Sunday, July 26, 2015

What's wrong with Philippine cops?



See - What's wrong with Philippine cops?


"x x x.
Consider the all too common reports about a group of cops who abduct a person, usually under the pretense of making an arrest. The poor guy is often taken to the police station first, and then carted off to a private residence, where he is either robbed or held for ransom. In other cases, he may actually be held right at the police station and forced to pay the officers so they won't file a particular charge against him.

Think about how this actually works. A policeman, or a group of policemen, makes an arrest, brings the subject to the station and locks him up, and then conducts business-style negotiations with the subject or his relatives, ending with the payment of "bail" and the release of the subject. All going on right inside the police station.

To make matters worse, when a policeman is actually arrested for this crime, the official charge is usually "unlawful detention", which makes it sound more like an error in procedure than a kidnapping...which is what it really is.

This happens because supervisors are not supervising. Procedures already exist to prevent this kind of activity, but they are not being followed, and they are not being enforced. Officially, locking a person up in a police station's detention cell involves more than one person, and a bit of paperwork. At the very least, there is always supposed to be a blotter entry and an incident report, and that means that the station commander or shift supervisor must be involved.




Formality and procedure

In addition, no policeman should have the authority to release an arrested person on his own. If a mistake has been made, or if release is warranted for some other official reason, a senior officer must always authorize it, and the situation must always be fully documented. Formality and procedure exist as a form of check-and-balance, designed to prevent activities such as unlawful detention and extortion by lone-wolf policemen. But in the informal world of Philippine police work, individual cops are allowed to operate so independently that supervisors rarely bother to question their activities.

The bottom line here is pretty simple. The only policemen who have the freedom to engage in criminal or abusive activity are those who are not being properly supervised. If station commanders and shift supervisors would require proper documentation, and monitor their people’s activities, most criminal behavior by policemen would simply not be possible. Supervisors have the power to completely eliminate this problem.

This is not a situation where rogue policemen are out of control. It's a situation where unsupervised policemen are simply not being controlled. Contrary to the common view of policemen as completely independent operators, a cop's day should be filled with assignments and tasks. Even on routine patrol, a policeman has duties that should keep him busy.

A properly supervised patrolman doesn't have time to sit and read the newspaper, let alone time to engage in kidnapping or extortion. If cops are kept busy doing the job they are paid to do, and if supervisors stay on top of their people, crimes committed by lawmen will drop dramatically, almost overnight. This requires active supervision by the leadership at all levels.

Police 'culture'

The relationship between a supervisor and his subordinates is not supposed to be a buddy-buddy relationship, and supervision involves more than just being present in the office. A professional supervisor corrects mistakes and violations, and reprimands improper behavior. As a matter of fact, every time an on-duty policeman is found to have been involved in kidnapping or any other criminal activity, his supervisor must automatically share in some degree of responsibility – simply because the crime could not have been committed if the supervisor had been supervising properly.

This police "culture" will not be changed by values formation seminars, bible studies, or appeals for honest behavior. It will change only when the entire police leadership corps declares, with one voice and without a wink or a nod, that it is unacceptable.

x x x."

Good faith; bad faith; motive; credibility; mistake; burden of proof; public office; transparency; good governance; accountability; right to information; right of access to public records; RA 6713; social media; privacy.


In an administrative case involving the application of the 15-day rule of RA No. 6713, the good faith, motive, credibility, and legal standing of the complainant were questioned by the respondent. We assisted him in preparing his sur-reply.

Sec. 5 (a) of R.A 6713 provides:

“Act promptly on letters and request- All Public Official and employee shall, within (15) days  from receipt thereof, respond to letters, telegrams or other means of communication sent by the public. The reply must contain the action taken.”


The respondent alleges that the hands of the complainant are “unclean”. In response the complainant argues that the respondent’s self-serving allegation deserves no weight and credit; that the respondent has not presented any evidence of bad faith and malice; that the complainant is entitled to the presumption of good faith in the performance of his legal and moral duty as a citizen to participate and to be vigilant in insuring:

(a)            good governance,
(b)            transparency, and
(c)             accountability

in their Barangay, as commanded by Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.  

