Monday, December 23, 2013

Judiciary funds fully audited – SC | Headlines, News, The Philippine Star | philstar.com

see - Judiciary funds fully audited – SC | Headlines, News, The Philippine Star | philstar.com


"x x x.

MANILA, Philippines - The Supreme Court (SC) assured the public yesterday that judiciary funds are fully audited and open to scrutiny.
Spokesman Theodore Te said the SC has been transparent in handling the judiciary fund, comprising only one percent of the national budget in the past years.
“The reports would show how much was collected, how much was disbursed and where the amounts went,” he said. “These documents were uploaded and publicly accessible as of August 2012.”
Reports on the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and Special Allowance for Justices and Judges (SAJJ) collections and disbursements have been available in the SC website since Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno took over the judiciary’s top post last year, Te said.
Sereno had said that all funds of the courts – including the JDF and SAJJ – have been accounted for even before Congress moved to scrutinize the judiciary’s budget.
“Every single centavo in the judiciary is fully audited,” she said. “We cannot escape COA (Commission on Audit) accounting.”
Headlines ( Article MRec ), pagematch: 1, sectionmatch: 1
In its annual report released last August, the SC detailed how the P15.357-billion budget of the judiciary last year was spent.
It was learned that from August 2012 to July 2013, the total JDF collections from legal fees have reached over P1 billion.
Sereno said some P870 million of the fund was distributed to employees of courts nationwide, while the rest would be used for capital outlay and equipment purchase.
An SC insider told The STAR that moves in the House of Representatives to scrutinize judiciary funds are “obvious retaliatory actions” in connection with the tribunal‘s decision declaring the Priority Development Assistance Fund unconstitutional.
x x x."

SC dismisses court employee found positive for shabu - InterAksyon.com

see - SC dismisses court employee found positive for shabu - InterAksyon.com


"x x x.

MANILA, Philippines -- The Supreme Court has dismissed an electrician assigned at the SC who was found to have been addicted to drugs.
In an administrative matter, Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. Aranal Sereno found Reynard B. Castor, Electrician II, Maintenance Division, Office of Administrative Services (OAS), liable for grave misconduct due to his use of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a prohibited drug.
“[T]he Court orders his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government including government-owned or controlled corporations,” the SC ruling said.
It explained that the verdict is immediately executory.
Castor’s dismissal arose from his series of sick leave application without any medical certificate.
Due to his frequent absences, he was referred to the SC Clinic for medical evaluation to determine his physical fitness to continue with his duties and responsibilities.
In the medical evaluation report on Castor dated June 27, 2013, Dr. Prudencio R. Banzon Jr. of SC’s Medical and Dental Services, said that sometime in March 2013 Castor sought consultation due to an on-and-off dizziness.
A chest X-ray was conducted and he was advised to seek pulmonary consultation.
A medical certificate was then issued by a pulmonologist declaring him fit for work.
According to Banzon, when Castor reported to him at the SC clinic on April 25, 2013 he was compelled to undergo a random drug test.
The drug test, which was undertaken at the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) laboratory, yielded positive for shabu.
Banzon remarked that Castor’s absences could be attributed to financial distress due to vice rather than illness.
On the basis of the result of the random drug test, the OAS issued its memorandum dated July 2, 2013 directing Castor to submit his comment/explanation why he should not be administratively charged with misconduct for the use of prohibited drugs.
In his letter dated July 9, 2013 Castor explained that during the early months of this year, he was confronted with emotional and financial problems regarding his family.
Because of these heavy problems, he incurred repeated absences from office.
According to him, he was so depressed that he even thought of committing suicide.
He admitted that it was during those times that he took prohibited drugs unintentionally.
He further claimed that the drugs affected his health and well-being as well as his performance at work.
He was nonetheless apologetic and asked that he be given another chance.
He also promised that this would not happen again.
“Undoubtedly, the use of prohibited drugs by Castor violated the norms of conduct for public service. By indulging in the use of illegal drugs, he committed conduct unbecoming of court personnel, which tarnished the very image and integrity of the Judiciary. No less than the Constitution mandates that a public office is a public trust and public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives,” the SC ruling said.
It added that “the image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat.”
“The conduct of a person serving the judiciary must, at all times, be characterized by propriety and decorum and above all else, be above suspicion so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the Judiciary. The Court would never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those in the administration of justice, which will violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary,” the SC said.

x x x."

‘SC can’t invoke fiscal autonomy’ | Headlines, News, The Philippine Star | philstar.com

see - ‘SC can’t invoke fiscal autonomy’ | Headlines, News, The Philippine Star | philstar.com


"x x x.

