefore liable for interest on the subject installments from the date of default until full payment of the sums of P300,000.00 and P330,000.00.
x x x."
"x x x.
"Tender of payment “is the manifestation by the debtor of a desire to comply with or pay an obligation. If refused without just cause, the tender of payment will discharge the debtor of the obligation to pay but only after a valid consignation of the sum due shall have been made with the proper court.”32 “Consignation is the deposit of the [proper amount with a judicial authority] in accordance with rules prescribed by law, after the tender of payment has been refused or because of circumstances which render direct payment to the creditor impossible or inadvisable.”33 “Tender of payment, without more, produces no effect.”34 “[T]o have the effect of payment and the consequent extinguishment of the obligation to pay, the law requires the companion acts of tender of payment and consignation.”35
As to the effect of tender of payment on interest, noted civilist Arturo M. Tolentino explained as follows:
When a tender of payment is made in such a form that the creditor could have immediately realized payment if he had accepted the tender, followed by a prompt attempt of the debtor to deposit the means of payment in court by way of consignation, the accrual of interest on the obligation will be suspended from the date of such tender. But when the tender of payment is not accompanied by the means of payment, and the debtor did not take any immediate step to make a consignation, then interest is not suspended from the time of such tender. x x x x. 36 (Emphasis supplied)
Here, the subject letter merely states Lourdes’ willingness and readiness to pay but it was not accompanied by payment. She claimed that she made numerous telephone calls to Atty. Carbon reminding the latter to collect her payment, but, neither said lawyer nor Constancia came to collect the payment. After that, the spouses Bonrostro took no further steps to effect payment. They did not resort to consignation of the payment with the proper court despite knowledge that under the contract, non-payment of the installments on the agreed date would make them liable for interest thereon. The spouses Bonrostro erroneously assumed that their notice to pay would excuse them from paying interest. Their claimed tender of payment did not produce any effect whatsoever because it was not accompanied by actual payment or followed by consignation. Hence, it did not suspend the running of interest. The spouses Bonrostro are therefore liable for interest on the subject installments from the date of default until full payment of the sums of P300,000.00 and P330,000.00.
x x x."
Sel-defense; burden of evidence - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/july2013/190340.pdf
see - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/july2013/190340.pdf
"x x x.
"Rogelio admits that he killed Abacco albeit in self-defense. “The rule consistently adhered to in this jurisdiction is that when the accused [admits] that he [is] the author of the death of the victim and his defense [is] anchored on self-defense, it becomes incumbent upon him to prove the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court.”16 With this admission, the burden of evidence is shifted to the appellant to prove that all the essential elements of self-defense are present. He must show and prove by clear and convincing evidence that his act was justified. Otherwise his conviction must be upheld and he cannot be exonerated from criminal liability. On this score, the accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution’s
evidence.
To successfully invoke the justifying circumstance of self-defense, the following requisites must be present:
(1) unlawful aggression;
(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
(3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.17
Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element of self-defense, for if no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense is navailing as there is nothing to repel. The unlawful aggression of the victim must put the life and personal safety of the person defending himself in actual peril. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude does not constitute unlawful aggression.18.
x x x."
"x x x.
"Rogelio admits that he killed Abacco albeit in self-defense. “The rule consistently adhered to in this jurisdiction is that when the accused [admits] that he [is] the author of the death of the victim and his defense [is] anchored on self-defense, it becomes incumbent upon him to prove the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court.”16 With this admission, the burden of evidence is shifted to the appellant to prove that all the essential elements of self-defense are present. He must show and prove by clear and convincing evidence that his act was justified. Otherwise his conviction must be upheld and he cannot be exonerated from criminal liability. On this score, the accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution’s
evidence.
To successfully invoke the justifying circumstance of self-defense, the following requisites must be present:
(1) unlawful aggression;
(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
(3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.17
Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element of self-defense, for if no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense is navailing as there is nothing to repel. The unlawful aggression of the victim must put the life and personal safety of the person defending himself in actual peril. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude does not constitute unlawful aggression.18.
x x x."
Mentally retarded witness - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/july2013/197537.pdf
see - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/july2013/197537.pdf
"x x x.
The fact of AAA’s mental retardation did not impair the credibility of her testimony. Mental retardation per se does not affect credibility. A one
mentally retarded may be a credible witness. The acceptance of her
testimony depends on the quality of her perceptions and the manner she can make them known to the court.23
We have thoroughly examined AAA’s testimony and found no reason
to depart from the legal adage that this Court accords the trial judge’s
assessment of the credibility of witnesses great respect in the absence of any attendant of grave abuse of discretion on the account that the trial court had the advantage of actually examining both real and testimonial pieces of evidence, including the demeanor of the witnesses, and is in the best position to rule on the matter. The rule finds an even greater application when the trial court’s findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.24
Taking into consideration the positive and categorical declaration of
AAA and the medical findings to support her claims, we affirm the lower
courts’ unanimous finding that AAA , by proof beyond reasonable doubt,
was raped by the appellant.
Appellant’s denials and alibi cannot prevail over the positive, consistent and straightforward testimony of AAA. Alibi is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly unreliable. To merit approbation, the accused must adduce clear and convincing evidence that he was in a place other than the situs criminis at the time the crime was committed, such that it was physically impossible for him to have been at
the scene of the crime when it was committed.25 Appellant admitted that he was in fact with AAA at his house when the rape incident occurred.
Considering that he was at the place where the crime was committed, his
alibi cannot be given any weight or value.
x x x."
"x x x.
The fact of AAA’s mental retardation did not impair the credibility of her testimony. Mental retardation per se does not affect credibility. A one
mentally retarded may be a credible witness. The acceptance of her
testimony depends on the quality of her perceptions and the manner she can make them known to the court.23
We have thoroughly examined AAA’s testimony and found no reason
to depart from the legal adage that this Court accords the trial judge’s
assessment of the credibility of witnesses great respect in the absence of any attendant of grave abuse of discretion on the account that the trial court had the advantage of actually examining both real and testimonial pieces of evidence, including the demeanor of the witnesses, and is in the best position to rule on the matter. The rule finds an even greater application when the trial court’s findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.24
Taking into consideration the positive and categorical declaration of
AAA and the medical findings to support her claims, we affirm the lower
courts’ unanimous finding that AAA , by proof beyond reasonable doubt,
was raped by the appellant.