Sec. 1, Art. XI, of the 1987 Constitution provides that:

(a)             “public office is a public trust”  and that
(b)            “public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.”

The very Preamble of the 1987 CONSTITUTION speaks of:

(a)             the “common good”,
(b)            “rule of law”, and
(c)             “truth, justice, (and) freedom”.

Sec. 28, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution provides that “the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.”

Sec.7, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution provides that:

1.      “the right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized”; and that
2.    “access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen”.

The respondent claims that the complainant violated the Cybercrime Prevention Act (R.A. No. 10175) when the latter submitted to the investigating office the screen shot copy of the subject vehicle from the Facebook Timeline of a Brgy Ex-O. The respondent alleges that the picture does not prove any offense.

The complainant argues that the privacy status of the Facebook account of the Ex-O is “Public”. It means that:

1.      all pictures posted by xxx are open to be seen by the General Public and
2.    the General Public has the right to access the same or to take screen shots thereof.

The picture of the vehicle attached to the reply-affidavit of the complainant was a corroborating evidence to describe to the Council the physical appearance of the subject motor vehicle.

The complainant argues that the pending issues is the violation by the respondent of the 15-day rule of R.A 6713. It is not about the physical appearance of the said motor vehicle.
               
On social media-based evidence, the case of RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES, et. al. vs. ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE, et. al., G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014,  is useful. It held:

1.      “Facebook connections are established through the process of “friending” another user.”
2.    “By sending a “friend request”, the user invites another to connect their accounts so that they can view any and all “Public” and “Friends Only” posts of the other.”
3.    “Once the request is accepted, the link is established and both users are permitted to view the other user’s “Public” or “Friends Only” posts, amon others.
4.    “Friending”, therefore, allows the user to form or maintain one-to-one relationships with other users, whereby the user gives his or her “Facebook friend” access to his or her profile and shares certain information to the latter.
5.     “(A) Facebook user can regulate the visibility and accessibility of digital images (photos) posted on his or her personal bulletin or “wall” except for the user’s profile picture and ID, by selecting his or her desired privacy setting:

(a)             “Public-the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
(b)            “Friends of Friends- only the user’s Facebook friends and the their friends can view the photo;
(c)             “Friends-only user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
(d)            “Custom-the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or network of the Facebook user; and
(e)             “Only Me-the digital image can only be viewed can be viewed only by the user.”

6.       “Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first necessary that said user xxx manifest the intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility.”

7.        “As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students’ Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceive privacy invasion since it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol.”

8.       “Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted.”

9.       “They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate access to the said posts.”

10.  “(I)nformation, otherwise private, voluntarily surrendered by them can be opened, read, or copied by third parties who may or may not be allowed to such access.”


The respondent questions the credibility of the complainant. The respondent claims that the complainant is not a law-abiding citizen; that the complainant has a previous case; that the subject Letter, dated xxx, of the complainant is untrue; and that the complainant is not a bona fide voter  nor a taxpayer of their Barangay.

In response the complainant argues that the claim of the respondent constitutes an unfair and dirty attempt to assassinate his character as a law-abiding and vigilant citizen; that the words of the respondent are unbecoming of an elected public official; that the respondent is employing diversionary tactics to maliciously confuse the Council and to unjustly destroy his credibility; that the argument of the respondent is irrelevant and immaterial to the pending issues; and that the malicious tactic of the respondents imposes a chilling effect on the part of vigilant citizens of their Barangay who might wish to participate in the future in promoting the rule of law, transparency, and good governance.

The complainant submitted a certified true copy of his Voters Registration Record issued by the Commission on Election to prove that he is a Registered Voter of their Barangay.

The complainant submitted a copy of the Official Receipt for the payment of the Local Real Estate Tax on the real property of his deceased stepmother to prove that he lives in the said property; that he is the one paying the said tax; and that he is a taxpayer of the City.

The complainant argues that the case for qualified theft against him in the past arose out of a mere misunderstanding between him and the Barangay Treasurer. The miscommunication referred to the turn-over of the hand-held radio which was assigned to him. His possession and use of the radio was authorized by a Memorandum issued by the Barangay Treasurer. The said case was dismissed.