MANILA, Philippines - A senior administration lawmaker yesterday warned members of the Supreme Court (SC) against invoking fiscal autonomy in resisting moves by the House of Representatives to scrutinize the use of the multibillion-peso Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
Cavite Rep. Elpidio Barzaga said even before the House committee on justice starts its investigation next year, he already saw some allegedly questionable disbursements made from the JDF – earlier described as the pork barrel of the high court – based on its website.
According to Barzaga, fiscal autonomy must be subservient to fiscal accountability and responsibility.
He said under Presidential Decree No. 1949 signed by the late strongman Ferdinand Marcos in 1984, 80 percent of the JDF should be spent for the cost of living allowance (COLA) of employees in the judiciary while the remainder should be used for the purchase of office equipment and other facilities.
“What is questionable is that the cumulative balance of 20 percent of the JDF for office equipment and other facilities as of June 30, 2013 is P1.775 billion, and yet the SC is not spending this 20 percent, although judges and court employees have been complaining that they lack computers, stationeries, and their courts are dilapidated,” Barzaga said.
He said for 2012, the SC collected P33,241,383.21 from cases brought before it, and yet it spent P65,674,615.79 for employees’ COLA and P108,787,950.47 for office equipment, expenditures way above the high court’s total collection.
Headlines ( Article MRec ), pagematch: 1, sectionmatch: 1
The lawmaker said he also saw a similar thing in the accounts of the Court of Appeals (CA), which collected only P5 million but disbursed P42 million that same year for expenses that were not identified.
“The Supreme Court must inform the public and the COA (Commission on Audit) the specific amount of COLA coming from JDF to clerks, interpreters, clerk of courts, sheriffs, judges and justices. The SC cannot evade the issue by invoking fiscal autonomy,” Barzaga said.
“We might later be surprised to find out that their COLA could be like those directors in government corporations who receive very high allowances,” he told radio dzBB in a separate interview, adding SC officials complain of lack of funds during the annual budget hearings in Congress.
He said the House also wants to find out the result of the COA audit on the JDF, if there was one.
Barzaga said under PD 1949, the COA is mandated to audit the JDF, adding that government appropriations should be spent so that public service would not suffer.
He dismissed the warning of Navotas City Rep. Tobias Tiangco that the pro-administration bloc in the House was trying to intimidate the SC justices so they would declare the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) legal and constitutional.
“I think a separate department in the government cannot instill fear in a coequal branch,” he said.
Palace backs Congress
Meanwhile, MalacaƱang yesterday gave Congress the go-signal to check corruption in the judiciary by scrutinizing the JDF.
Press Secretary Herminio Coloma Jr. said there are provisions in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) regarding the oversight functions of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
“It has been stated in the GAA which has been enacted into law recently, where the oversight process on what we call off-budget funds like the JDF will continue,” he said over dzRB.
Coloma also confirmed The STAR’s report that such has always been the mandate of the legislature – to ensure all funds are spent judiciously.
“That is what the law states and that is what we will be implementing strictly,” he said.
In approving the P2.2-trillion national budget for 2014, Aquino retained the special provision inserted by the Senate and the House in the budget subjecting all off-budget funds to congressional monitoring and examination.
‘Lawmakers want revenge’
Sources have alleged that the scrutiny of the JDF was one way where both the executive department and the legislature can take vengeance on the judiciary for nullifying the pork barrel of senators and congressmen.
“They are now focusing on the vulnerability of the justices,” an insider said.
Other insiders also said congressmen wanted to get back at the SC for its inconsistent ruling on the case of Marinduque Rep. Regina Reyes.
The SC has ruled with finality on her disqualification case, and favored her opponent, Lord Allan Velasco, son of Justice Presbitero Velasco, the lone abstainer from the SC’s unanimous ruling that declared the pork barrel funds unconstitutional. – Paolo Romero, Delon Porcalla
 x x x."

Wednesday, December 18, 2013

BIR Officials Amass Unexplained Wealth

see - BIR Officials Amass Unexplained Wealth


"x x x.

For the past six months, a team of PCIJ researchers led by PCIJ contributor Tess Bacalla, has been doing a lifestyle check on BIR personnel. The research yielded a wealth of information on the grand houses and expensive vehicles of BIR officials and employees who earn only a modest income. We found, from a check of 25 officials at various levels, that many of them cannot explain how they acquired their assets, including shares in businesses and companies.

One BIR regional director, for example, lives in a big house in posh Ayala Alabang, yet he earns less than P300,000 a year. Parked in his garage on the day PCIJ visited were a Ford Expedition, a Toyota Land Cruiser and a brand new BMW. A Revenue District Officer whose annual salary is P270,000 has two weekend houses in Calamba and lives during the week in a Greenhills condominium.

We found that BIR postings are so lucrative that many BIR personnel petition the Civil Service Commission to change their birth records so they can advance their dates of birth and delay their retirement. We found 24 such applications for a change in birth records from 1989 to the first quarter of 2001 alone.

The three-part series concludes by looking at the breakdown in the system of checks and balances in the BIR and the lack of transparency, oversight and accountability that contribute to making the bureau one of the most corrupt government agencies."

