Vehicular accidents; relevant provisions of Civil Code on human relations, quasi-delict, damages, attorney's fees.

Relevant Civil Code provisions

Human Relations - 

Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Quasi-delicts -

Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)

Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.(n)

Article 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. (n)

Article 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.

If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable. (n)

Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. (n)

Actual or Compensatory Damages -

Article 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.

Article 2200. Indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits which the obligee failed to obtain. (1106)

Article 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.

Article 2203. The party suffering loss or injury must exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the damages resulting from the act or omission in question.

Article 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:

(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;

(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;

(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;

(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;

(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim;

(6) In actions for legal support;

(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;

(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws;

(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;

(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;

(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.

In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.

Article 2214. In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce the damages that he may recover.

Article 2215. In contracts, quasi-contracts, and quasi-delicts, the court may equitably mitigate the damages under circumstances other than the case referred to in the preceding article, as in the following instances:

(1) That the plaintiff himself has contravened the terms of the contract;

(2) That the plaintiff has derived some benefit as a result of the contract;

(3) In cases where exemplary damages are to be awarded, that the defendant acted upon the advice of counsel;

(4) That the loss would have resulted in any event;

(5) That since the filing of the action, the defendant has done his best to lessen the plaintiff's loss or injury.

Other Kinds of Damages -

Article 2216. No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or exemplary damages, may be adjudicated. The assessment of such damages, except liquidated ones, is left to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances of each case.

Moral Damages -

Article 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act for omission.

Article 2218. In the adjudication of moral damages, the sentimental value of property, real or personal, may be considered.

Article 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;

(4) Adultery or concubinage;

(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;

(6) Illegal search;

(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;

(8) Malicious prosecution;

(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;

(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.

The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages.

The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named.

Article 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.

Exemplary or Corrective Damages - 

Article 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.

Article 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.

Article 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.

Article 2233. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right; the court will decide whether or not they should be adjudicated.

Article 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. In case liquidated damages have been agreed upon, although no proof of loss is necessary in order that such liquidated damages may be recovered, nevertheless, before the court may consider the question of granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show that he would be entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation for liquidated damages.

Attorney’s Fees; when awarded - 

Article 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:

(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;

(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;

(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;

(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;

(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim;

(6) In actions for legal support;

(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;

(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws;

(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;

(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;

(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.

In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.

Driver's duty; the measure of a motorist’s duty is such care as is, under the facts and circumstances of the particular case, commensurate with the dangers which are to be anticipated and the injuries which are likely to result from the use of the vehicle

LARRY V. CAMINOS, JR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 147437, May 8, 2009

“x x x.

Finally, on the issue of damages, inasmuch as petitioner had not extended efforts to present countervailing evidence disproving the extent and cost of the damage sustained by Arnold’s car, the award assessed and ordered by the trial court must stand.

All told, it must be needlessly emphasized that the measure of a motorist’s duty is such care as is, under the facts and circumstances of the particular case, commensurate with the dangers which are to be anticipated and the injuries which are likely to result from the use of the vehicle, and in proportion to or commensurate with the peculiar risk attendant on the circumstances and conditions in the particular case,81 the driver being under the duty to know and to take into consideration those circumstances and factors affecting the safe operation of the vehicle which would be open to ordinary observation.82

X x x.”

Footnotes

1 Richards v. Begenstos, 21 N.W.2d 23; Hodges v. Smith, 298 S.W. 1023; Lawson v. Fordyce, 12 N.W.2d 301.

2 Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Owen, 101 S.W.2d 354.

3 Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. Lyon, 107 F.2d 157; Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. McKee, 121 F.2d 583.

4 Burdick v. Powell Bros. Truck Lines, 124 F.2d 694; Dixie Motor Coach Corp. v. Lane, 116 F.2d 264; Shipley v. Komer, 154 F.2d 861.

5 Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Owen, 101 S.W.2d 354.

6 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Rollo, pp. 8-23.