The complainant argues that in the instant administrative case, the person on trial, so to speak, is the respondent, not the complainant; and that his  aforecited dismissed case is irrelevant and immaterial to the instant administrative case against the respondent.

The complainant argues that the respondent claims that his complaint is politically motivated for purposes of the upcoming 2016 Barangay Election. He states that he is not a politician; that he has never been a politician; that politics is not his career path; that he is an ordinary citizen who cares for good governance, transparency and accountability in their Barangay; that he is not a candidate in the 2016 Barangay Election; and that he is not a tool, dummy or crony of a politician who will in the 2016 Barangay Election.

The complainant argues that his good faith as a Complaining Citizen is presumed. If the respondent wishes to destroy the presumption of good faith in his favor the respondent has the burden of proof to prove her claim.

The complainant cited the case of Heirs of Severa Gregorio  vs. Court of Appeals, et al, G. R. No. 117609, December 19, 1998, which held that:  

1.      “(I)t is axiomatic that good faith is always presumed unless convincing evidence to the contrary is adduced”;
2.     “It is incumbent upon the party alleging bad faith to sufficiently prove such allegation”;  
3.     “Absent enough proof thereof, the presumption of good faith prevails”;
4.     “Without a clear and persuasive substantiation of bad faith, the presumption of good faith in favor of respondents stands”.

The complainant cited the analogous case of FRANCISCO M. LECAROZ, et. al. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, et. al., G.R. No. 130872, March 25, 1999, which held that:

“The rule is that any mistake on a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith”.


The complainant cited the case of People vs. De Guzman, GR 106025, Feb.  9, 1994, which held that:

1.      Innocence, and not wrong-doing, is presumed. 
2.    Good faith is presumed;
3.    The “presumption prevails until it is overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary”;
4.    “If not rebutted, it is conclusive”.  

The complainant argues that his motive as a  complaining citizen is not a valid and legal ground:

1.      to dismiss a consummated administrative offense or
2.    to free a guilty public official from administrative  liability.

Motive is irrelevant and immaterial to a determination of guilt of a respondent in a consummated administrative offense.

In the case of PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LYNDON FLORES y MALARAYAP, G.R. No. 116524. January 18, 1996, it was held that there is no reason to doubt the credibility of a witness and the veracity of his testimony “if his statements are not tainted with any contradiction, inconsistency, or prevarication” and when the witness testified in a “candid, categorical, and consistent manner”. (Citing People vs. Barte, 230 SCRA 401 [1994]).

If there is nothing on the record to show that a witness was actuated by any improper motive, “his testimony shall be entitled to full faith and credit”. (Citing People vs. Dela Cruz, 229 SCRA 754 [1994]). 

In the analogous case of People v. Gloria, Gayo, Cabilosa, and Cuison[G.R. No. 111806. March 9, 2000], it was held that:
1.      In a criminal offense, “motive is not an element of the offense”.
2.    “Motive becomes material only when the evidence is circumstantial or inconclusive, and there is some doubt on whether a crime has been committed or whether the accused has committed it”.
3.    “Indeed, motive is totally irrelevant when ample direct evidence sustains the culpability of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.”

[Citing: People v. Astorga, 283 SCRA 420, 433 (1997), citing People v. Sta. Agata, 244 SCRA 677, 684 (1995); People v. Cayetano, 223 SCRA 770 (1993); People v. Magpayao, 226 SCRA 13, 27 (1993).]
4.    “Where a reliable eyewitness has fully and satisfactorily identified the accused as the perpetrator of the felony, motive becomes immaterial in the successful prosecution of a criminal case.” [Citing: People v. Castillo, 273 SCRA 22, 32 (1997), citing People v. Lovedioro, 250 SCRA 389 (1995).]

The complainant argues that his alleged bad faith as a complainant has not been proved by the respondent.

In the case of Ford Philippines, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 99039, February 3, 1997, the Supreme Court held:

1.      That “bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence”;
2.    That bad faith “imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong”;
3.    That “it means a breach of a known duty through some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud”;
4.    That “it must be reiterated that bad faith should be established by clear and convincing evidence”; and
5.     That “settled rule is that the law always presumes good faith such that any person who seeks to be awarded damages due to acts of another has the burden of proving that the latter acted in bad faith or with ill motive”.



