See - Senate OKs bill limiting JBC members to serving two consecutive terms
"x x x.
MANILA, Philippines - On its first session day of the year, the Senate approved on Tuesday a bill on third and final reading seeking to limit the tenure of a regular member of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) to no more than two full terms of four years each.
Senator Aquilino "Koko" Pimentel III, author and sponsor of Senate Bill 2419, said the ban would ensure that no regular JBC member would indefinitely sit in the council and serve the appointing authority’s bidding.
The measure was co-authored by Senators Chiz Escudero, Miriam Defensor Santiago, Jinggoy Estrada and Cynthia Villar.
Under existing law, Pimentel said, regular members of the JBC may be reappointed without limitation and under different capacities.
He said the practice of perpetual indebtedness diminished and compromised the member’s impartiality, especially in screening applicants who may have close connections or association with the appointing authority.'
"The concept of perpetual re-appointment of a regular member may open the possibility of the appointee incurring political indebtedness to the appointing authority such that the more a regular member seeks his or her re-appointment, the deeper the political indebtedness becomes," Pimentel explained in his sponsorship speech.
"The enactment of the measure into law would prevent political interference in the affairs of the JBC, which is tasked to recommend appointees to the Judiciary," he added.
Pimentel said the bill would not limit the power of the President to appoint appointees but that would limit the qualification of persons who would sit as regular members of the JBC.
"The bill is not an undue limitation on the prerogative of the President to make appointments and neither does it impose an additional qualification which is not found in the Constitution," he said.
The essence of the measure, Pimentel stressed, was that no regular member of the JBC would be appointed for more than two full terms and that new blood were introduced in the council.
The Judicial and Bar Council of the Philippines is a constitutionally-created body that recommends appointees for vacancies that may arise in the composition of the Supreme Court and other lower courts.
The JBC is composed of the Supreme Court Chief Justice as ex officio chairperson; the Secretary of Justice, the chairperson of the Committee on Justice of the House of Representatives and the chairperson of the Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights as ex officio members; a representative of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, a professor of law, a retired member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector as regular members.
The council is the only government body that has members from all three branches of the government, excluding ad hoc and advisory bodies.
x x x."
Wednesday, January 21, 2015
Wednesday, January 7, 2015
How to prove filiation; evidence needed.
BEN-HUR NEPOMUCENO Vs.
ARHBENCEL ANN LOPEZ, represented by her mother ARACELI LOPEZ, G.R. No. 181258, March 18, 2010
“x x x.
Herrera v.
Alba[1] summarizes the laws, rules, and jurisprudence on
establishing filiation, discoursing in relevant part as follows:
Laws,
Rules, and Jurisprudence
Establishing
Filiation
The relevant provisions of the Family Code
provide as follows:
ART. 175. Illegitimate
children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children.
x x x x
ART. 172. The filiation of
legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The
record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation
in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence,
the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
The Rules on Evidence include
provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule 130 provide:
SEC.
39. Act or declaration about pedigree.
— The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect
to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be
received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the
relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act
or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family
genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these
facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of
family history intimately connected with pedigree.
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. — The
reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in
respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence
if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by
consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or
charts, engraving on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as
evidence of pedigree.
This Court's rulings further specify
what incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to establish filiation. In Pe
Lim v. CA, a case petitioner often cites, we stated that the issue of
paternity still has to be resolved by such conventional
evidence as the relevant incriminating verbal and written acts by the putative
father. Under Article 278 of the
New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in the record
of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing. To be effective, the claim of
filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the writing must be
the writing of the putative father. A notarial agreement to support a child
whose filiation is admitted by the putative father was considered acceptable
evidence. Letters to the mother
vowing to be a good father to the child and pictures of the putative father
cuddling the child on various occasions, together with the certificate of live
birth, proved filiation. However, a
student permanent record, a written consent to a father's operation, or a
marriage contract where the putative father gave consent, cannot be taken as
authentic writing. Standing alone,
neither a certificate of baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to
establish filiation. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the present case, Arhbencel relies,
in the main, on the handwritten note executed by petitioner which reads:
I, Ben-Hur C. Nepomuceno, hereby
undertake to give and provide financial support in the amount of P1,500.00
every fifteen and thirtieth day of each month for a total of P3,000.00 a
month starting Aug. 15, 1999, to Ahrbencel Ann
Lopez, presently in the custody of her mother Araceli Lopez without the
necessity of demand, subject to adjustment later depending on the needs of the
child and my income.