39 The REvised Penal Code, Reyes, Luis B., 15th ed. (2001) p. 995.

40 The Revised Penal Code, Reyes, Luis B., 15th ed. (2001) pp. 994-995.

41 People v. Paarlberg, 612 N.E.2d 106 (1933); People v. Crawford, 467 N.W.2d 818 (1991); Wood v. City of Casper, 683 P.2d 1147 (1984); State v. Houser, 626 P.2d 256 (1981); State v. Boydston, 609 P.2d 224(1980); State v. Tamanaha, 377 P.2d 688 (1962).

42 Wofford v. State, 395 S.E.2d 630 (1990); Shorter v. State, 122 N.E.2d 847 (1954); White v. State, 647 S.W.2d 751 (1983).

43 7A Am. Jur. 2d, pp. 861-862.

44 The Revised Penal Code, Reyes, Luis B., 15th ed. (2001) p. 995.

45 White v. State, 647 S.W.2d 751 (1983).

46 People v. Ackroyd, 543 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1989).

47 52 A.L.R.2d 1343.

48 Knuth v. Murphy, 54 N.W.2d 771. This case held that evidence of the extent of personal injuries is competent to show the force of the impact as a basis for an inference of the rate of speed of the vehicle.

49 Sanford v. State, 16 So.2d 628; People v. Whitby, 44 N.Y.S.2d 76.

50 People v. Devoe, 159 N.E. 682; People v. Whitby, 44 N.Y.S.2d 76.

51 People v. Carrie, 204 N.Y.S. 759.

52 People v. Herman, 20 N.Y.S.2d 149.

53 See Woodson v. Germas, 104 S.E.2d 739.

54 Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128474, 6 October 2004, 440 SCRA 136, 148-149.

55 Foster v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 670 So.2d 471.

56 Nunn v. Financial Indem. Co., 694 So.2d 630. Duty of reasonable care includes duty to keep the vehicle under control and to maintain proper lookout for hazards.

57 Roberts v. Leahy, 214 P.2d 673.

58 Reppert v. White Star Lines, 106 A.L.R. 413; Riccio v. Ginsberg, 62 A.L.R. 967.

59 Stauffer v. School District of Tecumseh, 473 N.W.2d 392.

60 Kane v. Locke, 12 N.W.2d 495; Shelton v. Detamore, 93 S.E.2d 314.

61 Matthews v. Patton, 123 A.2d 667.

62 Henthorn v. M.G.C.Corp., 83 N.W.2d 759.

63 Reed v. Stroh, 128 P.2d 829; Butcher v. Thornhill, 58 P.2d 179.

64 Reed v. Stroh, 128 P.2d 829; Tucker v. Ragland-Potter Co., 148 S.W.2d 691.

65 Webb v. Smith, 10 S.E. 2d 503; Le Master v. Fort Worth Transit Co., 142 S.W.2d 908.

66 Figlar v. Gordon, 53 A.2d 645.

67 Burrows v. Jacobsen, 311 N.W.2d 880 (1981).

68 Betchkal v. Willis, 378 N.W.2d 684 (1985).

69 Creech v. Blackwell, 298 S.W.2d 394.

70 Entitled "An Act to Compile the Laws Relative to Land Transportation and Traffic Rules, To Create a Land Transportation Commission and for Other Purposes." The law was approved on 20 June 1964.

71 McCarthy v. Beckwith, 141 N.E. 126; Arvo v. Delta Hardware Co., 204 N.W. 134; Cohen v. Silverman, 190 N.W. 795; Webber v. Park Auto Transp. Co., 47 A.L.R. 590.

72 Wlodkowski v. Yerkaitis, 57 A.2d 792.

73 Reynolds v. Madison Bus Co., 26 N.W. 2d 653.

74 Wilmes v. Mihelich, 25 N.W.2d 833.

75 Moore v. Kujath, 29 N.W.2d 883.

76 Moore v. Kujath, 29 N.W.2d 883.

77 Metzger v. Cushman’s Sons, 152 N.E. 695.

78 G.R. No. 125134, 22 January 1999, 301 SCRA 657.

79 State v. Blake, 255 N.W. 108.

80 State v. Sullivan, 277 N.W. 230.

81 Reed v. Stroh, 128 P.2d 829.

82 Webb v. Smith, 10 S.E. 2d 503; Le Master v. Fort Worth Transit Co., 142 S.W.2d 908.

Emergency Rule; Art. 2185, Civil Code (presumption negligence); Sec. 35 & 37, RA 4136, Land Transportation and Traffic Code (overspeeding, illegal overtaking).