Tuesday, July 21, 2015

VENUE IN JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE: | MVP Law | Philippines



See- VENUE IN JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE: | MVP Law | Philippines





"x x x.

VENUE IN JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE:

     

For purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.

x x x."

PREJUDICIAL QUESTION: | MVP Law | Philippines



See - PREJUDICIAL QUESTION: | MVP Law | Philippines


"x x x.
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION:

In Torres v. Garchitorena, G.R. No. 153666, December 27, 2002, 394 SCRA 494, 508-509, the Supreme Court stated that under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which said question is closely connected. The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action.

Clearly, the civil action must precede the filing of the criminal action for a Prejudicial Question to exist.

http://remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com/

x x x."

Aquino signs PH Competition Act, amendment to Cabotage law | Inquirer Business



See - Aquino signs PH Competition Act, amendment to Cabotage law | Inquirer Business


"x x x.

President Benigno Aquino III on Tuesday signed the Philippine Competition Act, a piece of legislation which establishes national competition policy in a bid to protect consumers and spur economic development, but previously stalled in Congress in the last two decades.

READ: Aquino set to sign Philippine Competition Act

Aquino also signed an act allowing foreign vessels to transport and co-load foreign cargoes for domestic transshipment, which amends the Cabotage Law.
ADVERTISEMENT


READ: Reforms in shipping industry to bring down prices of goods, says Sen. Aquino

The signing was witnessed by Senate President Franklin Drilon, House Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr., Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr., Trade Secretary Gregory Domingo, and Economic Planning Secretary Arsenio Balisacan.

Also present were Senators Vicente Sotto III, Paolo Benigno “Bam” Aquino IV, and Cynthia Villar, Representatives Neptali Gonzales II, Mark Villar, and Dakila Carlo Cua.

Around 250 government officials and businessmen attended the event.

Game-changing

The Philippine Competition Act, which has been described as “game-changing,” prohibits anti-competitive mergers and acquisitions, the fixing of prices during auctions or biddings, and agreements that limit or control production, markets and investments.

READ: A new competition law at last!

The law aims to level the playing field and improve efficiency in the economy.

“Ngayon, sa wakas, maliit man o malaki ang negosyo, ang labanan ay nasa paglalabas ng de-kalidad na produkto sa pinakamakatwirang presyo, imbes na under the table o ang paramihan ng kuneksiyon,” Aquino said in his speech.

(Now, at last, regardless if it is a small or big business, the competition involves releasing quality products at reasonable prices, instead of under the table practices or the use of connections.)

Belmonte said the new law would also encourage innovation and the production of more goods and services.

Another prohibited action, under the Competition Act, is the “abuse of dominant position” which refers to the selling of goods or services below cost to drive competitors out of the market or imposing barriers that prevent competitors from growing.

Penalties for violating the law may reach P100 million (first offense) or P250 million (second offense). Those engaged in anti-competitive agreements may also be imprisoned.

Aquino said that at the time when the country still didn’t have a competition law, “tsambahan ang naging pagtiyak ng patas na kalakaran sa merkado (it was only by chance that we could ensure that the market situation was fair).”

Cheaper cargo shipments

He said the amendment to the Cabotage law, on the other hand, will allow foreign ships to freely trade with their chosen port of destination. He said this will result in lower prices for both businessmen and consumers.

As an example, Aquino said a cargo container from Cagayan de Oro would no longer be required to pass through the port of Manila and pay $1,120. Instead, it could go straight to Hong Kong and pay only $500 instead of $1,264 ($1,120 plus $144 from Manila to Hong Kong).

Aquino called it absurd that the Philippines, which is among the largest manufacturers of ships and the largest supplier of seafarers has among the highest prices of shipments.

Because the Philippines is an archipelago, the the transfer of goods from island to island is indeed difficult, he admitted. He said allowing the current system to go on would only benefit a few people.

Belmonte, at the same time, described the shipping industry as “nearly cartelized” and that the amendment would address high shipping costs. He said effective implementation of the law will result in its success.