Appellant’s denials and alibi cannot prevail over the positive, consistent and straightforward testimony of AAA. Alibi is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly unreliable. To merit approbation, the accused must adduce clear and convincing evidence that he was in a place other than the situs criminis at the time the crime was committed, such that it was physically impossible for him to have been at
the scene of the crime when it was committed.25 Appellant admitted that he was in fact with AAA at his house when the rape incident occurred.
Considering that he was at the place where the crime was committed, his
alibi cannot be given any weight or value.
x x x."
Retrenchment vs. closure or cessation of business - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/july2013/172846.pdf
see - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/july2013/172846.pdf
"x x x.
"To be precise, closure or cessation of an employer’s business operations, whether in whole or in part, is governed by Article 283 of the Labor Code, as amended. It states:
Article 283.Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. - The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to
serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year.26
In Industrial Timber Corporation v. Ababon,27 the Court explained the above-quoted provision in this wise:
A reading of the foregoing law shows that a partial or total closure or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking may either be due to serious business losses or financial reverses or otherwise. Under the first kind, the employer must sufficiently and convincingly prove its allegation of substantial losses,while under the second kind, the employer can lawfully close shop anytime as long as cessation of or withdrawal from business operations was bona fide in character and not impelled by a motive to defeat or circumvent the tenurial rights of employees, and as long as he pays his employees their termination pay in the amount corresponding to their length of service. Just as no law forces anyone to go into business, no law can compel anybody to continue the same. It would
be stretching the intent and spirit of the law if a court interferes with management's prerogative to close or cease its business operations just because the business is not suffering from any loss or because of the desire to provide the workers continued employment.
In sum, under Article 283 of the Labor Code, three requirements are necessary for a valid cessation of business operations: (a) service of a written notice to the employees and to the DOLE at least one month before the intended date thereof; (b) the cessation of business must be bona fide in character; and (c) payment to the employees of termination pay amounting to one month pay or at least one-half month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher.28
x x x."
"x x x.
"To be precise, closure or cessation of an employer’s business operations, whether in whole or in part, is governed by Article 283 of the Labor Code, as amended. It states:
Article 283.Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. - The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to
serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year.26
In Industrial Timber Corporation v. Ababon,27 the Court explained the above-quoted provision in this wise:
A reading of the foregoing law shows that a partial or total closure or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking may either be due to serious business losses or financial reverses or otherwise. Under the first kind, the employer must sufficiently and convincingly prove its allegation of substantial losses,while under the second kind, the employer can lawfully close shop anytime as long as cessation of or withdrawal from business operations was bona fide in character and not impelled by a motive to defeat or circumvent the tenurial rights of employees, and as long as he pays his employees their termination pay in the amount corresponding to their length of service. Just as no law forces anyone to go into business, no law can compel anybody to continue the same. It would
be stretching the intent and spirit of the law if a court interferes with management's prerogative to close or cease its business operations just because the business is not suffering from any loss or because of the desire to provide the workers continued employment.
In sum, under Article 283 of the Labor Code, three requirements are necessary for a valid cessation of business operations: (a) service of a written notice to the employees and to the DOLE at least one month before the intended date thereof; (b) the cessation of business must be bona fide in character; and (c) payment to the employees of termination pay amounting to one month pay or at least one-half month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher.28
x x x."
JURIST - Paper Chase: US embassy criticizes new Vietnam Internet decree
see - JURIST - Paper Chase: US embassy criticizes new Vietnam Internet decree
THE PHILIPPINES HAS AN EQUIVALENT ANTI CYBERCRIME LAW. THE SUPREME COURT HAS RESTRAINED IT PENDENTE LITE. VIETNAM HAS SUCH A LAW, TOO, THE US EMBASSY THERE ASSAILS THE LAW FOR BEING ANTI-HUMAN RIGHTS.
"x x x.
[JURIST] The US Embassy in Hanoi [official website] on Tuesdaycriticized [press release] a new Vietnam Internet decree that would effectively restrict online discussion of current affairs in the country. The decree requires all foreign websites to have at least one server in Vietnam, which would give greater content control to the Vietnamese government. The US embassy stated that the new law, which is set to take effect in September [Reuters report], is inconsistent with the country's obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights[text], as well as those under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [text]. TheAsia Internet Coalition (AIC) [official website], an industry association formed by eBay, Facebook, Google, Salesforce and Yahoo! Incorporated, stated [press release] that "the Decree will stifle innovation and discourage businesses from operating in Vietnam." Although the new law will outlaw any Internet content that harms national security and declines to elaborate on what will constitute a security breach, the Vietnamese government stated that the decree is misunderstood and will not ban people from information-sharing.
This is the most recent criticism against the Vietnamese government for its history of suppressing dissident activity. In February 22 Vietnamese activists were sentenced to lengthy prison terms [JURIST report] after the group was convicted of engaging in subversive activities to overthrow the county's communist government. Also in FebruaryHuman Rights Watch (HRW) [advocacy website] stated in its annual World Report[JURIST report] that Vietnam's government has been "systematically suppressing freedom of expression, association, and peaceful assembly, and persecuting those who question government policies, expose official corruption, or call for democratic alternatives to one-party rule" during the last few years. In January Vietnamese authorities released and deported [JURIST report] Vietnamese-American pro-democracy activist Nguyen Quoc Quan after a nine-month detention. Quan wasarrested [JURIST report] on terrorism charges for planning protests in support of a banned group of US exiles. In the same month Vietnam convicted [JURIST report] 14 bloggers of subversion and issued prison sentences ranging from 3 to 13 years.
THE PHILIPPINES HAS AN EQUIVALENT ANTI CYBERCRIME LAW. THE SUPREME COURT HAS RESTRAINED IT PENDENTE LITE. VIETNAM HAS SUCH A LAW, TOO, THE US EMBASSY THERE ASSAILS THE LAW FOR BEING ANTI-HUMAN RIGHTS.