MARIKINA AUTO LINE TRANSPORT CORPORATION and FREDDIE L. SUELTO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ERLINDA V. VALDELLON, G.R. No. 152040, March 31, 2006

“x x x.

On the first issue, we find and so resolve that respondent People of the Philippines was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner Suelto swerved the bus to the right with recklessness, thereby causing damage to the terrace of private respondent’s apartment. Although she did not testify to seeing the incident as it happened, petitioner Suelto himself admitted this in his answer to the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-16051, and when he testified in the trial court.

Suelto narrated that he suddenly swerved the bus to the right of the road causing it to hit the column of the terrace of private respondent. Petitioners were burdened to prove that the damage to the terrace of private respondent was not the fault of petitioner Suelto.

We have reviewed the evidence on record and find that, as ruled by the trial court and the appellate court, petitioners failed to prove that petitioner acted on an emergency caused by the sudden intrusion of a passenger jeepney into the lane of the bus he was driving.

It was the burden of petitioners herein to prove petitioner Suelto’s defense that he acted on an emergency, that is, he had to swerve the bus to the right to avoid colliding with a passenger jeep coming from EDSA that had overtaken another vehicle and intruded into the lane of the bus. The sudden emergency rule was enunciated by this Court in Gan v. Court of Appeals,23 thus:

[O]ne who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.

Under Section 37 of Republic Act No. 4136, as amended, otherwise known as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, motorists are mandated to drive and operate vehicles on the right side of the road or highway:

SEC. 37. Driving on right side of highway. – Unless a different course of action is required in the interest of the safety and the security of life, person or property, or because of unreasonable difficulty of operation in compliance herewith, every person operating a motor vehicle or an animal-drawn vehicle on a highway shall pass to the right when meeting persons or vehicles coming toward him, and to the left when overtaking persons or vehicles going the same direction, and when turning to the left in going from one highway to another, every vehicle shall be conducted to the right of the center of the intersection of the highway.

Section 35 of the law provides, thus:

Sec. 35. Restriction as to speed.—(a) Any person driving a motor vehicle on a highway shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed, not greater nor less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard for the traffic, the width of the highway, and of any other condition then and there existing; and no person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway at such a speed as to endanger the life, limb and property of any person, nor at a speed greater than will permit him to bring the vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead (emphasis supplied).

In relation thereto, Article 2185 of the New Civil Code provides that "unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent, if at the time of mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation." By his own admission, petitioner Suelto violated the Land Transportation and Traffic Code when he suddenly swerved the bus to the right, thereby causing damage to the property of private respondent.

X x x.

As already maintained and concluded, the severe damages sustained could not have resulted had the accused acted as a reasonable and prudent man would. The accused was not diligent as he claims to be. What is more probable is that the accused had to swerve to the right and hit the commercial apartment of the plaintiff because he could not make a full stop as he was driving too fast in a usually crowded street.24

Moreover, if the claim of petitioners were true, they should have filed a third-party complaint against the driver of the offending passenger jeepney and the owner/operator thereof.

Petitioner Suelto’s reliance on the sudden emergency rule to escape conviction for the crime charged and his civil liabilities based thereon is, thus, futile.

X x x.”

Negligence; proximate cause

MARIANO C. MENDOZA and ELVIRA LIM vs. SPOUSES LEONORA J. GOMEZ and GABRIEL V. GOMEZ, G.R. No. 160110, June 18, 2014

“x x x.