“Naniniwala tayong kalayaan ang haligi ng matibay na estado; nagbubunsod ito ng kompetisyon, na nagpapalago ng ekonomiya at nagpapalawak ng oportunidad,” Aquino said.

(We believe that freedom is the pillar of a strong state; it spurs competition and the growth of the economy and expands opportunities).

He said the two legislation pieces will result in positive changes that the next generations would benefit from.

Drilon also called it a milestone, saying that the Philippines “is now better equipped to face the challenges of the future.”

x x x."

Read more: http://business.inquirer.net/195649/aquino-signs-ph-competition-act#ixzz3gWMnxdGU
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Monday, July 20, 2015

How cases are decided | Inquirer Opinion


See - How cases are decided | Inquirer Opinion



"x x x.

Judging cases on their merit. In general, how do judges, not necessarily of the Philippines, decide cases? To be sure, there are different schools of thought. The most common is the analytical school popularized by John Austin. It posits that a decision is simply the result of applying the law to a given set of facts, expressed in the formula, facts times law equals decision, or F x L = D.
Thus, if the facts show that Pedro killed Juan, the judge simply applies the law on homicide by sentencing the killer to jail. Many times, however, the facts are not plainly proven by the evidence. And even if the facts are indubitable, the law may not be clear. The analytical theory cannot fully explain how a judgment is reached when complicated issues are involved.

On the other hand, the sociological school led by Harvard Dean Roscoe Pound holds that a decision is the result of a number of stimuli being applied to the personality of a judge, expressed in the formula, stimuli times personality equals decision, or S x P = D.

Under this formula, the law and the facts are the two main stimuli, but there are others like the dire consequences of a decision on the public interest, or illness that could warp the thinking of a judge, or what I call the “plague of ships”—kinship, relationship, friendship and fellowship.

The personality of a judge refers to his/her education, training, intelligence, legal philosophy, passion for accuracy, industry, integrity, character, prior opinions and writings, etc. Pound looked at law as social engineering, not as a mathematical tool.

Procedure in judging. Process-wise, how do our justices decide cases? The complete answer is in the 38-page “Internal Rules of the Supreme Court.” Briefly, however, every petition or appeal is raffled, upon its receipt, to a “member-in-charge” (MIC) who determines whether the case should be handled by the banc (all 15 justices) or by one of the three court divisions (of five justices each).

The MIC then prepares a summary of the facts, issues and arguments presented by the petitioner, and recommends either to dismiss the petition outright for utter lack of merit, or to require a comment from the respondents. The MIC also recommends whether to grant a temporary restraining order.

After receipt of the comment, the Court, upon the MIC’s recommendation, may dismiss the petition via a resolution, or require—in a few cases—oral argument, or ask the parties to submit written memoranda.

After receipt of the memoranda, the MIC submits a report on how the case should be disposed of. Deliberations follow. If the justices agree with the recommendation, the MIC then prepares the decision. Should the justices, by majority vote, disagree, another justice is assigned to write the decision and the MIC submits a dissent. Other justices may write concurring or dissenting opinions.

* * *

Comments to chiefjusticepanganiban@hotmail.com

x x x."

Food Safety Act of 2013, R.A. 10611

See - http://www.mb.com.ph/govt-called-to-take-action-amid-food-poisoning-cases/



"x x x.

It is about time the government takes drastic food safety vigilance measures to protect the public in the wake of food poisoning cases happening in various parts of the country, a number of socio-civic groups said yesterday.

Rene Pineda, president of the Consumer Rights for Safe Food (CRSF), asked concerned government agencies to fully enforce Republic Act 10611 and its recently promulgated Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) to uphold the safety and welfare of the consuming public.

Also known as the Food Safety Act of 2013, R.A. 10611, among other measures, aims to “establish policies and programs for addressing food safety hazards and developing appropriate standards and control measures.”

“The rise in food poisoning cases affecting young children, the most vulnerable population group, warrants the speedy implementation of R.A. 10611, including the establishment of the Food Safety Regulation Coordinating Board, which is tasked to prepare crisis management plan and lead food control activities,” he added.

For his part, toxicologist Dr. Romy Quijano, president of the Pesticide Action Network – Philippines underscored the need for “vigorous public education, multi-sectoral dialogues on food safety issues, and the conduct of continuing monitoring programs for food manufacturers and food business operators” to prevent food poisoning incidents.