FEU appoints new dean of law

see - FEU appoints new dean of law


"x x x.

NEW DEAN. Succeeding Atty. Juan Andres D. Bautista is Atty. Melencio S. Sta. Maria who will serve as dean of FEU's Institute of Law. NEW DEAN. Succeeding Atty. Juan Andres D. Bautista is Atty. Melencio S. Sta. Maria who will serve as dean of FEU's Institute of Law.

MANILA, Philippines — Far Eastern University (FEU) President Dr. Michael M. Alba recently appointed Atty. Melencio S. Sta. Maria as the new dean of its Institute of Law, succeeding Atty. Juan Andres D. Bautista who served in the position for 16 years.

"I am confident that Atty. Melencio Sta. Maria will lead the Institute of Law to new heights while continuing its legacy as one of the oldest and respected law schools in the country,” said Dr. Alba. “His vast knowledge and experience, both as a lawyer and professor, can only positively contribute to the caliber of legal education FEU offers.”

Atty. Sta. Maria comes with 27 years of teaching experience at the Ateneo de Manila School of Law, where he taught Public Corporation Law, Public International Law, Wills and Succession and Contract Drafting.

Apart from being a bar reviewer in Civil Law and an awardee of various professorial chairs, he has also written three important textbooks: Persons and Family Relations Law, Court Procedures in Family Law Cases, and Obligations and Contracts: Text and Cases. He frequently lends his expertise as an expert-witness in the field of Philippine Contract Law in international arbitration cases.

Atty. Sta Maria holds a Master of Laws in Banking Law from the Morin Center for Banking Law Studies at Boston University’s School of Law. He completed his Bachelor of Laws with honors at the Ateneo de Manila University, where he also previously learned his Bachelor of Science in Biology.

Founded in 1934, FEU’s Institute of Law takes pride in providing quality legal education at an affordable cost and endeavors to be a law school that is a haven for the working class.

x x x."

CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE OF DRIVERS AND OPERATORS; applicable laws; penalties; civil liabilities.



Reckless imprudence vis-Ć -vis simple negligence. -   

Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code provides that  “reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or falling to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing of failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place”.

The same article provides that “simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest”.

Penalty for Reckless imprudence. –

Art. 365 of the Rev. Penal Code (“Imprudence and negligence”) provides that “any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed”.


Penalty for Simple Imprudence or Negligence. –

The aforecited Art. 365 provides that “any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed”.


Penalty for Damage to Property –

Article 365 provides that “when the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos”.


Penalty for Light Felony-

A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.


Exceptions under Art. 365 -

The provisions of Art. 365 are not be applicable:

1.      “When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.

2.    When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, the death of a person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.”


Failure to Lend Help –

Art. 365 provides that “the penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give”. (As amended by R.A. 1790, approved June 21, 1957). 


REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10586 (“Anti-Drunk and Drugged Driving Act of 2013″) –

Punishable Act –

Sec. 5 of RA 10586 (“Punishable Act”) provides that “it shall be unlawful for any person to drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, dangerous drugs and/or other similar substances”.

Mandatory Tests –

Sec. 8 (“Refusal to Subject Oneself to Mandatory Tests”) of the said provides that “a driver of a motor vehicle who refuses to undergo the mandatory field sobriety and drug tests under Sections 6, 7 and 15 of this Act shall be penalized by the confiscation and automatic revocation of his or her driver’s license, in addition to other penalties provided herein and/or other pertinent laws”.


Penalties under RA 10586 –

The penalties imposed by the said law are contained in Sec. 12 (“Penalties”) thereof. It provides that “a driver found to have been driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, dangerous drugs and/or other similar substances, as provided for under Section 5 of this Act” shall be penalized as follows:

“(a) If the violation of Section 5 did not result in physical injuries or homicide, the penalty of three (3) months imprisonment, and a fine ranging from Twenty thousand pesos (Php20,000.00) to Eighty thousand pesos (Php80,000.00) shall be imposed”;

“(b) If the violation of Section 5 resulted in physical injuries, the penalty provided in Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code or the penalty provided in the next preceding subparagraph, whichever is higher, and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (Php100,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos (Php200,000.00) shall be imposed”;

Notes:

Article 263 (Serious physical injuries) of the Rev. Penal Code provides that “any person who shall wound, beat, or assault another, shall be guilty of the crime of serious physical injuries and shall suffer:

1. The penalty of prision mayor, if in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the injured person shall become insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind;

2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have lost the use of speech or the power to hear or to smell, or shall have lost an eye, a hand, a foot, an arm, or a leg or shall have lost the use of any such member, or shall have become incapacitated for the work in which he was therefor habitually engaged;

3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have become deformed, or shall have lost any other part of his body, or shall have lost the use thereof, or shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance of the work in which he as habitually engaged for a period of more than ninety days;

4. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if the physical injuries inflicted shall have caused the illness or incapacity for labor of the injured person for more than thirty days.

