Execution - If the delays were through no fault of the prevailing party, the same should not be included in computing the 5-year period to execute a judgment by motion.

ZAMBOANGA BARTER TRADERS KILUSANG BAYAN, INC., et. al. vs. 

HON. JULIUS RHETT J. PLAGATA, et. al., G.R. No. 148433, September 30, 2008

"X x x.

Was public respondent Labor Arbiter justified in issuing the second alias writ of execution when the motion asking for the same was filed on 18 December 1989 beyond five years after the decision of the NLRC became final and executory on 18 January 1984?

We believe so.

We find that private respondent Mendoza need not file an independent action to enforce the NLRC decision. The motion he filed on 18 December 1989 to execute the judgment is sufficient in light of his two prior motions[1] filed within the five-year period and the non-satisfaction of the judgment for causes beyond his control. 

Section 6 of Rule 39[2] of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. – A judgment may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.

The purpose of the law (or rule) in prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgments or actions is to prevent obligors from sleeping on their rights.[3]

It is clear from the above rule that a judgment may be executed on motion within five years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.[4] If the prevailing party fails to have the decision enforced by a mere motion after the lapse of five years from the date of its entry (or from the date it becomes final and executory), the said judgment is reduced to a mere right of action in favor of the person whom it favors and must be enforced, as are all ordinary actions, by the institution of a complaint in a regular form.[5] However, there are instances in which this Court allowed execution by motion even after the lapse of five years upon meritorious grounds.[6] In Lancita v. Magbanua,[7] the Court declared:

In computing the time limited for suing out an execution, although there is authority to the contrary, the general rule is that there should not be included the time when execution is stayed, either by agreement of the parties for a definite time, by injunction, by the taking of an appeal or writ of error so as to operate as a supersedeas, by the death of a party, or otherwise. Any interruption or delay occasioned by the debtor will extend the time within which the writ may be issued without scire facias. 

In Republic v. Court of Appeals,[8] we ruled:

To be sure, there had been many instances where this Court allowed execution by motion even after the lapse of five years, upon meritorious grounds. These exceptions have one common denominator, and that is: the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment debtor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage.

In Gonzales v. Court of Appeals,[9] we emphasized that if the delays were through no fault of the prevailing party, the same should not be included in computing the 5-year period to execute a judgment by motion.

In the case under consideration, the decision of the NLRC was promulgated on 15 November 1983, and it became final and executory on 18 January 1984 (not December 1983 as ruled by the Court of Appeals). On 2 July 1984, a writ of execution was issued by Executive Labor Arbiter Abdulwahid. Said writ was returned unsatisfied. From the return of the sheriff, there is no doubt that he was threatened by Atty. Hasan G. Alam, President of ZBTKBI, who told him to “clad himself with iron dress” if he would enforce the writ Thereafter a motion for issuance of an alias writ of execution dated 23 October 1984 was filed by Mendoza, because the lifespan of the first writ of execution expired without being satisfied. Consequently, an Alias Writ of Execution was issued on 19 November 1984. The writ remained unsatisfied. At this point, two writs of execution were already issued but were not satisfied. On 18 December 1989, Mendoza filed a Motion for Issuance of (Second) Alias Writ of Execution, which public respondent Executive Labor Arbiter Rhett Julius J. Plagata issued on 2 January 1990. 

It cannot be disputed that Mendoza had not slept on his rights. In fact, he filed three motions so that the judgment in his favor could be executed and satisfied. The judgment was satisfied by virtue of the second alias writ of execution, which was issued upon a motion filed beyond the five-year period. The satisfaction of the judgment was not successful during the first two writs of execution. The delay in the enforcement of the two writs was clearly caused by petitioner through its President, Atty. Alam. Said delay was indeed beneficial and advantageous to petitioner, because the judgment against it, at that time, was yet to be implemented. It is very clear that if not for the threats received by the sheriff tasked to implement the writs of execution, the satisfaction of judgment would not have been delayed.

Under the circumstances obtaining, we hold that the five-year period allowed for enforcement of a judgment by motion was deemed to have been interrupted by petitioner. The prevention of the satisfaction of the judgment on the first two writs of execution cannot be blamed on Mendoza. The satisfaction of the judgment was already beyond his control. He did what he was supposed to do – file the requisite motions so that writs of execution would be issued. In view of the foregoing and for reasons of equity, we deem that the Motion for Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution filed by Mendoza on 18 December 1989 has been filed within the five-year period.