The abovequoted note does not contain any statement
whatsoever about Arhbencel’s filiation to petitioner. It is, therefore, not within the ambit of
Article 172(2) vis-à-vis Article 175
of the Family Code which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation
an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the
parent concerned.
The note cannot also be accorded the same weight as
the notarial agreement to support the child referred to in Herrera. For it is not even
notarized. And Herrera instructs that the notarial agreement must be accompanied
by the putative father’s admission of filiation to be an acceptable evidence of
filiation. Here, however, not only has
petitioner not admitted filiation through contemporaneous actions. He has consistently denied it.
The only other
documentary evidence submitted by Arhbencel, a copy of her Certificate of
Birth,[2]
has no probative value to establish filiation to petitioner, the latter not
having signed the same.
At bottom, all that Arhbencel really has is
petitioner’s handwritten undertaking to provide financial support to her which,
without more, fails to establish her claim of filiation. The Court is mindful that the best interests
of the child in cases involving paternity and filiation should be
advanced. It is, however, just as
mindful of the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy
and peace of the putative father’s legitimate family.
x x x."
Who are obliged to support each other
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BEN-HUR NEPOMUCENO Vs.
ARHBENCEL ANN LOPEZ, represented by her mother ARACELI LOPEZ, G.R. No. 181258, March 18, 2010
|
|
“x x x.
The relevant
provisions of the Family Code[1]
that treat of the right to support are Articles 194 to 196, thus:
Article 194. Support compromises everything indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
The
education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding
paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some profession, trade or
vocation, even beyond the age of majority. Transportation shall include
expenses in going to and from school, or to and from place of work.
Article
195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the following
are obliged to support each other to the whole extent set forth in the
preceding article:
1. The
spouses;
2. Legitimate
ascendants and descendants;
3. Parents
and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of
the latter;
4. Parents
and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate
children of the latter; and
5. Legitimate
brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood.
Article 196. Brothers and sisters not
legitimately related, whether of the full or half-blood, are likewise bound to
support each other to the full extent set forth in Article 194, except only
when the need for support of the brother or sister, being of age, is due to a
cause imputable to the claimant's fault or negligence. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Arhbencel’s demand for support, being
based on her claim of filiation to petitioner as his illegitimate daughter,
falls under Article 195(4). As such, her
entitlement to support from petitioner is dependent on the determination of her
filiation.
X x
x.”
Illegitimate children are entitled to support and successional rights but their filiation must be duly proved
CHERRYL B. DOLINA,
Vs. GLENN D. VALLECERA,
G.R. No.
182367
December 15, 2010
“x
x x,
The Issue Presented
The
sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed
Dolina’s action for temporary protection and denied her application for
temporary support for her child.
The Court’s
Ruling
Dolina
evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for her child. The object of R.A. 9262 under which she filed
the case is the protection and safety of women and children who are victims of
abuse or violence.[1] Although the issuance of a protection order
against the respondent in the case can include the grant of legal support for
the wife and the child, this assumes that both are entitled to a protection
order and to legal support.
Dolina
of course alleged that Vallecera had been abusing her and her child. But it became apparent to the RTC upon
hearing that this was not the case since, contrary to her claim, neither she
nor her child ever lived with Vallecera.
As it turned out, the true object of her action was to get financial
support from Vallecera for her child, her claim being that he is the
father. He of course vigorously denied
this.