If the offense shall have been committed against any of the persons enumerated in Article 246, or with attendance of any of the circumstances mentioned in Article 248, the case covered by subdivision number 1 of this Article shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods; the case covered by subdivision number 2 by prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period; the case covered by subdivision number 3 by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods; and the case covered by subdivision number 4 by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not be applicable to a parent who shall inflict physical injuries upon his child by excessive chastisement.”

Article 248 (Murder) of the Rev. Penal Code provides that “any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.

3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.

4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.

5. With evident premeditation.

6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.”


(c) “If the violation of Section 5 resulted in homicide, the penalty provided in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos (Php300,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) shall be imposed”;


Notes -

Article 249 (Homicide) of the Rev. Penal Code provides that “any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal”.

Article 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

(d) “The nonprofessional driver’s license of any person found to have violated Section 5 of this Act shall also be confiscated and suspended for a period of twelve (12) months for the first conviction and perpetually revoked for the second conviction. The professional driver’s license of any person found to have violated Section 5 of this Act shall also be confiscated and perpetually revoked for the first conviction. The perpetual revocation of a driver’s license shall disqualify the person from being granted any kind of driver’s license thereafter.”


Without Prejudice to Other Applicable Laws. –

Art. 12 of RA  10586 provides that the “prosecution for any violation of this Act shall be without prejudice to criminal prosecution for violation of the Revised Penal Code, Republic Act No. 9165 and other special laws and existing local ordinances, whenever applicable”. The crime defined under RA 10586, a special law, is classified as malum prohibitum. The offender may still be prosecuted under Art. 365, et. seq. of the Rev. Penal Code, where the offenses defined therein are classified as mala en se.


Direct Criminal and Civil Liabilities 
of the Operator –

Sec. 13 (“Direct Liability of Operator and/or Owner of the Offending Vehicle”) of RA 10586   provides that “the owner and/or operator of the vehicle driven by the offender shall be directly and principally held liable together with the offender for the fine and the award against the offender for civil damages unless he or she is able to convincingly prove that he or she has exercised extraordinary diligence in the selection and supervision of his or her drivers in general and the offending driver in particular.”

The said section provides that it “shall principally apply to the owners and/or operators of public utility vehicles and commercial vehicles such as delivery vans, cargo trucks, container trucks, school and company buses, hotel transports, cars or vans for rent, taxi cabs, and the like”.


What laws did RA 10586 repeal? –

Sec. 19 (Repealing Clause) of RA 10586 repealed the following laws:

1.      “Subparagraph (f), Section 56, Article 1 of Republic Act No. 4136, otherwise known as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, as amended”;

Note –

Section 56 (Penalty for violation) of RA 4136 provides that the penalty for  “(f) Driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of liquor or narcotic drug, a fine of not less than two hundred pesos nor more than five hundred pesos, or imprisonment of not more than three months, or both, at the discretion of the Court”.

2.    “Subparagraph (f), Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7924, otherwise known as “An Act Creating the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Defining its Powers and Functions, Providing Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes;”

Note –

Subparagraph (f), Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7924 provides that among the powers of the MMDA is to “install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or non-moving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke driver's licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of RA 4136, and PD 1605 to the contrary notwithstanding.”

3.    “Subparagraph (a), Section 36 of Republic Act No. 9165”; and

Note –

RA 9165, “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002". -  

“Section 36, Subparagraph (a) (Authorized Drug Testing)  of RA 9165, or the “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002”, provides that “no driver's license shall be issued or renewed to any person unless he/she presents a certification that he/she has undergone a mandatory drug test and indicating thereon that he/she is free from the use of dangerous drugs;”


4.    “All other laws, orders, issuances, circulars, rules and regulations or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any provision of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly”.




Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr.
Laserna Cueva-Mercader Law Offices
Las Pinas City, MM, PH



Reckless imprudence, right of way explained.

LARRY V. CAMINOS, JR.  vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 147437, May 8, 2009


D E C I S I O N

 Tinga, J.:
                                                                            
The right of a person using public streets and highways for travel in relation  to  other  motorists  is  mutual,  coordinate and reciprocal.[1]  He is bound to anticipate the presence of other persons whose rights on the street or highway are equal to his own.[2]  Although he is not an insurer against injury to persons or property,[3] it is nevertheless his duty to operate his motor vehicle with due and reasonable care and caution under the circumstances for the safety of others[4] as well as for his own.[5]

X x x.