Quezon City-based chemical safety and environmental group EcoWaste Coalition insisted immediate steps that should be carried out to promote food safety vigilance among government, business, and consumer stakeholders.


“We suggest that all flag-raising ceremonies across the country every Monday be used by government and school authorities to drum up personal and collective consciousness and action towards food safety. It’s a good platform to disseminate policies and measures to prevent food poisoning,” Aileen Lucero of EcoWaste stated.

Lucero said that at the soonest time possible government officials from Department of Health (DOH) Secretary Janette Garin down to local mayors should go down the streets and conduct on-the-spot food safety inspections as seeing them in public would assure the people that steps are being done to guarantee public access to safe food.


“The government should also ensure that no stone is left unturned to resolve recent food poisoning cases and that the culprits be duly penalized,” Lucero added.

The EcoWaste Coalition further urged local health departments to organize food safety seminars targeting all food business operators, including cottage food industries, school canteens, restaurants and street vendors to reiterate safe and hygienic food manufacturing and handling practices,” she added.

x x x."


Read more at http://www.mb.com.ph/govt-called-to-take-action-amid-food-poisoning-cases/#3Stfw1rGkIeIEkRD.99

Sunday, July 19, 2015

Amending an Answer; sample motion for leave of court to amend Answer,



                                                        "x x x.

MOTION FOR LEAVE OF COURT
TO AMEND OR MODIFY THE COMMENT (ANSWER), DATED xxx, OF THE DEFENDANTS


          THE DEFENDANTS, by counsel, respectfully state:

1.      On xxx, the Defendants, pro se (by and for themselves and without assistance of a Counsel), filed their Responsive Pleading to the main case which was denominated as a “COMMENT (ANSWER)”, dated xxx.

1.1.           It was apparently originally intended as the Comment of the Defendants to the incidents pending at that time, i.e., Plaintiff’s Motion/s for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction.

1.2.          The Defendants, pro se, subsequently intended the said Comment as their ANSWER to the main case, as shown by the handwritten words “Answer” in parenthesis on the title of the said Comment, dated xxx.

2.    Although the said Comment (Answer) contained “admissions/denials/defenses” and a valid “prayer”, and although voluminous documents were attached thereto in support of the pro se counter-allegations of ultimate facts by the Defendants, nonetheless, the undersigned new Counsel for the Defendants feel that, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY,  there is a great need for him to AMEND, MODIFY, CLARIFY, IMPROVE, AND STRENGTHEN the said “Comment (Answer)” of the Defendants:

(a) to better protect their rights and interests,

(b) to more clearly present their legal theory of the case,

(c) to strengthen the legal and factual position of the Defendants and the supporting evidence in support thereof, and

(d) to allege their compulsory counterclaim.

3.     This Motion is not intended to delay this case but is being presented solely to serve the best interest of justice and fair play by improving the pro se Responsive Pleading of the Defendants without the assistance of a Counsel.

4.    Please note that the main case is yet to undergo Mediation Phase, Pretrial Phase, and Judicial Dispute Resolution Phase.

4.1.          It has not yet reached the Main Trial On The Merits Phase.

5.     The rights of the Plaintiff and will not be injured by this fair and reasonable Motion.

WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice and for the legal and factual reasons cited hereinabove, it is respectfully prayed that, after notice and hearing, an Order be issued giving the undersigned new Counsel for the Defendants 30 days to file an AMENDED/MODIFIED ANSWER for the Defendants, counted from receipt of the Order granting this Motion.

FURTHER, the Defendants respectfully pray for such and other reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable in the premises.

          Xx x City, xxx, 2015.


LASERNA CUEVA-MERCADER
LAW OFFICES
Counsel for Defendants
Unit 15, Star Arcade, C. V. Starr Ave.
Philamlife Village, Las Pinas City 1740
Tel. Nos. 8725443 & 8462539
X x x.


MANUEL LASERNA JR.
X x x.


X x x.”

Indirect contempt; how commenced; sample motion to deny due course and expunge motion for indirect contempt.




“x x x.