To
be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first
establish the filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or
acknowledged. Since Dolina’s demand for
support for her son is based on her claim that he is Vallecera’s illegitimate
child, the latter is not entitled to such support if he had not acknowledged
him, until Dolina shall have proved his relation to him.[2] The child’s remedy is to file through her
mother a judicial action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition.[3] If filiation is beyond question, support
follows as matter of obligation.[4] In short, illegitimate children are entitled
to support and successional rights but their filiation must be duly proved.[5]
Dolina’s
remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action against Vallecera for
compulsory recognition in order to establish filiation and then demand
support. Alternatively, she may directly
file an action for support, where the issue of compulsory recognition may be
integrated and resolved.[6]
It
must be observed, however, that the RTC should not have dismissed the entire
case based solely on the lack of any judicial declaration of filiation between
Vallecera and Dolina’s child since the main issue remains to be the alleged
violence committed by Vallecera against Dolina and her child and whether they
are entitled to protection. But of
course, this matter is already water under the bridge since Dolina failed to
raise this error on review. This
omission lends credence to the conclusion of the RTC that the real purpose of
the petition is to obtain support from Vallecera.
While
the Court is mindful of the best interests of the child in cases involving
paternity and filiation, it is just as aware of the disturbance that unfounded
paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of the putative father’s
legitimate family.[7] Vallecera disowns Dolina’s child and denies
having a hand in the preparation and signing of its certificate of birth. This issue has to be resolved in an
appropriate case.
X
x x.”
[1] Go-Tan
v. Tan, G.R. No. 168852, September 30, 2008, 567 SCRA 231, 238.
[2]
Article 195, paragraph 4 of the Family Code requires support between parents
and their illegitimate children.
[3] Tayag
v. Tayag-Gallor, G.R. No. 174680, March 24, 2008, 549 SCRA 68, 74.
[4]
Montefalcon v. Vasquez, G.R.
No. 165016, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 513, 527.
[5] De la
Puerta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77867, February 6, 1990, 181 SCRA 861,
869.
[6] Agustin v. Court of Appeals, 499 Phil.
307, 317 (2005).
[7]
Nepomuceno v. Lopez, G.R. No.
181258, March 18, 2010.
Substantial justice must prevail
JOANIE SURPOSA UY vs. JOSE NGO CHUA, G.R. No. 183965, September 18, 2009.
“x
x x.
It must be kept in mind that substantial
justice must prevail . When there is a strong showing that grave
miscarriage of justice would result from the strict application of the Rules,
this Court will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of substantial
justice. The Rules of Court were
conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of
justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise,
courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial
discretion. That is precisely why courts
in rendering real justice have always been, as they in fact ought to be,
conscientiously guided by the norm that when on the balance, technicalities
take backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around.[1]
X x x.”
[1] See People v. Flores, 336 Phil. 58, 64 (1997), citing De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, 326 Phil.
182, 188 (1996).
Guidelines on when a demurrer to evidence should be granted
JOANIE SURPOSA UY vs. JOSE NGO CHUA, G.R.
No. 183965, September 18, 2009.
“x x x.
Although respondent’s pleading was captioned a
Demurrer to Evidence, it was more appropriately a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of res judicata.
Demurrer
to Evidence is governed by Rule 33 of the Rules of Court, Section 1 of which is
reproduced in full below:
SECTION 1. Demurrer
to evidence. – After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his
evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the
facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the
right to present evidence. If the motion
is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed
to have waived the right to present evidence.