Reckless imprudence generally defined by our penal law consists in voluntarily but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.[6]

Imprudence connotes a deficiency of action.  It implies a failure in precaution  or a failure to take the necessary precaution once the danger or peril becomes foreseen.[7]  Thus, something more than mere negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle is necessary to constitute the offense of reckless driving, and a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is required.[8]  Willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others within the meaning of reckless driving statutes has been held to involve a conscious choice of a course of action which injures another, either with knowledge of serious danger to others involved, or with knowledge of facts which would disclose the danger to any reasonable person.[9]

Hence, in prosecutions for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property, whether or not one of the drivers of the colliding automobiles is guilty of the offense is a question that lies in the manner and circumstances of the operation of the motor vehicle,[10] and a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt requires the concurrence of the following elements, namely, (a) that the offender has done or failed to do an act; (b) that the act is voluntary; (c) that the same is without malice; (d) that material damage results; and (e) that there has been inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender.[11] 

Among the elements constitutive of the offense, what perhaps is most central to a finding of guilt is the conclusive determination that the accused has exhibited, by his voluntary act without malice, an inexcusable lack of precaution because it is that which supplies the criminal intent so indispensable as to bring an act of mere negligence and imprudence under the operation of the penal law.[12] This, because a conscious indifference to the consequences of the conduct is all that that is required from the standpoint of the frame of mind of the accused,[13] that is, without regard to whether the private offended party may himself be considered likewise at fault.

Inasmuch as the Revised Penal Code, however, does not detail what particular act or acts causing damage to property may be characterized as reckless imprudence, certainly, as with all criminal prosecutions, the inquiry as to whether the accused could be held liable for the offense is a question that must be addressed by the facts and circumstances unique to a given case.  Thus, if we must determine whether petitioner in this case has shown a conscious indifference to the consequences of his conduct, our attention must necessarily drift to the most fundamental factual predicate. And we proceed from petitioner’s contention that at the time the collision took place, he was carefully driving the car as he in fact approached the intersection on second gear and that his speed allegedly was somewhere between 25 and 30 kph which under normal conditions could be considered so safe and manageable as to enable him to bring the car to a full stop when necessary. 

Aside from the entry in the TAIR, however, which noted petitioner’s speed to be beyond what is lawful, the physical evidence on record likewise seems to negate petitioner’s contention. The photographs taken of Arnold’s car clearly show that the extent of the damage to it could not have been caused by petitioner’s car running on second gear at the speed of 25-30 kph.  The fact that the hood of Arnold’s car was violently wrenched as well as the fact that on impact the car even turned around 180 degrees and was hurled several feet away from the junction to the outer lane of Ortigas Avenue—when in fact Arnold had already established his turn to the left on the inner lane and into the opposite lane—clearly demonstrate that the force of the collision had been created by a speed way beyond what petitioner’s estimation.

Rate of speed, in connection with other circumstances, is one of the principal considerations in determining whether a motorist has been reckless in driving an automobile,[14] and evidence of the extent of the damage caused may show the force of the impact from which the rate of speed of the vehicle may be modestly inferred.[15]  While an adverse inference may be gathered with respect to reckless driving[16] from proof of excessive speed under the circumstances[17]—as in this case where the TAIR itself shows that petitioner approached the intersection in excess of lawful speed—such proof raises the presumption of imprudent driving which may be overcome by evidence,[18] or, as otherwise stated, shifts the burden of proof so as to require the accused to show that under the circumstances he was not driving in a careless or imprudent manner.[19]

We find, however, that petitioner has not been able to discharge that burden inasmuch as the physical evidence on record is heavy with conviction way more than his bare assertion that his speed at the time of the incident was well within what is controllable.  Indeed, the facts of this case do warrant a finding that petitioner, on approach to the junction, was traveling at a speed far greater than that conveniently fixed in his testimony.  Insofar as such facts are consistent with that finding, their truth must reasonably be admitted.[20]

Speeding, moreover, is indicative of imprudent behavior because a motorist is bound to exercise such ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with the conditions encountered on the road.  What is reasonable speed, of course, is necessarily subjective as it must conform to the peculiarities of a given case but in all cases, it is that which will enable the driver to keep the vehicle under control and avoid injury to others using the highway.[21]  This standard of reasonableness is actually contained in Section 35 of R.A. No. 4136.  It states:




SEC. 35. Restriction as to speed.—(a) Any person driving a motor vehicle on a highway shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed, not greater nor less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard for the traffic, the width of the highway, and of any other condition then and there existing; and no person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway at such speed as to endanger the life, limb and property of any person, nor at a speed greater than will permit him to bring the vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead.