X x x."

[1] One was filed on 13 July 1983 even prior to the decision becoming final and executory. 

[2] Prior to 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 

[3] Francisco Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 117622-23, 23 October 2006, 505 SCRA 8, 26. 

[4] Camacho v. Court of Appeals, 351 Phil. 108, 113. 

[5] Macias v. Lim, G.R. No. 139284, 4 June 2004, 431 SCRA 20, 39. 

[6] Yau v. Silverio, Sr., G.R. Nos. 158848 and 171994, 4 February 2008, 543 SCRA 520, 529. 

[7] 117 Phil. 39, 44-45 (1963). 

[8] 329 Phil. 115, 121-122 (1996). 

[9] G.R. No. 62556, 13 August 1992, 212 SCRA 595.

Execution - "MIAA correctly contend that CBL’s dilatory tactics and legal maneuverings to evade payment of its obligations suspended the running of the five-year reglementary period within which to enforce the judgment by motion. The Court previously had the occasion to rule that in computing the time for suing out an execution, the time during which the execution is stayed should be excluded, and the time will be extended by any delay occasioned by the debtor.[5] In cases where the delays were occasioned by the judgment obligor’s own initiatives and for his advantage, which were beyond the judgment obligee’s control, the five (5) - year period allowed for enforcement of the judgment by motion was deemed to have been effectively interrupted or suspended.[6]."

CALIFORNIA BUS LINES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et. al., , G.R. No. 145408, August 20, 2008.

"x x x.

CBL contends that when the Compromise Agreement was approved by the MTC, its earlier decision dated July 30, 1993 was already final and executory. Thus, the Compromise Agreement substantially altered the July 30, 1993 MTC decision, and the subsequent application for an Alias Writ of Execution after more than seven (7) years cannot be entertained since “it is fundamental that a final and executory decision cannot be amended or corrected except for clerical errors or mistakes.”[1]

The argument is specious. As correctly emphasized by the CA in its Decision,[2] “it is also well-settled that the court is authorized to modify or alter a judgment after the same has become executory, whenever the circumstances transpire rendering its execution unjust and equitable.”[3] The Compromise Agreement, thus, explicitly justified the amicable settlement reached by the parties after “having seriously considered in all good faith, the financial position and the capacity of the defendant CBL to fulfill its obligation under the decision promulgated in this case and cognizant over the fate of almost seven hundred employees and the riding public in the event the decision is executed…”. 

The parties voluntarily entered into the Compromise Agreement which accorded to each party mutually acceptable concessions. MIAA agreed that the obligation of CBL be paid in installments in accordance with a schedule of installments disputed by the parties and CBL was allowed to stay in the leased premises provided the rentals mentioned in the Agreement are paid. Furthermore, the parties themselves invoked the jurisdiction of the MTC by submitting with the assistance of their counsel the Compromise Agreement for approval after the July 30, 1993 MTC decision has become final and executory. 

Considering the foregoing circumstance, it would be highly inequitable to rule that the MTC has no jurisdiction to amend the final and executory July 30, 1993 MTC decision, when the MTC decision of December 13, 1993, approving the Compromise Agreement, was rendered at the instance of both CBL and MIAA and for their mutual benefit.

Moreover, CBL had complied with the terms of said Compromise Agreement for a period of five (5) years from its execution on November 3, 1993 until November 1998. CBL cannot question the MTC decision based on said Compromise Agreement and insist upon the execution of the July 30, 1993 MTC decision without trifling with court processes. Accordingly, we find the December 13, 1993 MTC decision, based on the Compromise Agreement, to be valid and binding upon the parties thereto.

Having upheld the validity and binding effect of the December 13, 1993 MTC decision, MIAA was well within the five-year reglementary period dictated by Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court[4] when it filed its first Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution of the said decision on February 3, 1994 due to CBL’s non-compliance with the terms of the Compromise Agreement. This resulted in the issuance of the Writ of Execution dated February 10, 1994. A levy on CBL’s property was made but this was later on lifted when the latter issued postdated checks to secure payment of its monetary obligation under the Compromise Agreement. Subsequently, CBL failed again to pay the outstanding balance of its obligation. MIAA filed another Motion for the Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution on January 31, 1996, which led to the issuance of the Alias Writ of Execution dated January 13, 1998. However, the same was not enforced up to this day. 