Demurrer
to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the
defendant having to submit evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily have to
do, if plaintiff's evidence shows that he is not entitled to the relief sought. Demurrer, therefore, is an aid or instrument
for the expeditious termination of an action, similar to a motion to dismiss,
which the court or tribunal may either grant or deny.[1]
The
Court has recently established some guidelines on when a demurrer to evidence
should be granted, thus:
A demurrer to evidence may be
issued when, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to
relief. Where the plaintiff's evidence
together with such inferences and conclusions as may reasonably be drawn
therefrom does not warrant recovery against the defendant, a demurrer to
evidence should be sustained. A demurrer to evidence is likewise sustainable
when, admitting every proven fact favorable to the plaintiff and indulging in
his favor all conclusions fairly and reasonably inferable therefrom, the
plaintiff has failed to make out one or more of the material elements of his
case, or when there is no evidence to support an allegation necessary to his
claim. It should be sustained where the plaintiff's evidence is prima facie
insufficient for a recovery.[2]
The
essential question to be resolved in a demurrer to evidence is whether
petitioner has been able to show that she is entitled to her claim, and it is
incumbent upon RTC-Branch 24 to make such a determination. A perusal of the Resolution dated 25 June 2008 of RTC-Branch 24 in
Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB shows that it is barren of any discussion on
this matter. It did not take into
consideration any of the evidence presented by petitioner. RTC-Branch 24 dismissed Special Proceedings
No. 12562-CEB on the sole basis of res
judicata, given the Decision dated 21 February 2000 of RTC-Branch 9 in
Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, approving the Compromise Agreement between
petitioner and respondent. Hence, the
Resolution dated 25 June 2008 of RTC-Branch 24 should be deemed as having
dismissed Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB on the ground of res judicata rather than an adjudication
on the merits of respondent’s demurrer to evidence. Necessarily, the last line of Section 1, Rule
33 of the Rules of Court should not apply herein and respondent should still be
allowed to present evidence before RTC-Branch 24 in Special Proceedings No.
12562-CEB.
X
x x.”
A judgment void for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all.
JOANIE SURPOSA UY vs. JOSE NGO CHUA, G.R.
No. 183965, September 18, 2009.
“x
x x.
A judgment void for want of
jurisdiction is no judgment at all.
It cannot be the source of any right or the creator of any obligation. All acts
performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal
effect. Hence, it can never become
final, and any writ of execution based on it is void. It may be said to be a lawless thing that can
be treated as an outlaw and slain on sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it
exhibits its head.[1]
X
x x.”
The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised.
JOANIE SURPOSA UY vs. JOSE NGO CHUA, G.R.
No. 183965, September 18, 2009.
“x
x x.
The
central issue in this case is whether the Compromise Agreement entered into
between petitioner and respondent, duly approved by RTC-Branch 9 in its
Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, constitutes
res judicata in Special Proceeding
No. 12562-CEB still pending before RTC-Branch 24.
The
doctrine of res judicata is a rule
that pervades every well- regulated system of jurisprudence and is founded upon
two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law, namely: (1) public
policy and necessity, which makes it in the interest of the State that there
should be an end to litigation, interest
reipublicae ut sit finis litium, and (2) the hardship of the individual
that he should be vexed twice for the same cause, nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa.[1]
For
res judicata, to serve as an absolute
bar to a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (1) there
must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on
the merits; and (4) there must be, between the two cases, identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action.[2]
It
is undeniable that Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, previously before
RTC-Branch 9, and Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB, presently before RTC-Branch
24, were both actions for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation
filed by petitioner against respondent.
Hence, there is apparent identity of parties, subject matter, and causes
of action between the two cases.
However, the question arises as to whether the other elements of res judicata exist in this case.
The court rules in the negative.
A
compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions,
avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced.[3] In Estate
of the late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic,[4]
the Court pronounced that a judicial compromise has the effect of res judicata. A judgment based on a compromise agreement is
a judgment on the merits.
It must be emphasized, though, that
like any other contract, a compromise agreement must comply with the requisites
in Article 1318 of the Civil Code, to wit:
(a) consent of the contracting parties; (b) object certain that is the
subject matter of the contract; and (c) cause of the obligation that is
established. And, like any other
contract, the terms and conditions of a compromise agreement must not be
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy and public order. Any compromise agreement that is contrary to
law or public policy is null and void, and vests no rights in and holds no
obligation for any party. It produces no
legal effect at all.[5]
In connection with the foregoing, the Court calls
attention to Article 2035 of the Civil Code, which states:
ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions
shall be valid:
(1) The civil status of
persons;
(2) The validity of a
marriage or a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal
separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of
courts;
Future legitime. (Emphases ours.)