Even apart from statutory regulations as to speed, a motorist is nevertheless expected to exercise ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with all the conditions encountered [22] which will enable him to keep the vehicle under control and, whenever necessary, to put the vehicle to a full stop to avoid injury to others using the highway. [23] 

It is must be stressed that this restriction on speed assumes more importance where the motorist is approaching an intersection.  Ordinary or reasonable care in the operation of a motor vehicle at an intersection would naturally require more precaution than is necessary when driving elsewhere in a street or highway.[24]  A driver approaching an intersection is generally under duty, among others, to be vigilant and to have the vehicle under control as to be able to stop at the shortest possible notice,[25]  that is, he must look for vehicles that might be approaching from within the radius that denotes the limit of danger.[26]

Since compliance with this duty is measured by whether an approaching motorist has exercised the level of precaution required under the circumstances, then with more reason that he exhibit a relatively higher level of care when the intersection is blind at the point where the roads meet.  In other words, where the view at an intersection is obstructed and an approaching motorist cannot get a good view to the right or left until he is close to the intersection, prudence would dictate that he take particular care to observe the traffic before entering the intersection or otherwise use reasonable care to avoid a collision,[27] which means that he is bound is to move with the utmost caution until it is determinable that he can proceed safely and at the slowest speed possible[28] so that the vehicle could be stopped within the distance the driver can see ahead.[29]

On this score, what brings certain failure in petitioner’s case is his own admission that he had not seen Arnold’s car making a left turn at the intersection.  Of course, there had been an arduous debate at the trial as to whether Arnold’s car was in motion or at a full stop at the intersection moments before the collision; nevertheless, inasmuch as he (Arnold), as shown by the evidence, had been able to establish himself at the intersection significantly ahead of petitioner, it defies logic to accord even a semblance of truth to petitioner’s assertion that he had not seen Arnold’s car entering the intersection laterally from his left especially when the said car admittedly had already taken two feet of the other lane of the road—the lane on which petitioner was proceeding to cross—and well beyond the median line of the intersecting road on which Arnold proceeded after making the turn.  Indeed, not even the fact that the view at the intersection was blocked by the flower bed on the traffic island could provide an excuse for petitioner as it has likewise been established that he approached the intersection at such a speed that could not, as in fact it did not, enable him to arrest his momentum and forestall the certainty of the collision. 

It can only be surmised at this point that petitioner had inexcusably fallen short of the standard of care in a situation which called for more precaution on the highway in failing to make an observation in the interest at least of his own safety whether or not it was safe to enter the crossing.  Since he is chargeable with what he should have observed only had he exercised the commensurate care required under the circumstances of the case, the inescapable conclusion is that he had inexcusably breached the elementary duties of a responsible, prudent and reasonable motorist.

In general, the degree of care and attention required of a driver in a particular case in exercising reasonable care will vary with and must be measured in the light of all the surrounding circumstances, such that it must be commensurate with the dangers which are to be anticipated and the injuries which are likely to result from the use of the vehicle.[30] In other words, he must observe a sense of proportionality between precaution and the peculiar risks attendant or even inherent in the condition of the road[31] which are open to ordinary observation.[32]  The ultimate test, in other words, is to be found in the reasonable foreseeability that harm might result if commensurate care is not exercised. It is not necessary, however, that a motorist actually foresee the probability of harm or that the particular injury which resulted was foreseeable; it would suffice that he, in the position of an ordinary prudent man, knowing what he knew or should have known, anticipate that harm of a general nature as that suffered was to materialize.[33]  The evidence in this case is teeming with suggestion that petitioner had failed to foresee the certainty of the collision that was about to happen as he entered the junction in question especially considering that his lateral vision at the intersection was blocked by the structures on the road.  In the same way, he failed to solidly establish that such failure to foresee the danger lurking on the road could be deemed excusable as indeed his contention that he was running at a safe speed is totally negated by the evidence derived from the physical facts of the case.

Yet, petitioner clings to a chance of acquittal.  In his petition, he theorizes that the negligence of Arnold, which according to the Court of Appeals was incipient in character, was actually the principal determining factor which caused the mishap and the fact that the TAIR indicated that Arnold had no right of way, it is he himself who had the status of a favored driver.  The contention is utterly without merit.



In traffic law parlance, the term “right of way” is understood as the right of one vehicle to proceed in a lawful manner in preference to another approaching vehicle under such circumstances of direction, speed and proximity as to give rise to a danger of collision unless one of the vehicles grants precedence to the other.[34] Although there is authority to the effect that the right of way is merely of statutory creation and exists only according to express statutory provision,[35] it is generally recognized, where no statute or ordinance governs the matter, that the vehicle first entering an intersection is entitled to the right of way, and it becomes the duty of the other vehicle likewise approaching the intersection to proceed with sufficient care to permit the exercise of such right without danger of collisions.[36]

In our setting, the right of way rule is governed by Section 42 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4136,[37]  which materially provides:

Section 42. Right of Way.

(a)  When two vehicles approach or enter an intersection at approximately the same time, the driver of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right of way to the vehicle on the right, except as otherwise hereinafter provided. The driver of any vehicle traveling at an unlawful speed shall forfeit any right which he might otherwise have hereunder.
(b)  The driver of a vehicle approaching but not having entered an intersection shall yield the right of a way to a vehicle within such intersection or turning therein to the left across the line of travel of such first-mentioned vehicle, provided the driver of the vehicle turning left has given a plainly visible signal of intention to turn as required in this Act.    x x x.