The first question to address, then, is whether or not Mendoza’s negligence was duly proven. Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.21

As found by the RTC, and affirmed by the CA, Mendoza was negligent in driving the subject Mayamy bus, as demonstrated by the fact that, at the time of the collision, the bus intruded on the lane intended for the Isuzu truck. Having encroached on the opposite lane, Mendoza was clearly in violation of traffic laws. Article2185 of the Civil Code provides that unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. In the case at bar, Mendoza’s violation of traffic laws was the proximate cause of the harm.

Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.22

The evidence on record shows that before the collision, the Isuzu truck was in its rightful lane, and was even at a stop, having been flagged down by a security guard of St. Ignatius Village.23 The mishap occurred when the Mayamy bus, travelling at a fast speed as shown by the impact of the collision, and going in the opposite direction as that of the Isuzu truck, encroached on the lane rightfully occupied by said Isuzu truck, and caused the latter to spin, injuring Perez, Anla, Banca, and Repisada, and considerably damaging the Isuzu truck

X x x.”

Reckless imprudence; penalty when reckless imprudence in the use of a motor vehicle results in the death of a person

ROGELIO J. GONZAGA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 195671, January 21, 2015

“x x x.

Reckless imprudence, as defined in Article 365⁴⁰ of the RPC, consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

In order to establish a motorist’s liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, 

it must be shown that there was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the injuries or damages complained of. To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle – a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is required.⁴¹ Willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others within the meaning of reckless driving statutes has been held to involve a conscious choice of a course of action which injures another, either with knowledgeof serious danger to others involved, or with knowledge of facts which would disclose the danger to any reasonable person. Verily, it is the inexcusable lack of precaution or conscious indifference to the consequences of the conduct which supplies the criminal intent and brings an act of mere negligence and imprudence under the operation of the penal law, without regard to whether the private offended party may himself be considered likewise at fault.⁴²

In the present case, the RTC and the CA uniformly found that Rogelio’s act of driving very fast on the wrong side of the road was the proximate cause of the collision, resulting to the death of Dionesio, Sr. and serious physical injuries to Dionesio, Jr. and Cherry. Notably, the road where the incident occurred was a curve sloping upwards towards Brgy. Bocboc where the Inguitos were bound and descending towards the opposite direction where Rogelio was going. Indeed, the very fact of speeding, under such circumstances, is indicative of imprudent behavior. As a motorist, Rogelio was bound to exercise ordinary care in such affair by driving at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with the conditions encountered, as this would enable him to keep the vehicle under control and avoid injury to others using the highway.⁴³ Moreover, it is elementary in traffic school that a driver slows down before negotiating a curve as it may be reasonably anticipated that another vehicle may appear from the opposite direction at any moment. Hence, excessive speed, combined with other circumstances such as the occurrence of the accident on or near a curve, as in this case, constitutes negligence.⁴⁴ Consequently, the Court finds that Rogelio acted recklessly and imprudently in driving at a fast speed on the wrong side of the road while approaching the curve where the incident happened, thereby rendering him criminally liable, aswell as civilly accountable for the material damages resulting therefrom. Nonetheless, while the CA and the RTC concurred that the proximate cause of the collision was Rogelio’s reckless driving, the CA Decision made no mention as to the presence or absence of the limiting element in the last paragraph of Article 365 of the RPC, which imposes the penalty next higher in degreeupon the offender who "fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in his hands to give." Based on case law, the obligation under this paragraph: (a) is dependent on the means in the hands of the offender, i.e., the type and degree of assistance that he/she, at the time and place of the incident, is capable of giving; and (b) requires adequate proof.⁴⁵

X x x.

Under Article 365 of the RPC, when reckless imprudence in the use of a motor vehicle results in the death of a person, as in this case, the accused shall be punished with the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, i.e., two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,⁵¹ the minimum of said penalty should be taken from arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. Consequently, the Court finds a need to modify the penalty to be imposed on Rogelio and thus, sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years of prision correccional in its minimum, as minimum, to six years of prision correccional in its maximum, as maximum.

X x x.”

Footnotes

⁴⁰ Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence.— Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayorin its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayorin its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menorin its maximum period shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would, otherwise, constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayorin its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.

A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.

In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed, in the period which they may deem proper to apply.