The Compromise Agreement between petitioner and
respondent, executed on 18 February 2000 and approved by RTC-Branch 9 in its
Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, obviously
intended to settle the question of petitioner’s status and filiation, i.e., whether she is an illegitimate
child of respondent. In exchange for
petitioner and her brother Allan acknowledging that they are not the children of respondent,
respondent would pay petitioner and Allan P2,000,000.00 each. Although unmentioned, it was a necessary
consequence of said Compromise Agreement that petitioner also waived away her
rights to future support and future legitime as an illegitimate child of
respondent. Evidently, the Compromise
Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is covered
by the prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code.
Advincula v. Advincula[6] has a factual background closely similar to the one
at bar. Manuela Advincula (Manuela)
filed, before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Iloilo, Civil Case No. 3553
for acknowledgment and support, against Manuel Advincula (Manuel). On motion of both parties, said case was
dismissed. Not very long after, Manuela again instituted, before the same
court, Civil Case No. 5659 for acknowledgment and support, against Manuel. This Court declared that although Civil Case
No. 3553 ended in a compromise, it did not bar the subsequent filing by Manuela
of Civil Case No. 5659, asking for the same relief from Manuel. Civil Case No. 3553 was an action for
acknowledgement, affecting a person’s civil status, which cannot be the subject
of compromise.
It is
settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of a
child cannot be compromised. Public
policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a
child.[7] Paternity and filiation or the lack of the
same, is a relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the
Court to declare its existence or absence.
It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.[8]
Being
contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise Agreement dated 18 February
2000 between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It
produces no legal effect at all. The
void agreement cannot be rendered operative even by the parties' alleged
performance (partial or full) of their respective prestations.[9]
Neither
can it be said that RTC-Branch 9, by approving the Compromise Agreement, in its
Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, already
made said contract valid and legal.
Obviously, it would already be beyond the jurisdiction of RTC-Branch 9
to legalize what is illegal. RTC-Branch
9 had no authority to approve and give effect to a Compromise Agreement that
was contrary to law and public policy, even if said contract was executed and
submitted for approval by both parties.
RTC-Branch 9 would not be competent, under any circumstances, to grant
the approval of the said Compromise Agreement.
No court can allow itself to be used as a tool to circumvent the explicit
prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code. The following quote in Francisco v. Zandueta[10]
is relevant herein:
It is a universal rule of law
that parties cannot, by consent, give a court, as such, jurisdiction in a
matter which is excluded by the laws of the land. In such a case the question
is not whether a competent court has obtained jurisdiction of a party triable
before it, but whether the court itself is competent under any circumstances to
adjudicate a claim against the defendant. And where there is want of
jurisdiction of the subject-matter, a judgment is void as to all persons, and
consent of parties can never impart to it the vitality which a valid judgment
derives from the sovereign state, the court being constituted, by express provision
of law, as its agent to pronounce its decrees in controversies between its
people. (7 R. C. L., 1039.)
X x x.”
[1] Arenas v. Court of Appeals, 399 Phil. 372, 385 (2000).
[2] Estate of the late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic, G.R. No. 168661, 26 October 2007 , 537 SCRA
513, 537.
[3] Civil Code, Article 2028.
[4] Supra note 17, citing Romero v. Tan, 468 Phil. 224, 239
(2004).
[5] Rivero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141273, 17 May 2005 , 458 SCRA 714, 735.
[6] 119 Phil. 448 (1964).
[7] Concepcion
[8] De Asis v. Court of Appeals, 362 Phil. 515, 522 (1999).
[9] See
Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government, 366 Phil. 863, 871 (1999).
[10] 61 Phil. 752, 757-758 (1935).
A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
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JOANIE SURPOSA UY,
Vs. JOSE NGO CHUA, G.R.
No. 183965, September 18, 2009
.
|
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“x
x x.