MIAA correctly contend that CBL’s dilatory tactics and legal maneuverings to evade payment of its obligations suspended the running of the five-year reglementary period within which to enforce the judgment by motion. The Court previously had the occasion to rule that in computing the time for suing out an execution, the time during which the execution is stayed should be excluded, and the time will be extended by any delay occasioned by the debtor.[5] In cases where the delays were occasioned by the judgment obligor’s own initiatives and for his advantage, which were beyond the judgment obligee’s control, the five (5) - year period allowed for enforcement of the judgment by motion was deemed to have been effectively interrupted or suspended.[6]

Here, CBL made several acts that constituted delay which redounded to its benefit. The judgment based on the Compromise Agreement was promulgated on December 13, 1993. It became final and executory because CBL did not appeal therefrom. The first writ of execution issued on February 10, 1994 was stalled because CBL issued postdated checks as security for its outstanding obligation. The second writ of execution issued on January 13, 1998 was likewise never enforced because CBL filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the RTC and, subsequently after being rebuffed by the said trial court, an erroneous remedy of petition for review under Rule 42 was filed by CBL with the CA which likewise dismissed the said petition. The latter development occasioned the filing of CBL’s present petition under Rule 65. 

Undoubtedly, CBL was benefited by the continued deferment of the payment of its long-established outstanding balance of its monetary obligation to MIAA due to its incessant but futile resort to the review processes of our justice system. CBL successfully evaded the payment of its debt under the shield of technicalities, at the expense of MIAA. 

The assailed Alias Writ of Execution dated January 13, 1998 was validly issued by the RTC and is still enforceable because the prescriptive period by which it can be enforced by motion has been effectively suspended beginning November 23, 1998 when CBL filed with the RTC its petition for certiorari under Rule 65[7].

The purpose of the law in prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgments or actions is to prevent obligors from sleeping on their rights. Far from sleeping on their rights, MIAA persistently pursued their rights of action. It is utterly unjust to allow CBL to further evade the satisfaction of its obligation because of sheer literal adherence to technicality, which CBL itself had put aside to serve its own interest, the well-being of its employees and the interest of the riding public. After all, procedural rules are liberally construed in order to promote their objective and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.[8]

x x x.

It is high time to write finis to this case. Litigation must at some time be terminated for public policy dictates that once a judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable, the prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party. 

The Court finds CBL’s obstinate efforts to stay the execution of a valid judgment as an unjustifiable use of the processes of our legal system. CBL and counsel so far only succeeded in unduly delaying the complete execution of the judgment based on the Compromise Agreement to which it had voluntarily acceded. 

X x x."

[1] Yu v. National Labor Relations Commission, 245 SCRA 134 

[2] Supra note 3. 

[3] Aboitiz Shipping Employees Asso. v. Trajano, 278 SCRA 387 and Cabrias v. Adil, 135 SCRA 354. 

[4] Execution by motion or by independent action. – A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations. (Section 6, Rule 39, Rules of Court.) 

[5] Blouse Potenciano v. Mariano, 96 SCRA 463, 464 and De la Rosa v. Fernandez, 172 SCRA 371. 

[6] Camacho v. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 611. 

[7] CA Records, pp. 103-108. 

[8] Radiowealth Finance Company v. Del Rosario, 335 SCRA 288. 

[9] Sec. 1. Scope. - This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their jurisdiction: 

A. Civil Cases: 

(1) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, irrespective of the amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered. Where attorney's fees are awarded, the same shall not exceed twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). 

[10] Sec.10-xxx The OGCC is authorized to receive attorney’s fees adjudged in favor of their client government-owned or controlled corporations, their subsidiaries/other corporate offsprings and government acquired asset corporation. xxx. 

[11] Art. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith. 

[12] Rollo, pp. 284-292. 

[13] Indirect Contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt: 

x x x

(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule; 

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice; 

x x x. 

(paragraphs [c] & [d], Section 3, Rule 71, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure) 

[14] Sesbreño v. Igonia, 480 SCRA 243.

x x x."