"x x x.
 | |
This is the most recent criticism against the Vietnamese government for its history of suppressing dissident activity. In February 22 Vietnamese activists were sentenced to lengthy prison terms [JURIST report] after the group was convicted of engaging in subversive activities to overthrow the county's communist government. Also in FebruaryHuman Rights Watch (HRW) [advocacy website] stated in its annual World Report[JURIST report] that Vietnam's government has been "systematically suppressing freedom of expression, association, and peaceful assembly, and persecuting those who question government policies, expose official corruption, or call for democratic alternatives to one-party rule" during the last few years. In January Vietnamese authorities released and deported [JURIST report] Vietnamese-American pro-democracy activist Nguyen Quoc Quan after a nine-month detention. Quan wasarrested [JURIST report] on terrorism charges for planning protests in support of a banned group of US exiles. In the same month Vietnam convicted [JURIST report] 14 bloggers of subversion and issued prison sentences ranging from 3 to 13 years.
x x x."
Evils of pork barrel system.
Budget Secretary Florencio Abad claims: “Ultimately, the decision on whether or not to abolish or continue on with the PDAF rests with ...the House of Representatives. So, I think it’s better for us to await the wisdom of this chamber ...”
He hides the fact that it is the Office of the President and his very own department which prepared and originated the pork-barrel-infested 2014 budget proposal.
If Malacanang is sincere in ridding Congress of the corruption-laden pork barrel system, as part of its "matuwid na daan" anti-corruption campaign, it should have excluded the item in its budget proposal in the first place.
Had it done so, Congress cannot restore or revive the item.
It can only reduce items in the budget proposal, as a matter of constitutional law - but not to increase or add new items to the proposal.
Abad added that “the President feels that the greater majority of legislators, who have been using their (pork barrel) rather prudently and well, should not be punished for the possible infraction committed by some.”
This is not a valid argument if we speak of prudence, orderliness, and wisdom in basic fiscal management principles in relation to the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.
The basic constitutional task of Congress is legislative in nature, i.e., to deliberate on and adopt laws in consultation with the people. Congress should not to act as a "de facto Executive" by meddling in program planning and implementation.
It must focus its energy and resources on legislation, as mandated by the Constitution, if it wishes to be true to its real essence, mission and role in government.
It is unfortunate that in past jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has validated as constitutionality of the pork barrel system, despite vehement opposition from the public, especially the Bar and the Civil Society.
To my mind, the pork barrel system is the result of a massive and mutually satisfying "political conspiracy" (amounting to criminal malice and gross recklessness) among the three branches of government.
Acting in unison, they ignore the voice of the sovereign people and protect solely their vested financial and turf interests.
They have manipulated the interpretation of the Constitution and brainwashed the people into believing that the pork barrel system is both a legal and a necessary tool to serve the poor.
Developed countries, such as the USA, have condemned and abandoned the pork barrel system since the 1800s, despite the attempts of some US legislators to revive the item from time to time.
But, as a whole, Americans society abhors the concept.
All things being equal, my prognosis is that the three branches of government will not abandon the pork barrel system now or in the future.
The three branches of government belong to one secret "old boys' club", so to speak.
They soothe each other.
They serve each other.
They scratch each other's back.
They inspire each other.
They are co-conspirators.
When one speaks of easy money, the constitutional doctrine of "check and balance" that theoretically reigns among the three branches of government is rendered inutile.
Only a vigilant and courageous Press and Civil Society can save us from the conspiracy of the three ranches of government.
Nothing else. Nobody else.
I have lost my respect for P-Noy because of his anti-people and anti-Constitution mentality as shown by his full support to the pork barrel system.
History will prove that this deadly cancer called the pork barrel system perpetuates political dynasties, warlordism, feudalism, oligarchy, culture of corruption, and rigged elections in the country.
- Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr.
Las Pinas City
Read more: http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/461037/lawmakers-grill-abad-on-pork-in-budget#ixzz2bJeE9RHs
Follow us: @inquirerdotnet on Twitter | inquirerdotnet on Facebook
He hides the fact that it is the Office of the President and his very own department which prepared and originated the pork-barrel-infested 2014 budget proposal.
If Malacanang is sincere in ridding Congress of the corruption-laden pork barrel system, as part of its "matuwid na daan" anti-corruption campaign, it should have excluded the item in its budget proposal in the first place.
Had it done so, Congress cannot restore or revive the item.
It can only reduce items in the budget proposal, as a matter of constitutional law - but not to increase or add new items to the proposal.
Abad added that “the President feels that the greater majority of legislators, who have been using their (pork barrel) rather prudently and well, should not be punished for the possible infraction committed by some.”
This is not a valid argument if we speak of prudence, orderliness, and wisdom in basic fiscal management principles in relation to the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.
The basic constitutional task of Congress is legislative in nature, i.e., to deliberate on and adopt laws in consultation with the people. Congress should not to act as a "de facto Executive" by meddling in program planning and implementation.
It must focus its energy and resources on legislation, as mandated by the Constitution, if it wishes to be true to its real essence, mission and role in government.
It is unfortunate that in past jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has validated as constitutionality of the pork barrel system, despite vehement opposition from the public, especially the Bar and the Civil Society.
To my mind, the pork barrel system is the result of a massive and mutually satisfying "political conspiracy" (amounting to criminal malice and gross recklessness) among the three branches of government.
Acting in unison, they ignore the voice of the sovereign people and protect solely their vested financial and turf interests.
They have manipulated the interpretation of the Constitution and brainwashed the people into believing that the pork barrel system is both a legal and a necessary tool to serve the poor.
Developed countries, such as the USA, have condemned and abandoned the pork barrel system since the 1800s, despite the attempts of some US legislators to revive the item from time to time.
But, as a whole, Americans society abhors the concept.
All things being equal, my prognosis is that the three branches of government will not abandon the pork barrel system now or in the future.
The three branches of government belong to one secret "old boys' club", so to speak.
They soothe each other.
They serve each other.
They scratch each other's back.
They inspire each other.
They are co-conspirators.
When one speaks of easy money, the constitutional doctrine of "check and balance" that theoretically reigns among the three branches of government is rendered inutile.
Only a vigilant and courageous Press and Civil Society can save us from the conspiracy of the three ranches of government.