URGENT AD CAUTELAM MOTION TO DENY DUE COURSE TO AND TO EXPUNGE PLAINTIFF’S “MOTION TO CITE RESPONDENTS xxx FOR INDIRECT CONTEMPT”, DATED xxx.


          THE DEFENDANTS, by counsel, respectfully state:
                                                                                                   
1.      The Plaintiff has filed a “MOTION TO CITE RESPONDENTS x x x FOR INDIRECT CONTEMPT”, DATED x x x.

(1)            The said pending Motion prays that Defendants be cited for INDIRECT CONTEMPT for the alleged violations of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction allegedly issued by the Court.

2.    X x x.

3.     It is noteworthy to discuss hereinbelow the new rules on direct contempt and indirect contempt under RULE 71 (CONTEMPT) of the 1997 Rules of Cicil Procedure.

4.    Sec. 3, Rule 71 (Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing) provides that “(a)fter a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt” on the seven (7) grounds enumerated therein.

(1)            A “CHARGE”, referred to above, speaks of a SHOW-CAUSE ORDER MOTO PROPRIO ISSUED BY THE COURT or a SEPARATE PETITION (an initiatory pleading that must follow the rules for initiatory pleadings in the Rules of Court).

(2)          A mere MOTION of a party is no longer allowed under Rule 71.

5.     Sec. 4, Rule 71 (How proceedings commenced) provides that “(p)roceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt”.


5.1.        To repeat: The abovecited provision speaks of two (2) modes to initiate an INDIRECT CONTEMPT proceeding:


5.1.2. “INITIATED MOTO PROPRIO BY THE COURT” (which the Court has not done); and

5.1.3. “ANY OTHER FORMAL CHARGE”, i.e. a separate/new Petition, an initiatory pleading and not a mere Motion (which Plaintiff has failed to do).


6.       Sec. 4, Rule 71 further provides  that “(i)n all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned”. 

6.1.        Furthermore, it provides that “(i)f the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.

7.        Sec. 5, Rule 71 (Where charge to be filed) provides, inter alia, that “(w)here the charge for indirect contempt has been committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or against an officer appointed by it, the charge may be filed with such court”. 

8.       Sec. 6, Rule 71 ( Hearing; release on bail) provides, inter alia, that “(i)f the hearing is not ordered to be had forthwith, the respondent may be released from custody upon filing a bond, in an amount fixed by the court, for his appearance at the hearing of the charge”; and that “(o)n the day set therefor, the court shall proceed to investigate the charge and consider such comment, testimony or defense as the respondent may make or offer”.

9.       JURISPRUDENCE. –

9.1.        In the case of “HONORATO ESPINOSA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PRESIDING JUDGE, Branch 23, RTC Iloilo City and Sps. RODOLFO and VIOLETA ALCANTARA, respondents”, [G.R. No. 128686.  May 28, 2004], the Supreme Court held, inter alia, that:

9.1.1.            “Unlike in cases of direct contempt, which can be summarily adjudged and punished by a fine, a finding of guilt for indirect contempt must be preceded by a charge in writing, an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon and to be heard by himself or by counsel in a hearing”;  

9.1.2.           “The Court of Appeals erred in summarily punishing Espinosa and his counsel, considering that the charge against them only constitutes indirect contempt”;

9.1.3.           “In cases of indirect contempt, no matter how palpable the errant’s bad faith might appear to the court, due process as laid down in the rules of procedure must be observed before the penalty is imposed” (cf. Rule 71).
THUS:
“x x x.
However, this Court is unable to sustain the Court of Appeals’ declaration that Espinosa and his counsel are in contempt of court and the corresponding fine of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) imposed upon them. Under Revised Circular No. 28-91, the submission of a false certification constitutes indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the filing of criminal action against the guilty party and the institution of disciplinary
proceedings against the counsel. Unlike in cases of direct contempt, which can be summarily adjudged and punished by a fine[39], a finding of guilt for indirect contempt must be preceded by a charge in writing, an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon and to be heard by himself or by counsel in a hearing.[40] The Court of Appeals erred in summarily punishing Espinosa and his counsel, considering that the charge against them only constitutes indirect contempt. In cases of indirect contempt, no matter how palpable the errant’s bad faith might appear to the court, due process as laid down in the rules of procedure must be observed before the penalty is imposed.
X x x.”