Execution - One of the exceptions to the principle of immutability of final judgments is the existence of supervening events. Supervening events refer to facts which transpire after judgment has become final and executory or to new circumstances which developed after the judgment has acquired finality, including matters which the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial as they were not yet in existence at that time.

Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres vs. Heirs of Manuel Abella, G.R. No. 143510, November 23, 2005. 

“X x x.

Hence, the herein petition where the only issue for resolution is whether or not the final and executory judgment in the case for quieting of title wherein respondents were adjudged to be the owners of the subject property is a supervening event that justifies the suspension or non-enforcement of the final judgment in the previous case for forcible entry.

X x x. 

The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.

The theory advanced by petitioner from the very beginning is that he is entitled to possession of the disputed property as the owner thereof because the property was transferred to him by virtue of an onerous donation made by respondents. Thus, petitioner’s alleged right of possession is premised on his claim of ownership. He cannot change his theory when the case is on review, by presenting another theory that is inconsistent with his allegations during the proceedings below. Petitioner cannot contradict himself by saying first that respondents had agreed to transfer to him the ownership over the property, only to say later that what respondents granted to him was the right to possess the property. Petitioner is bound by the statements he made while the case was being heard in the lower courts. As held in Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. NLRC,[6] to wit:

... The rule is well-settled that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the trial court need not be, and ordinarily will not be considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal because this would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. ...[7]

Furthermore, it should be emphasized that in a case for ejectment, any finding of the court regarding the issue of ownership is merely provisional and not conclusive. This was stressed in Umpoc vs. Mercado,[8] where the Court stated:

... we emphasize that our disquisition on the issue of ownership in ejectment cases, as in the case at bar, is only provisional to determine who between the parties has the better right of possession. It is, therefore, not conclusive as to the issue of ownership, which is the subject matter of a separate case of annulment of title filed by respondent. x x x As the law now stands, in an ejectment suit, the question of ownership may be provisionally ruled upon for the sole purpose of determining who is entitled to possession de facto. [9]

Thus, the finding in the forcible entry case that petitioner had become the owner and rightful possessor of the disputed property because respondents had donated the property to petitioner is only provisional. It is the ruling in the case for quieting of title, adjudging herein respondents to be the absolute owners of the subject property, which is conclusive. The finding in the case for quieting of title that respondents never consented to petitioner’s occupation of the subject property has now become final and immutable. X x x.

Necessarily, the finding in the case for quieting of title that respondents never agreed to donate the property or to allow petitioner to occupy the subject land prevails over the ruling in the forcible entry case. 

The foregoing findings totally foreclose petitioner’s belated claim that even if title over the property remained with respondents, he is nevertheless entitled to possession thereof. Since respondents never made the alleged donation, there is absolutely no legal and factual basis for petitioner to claim the right of possession over it.

Hence, there can be no other conclusion but that the finality of the decision in the quieting of title case constitutes a supervening event that justifies the non-enforcement of the judgment in the forcible entry case. In Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,[11] the Court explained thus:

... The jurisdiction of the court to amend, modify or alter its judgment terminates when the judgment becomes final. This is the principle of immutability of final judgment that is subject to only few exceptions, none of which is present in this case. On the other hand, the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment continues even after the judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment.

x x x. 

One of the exceptions to the principle of immutability of final judgments is the existence of supervening events. Supervening events refer to facts which transpire after judgment has become final and executory or to new circumstances which developed after the judgment has acquired finality, including matters which the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial as they were not yet in existence at that time.[12]

In the case at bar, the new circumstance which developed after the finality of the judgment in the forcible entry is the fact that the decision in the case for quieting of title had also attained finality and conclusively resolved the issue of ownership over the subject land, and the concomitant right of possession thereof. Verily, to grant execution of the judgment in the forcible entry case would work injustice on respondents who had been conclusively declared the owners and rightful possessors of the disputed land.

X x x.”

Execution - Under the present procedure, the prevailing party can secure certified true copies of the judgment or final order of the appellate court and the entry thereof, and submit the same to the court of origin with and to justify his motion for a writ of execution, without waiting for its receipt of the records from the appellate court. That motion must be with notice to the adverse party, with a hearing when the circumstances so require, to enable him to file any objection thereto or bring to the attention of said court matters which may have transpired during the pendency of the appeal and which may have a bearing on the execution sought to enforce the judgment.