Nothing else. Nobody else.
I have lost my respect for P-Noy because of his anti-people and anti-Constitution mentality as shown by his full support to the pork barrel system.
History will prove that this deadly cancer called the pork barrel system perpetuates political dynasties, warlordism, feudalism, oligarchy, culture of corruption, and rigged elections in the country.
- Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr.
Las Pinas City
Read more: http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/461037/lawmakers-grill-abad-on-pork-in-budget#ixzz2bJeE9RHs
Follow us: @inquirerdotnet on Twitter | inquirerdotnet on Facebook
Wednesday, August 7, 2013
Libel, Press Freedom, Privileged Communication
Lawyer Lorna Kapunan says the Inquirer and Rappler.com are liable for libel for failing to get the side of her clients Janet Napoles and her daughter, and for printing “false” stories. She says she wants to test amatory "good faith in reporting". She claims "using ‘alleged’ in a story is not a license to commit falsehood". She adds "if a reporter says something is ‘alleged’ and prints the story based on what she think is "hearsay", and say the other camp can’t be reached for their side — which she also claims is not true — that is not a defense to libel". She states the articles about her clients "were based on unverified 'testimonials' and that they subjected them to 'trial by publicity'.” She claims reporters who wrote the stories against her clients "never tried to get their side".
Offhand, it should be stated that "any person who acts in the fulfillment of a DUTY or in the lawful exercise of a RIGHT OR OFFICE " does NOT incur criminal liability (Art. 11, Rev. Penal Code [RPC]).
Art. 353 of the RPC defines LIBEL as "a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead".
Under Art. 354 of the RPC, "every DEFAMATORY imputation is PRESUMED to be malicious, EVEN IF it be true, IF no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, EXCEPT in the following cases:
1. A PRIVATE communication made by any person to another in the performance of any LEGAL, MORAL OR SOCIAL DUTY; and
2. A FAIR AND TRUE REPORT, made in GOOD FAITH, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions."
It should be noted that "in every criminal prosecution for libel, THE TRUTH may be given in evidence to the court and if it appears that the matter charged as libelous is true, and, moreover, that it was published with GOOD MOTIVES and for JUSTIFIABLE ENDS, the defendants shall be ACQUITTED" (Art. 361, Par. 1, RPC). (NOTE: Par. 2 of the same provision states that proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not constituting a crime shall not be admitted, unless the imputation shall have been made against GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES with respect to facts related to the discharge of their official duties", and "in such cases if the defendant proves THE TRUTH of the imputation made by him, he shall be ACQUITTED").
The 1987 Constitution contains relevant provisions on the issue at hand. Sec. 24, Art. II (State Policies) thereof provides that "the State recognizes the vital role of COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION in nation-building". Sec. 27 thereof provides that "the State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against GRAFT AND CORRUPTION". Sec. 28 thereof provides that "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest".
Art. III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution is explicit on PRESS FREEDOM and other relate constitutional/human rights. Sec. 4 thereof provides that "no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of SPEECH , of EXPRESSION, or of THE PRESS, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and PETITION the Government for redress of grievances". Moreover, Sec. 7 thereof provides that "the right of the people to INFORMATION on matters of PUBLIC CONCERN shall be recognized' and that "ACCESS to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law".
In all criminal proceedings, the respondents are entitled to the CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE. (Sec. 14 [2], Article III, Bill of Rights, 1987 Constitution).
The presumption of innocence is a basic and universal human right that forms a crucial part of a person’s right to DUE PROCESS OF LAW and EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW (cf. 1947 U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
Rule 131, in general, of the Rules of Evidence commands that he who makes an affirmative allegation has the burden of proof to show and establish the veracity thereof.
Sec. 3 of Rule 131 sets forth certain basic legal presumptions, e.g., “that a person is innocent of crime or wrong”, “that official duty has been regularly performed”, and “that the law has been obeyed”.
In the light of the foregoing constitutional and statutory presumptions, the complainants in a libel case have the heavy burden of proof to destroy the aforementioned presumptions and to show, with clear, credible, and convincing evidence beyond reasonable doubt that the respondents had acted with ACTUAL CRIMINAL MALICE in making the questioned news articles.
Under the EQUIPOISE OF EVIDENCE RULE, all things being equal, that is, where the evidence proffered by the complainants would show neither the guilt nor the innocence of the respondents, the aforesaid constitutional and legal presumptions of innocence should ipso facto operate in favor of the respondents to protect their civil and human rights under the Constitution.
Under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, EXCEPT in the following cases of PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS:
“1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.” (emphasis supplied).
Article 361 of the Revised Penal Code, inter alia, provides that “in every criminal prosecution for libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the court and if it appears that the matter charged as libelous is true, and, moreover, that it was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the defendants shall be acquitted”.
Under Article 362 of the Revised Penal Code, ACTUAL MALICE, not merely presumptive malice, is required to remove a respondent from the legal protection of the privileged communication rule under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, supra. Article 362 provides: “Libelous remarks or comments connected with the matter privileged under the provisions of Article 354, if made with malice, shall not exempt the author thereof nor the editor or managing editor of a newspaper from criminal liability.”
In the case of Vasquez v. CA, et. al., GR 118971, September 15, 1999, the Supreme Court, in discussing the rule on ACTUAL MALICE, held that the prosecution “must prove not only that the charges made by petitioner were false but also that petitioner made them with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not”. Thus:
“For that matter, even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to official conduct, unless the public official concerned proves that the statement was made with actual malice – that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. This is the gist of the ruling in the landmark case of New York Times vs. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, which this Court has cited with approval in several of its own decisions. (Lopez v. CA, 145 Phil. 219 [1970]; Mercado v. CFI, 201 Phil. 565 [1982]; Babst v. NIB, 132 SCRA 316 [1984]). This is the rule of “actual malice”. In this case, the prosecution failed to prove not only that the charges made by petitioner were false but also that petitioner made them with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not.
A rule placing on the accused the burden of showing the truth of allegations of official misconduct and/or good motives and justifiable ends for making such allegations would not only be contrary to Art. 361 of the Revised Penal Code. It would, above all, infringe on the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Such a rule would deter citizens from performing their duties as members of a self-governing community. Without free speech and assembly, discussions of our most abiding concerns as a nation would be stifled. Public discussion is a political duty and the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people. (Whitney v. California, 247 U.S. 357).