At
the outset, the Court notes that from the RTC Resolution granting respondent’s
Demurrer to Evidence, petitioner went directly to this Court for relief. This is only proper, given that petitioner is
raising pure questions of law
in her instant Petition.
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. –
A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from
a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or
other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme
Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
Clearly,
a party may directly appeal to this Court from a decision or final order or
resolution of the trial court on pure questions of law. A question of law lies, on one hand, when the
doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts; a
question of fact exists, on the other hand, when the doubt or difference arises
as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. Here, the facts are not disputed; the
controversy merely relates to the correct application of the law or jurisprudence
to the undisputed facts.[1]
X
x x.”
The crucial consideration in litis pendentia is the identity and similarity of the issues under litigation.
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the United abangan clan, inc., represented by
cristituto f. abangan VS. yolanda c. sabellano-sumagang, ernesto tiro, basilisa
cabellon-moreno, martin c. tabura, jr., romualdo c. tabura, rolando cabellon,
represented by rolando
cabellon, and the honorable
city civil registrar of cebu city, G.R. No. 186722, June 18, 2012
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:
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“x x x.
The
sole issue before this Court is whether or not the instant petition was
properly dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia.
Litis pendentia,
as a ground for the dismissal of an action, refers to a situation in which
another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of
action, and the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious.[1]
In order to successfully invoke the rule, the movant must prove the existence
of the following requisites: (a) the identity of parties, or at least like
those representing the same interest in both actions; (b) the identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts;
and (c) the identity of the two (2) cases, such that the judgment that may be
rendered in the pending case would, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata in the other.[2]
The crucial
consideration in litis pendentia is
the identity and similarity of the issues under litigation.[3]
As early as in J. Northcott & Co.,
Inc. v. Villa-Abrille, we ruled: “One of the recognized tests of such
identity is to discover whether a judgment in the prior action would be
conclusive as to the liability sought to be enforced in the second and would
operate as a bar to the latter. In other words, if a final judgment in the
prior action, be it of whatsoever character it may, would support the plea of res judicata in the second, the two
suits may be considered identical; otherwise not.”[4]
There is no identity
and similarity between the first and the second petitions with respect to the
issues under litigation. The action in the prior Petition (SP. PROC. No.
16171-CEB) involves a judicial declaration of heirship, while the main issue in
the present one (SP. PROC. No. 16180-CEB) pertains to a cancellation of entry
in the civil register. An action for declaration of heirship (declaracion de herederos) refers to a
special proceeding in which a person claiming the status of heir seeks prior
judicial declaration of his or her right to inherit from
a decedent.[5] On
the other hand, an action for cancellation of entry in the civil register
refers to a special proceeding whereby a substantial change affecting the civil
status of a party is sought through the amendment of the entry in the civil
register.[6]
In the former, what is established is a party’s right of succession to the
decedent; in the latter, among those settled are the issues of nationality,
paternity, filiation, legitimacy of the marital status, and registrability of
an event affecting the status or nationality of an individual. Because the
respective subject matters in the two actions differ, any decision that may be
rendered in one of them cannot constitute res
judicata in the other. A judicial declaration of heirship is inconclusive
on the fact of occurrence of an event registered or to be registered in the
civil register, while changes in the entries in the civil register do not in
themselves settle the issue of succession.
X x x.”
[1]
Bangko Silangan Development Bank v. Court
of Appeals, 412 Phil. 755 (2001).
[2]
Mariscal v. Court of Appeals, 370
Phil. 52 (1999).
[3]
Id.
[4]
J.
Northcott & Co., Inc. v. Villa-Abrille, 41 Phil. 462, 465 (1921).
[5]
See Suiliong & Co. v. Chio-Taysan,
12 Phil. 13 (1908); Cabuyao v. Caagbay,
95 Phil. 614 (1954); Marabiles v. Quito,
100 Phil. 64 (1956).
[6] Republic v. Medina, 204 Phil. 615 (1982)
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