2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law [Act No. 3992 entitled "An Act to Amend and Compile the Laws Relative to Motor Vehicles"], the death of a person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical conditions and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.

The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in his hands to give. (Emphases supplied)

⁴¹ Dumayag v. People, G.R. No. 172778, November 26, 2012, 686 SCRA 347, 359.

⁴² Caminos,Jr. v. People, 605 Phil. 422, 434-435 (2009).

⁴³ Id. at 437.

⁴⁴ Gabriel v. CA, 483 Phil. 142, 157-158 (2004).

⁴⁵ Abueva v. People, 438 Phil. 610, 623-624 (2002).

⁵⁰ Art. 263. Serious physical injuries. — Any person who shall wound, beat, or assault another, shall be guilty of the crime of serious physical injuries and shall suffer:

1. The penalty of prision mayor, if in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the injured person shall become insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind;

2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum period, if in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have lost the use of speech or the power to hear or to smell, or shall have lost an eye, a hand, a foot, an arm, or a leg, or shall have lost the use of any such member, or shall have become incapacitated for the work in which he was theretofore habitually engaged;

3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have become deformed, or shall have lost any other part of his body, or shall have lost the use thereof, or shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance of the work in which he as habitually engaged for a period of more than ninety days;

4. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if the physical injuries inflicted shall have caused the illness or incapacity for labor of the injured person for more than thirty days.

If the offense shall have been committed against any of the persons enumerated in Article 246, or with attendance of any of the circumstances mentioned in Article 248, the case covered by subdivision number 1 of this Article shall be punished by reclusion temporalin its medium and maximum periods; the case covered by subdivision number 2 by prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period; the case covered by subdivision number 3 by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods; and the case covered by subdivision number 4 by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not be applicable to a parent who shall inflict physical injuries upon his child by excessive chastisement.

⁵¹ Pertinently, Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law which provides:

Section 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.

⁵² See Articles 2217 to 2220 of the Civil Code.

⁵³ People v. Berondo, Jr., 601 Phil. 538, 546 (2009); citing People v. Whisenhunt, 420 Phil. 677, 701 (2001).

⁵⁴ See People of the Philippines v. Torres, G.R. No. 189850, September 22, 2014.

Contributory negligence

SABINIANO DUMAYAG vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 172778,  November 26, 2012

“ x x x.

Under the proven circumstances, there was contributory negligence on the part of petitioner. It is to be noted that there were two blind curves along the national highway. Having travelled along it for the past 20 years, he was aware of the blind curves and should have taken precaution in operating the passenger bus as it approached them. In the situation at hand, he did not exercise the necessary precaution. After negotiating the first curve, he claimed to have stepped on the accelerator pedal because his lane was clear. According to SPO2 Patalinghug, he found skid marks produced by the passenger bus. It could only mean that petitioner had slammed on the brake brought about by the sudden emergence of the tricycle in front of him. Notwithstanding, it was still short of reckless or criminal negligence as he was driving along his rightful lane.

Considering that the proximate cause was the negligence of the tricycle driver and that negligence on the part of petitioner was only contributory, there is a need to mitigate the amounts of the civil liability imposed on the latter. The determination of the mitigation of the civil liability varies depending on the circumstances of each case.³¹ The Court allowed the reduction of 50% in Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co.,³² 20% in Phoenix Construction, Inc. v. IAC³³ and LBC Air Cargo, Inc. v. CA, ³⁴ and 40% in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. CA ³⁵ and Philippine Bank of Commerce v. CA.³⁶

In this case, a reduction of 50% of the actual damages is deemed equitable considering that the negligence of the tricycle driver was the proximate cause of the accident and that of petitioner was merely contributory. Moreover, under the circumstances, petitioner cannot be made liable for moral and exemplary damages for lack of basis. The award of attorney's fees is not warranted either.

X x x.”

Reckless imprudence; proximate cause; contributory negligence

SABINIANO DUMAYAG vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 172778,  November 26, 2012

“x x x.