As already stated, however, in accordance with Art. 361, if the defamatory matter either constitutes a crime or concerns the performance of official duties, and the accused proves the truth of his charge, he should be acquitted. (L.B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Vol. 2, 1981 ed., p. 361).
[See also: Manuel v. Pano, 172 SCRA 225 (1989); - US v. Eguia, 38 Phil. 857 (1918); - People v. Burgos, 59 Phil. 375 (1934); - People v. Garcia, 281 SCRA 463 (1997); - Daez v. CA, 191 SCRA 61 (1990); Art. 353, RPC; Art. 361, RPC; Alonzo v. CA, 241 SCRA 51 (1995); Kunkle v. Cablenews-American, 42 Phil. 757 (1922); US v. Sotto, 38 Phil. 666 (1918); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 US 254, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964); Lopez v. CA, 145 Phil. 219 (1970); Mercado v. CFI, 201 Phil. 565 (1982); Babst v. NIB, 132 SCRA 316 (1984); Whitney v. California, 247 US 357, 71 L. Ed. 1095 (1927); Manuel v. Pano, 172 SCRA 225 (1989)].
In the case of OCAMPO vs. SUN-STAR PUBLISHING, INC., G.R. No. 133575, December 15, 2000, the Supreme Court held that while the law presumes every defamatory imputation to be malicious, there are exceptions to this general rule, set forth in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
In BRILLANTE vs. CA, ET. AL., G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571, October 19, 2004, the Supreme Court reiterated the doctrine of PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION under Article 354, No. 1, of the Revised Penal Code, as discussed in the case of OCAMPO, supra, and it clarified that “the interest sought to be protected by the person making the communication need not be his own, but may refer to an interest shared by the other members of society”. According to the Supreme Court, “indeed, the purpose of affording protection to privileged communication is to permit all interested persons or citizens with grievances to freely communicate, with immunity, to the persons who could furnish the protection asked for”. (Id.).
The Supreme Court stressed that “the plainest principles of natural right and sound public policy require that the utmost possible freedom should be accorded every citizen to complain to the supervising, removing and appointing authorities of the misconduct of the public officials with whom he comes into contact, and like considerations make it equally proper that members of a religious organization should enjoy equal freedom in bringing to the attention of the church authorities the misbehavior of their spiritual leaders or of fellow-members”. (Id.). The said right must be exercised “in good faith” and that such complaints “must be made to a functionary having authority to redress the evils complained of, that they must be made in good faith, and that they must not be actuated by malice”. (Id.).
In the case of BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, et. al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et. al., G. R. NO. 107566, November 25, 2004, the Supreme Court held that the rule on PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION applies to “fair comment on matters of public interest, fair comment being that which is true, or which if false, expresses the real opinion of the author based upon reasonable degree of care and on reasonable grounds”.
The Supreme Court further held that “the remedy of the person allegedly libeled is to show proof that an article was written with the author’s knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” While the law itself creates the presumption that every defamatory imputation is malicious, nevertheless, “the privileged character of a communication destroys said presumption.” The burden of proving actual malice “shall then rest on the plaintiff”. (Id.).
In BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, supra, the Supreme Court reiterated its holding in the prior case of Borjal vs. CA, G.R. No. 126466, 14 January 1999, 310 SCRA 1, and held that, “even assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not prove actual malice”. It further held: “Errors or misstatements are inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression and debate. Consistent with good faith and reasonable care, the press should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in the choice of language. There must be some room for misstatement of fact as well as for misjudgment. Only by giving them much leeway and tolerance can they courageously and effectively function as critical agencies in our democracy.” (Id.).
In the recent case of FILIPINAS BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC. vs. AGO MEDICAL AND EDUCATIONAL CENTER-BICOL CHRISTIAN COLLEGE OF MEDICINE (AMEC-BCCM), GR. 141994, January 17, 2005, which cited the case of BORJAL, supra, , the Supreme held that “fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander”. The doctrine of fair comment means “that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable”.
The Supreme Court further held therein, thus: “In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts”.
Parenthetically, it should be noted that in Adm. Circular No. 08-2008, dated January 25, 2008, of former Chief Justice Reynato Puno, pursuant to the resolution of the Supreme Court En Banc in A.M. No. 08-1-17 SC at its session of 22 January 2008, entitled “GUIDELINES IN THE OBSERVANCE OF A RULE OF PREFERENCE IN THE IMPOSITION OF PENALTIES IN LIBEL CASES”, the Supreme Court reminded all trial judges that in recent cases cited in the administrative circular, it opted to impose ONLY A FINE on the person convicted of the crime of libel, particularly in those cases:
1. where the accused wrote the libelous article merely to defend his honor against the malicious messages, where the accused committed the offense in the heat of anger and in reaction to a perceived provocation,
2. where the intensely feverish passions evoked during an election period must have agitated petitioner into writing his open letter and that incomplete privileged communication should be appreciated in favor of petitioner, especially considering the wide latitude traditionally given to defamatory utterances against public officials in connection with or relevant to their performance of official duties or against public figures in relation to matters of public interest involving them, and
3. where the crime of libel was the first offense of the accused and he was motivated purely by his belief that he was merely exercising a civic or moral duty to his client when wrote the defamatory letter to private complainant.
The Supreme Court stated therein that in the foregoing cases the “emergent rule of preference for the imposition of fine only rather than imprisonment in libel cases under the circumstances therein specified”.
- ATTY. MANUEL J. LASERNA JR.
Laserna Cueva-Mercader LAw Offices
Las Pinas City
Founder, Las Pinas City Bar Assn, Inc.
Former Vice Pres., IBP PPLM Chapter
Former Professor of LAw, FEU Inst. of Law
3rd placer, 1984 Bar Exams
August 7, 2013.
Offhand, it should be stated that "any person who acts in the fulfillment of a DUTY or in the lawful exercise of a RIGHT OR OFFICE " does NOT incur criminal liability (Art. 11, Rev. Penal Code [RPC]).