JAIME TAN, JR. vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 136368, January 16, 2002

“X x x.

On April 18, 1994, this Court issued Circular No. 24-94, viz:

"TO: COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBAYAN, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

SUBJECT: RESOLUTION OF THE COURT EN BANC APPROVING AND PROMULGATING THE REVISED PROVISION ON EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS. SPECIFICALLY IN APPEALED CASES, AND AMENDING SECTION 1, RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT

It appears that in a number of instances, the execution of judgments in appealed cases cannot be promptly enforced because of undue administrative delay in the remand of the records to the court of origin, aggravated at times by misplacement or misdelivery of said records. The Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court has drafted proposals including a provision which can remedy the procedural impasse created by said contingencies.

Accordingly, pending approval by the Court of the revised rules on Civil Procedure, and to provide a solution to the aforestated problems, the Court Resolved to approve and promulgate the following section thereof on execution of judgments, amending Section 1, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court:

Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. - Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.

If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, such execution may forthwith be applied for in the lower court from which the action originated, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or the final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.

The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution.

This resolution shall be published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation and shall take effect on June 1, 1994.

April 18, 1994.

"(Sgd.) ANDRES R. NARVASA

Chief Justice" 

The Circular took effect on June 1, 1994.

The 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, however, amended the rule on finality of judgment by providing in section 1, Rule 39 as follows:

"Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. - Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected. (1a)

If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.

The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution."

The rationale of the new rule is explained by retired Justice F.D. Regalado as follows:12

"1. The term 'final order' is used in two senses depending on whether it is used on the issue of appealability or on the issue of binding effect. For purposes of appeal, an order is "final" if it disposes of the action, as distinguished from an interlocutory order which leaves something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case (De la Cruz, et al. vs. Paras, et al., L-41053, Feb. 27, 1976). For purposes of binding effect or whether it can be subject of execution, an order is 'final' or executory after the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal and no appeal has been perfected (see Perez, et al. vs. Zulueta, L-10374, Sept. 30, 1959; cf. Denso [Phil.], Inc. vs. IAC, et al., G.R. No. 75000, Feb. 27, 1987; Montilla vs. CA, et al., L-47968, May 9, 1988).

2. On the aspect of appealability, these revised Rules use the adjective 'final' with respect to orders and resolutions, since to terminate a case the trial courts issue orders while the appellate courts and most of the quasi-judicial agencies issue resolutions. Judgment are not so qualified since the use of the so-called interlocutory judgments is not favored in this jurisdiction, while the categorization of an order or a resolution for purposes of denoting that it is appealable is to distinguish them from interlocutory orders or resolutions. However, by force of extended usage the phrase 'final and executory judgment' is sometimes used and tolerated, although the use of 'executory' alone would suffice. These observations also apply to the several and separate judgments contemplated in Rule 36, or partial judgments which totally dispose of a particular claim or severable part of the case, subject to the power of the court to suspend or defer action on an appeal from or further proceedings in such special judgment, or as provided by Rule 35 on the matter of partial summary judgments which are not considered as appealable (see Sec. 4, Rule 35 and the explanation therein).

The second paragraph of this section is an innovation in response to complaints over the delay caused by the former procedure in obtaining a writ of execution of a judgment, which has already been affirmed on appeal, with notice to the parties. As things then stood, after the entry of judgment in the appellate court, the prevailing party had to wait for the records of the case to be remanded to the court of origin when and where he could then move for the issuance of a writ of execution. The intervening time could sometimes be substantial, especially if the court a quo is in a remote province, and could also be availed of by the losing party to delay or thwart actual execution.

On these considerations, the Supreme Court issued Circular No. 24-94, dated April 18, 1994, approving and promulgating in advance this amended Section 1 of Rule 39 and declaring the same effective as of June 1, 1994.

Under the present procedure, the prevailing party can secure certified true copies of the judgment or final order of the appellate court and the entry thereof, and submit the same to the court of origin with and to justify his motion for a writ of execution, without waiting for its receipt of the records from the appellate court. That motion must be with notice to the adverse party, with a hearing when the circumstances so require, to enable him to file any objection thereto or bring to the attention of said court matters which may have transpired during the pendency of the appeal and which may have a bearing on the execution sought to enforce the judgment.