The provision governs the situation when two vehicles approach the intersection from the same direction and one of them intends make a turn on either side of the road. But the rule embodied in the said provision, also prevalent in traffic statutes in the United States, has also been liberally applied to a situation in which two vehicles approach an intersection from directly opposite directions at approximately the same time on the same street and one of them attempts to make a left-hand turn into the intersecting street, so as to put the other upon his right, the vehicle making the turn being under the duty of yielding to the other.[38]

Nevertheless, the right of way accorded to vehicles approaching an intersection is not absolute in terms.  It is actually subject to and is affected by the relative distances of the vehicles from the point of intersection.[39]  Thus, whether one of the drivers has the right of way or, as sometimes stated, has the status of a favored driver on the highway, is a question that permeates a situation where the vehicles approach the crossing so nearly at the same time and at such distances and speed that if either of them proceeds without regard to the other a collision is likely to occur.[40] Otherwise stated, the statutory right of way rule under Section 42 of our traffic law applies only where the vehicles are approaching the intersection at approximately the same time and not where one of the vehicles enter the junction substantially in advance of the other.

Whether two vehicles are approaching the intersection at the same time does not necessarily depend on which of the vehicles enters the intersection first.  Rather, it is determined by the imminence of collision when the relative distances and speeds of the two vehicles are considered.[41]  It is said that two vehicles are approaching the intersection at approximately the same time where it would appear to a reasonable person of ordinary prudence in the position of the driver approaching from the left of another vehicle that if the two vehicles continued on their courses at their speed, a collision would likely occur, hence, the driver of the vehicle approaching from the left must give the right of precedence to the driver of the vehicle on his right.[42]

Nevertheless, the rule requiring the driver on the left to yield the right of way to the driver on the right on approach to the intersection, no duty is imposed on the driver on the left to come to a dead stop, but he is merely required to approach the intersection with his vehicle under control so that he may yield the right of way to a vehicle within the danger zone on his right.[43]  He is not bound to wait until there is no other vehicle  on his right in sight before proceeding to the intersection but only until it is reasonably safe to proceed.[44]  Thus, in Adzuara v. Court of Appeals,[45] it was established that a motorist crossing a thru-stop street has the right of way over the one making a turn; but if the person making the turn has already negotiated half of the turn and is almost on the other side so that he is already visible to the person on the thru-street, he is bound to give way to the former.

Moreover, in a prosecution for reckless or dangerous driving, the negligence of the person who was injured or who was the driver of the motor vehicle with which the accused’s vehicle collided does not constitute a defense.[46]  In fact, even where such driver is said to be guilty of a like offense, proof thereof may never work favors to the case of the accused.[47]  In other words, proof that the offended party was also negligent or imprudent in the operation of his automobile bears little weight, if at all, at least for purposes of establishing the accused’s culpability beyond reasonable doubt.  Hence, even if we are to hypothesize that Arnold was likewise negligent in neglecting to keep a proper lookout as he took a left turn at the intersection, such negligence, contrary to petitioner’s contention, will nevertheless not support an acquittal.  At best, it will only determine the applicability of several other rules governing situations where concurring negligence exists and only for the purpose of arriving at a proper assessment of the award of damages in favor of the private offended party. 



But it must be asked: do the facts of the case support a finding that Arnold was likewise negligent in executing the left turn?  The answer is in the negative.  It is as much unsafe as it is unjust to assume that Arnold, just because the TAIR so indicated that he at the time had no right of way, that  Arnold  had performed a risky maneuver at the intersection in failing to keep a proper lookout for oncoming vehicles.  In fact, aside from petitioner’s bare and self-serving assertion that Arnold’s fault was the principal determining cause of the mishap as well as his allegation that it was actually Arnold’s car that came colliding with his car, there is no slightest suggestion in the records that could tend to negate what the physical evidence in this case has established.  Clearly, it was petitioner’s negligence, as pointed out by the OSG, that proximately caused the accident.

Finally, on the issue of damages, inasmuch as petitioner had not  extended efforts to present countervailing evidence disproving the extent and cost of the damage sustained by Arnold’s car, the award assessed and ordered by the trial court must stand.

All told, it must be needlessly emphasized that the measure of a motorist’s duty is such care as is, under the facts and circumstances of the particular case, commensurate with the dangers which are to be anticipated and the injuries which are likely to result from the use of the vehicle, and in proportion to or commensurate with the peculiar risk attendant on the circumstances and conditions in the particular case,[48] the driver being under the duty to know and to take into consideration those circumstances and factors affecting the safe operation of the vehicle which would be open to ordinary observation.[49]

X x x.




[1]Richards v. Begenstos, 21 N.W.2d 23; Hodges v. Smith, 298 S.W. 1023; Lawson v. Fordyce, 12 N.W.2d 301.


[2]Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Owen, 101 S.W.2d 354.