Art. 353 of the RPC defines LIBEL as "a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead".
Under Art. 354 of the RPC, "every DEFAMATORY imputation is PRESUMED to be malicious, EVEN IF it be true, IF no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, EXCEPT in the following cases:
1. A PRIVATE communication made by any person to another in the performance of any LEGAL, MORAL OR SOCIAL DUTY; and
2. A FAIR AND TRUE REPORT, made in GOOD FAITH, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions."
It should be noted that "in every criminal prosecution for libel, THE TRUTH may be given in evidence to the court and if it appears that the matter charged as libelous is true, and, moreover, that it was published with GOOD MOTIVES and for JUSTIFIABLE ENDS, the defendants shall be ACQUITTED" (Art. 361, Par. 1, RPC). (NOTE: Par. 2 of the same provision states that proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not constituting a crime shall not be admitted, unless the imputation shall have been made against GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES with respect to facts related to the discharge of their official duties", and "in such cases if the defendant proves THE TRUTH of the imputation made by him, he shall be ACQUITTED").
The 1987 Constitution contains relevant provisions on the issue at hand. Sec. 24, Art. II (State Policies) thereof provides that "the State recognizes the vital role of COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION in nation-building". Sec. 27 thereof provides that "the State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against GRAFT AND CORRUPTION". Sec. 28 thereof provides that "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest".
Art. III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution is explicit on PRESS FREEDOM and other relate constitutional/human rights. Sec. 4 thereof provides that "no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of SPEECH , of EXPRESSION, or of THE PRESS, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and PETITION the Government for redress of grievances". Moreover, Sec. 7 thereof provides that "the right of the people to INFORMATION on matters of PUBLIC CONCERN shall be recognized' and that "ACCESS to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law".
In all criminal proceedings, the respondents are entitled to the CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE. (Sec. 14 [2], Article III, Bill of Rights, 1987 Constitution).
The presumption of innocence is a basic and universal human right that forms a crucial part of a person’s right to DUE PROCESS OF LAW and EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW (cf. 1947 U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
Rule 131, in general, of the Rules of Evidence commands that he who makes an affirmative allegation has the burden of proof to show and establish the veracity thereof.
Sec. 3 of Rule 131 sets forth certain basic legal presumptions, e.g., “that a person is innocent of crime or wrong”, “that official duty has been regularly performed”, and “that the law has been obeyed”.
In the light of the foregoing constitutional and statutory presumptions, the complainants in a libel case have the heavy burden of proof to destroy the aforementioned presumptions and to show, with clear, credible, and convincing evidence beyond reasonable doubt that the respondents had acted with ACTUAL CRIMINAL MALICE in making the questioned news articles.
Under the EQUIPOISE OF EVIDENCE RULE, all things being equal, that is, where the evidence proffered by the complainants would show neither the guilt nor the innocence of the respondents, the aforesaid constitutional and legal presumptions of innocence should ipso facto operate in favor of the respondents to protect their civil and human rights under the Constitution.
Under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, EXCEPT in the following cases of PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS:
“1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.” (emphasis supplied).
Article 361 of the Revised Penal Code, inter alia, provides that “in every criminal prosecution for libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the court and if it appears that the matter charged as libelous is true, and, moreover, that it was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the defendants shall be acquitted”.
Under Article 362 of the Revised Penal Code, ACTUAL MALICE, not merely presumptive malice, is required to remove a respondent from the legal protection of the privileged communication rule under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, supra. Article 362 provides: “Libelous remarks or comments connected with the matter privileged under the provisions of Article 354, if made with malice, shall not exempt the author thereof nor the editor or managing editor of a newspaper from criminal liability.”
In the case of Vasquez v. CA, et. al., GR 118971, September 15, 1999, the Supreme Court, in discussing the rule on ACTUAL MALICE, held that the prosecution “must prove not only that the charges made by petitioner were false but also that petitioner made them with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not”. Thus:
“For that matter, even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to official conduct, unless the public official concerned proves that the statement was made with actual malice – that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. This is the gist of the ruling in the landmark case of New York Times vs. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, which this Court has cited with approval in several of its own decisions. (Lopez v. CA, 145 Phil. 219 [1970]; Mercado v. CFI, 201 Phil. 565 [1982]; Babst v. NIB, 132 SCRA 316 [1984]). This is the rule of “actual malice”. In this case, the prosecution failed to prove not only that the charges made by petitioner were false but also that petitioner made them with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not.
A rule placing on the accused the burden of showing the truth of allegations of official misconduct and/or good motives and justifiable ends for making such allegations would not only be contrary to Art. 361 of the Revised Penal Code. It would, above all, infringe on the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Such a rule would deter citizens from performing their duties as members of a self-governing community. Without free speech and assembly, discussions of our most abiding concerns as a nation would be stifled. Public discussion is a political duty and the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people. (Whitney v. California, 247 U.S. 357).
As already stated, however, in accordance with Art. 361, if the defamatory matter either constitutes a crime or concerns the performance of official duties, and the accused proves the truth of his charge, he should be acquitted. (L.B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Vol. 2, 1981 ed., p. 361).
[See also: Manuel v. Pano, 172 SCRA 225 (1989); - US v. Eguia, 38 Phil. 857 (1918); - People v. Burgos, 59 Phil. 375 (1934); - People v. Garcia, 281 SCRA 463 (1997); - Daez v. CA, 191 SCRA 61 (1990); Art. 353, RPC; Art. 361, RPC; Alonzo v. CA, 241 SCRA 51 (1995); Kunkle v. Cablenews-American, 42 Phil. 757 (1922); US v. Sotto, 38 Phil. 666 (1918); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 US 254, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964); Lopez v. CA, 145 Phil. 219 (1970); Mercado v. CFI, 201 Phil. 565 (1982); Babst v. NIB, 132 SCRA 316 (1984); Whitney v. California, 247 US 357, 71 L. Ed. 1095 (1927); Manuel v. Pano, 172 SCRA 225 (1989)].