The third paragraph of this section, likewise a new provision, is due to the experience of the appellate courts wherein the trial court, for reasons of its own or other unjustifiable circumstances, unduly delays or unreasonably refuses to act on the motion for execution or issue the writ therefor. On motion in the same case while the records are still with the appellate court, or even after the same have been remanded to the lower court, the appellate court can direct the issuance of the writ of execution since such act is merely in the enforcement of its judgment and which it has the power to require."

X x x.

Execution of judgmet; whether the supervening events are grave enough to warrant a modification in the execution of the judgment.

JANE C. ABALOS, et. al. vs. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION, G.R. No. 140374, November 27, 2002

"X x x.

A basic tenet in our rules of procedure is that an award that is final and executory cannot be amended or modified anymore. Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land. However, this rule is subject to exceptions as stated in the case of David vs. CA, 316 SCRA 710 (1999), cited by respondent:

One exception is that where facts and/or events transpire after a decision has become executory, which facts and/or events present a supervening cause or reason which renders the final and executory decision no longer enforceable. Under the law, the court may modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering its execution unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and executory.10

In David, we held also that "where an execution order [which] has been issued is still pending, all proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the suit." As such, modification of the execution of such judgment is allowed.

In Torres vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 330 SCRA 311 (2000), this Court ruled that:

Execution is the final stage of litigation, the end of the suit. It cannot be frustrated except for serious reasons demanded by justice and equity. In this jurisdiction, the rule is that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of execution to enforce the judgment. A writ of execution may however be refused on equitable grounds as when there was a change in the situation of the parties that would make execution inequitable or when certain circumstances, which transpired after judgment became final, rendered execution of judgment unjust. The fact that the decision has become final does not preclude a modification or an alteration thereof because even with the finality of judgment, when its execution becomes impossible or unjust, it may be modified or altered to harmonize the same with justice and the facts (emphasis supplied). 

In Deltaventures Resources Inc. vs. Cabato, 327 SCRA 521 (2000), we held that "jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated."13 The power of a voluntary arbitrator to issue a writ of execution carries with it the power to inquire into the correctness of its execution and to consider whatever supervening events transpire during execution.14 Therefore, we are in agreement with the appellate court that a voluntary arbitrator has jurisdiction to amend the mode of executing an award if and when the case merits such amendment.

X x x.

Considering the circumstances in the present case, we find that the only issue to be resolved is whether the supervening events are grave enough to warrant a modification in the execution of the judgment. Both the voluntary arbitrator and the Court of Appeals found that reinstatement is no longer possible due to the fact that respondent has been continuously suffering business losses and reducing the number of its employees pending litigation, and so the positions held by petitioners were abolished as a cost-cutting measure. Petitioners argue, however, that "to excuse the respondent from reinstating the petitioners would be to allow it to do indirectly what it was not allowed to do directly – the retrenchment of the petitioners." They add that what is so scheming about this ploy is that respondent now tries to justify its refusal to reinstate the petitioners "by its very own act of abolishing their positions."

X x x.

RA 10630, amending RA 9344, JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT OF 2006

See - https://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2013/ra_10630_2013.html

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10630

AN ACT STRENGTHENING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN THE PHILIPPINES, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9344, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT OF 2006" AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR

Section 1. The Title of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby amended to read as follows: "An Act Establishing a Comprehensive Juvenile Justice and Welfare System, Creating the Juvenile justice and Welfare Council under the Department of Social Welfare and Development, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes."

Section 2. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. – The following terms as used in this Act shall be defined as follows:

"x x x

"(s) ‘Bahay Pag-asa’ – refers to a 24-hour child-caring institution established, funded and managed by local government units (LGUs) and licensed and/or accredited nongovernment organizations (NGOs) providing short-term residential care for children in conflict with the law who are above fifteen (15) but below eighteen (18) years of age who are awaiting court disposition of their cases or transfer to other agencies or jurisdiction.

"Part of the features of a ‘Bahay Pag-asa’ is an intensive juvenile intervention and support center. This will cater to children in conflict with the law in accordance with Sections 20, 20-A and 20-B hereof.

"A multi-disciplinary team composed of a social worker, a psychologist/mental health professional, a medical doctor, an educational/guidance counselor and a Barangay Council for the Protection of Children (BCPC) member shall operate the ‘Bahay Pag-asa’. The team will work on the individualized intervention plan with the child and the child’s family.