[3]Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. Lyon, 107 F.2d 157; Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. McKee, 121 F.2d 583.

[4]Burdick v. Powell Bros. Truck Lines, 124 F.2d 694; Dixie Motor Coach Corp. v. Lane, 116 F.2d 264; Shipley v. Komer, 154 F.2d 861.

[5]Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Owen, 101 S.W.2d 354.


[6]The REvised Penal Code, Reyes, Luis B., 15th ed. (2001)  p. 995.


[7]The Revised Penal Code, Reyes, Luis B., 15th ed. (2001)  pp. 994-995.

[8]People v. Paarlberg, 612 N.E.2d 106 (1933); People v. Crawford, 467 N.W.2d 818 (1991); Wood v. City of Casper, 683 P.2d 1147 (1984); State v. Houser, 626 P.2d 256 (1981); State v. Boydston, 609 P.2d 224 (1980); State v. Tamanaha, 377 P.2d 688 (1962).

[9]Wofford v. State, 395 S.E.2d 630 (1990); Shorter v. State, 122 N.E.2d 847 (1954); White v. State, 647 S.W.2d 751 (1983).

[10]7A Am. Jur. 2d, pp. 861-862.

[11]The Revised Penal Code, Reyes, Luis B., 15th ed. (2001)  p. 995.


[12]White v. State, 647 S.W.2d 751 (1983).

[13]People v. Ackroyd, 543 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1989).


[14]52 A.L.R.2d 1343.

[15]Knuth v. Murphy, 54 N.W.2d 771.  This case held that evidence of the extent of personal injuries is competent to show the force of the impact as a basis for an inference of the rate of speed of the vehicle.

[16]Sanford v. State, 16 So.2d 628; People v. Whitby, 44 N.Y.S.2d 76.

[17]People v. Devoe, 159 N.E. 682; People v. Whitby, 44 N.Y.S.2d 76.


[18]People v. Carrie, 204 N.Y.S. 759.

[19]People v. Herman, 20 N.Y.S.2d 149.

[20]See Woodson v. Germas, 104 S.E.2d 739.

[21]Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128474, 6 October 2004, 440 SCRA 136, 148-149.


[22]Foster v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 670 So.2d 471.

[23]Nunn v. Financial Indem. Co., 694 So.2d 630. Duty of reasonable care includes duty to keep the vehicle under control and to maintain proper lookout for hazards.

[24]Roberts v. Leahy, 214 P.2d 673.

[25]Reppert v. White Star Lines, 106 A.L.R. 413;  Riccio v. Ginsberg, 62 A.L.R. 967.


[26]Stauffer v. School District of Tecumseh, 473 N.W.2d 392.

[27]Kane v. Locke, 12 N.W.2d 495; Shelton v. Detamore, 93 S.E.2d 314.

[28]Matthews v. Patton, 123 A.2d 667.

[29]Henthorn v. M.G.C.Corp., 83 N.W.2d 759.


[30]Reed v. Stroh, 128 P.2d 829; Butcher v. Thornhill, 58 P.2d 179.


[31]Reed v. Stroh, 128 P.2d 829; Tucker v. Ragland-Potter Co., 148 S.W.2d 691.

[32]Webb v. Smith, 10 S.E. 2d 503; Le Master v. Fort Worth Transit Co., 142 S.W.2d 908.

[33]Figlar v. Gordon, 53 A.2d 645.

[34]Burrows v. Jacobsen, 311 N.W.2d 880 (1981).

[35]Betchkal v. Willis, 378 N.W.2d 684 (1985).

[36]Creech v. Blackwell, 298 S.W.2d 394.

[37] Entitled “An Act to Compile the Laws Relative to Land Transportation and Traffic Rules, To Create a Land Transportation Commission and for Other Purposes.”  The law was approved on 20 June 1964.


[38]McCarthy v. Beckwith, 141 N.E. 126; Arvo v. Delta Hardware Co., 204 N.W. 134; Cohen v. Silverman, 190 N.W. 795; Webber v. Park Auto Transp. Co., 47 A.L.R. 590.

[39]Wlodkowski v. Yerkaitis, 57 A.2d 792.

[40]Reynolds v. Madison Bus Co., 26 N.W. 2d 653.


[41]Wilmes v. Mihelich, 25 N.W.2d 833.

[42]Moore v. Kujath, 29 N.W.2d 883.

[43]Moore v. Kujath, 29 N.W.2d 883.


[44]Metzger v. Cushman’s Sons, 152 N.E. 695.

[45]G.R. No. 125134, 22 January 1999, 301 SCRA 657.

[46]State v. Blake, 255 N.W. 108.

[47]State v. Sullivan, 277 N.W. 230.

[48]Reed v. Stroh, 128 P.2d 829.


[49] Webb v. Smith, 10 S.E. 2d 503; Le Master v. Fort Worth Transit Co., 142 S.W.2d 908.