9.2.      In the case of FRANK LAWRENCE A. CARIÑO @ "FRANKIE CARIÑO," complainant, vs.JUDGE JONATHAN S. BITENG, respondent, [A.M. No. MTJ-99-1213. October 2, 2000], the Supreme Court held that “(u)nlike in a case of direct contempt, where the contemnor may summarily be adjudged in contempt, in indirect contempt the Rules require that a written charge be filed and opportunity be given to the accused to be heard by himself or counsel before the accused may be punished for contempt.” 

THUS:

“x x x.
Conformably with Section 3, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court[5] and our decision inCastaños vs. Escaño, Jr. 251 SCRA 174 (1995), the OCA found that Judge Biteng did not give complainant the opportunity to be heard as a matter of due process of law before citing complainant with indirect contempt, and ordering his arrest and detention, and concluded that this failure of the judge constitutes gross ignorance of the law and incompetence. Not to be disregarded too according to OCA, is a past case involving respondent judge,Administrative Matter, No. MTJ-95-1018, Sule vs. Biteng, 243 SCRA 524 (1995), in which Judge Biteng was fined with P20,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law and incompetence and warned that a repetition of the same offense, ignorance of the law, would be dealt with severely.
The aforecited rule and the jurisprudence on the instant complaint against Judge Biteng leave us no recourse but to agree with OCA's evaluation and recommendation. Unlike in a case of direct contempt, where the contemnor may summarily be adjudged in contempt, in indirect contempt the Rules require that a written charge be filed and opportunity be given to the accused to be heard by himself or counsel before the accused may be punished for contempt.
X x x.”

9.3.      In the case of “ATTY. ROMEO B. IGOT vs. CA, et al.”, GR 150794, August 17, 2004, the Supreme Court held, inter alia, that

9.3.1.           “Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt”.      

9.3.2.         “In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatorypleadings for civil actions in the court concerned.  If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.
THUS:

“X x x.  The pertinent rules on the matter are Sections 4 and 5, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, which read:

          SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced. – Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
          In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned.  If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.

X x x.”

WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice and for the legal reasons cited hereinabove, it is respectfully prayed that, after notice and hearing, an Order be issued:

1.      GRANTING the Defendants’ herein “URGENT AD CAUTELAM MOTION TO DENY DUE COURSE TO AND  TO EXPUNGE PLAINTIFF’S “MOTION TO CITE RESPONDENTS xxx  FOR INDIRECTT CONTEMPT”, DATED xxx”;

2.    DENYING DUE COURSE to the Plaintiff’s aforecited Motion;

3.     EXPUNGING from the Record the aforecited Plaintiff’s Motion;

4.    RECALLING AND REVOKING the previous Order, dated x x x, setting the Plaintiff’s Motion for hearing before the Court on xxx, and all such subsequent Orders issued thereafter;

5.     CANCELLING the hearings set by the Court on xxx.

6.    By way of Ad Cautelam Relief, GRANTING the Defendants, by counsel, a reasonable time, e.g. 15 days, to file their formal COMMENT to the Plaintiff’s pending Motion to Cite the Defendants for Indirect Contempt if and when this Ad Cautelam Motion of the Defendants is denied, the period to file the said Comment to be counted from date of receipt of the Order, if any, denying this Motion.

7.     Further, by way of Ad Cautelam Relief, GRANTING the Defendants sufficient time to PRESENT both TESTIMONIAL AND DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE, in chief and in rebuttal phases, to prove the lack of merit of Plaintiff’s pending Motion, if and when this Motion of the Defendants is denied.

FURTHER, the Defendants respectfully pray for such and other reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable in the premises.

          Xxx City, xxx, 2015.


LASERNA CUEVA-MERCADER
LAW OFFICES
Counsel for Defendants
Unit 15, Star Arcade, C. V. Starr Ave.
Philamlife Village, Las Pinas City 1740
Tel. Nos. 8725443 & 8462539
X x x.


MANUEL LASERNA JR.
X x x.


X x x.”