In the case of OCAMPO vs. SUN-STAR PUBLISHING, INC., G.R. No. 133575, December 15, 2000, the Supreme Court held that while the law presumes every defamatory imputation to be malicious, there are exceptions to this general rule, set forth in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
In BRILLANTE vs. CA, ET. AL., G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571, October 19, 2004, the Supreme Court reiterated the doctrine of PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION under Article 354, No. 1, of the Revised Penal Code, as discussed in the case of OCAMPO, supra, and it clarified that “the interest sought to be protected by the person making the communication need not be his own, but may refer to an interest shared by the other members of society”. According to the Supreme Court, “indeed, the purpose of affording protection to privileged communication is to permit all interested persons or citizens with grievances to freely communicate, with immunity, to the persons who could furnish the protection asked for”. (Id.).
The Supreme Court stressed that “the plainest principles of natural right and sound public policy require that the utmost possible freedom should be accorded every citizen to complain to the supervising, removing and appointing authorities of the misconduct of the public officials with whom he comes into contact, and like considerations make it equally proper that members of a religious organization should enjoy equal freedom in bringing to the attention of the church authorities the misbehavior of their spiritual leaders or of fellow-members”. (Id.). The said right must be exercised “in good faith” and that such complaints “must be made to a functionary having authority to redress the evils complained of, that they must be made in good faith, and that they must not be actuated by malice”. (Id.).
In the case of BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, et. al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et. al., G. R. NO. 107566, November 25, 2004, the Supreme Court held that the rule on PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION applies to “fair comment on matters of public interest, fair comment being that which is true, or which if false, expresses the real opinion of the author based upon reasonable degree of care and on reasonable grounds”.
The Supreme Court further held that “the remedy of the person allegedly libeled is to show proof that an article was written with the author’s knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” While the law itself creates the presumption that every defamatory imputation is malicious, nevertheless, “the privileged character of a communication destroys said presumption.” The burden of proving actual malice “shall then rest on the plaintiff”. (Id.).
In BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, supra, the Supreme Court reiterated its holding in the prior case of Borjal vs. CA, G.R. No. 126466, 14 January 1999, 310 SCRA 1, and held that, “even assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not prove actual malice”. It further held: “Errors or misstatements are inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression and debate. Consistent with good faith and reasonable care, the press should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in the choice of language. There must be some room for misstatement of fact as well as for misjudgment. Only by giving them much leeway and tolerance can they courageously and effectively function as critical agencies in our democracy.” (Id.).
In the recent case of FILIPINAS BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC. vs. AGO MEDICAL AND EDUCATIONAL CENTER-BICOL CHRISTIAN COLLEGE OF MEDICINE (AMEC-BCCM), GR. 141994, January 17, 2005, which cited the case of BORJAL, supra, , the Supreme held that “fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander”. The doctrine of fair comment means “that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable”.
The Supreme Court further held therein, thus: “In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts”.
Parenthetically, it should be noted that in Adm. Circular No. 08-2008, dated January 25, 2008, of former Chief Justice Reynato Puno, pursuant to the resolution of the Supreme Court En Banc in A.M. No. 08-1-17 SC at its session of 22 January 2008, entitled “GUIDELINES IN THE OBSERVANCE OF A RULE OF PREFERENCE IN THE IMPOSITION OF PENALTIES IN LIBEL CASES”, the Supreme Court reminded all trial judges that in recent cases cited in the administrative circular, it opted to impose ONLY A FINE on the person convicted of the crime of libel, particularly in those cases:
1. where the accused wrote the libelous article merely to defend his honor against the malicious messages, where the accused committed the offense in the heat of anger and in reaction to a perceived provocation,
2. where the intensely feverish passions evoked during an election period must have agitated petitioner into writing his open letter and that incomplete privileged communication should be appreciated in favor of petitioner, especially considering the wide latitude traditionally given to defamatory utterances against public officials in connection with or relevant to their performance of official duties or against public figures in relation to matters of public interest involving them, and
3. where the crime of libel was the first offense of the accused and he was motivated purely by his belief that he was merely exercising a civic or moral duty to his client when wrote the defamatory letter to private complainant.
The Supreme Court stated therein that in the foregoing cases the “emergent rule of preference for the imposition of fine only rather than imprisonment in libel cases under the circumstances therein specified”.
- ATTY. MANUEL J. LASERNA JR.
Laserna Cueva-Mercader LAw Offices
Las Pinas City
Founder, Las Pinas City Bar Assn, Inc.
Former Vice Pres., IBP PPLM Chapter
Former Professor of LAw, FEU Inst. of Law
3rd placer, 1984 Bar Exams
August 7, 2013.
Saturday, August 3, 2013
The Civil Trial Process - James N. Guirl Personal Injury Law Blog on Lawyers.com
see - The Civil Trial Process - James N. Guirl Personal Injury Law Blog on Lawyers.com
THE US CIVIL TRIAL PROCESS IS NOT VERY DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF THE PHL, EXCEPT PERHAPS THAT IN THE USA THE DISCOVERY PROCESS IS REALLY EMPHASIZED AND PRACTICED, UNLIKE IN THE PHL.
"x x x.
THE US CIVIL TRIAL PROCESS IS NOT VERY DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF THE PHL, EXCEPT PERHAPS THAT IN THE USA THE DISCOVERY PROCESS IS REALLY EMPHASIZED AND PRACTICED, UNLIKE IN THE PHL.
"x x x.
What are the basic steps that a civil case takes?
- The plaintiff (you) files a complaint. This is a document detailing the facts as the plaintiff sees them and explains why he believes that he should be able to recover damages.
- The defendant then files an answer. The defendant admits, denies or states that he does not have enough information to admit or deny each of your allegations.
- After you receive the answer, the parties engage in discovery. Each party can ask the other questions in writing, called interrogatories. You may also ask the defendant to produce relevant documents. Often the lawyers meet with the judge before discovery starts, make a schedule and agree on certain rules.
- The next step is the taking of depositions. Each party can ask the other party and the party’s witnesses questions under oath. The proceedings are recorded, either in a transcript and/or on video, and the testimony is very much like what would happen at trial, except that the judge and jury are not there.
- After all the discovery is concluded, the defendant will probably move for summary judgment. This motion argues that even if the facts are as the plaintiff states, there is no legal theory under which he can recover. The judge will rule on this motion, and if it is granted, then the plaintiff loses the case.