Reckless imprudence, as defined by our penal law, consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.²² In order to establish a motorist’s liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be shown that there was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the injuries or damages complained of.²³ Thus, to constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, and a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is required.²⁴

After going over the records of this case, the Court is unable to sustain the findings of fact and conclusion reached by the courts below. The totality of the evidence shows that the proximate cause of the collision was the reckless negligence of the tricycle driver, who hastily overtook another vehicle while approaching a blind curve, in violation of traffic laws.

Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.²⁵

The evidence indubitably shows that before the collision, the passenger bus was cruising along its rightful lane when the tricycle coming from the opposite direction suddenly swerved and encroached on its lane. The accident would not have happened had Genayas, the tricycle driver, stayed on his lane and did not recklessly try to overtake another vehicle while approaching a blind curve. Section 37 of R.A. No. 4136, as amended, mandates all motorists to drive and operate vehicles on the right side of the road or highway. When overtaking another, it should be made only if the highway is clearly visible and is free from oncoming vehicle. Overtaking while approaching a curve in the highway, where the driver’s view is obstructed, is not allowed.²⁶ Corollarily, drivers of automobiles, when overtaking another vehicle, are charged with a high degree of care and diligence to avoid collision. The obligation rests upon him to see to it that vehicles coming from the opposite direction are not taken unaware by his presence on the side of the road upon which they have the right to pass.²⁷

The MTC opined that the accident could have been avoided or damage or injuries could only be slight and manageable, if the speed of the passenger bus was commensurate with the demands of the circumstances and the condition of the road. The Court, however, cannot subscribe to the conclusion that petitioner was driving fast and without regard to the condition of the road at the time of the collision.

The testimony of Cagakit that the passenger bus was running fast at the time of the collision lacks probative value. The actual speed of the bus was not established because he merely stated that when the tricycle was trying to overtake the Mitsubishi pick-up, a fast moving vehicle hit it. Also, it was not indubitably shown that petitioner was driving at a speed beyond the rate allowed by law.²⁸ In a similar case, Vallacar Transit, Inc. v. Catubig,²⁹ the Court, in adopting the conclusion of the RTC, wrote:

Based on the evidence on record, it is crystal clear that the immediate and proximate cause of the collision is the reckless and negligent act of Quintin Catubig, Jr. and not because the Ceres Bus was running very fast. Even if Ceres Bus is running very fast on its lane, it could not have caused the collision if not for the fact that Quintin Catubig, Jr. tried to overtake a cargo truck and encroached on the lane traversed by the Ceres Bus while approaching a curve. As the driver of the motorcycle, Quintin Catubig, Jr. has not observed reasonable care and caution in driving his motorcycle which an ordinary prudent driver would have done under the circumstances. Recklessness on the part of Quintin Catubig, Jr. is evident when he tried to overtake a cargo truck while approaching a curve in Barangay Donggo-an, Bolisong, Manjuyod, Negros Oriental.

x x x.

Furthermore, it was undisputed that the tricycle was overloaded, with a total of eight (8) passengers (excluding the driver), which is a clear violation of traffic rules and regulation. It was likewise admitted by the owner of the tricycle, Beethoven Bernabe (Bernabe), that his driver violated the conditions specified in the tricycle franchise which prohibited all tricycles to travel along the national highway. In fact, he admitted that Genayas was only the alternate driver of his son and that he did not interview him anymore when he applied as a company driver because he was a neighbor and a nephew of his wife. For said reason, the award of damages to Bernabe by the courts below has no justifiable basis.

The immediate and proximate cause being the reckless and imprudent act of the tricycle driver, petitioner should be acquitted. Nevertheless, he is civilly liable. The rule is that an "acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict."³⁰

Under the proven circumstances, there was contributory negligence on the part of petitioner. It is to be noted that there were two blind curves along the national highway. Having travelled along it for the past 20 years, he was aware of the blind curves and should have taken precaution in operating the passenger bus as it approached them. In the situation at hand, he did not exercise the necessary precaution. After negotiating the first curve, he claimed to have stepped on the accelerator pedal because his lane was clear. According to SPO2 Patalinghug, he found skid marks produced by the passenger bus. It could only mean that petitioner had slammed on the brake brought about by the sudden emergence of the tricycle in front of him. Notwithstanding, it was still short of reckless or criminal negligence as he was driving along his rightful lane.