"x x x."

Section 3. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. – A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.

"A child is deemed to be fifteen (15) years of age on the day of the fifteenth anniversary of his/her birthdate.

"A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.

"The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws."

Section 4. Section 8 of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 8. Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC). – A Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC) is hereby created and attached to the Department of Social Welfare and Development and placed under its administrative supervision. The JJWC shall be chaired by an Undersecretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Development. It shall ensure the effective implementation of this Act and coordination among the following agencies:

"(a) Department of Justice (DOJ);

"(b) Council for the Welfare of Children (CWC);

"(c) Department of Education (DepED);

"(d) Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG);

"(e) Public Attorney’s Office (PAO);

"(f) Bureau of Corrections (BUCOR);

"(g) Parole and Probation Administration (PPA);

"(h) National Bureau of Investigation (NBI);

"(i) Philippine National Police (PNP);

"(j) Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP);

"(k) Commission on Human Rights (CHR);

"(l) Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA);

"(m) National Youth Commission (NYC); and

"(n) Other institutions focused on juvenile justice and intervention programs.

"The JJWC shall be composed of representatives, whose ranks shall not be lower than director, to be designated by the concerned heads of the following departments or agencies and shall receive emoluments as may be determined by the Council in accordance with existing budget and accounting rules and regulations:

"(1) Department of Justice (DOJ);

"(2) Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD);

"(3) Council for the Welfare of Children (CWC);

"(4) Department of Education (DepED);

"(5) Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG);

"(6) Commission on Human Rights (CHR);

"(7) National Youth Commission (NYC);

"(8) Two (2) representatives from NGOs, to be designated by the Secretary of Social Welfare and Development, to be selected based on the criteria established by the Council;

"(9) Department of Health (DOH); and

"(10) One (1) representative each from the League of Provinces, League of Cities, League of Municipalities and League of Barangays.

"There shall be a Regional Juvenile Justice and Welfare Committee (RJJWC) in each region. The RJJWCs will be under the administration and supervision of the JJWC. The RJJWC shall be chaired by the director of the regional office of the DSWD. It shall ensure the effective implementation of this Act at the regional and LGU levels and the coordination among its member agencies.

"The RJJWC will be composed of permanent representatives who shall have a rank not lower than an assistant regional director or its equivalent to be designated by the concerned department heads from the following agencies and shall receive emoluments as may be determined by the Council in accordance with existing budget and accounting rules and regulations:

"(i) Department of Justice (DOJ);

"(ii) Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD);

"(iii) Department of Education (DepED);

"(iv) Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG);

"(v) Commission on Human Rights (CHR);

"(vi) Department of Health (DOH);

"(vii) Two (2) representatives from NGOs operating within the region selected by the RJJWC based on the criteria established by the JJWC;

"(viii) One (1) sectoral representative from the children or youth sector within the region; and

"(ix) One (1) representative from the League of Provinces/ Cities/ Municipalities/ Barangays of the Philippines.

"The JJWC shall convene within fifteen (15) days from the effectivity of this Act. The Secretary of Social Welfare and Development shall determine the organizational structure and staffing pattern of the JJWC national secretariat and the RJJWC secretariat.

"In the implementation of this Act, the JJWC shall consult with the various leagues of local government officials.

"The JJWC shall coordinate with the Office of the Court Administrator and the Philippine Judicial Academy to ensure the realization of its mandate and the proper discharge of its duties and functions, as herein provided."

Section5. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 9. Duties and Functions of the JJWC. – The JJWC shall have the following duties and functions:

"(a) To oversee the implementation of this Act;

"(b) To advise the President on all matters and policies relating to juvenile justice and welfare;

"(c) To assist the concerned agencies in the review and redrafting of existing policies/regulations or in the formulation of new ones in line with the provisions of this Act;

"(d) To periodically develop a comprehensive 3 to 5-year national juvenile intervention program, with the participation of government agencies concerned, NGOs and youth organizations;

"(e) To coordinate the implementation of the juvenile intervention programs and activities by national government agencies and other activities which may have an important bearing on the success of the entire national juvenile intervention program. All programs relating to juvenile justice and welfare shall be adopted in consultation with the JJWC;