- The judge may require the two parties to discuss the possibility of settlement before the trial date. If settlement discussions were not successful, then the case is set for trial.
- Your case is tried and the jury decides whether you are entitled to damages and then the amount of damages.
- Often the losing party at trial appeals, arguing that the judge made a mistake of law at the trial.
x x x."
Friday, August 2, 2013
Gross negligence by lawyers - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/july2013/7749.pdf
see - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/july2013/7749.pdf
"x x x.
As regards the appropriate penalty, several cases show that lawyers who have been held liable for gross negligence for infractions similar to those of the respondent were suspended for a period of six (6) months. In Aranda v. Elayda,32 a lawyer who failed to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due notice which resulted in the submission of the case for decision was found guilty of gross negligence and hence, suspended for six (6) months. In Heirs of Tiburcio F. Ballesteros, Sr. v. Apiag,33 a lawyer who did not file a pre-trial brief and was absent during the pre-trial conference was likewise suspended for six (6) months. In Abiero v. Juanino,34 a lawyer who neglected a legal matter entrusted to him by his client in breach of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code was also suspended for six (6) months. Thus, consistent with existing jurisprudence, the Court finds it proper to impose
the same penalty against respondent and accordingly suspends him for a
period of six (6) months.
x x x.?
"x x x.
As regards the appropriate penalty, several cases show that lawyers who have been held liable for gross negligence for infractions similar to those of the respondent were suspended for a period of six (6) months. In Aranda v. Elayda,32 a lawyer who failed to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due notice which resulted in the submission of the case for decision was found guilty of gross negligence and hence, suspended for six (6) months. In Heirs of Tiburcio F. Ballesteros, Sr. v. Apiag,33 a lawyer who did not file a pre-trial brief and was absent during the pre-trial conference was likewise suspended for six (6) months. In Abiero v. Juanino,34 a lawyer who neglected a legal matter entrusted to him by his client in breach of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code was also suspended for six (6) months. Thus, consistent with existing jurisprudence, the Court finds it proper to impose
the same penalty against respondent and accordingly suspends him for a
period of six (6) months.
x x x.?
Lawyer disbarred for dishonesty - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/july2013/6490.pdf
see - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/july2013/6490.pdf
"x x x.
Quite the contrary, he employed his knowledge and skill of the law as well
as took advantage of the credulity of petitioners to secure undue gains for
himself and to inflict serious damage on others. He did so over the course of several years in a sustained and unrelenting fashion and outdid his previous wrongdoing with even greater, more detestable offenses. He has hardly shown any remorse. From how he has conducted himself in these
proceedings, he is all but averse to rectifying his ways and assuaging
complainants' plight. Respondent even foisted upon the IBP and this Court his duplicity by repeatedly absenting himself ·from the IBP's hearings
without justifiable reasons. He also vexed this Court to admit his Appeal
despite his own failure to comply with the much extended period given to
him, thus inviting the Court to be a party in delaying complainants' cause.
For all his perversity, respondent deserves none of this Court's clemency.
x x x."
"x x x.
Quite the contrary, he employed his knowledge and skill of the law as well
as took advantage of the credulity of petitioners to secure undue gains for
himself and to inflict serious damage on others. He did so over the course of several years in a sustained and unrelenting fashion and outdid his previous wrongdoing with even greater, more detestable offenses. He has hardly shown any remorse. From how he has conducted himself in these
proceedings, he is all but averse to rectifying his ways and assuaging
complainants' plight. Respondent even foisted upon the IBP and this Court his duplicity by repeatedly absenting himself ·from the IBP's hearings
without justifiable reasons. He also vexed this Court to admit his Appeal
despite his own failure to comply with the much extended period given to
him, thus inviting the Court to be a party in delaying complainants' cause.
For all his perversity, respondent deserves none of this Court's clemency.
x x x."
Causing undue injury to the gov't - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/july2013/168951.pdf
see - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/july2013/168951.pdf
"x x x.
"Upon the entire evidence on record, the Sandiganbayan was convinced that petitioners were guilty of causing undue injury to the Government. In Llorente, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 32 this Court said that to hold a person liable for causing undue injury under Section 3(e), the concurrence of the following elements must be established beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution:
(1) that the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former;
(2) that said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official duties or in relation to his or her public positions;
(3) that he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private party; and
(4) that the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
We sustain the decision of the Sandiganbayan holding petitioners liable for causing undue injury to the Government in appointing Dr. Posadas as TMC Project Director with evident bad faith.
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.33 It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self interest or ill will for ulterior purposes.34 Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or cause damage.35
In Pecho v. Sandiganbayan, 36 the Court en banc defined injury as “any wrong or damage done to another, either in his person, or in his rights, reputation or property; the invasion of any legally protected interests of another.” It must be more than necessary or are excessive, improper or illegal. It is required that the undue injury caused by the positive or passive acts of the accused be quantifiable and demonstrable and proven to the point of moral certainty.37“Undue” means illegal, immoral, unlawful, void of equity and moderations.38
x x x."
"x x x.
"Upon the entire evidence on record, the Sandiganbayan was convinced that petitioners were guilty of causing undue injury to the Government. In Llorente, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 32 this Court said that to hold a person liable for causing undue injury under Section 3(e), the concurrence of the following elements must be established beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution:
(1) that the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former;
(2) that said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official duties or in relation to his or her public positions;
(3) that he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private party; and
(4) that the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
We sustain the decision of the Sandiganbayan holding petitioners liable for causing undue injury to the Government in appointing Dr. Posadas as TMC Project Director with evident bad faith.
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.33 It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self interest or ill will for ulterior purposes.34 Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or cause damage.35
In Pecho v. Sandiganbayan, 36 the Court en banc defined injury as “any wrong or damage done to another, either in his person, or in his rights, reputation or property; the invasion of any legally protected interests of another.” It must be more than necessary or are excessive, improper or illegal. It is required that the undue injury caused by the positive or passive acts of the accused be quantifiable and demonstrable and proven to the point of moral certainty.37“Undue” means illegal, immoral, unlawful, void of equity and moderations.38
x x x."
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