Considering that the proximate cause was the negligence of the tricycle driver and that negligence on the part of petitioner was only contributory, there is a need to mitigate the amounts of the civil liability imposed on the latter. The determination of the mitigation of the civil liability varies depending on the circumstances of each case.³¹ The Court allowed the reduction of 50% in Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co.,³² 20% in Phoenix Construction, Inc. v. IAC³³ and LBC Air Cargo, Inc. v. CA, ³⁴ and 40% in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. CA ³⁵ and Philippine Bank of Commerce v. CA.³⁶

In this case, a reduction of 50% of the actual damages is deemed equitable considering that the negligence of the tricycle driver was the proximate cause of the accident and that of petitioner was merely contributory. Moreover, under the circumstances, petitioner cannot be made liable for moral and exemplary damages for lack of basis. The award of attorney's fees is not warranted either.

X x x.”

Footnotes

¹⁸ Section 41. Restrictions on overtaking and passing.

(a) The driver of a vehicle shall not drive to the left side of the center line of a highway in overtaking or passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction, unless such left side is clearly visible, and is free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance ahead to permit such overtaking or passing to be made in safety.

(b) The driver of a vehicle shall not overtake or pass another vehicle proceeding in the same direction, when approaching the crest of a grade, not upon a curve in the highway, where the driver's view along the highway is obstructed within a distance of five hundred feet ahead, except on a highway having two or more lanes for movement of traffic in one direction where the driver of a vehicle may overtake or pass another vehicle: Provided, That on a highway within a business or residential district, having two or more lanes for movement of traffic in one direction, the driver of a vehicle may overtake or pass another vehicle on the right.

²⁰ Lambert v. Heirs of Ray Castillon, 492 Phil. 384, 389 (2005).

²¹ Estacion v. Bernardo, 518 Phil. 388, 398-399 (2006).

²² Art. 365, Revised Penal Code.

²³ Gaid v. People, G.R. No. 171636, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 489, 498-499.

²⁴ Caminos, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 147437, May 8, 2009, 587 SCRA 348, 357.

²⁵ Vallacar Transit v. Catubig, G.R. No. 175512, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 281, 295-296.

²⁶ Section 41 (a) (b) of Republic Act No. 4136.

²⁷ United States v. Crame, Separate Opinion, 30 Phil. 2, 21-22 (1915).

²⁸ Republic Act No. 4136, Section 35. Restriction as to speed. -

(a) Any person driving a motor vehicle on a highway shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed, not greater nor less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard for the traffic, the width of the highway, and of any other condition then and there existing; and no person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway at such a speed as to endanger the life, limb and property of any person, nor at a speed greater than will permit him to bring the vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead.

(b) Subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the rate of speed of any motor vehicle shall not exceed the following:

MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE SPEEDS	Passengers Cars and Motorcycle	Motor trucks and buses
1. On open country roads, with no "blinds corners" not closely bordered by habitations.	80 km. per hour	50 km. per hour
2. On "through streets" or boulevards, clear of traffic, with no " blind corners," when so designated.	40 km. per hour	30 km. per hour
3. On city and municipal streets, with light traffic, when not designated "through streets".	30 km. per hour	30 km. per hour
4. Through crowded streets, approaching intersections at "blind corners," passing school zones, passing other vehicles which are stationery, or for similar dangerous circumstances.	20 km. per hour	20 km. per hour

³⁰ Heirs of Late Guaring, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 336 Phil. 274, 279 (1997).

³¹ Lambert v. Heirs of Ray Castillon, supra note 17, at 392.

³² 7 Phil. 359 (1907).

³³ 232 Phil. 327 (1987).

³⁴ 311 Phil. 715 (1995).

³⁵ G.R. No. 102383, November 26, 1992, 216 SCRA 51,

³⁶ 336 Phil. 667 (1997).