"(f) To consult with the various leagues of local government officials in the formulation and recommendation of policies and strategies for the prevention of juvenile delinquency and the promotion of juvenile justice and welfare;

"(g) To formulate and recommend policies and strategies in consultation with children for the prevention of juvenile delinquency and the administration of justice, as well as for the treatment and rehabilitation of the children in conflict with the law;

"(h) To collect relevant information and conduct continuing research and support evaluations and studies on all matters relating to juvenile justice and welfare, such as, but not limited to:

"(1) The performance and results achieved by juvenile intervention programs and by activities of the local government units and other government agencies;

"(2) The periodic trends, problems and causes of juvenile delinquency and crimes; and

"(3) The particular needs of children in conflict with the law in custody.

"The data gathered shall be used by the JJWC in the improvement of the administration of juvenile justice and welfare system.

"The JJWC shall submit an annual report to Congress on the implementation of the provisions of this Act.

"The JJWC shall set up a mechanism to ensure that children are involved in research and policy development.

"(i) Through duly designated persons and with the assistance of the agencies provided in the preceding section, to conduct regular inspections in detention and rehabilitation facilities and to undertake spot inspections on their own initiative in order to check compliance with the standards provided herein and to make the necessary recommendations to appropriate agencies;

"(j) To initiate and coordinate the conduct of trainings for the personnel of the agencies involved in the administration of the juvenile justice and welfare system and the juvenile intervention program;

"(k) To submit an annual report to the President on the implementation of this Act; and

"(l) To perform such other functions as may be necessary to implement the provisions of this Act."

"SEC. 9-A. Duties and Functions of the RJJWC. – The RJJWC shall have the following duties and functions:

"(a) To oversee and ensure the effective implementation of this Act at the regional level and at the level of the LGUs;

"(b) To assist the concerned agencies in the implementation and in compliance with the JJWC’s adopted policies/regulations or provide substantial inputs to the JJWC in the formulation of new ones in line with the provisions of this Act;

"(c) To assist in the development of the comprehensive 3 to 5-year local juvenile intervention program, with the participation of concerned LGUs, NGOs and youth organizations within the region and monitor its implementation;

"(d) To coordinate the implementation of the juvenile intervention programs and activities by national government agencies and other activities within the region;

"(e) To oversee the programs and operation of the intensive juvenile intervention and support center established within the region;

"(f) To collect relevant regional information and conduct continuing research and support evaluations and studies on all matters relating to juvenile justice and welfare within the region, such as, but not limited to:

"(1) Performance and results achieved by juvenile intervention programs and by activities of the LGUs and other government agencies within the region;

"(2) The periodic trends, problems and causes of juvenile delinquency and crimes from the LGU level to the regional level; and

"(3) The particular needs of children in conflict with the law in custody within their regional jurisdiction.

"The data gathered shall be forwarded by the RJJWC to the JJWC on an annual basis and as may be deemed necessary by the JJWC.

"(g) Through duly designated persons and with the assistance of the agencies provided in the preceding section, to conduct regular inspections in detention and rehabilitation facilities within the region and to undertake spot inspections on their own initiative in order to check compliance with the standards provided herein and to make the necessary reports and recommendations to appropriate agencies and to the JJWC;

"(h) To initiate and coordinate the conduct of trainings for the personnel of the agencies involved in the administration of the juvenile justice and welfare system and the juvenile intervention program within the region;

"(i) To submit an annual report to the JJWC on the implementation of this Act; and

"(j) To perform such other functions as may be determined by the JJWC to implement the provisions of this Act."

Section 6. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 20. Children Below the Age of Criminal Responsibility. – If it has been determined that the child taken into custody is fifteen (15) years old or below, the authority which will have an initial contact with the child, in consultation with the local social welfare and development officer, has the duty to immediately release the child to the custody of his/her parents or guardian, or in the absence thereof, the child’s nearest relative. The child shall be subjected to a community-based intervention program supervised by the local social welfare and development officer, unless the best interest of the child requires the referral of the child to a youth care facility or ‘Bahay Pag-asa’ managed by LGUs or licensed and/or accredited NGOs monitored by the DSWD.

"The local social welfare and development officer shall determine the appropriate programs for the child who has been released, in consultation with the child and the person having custody over the child. If the parents, guardians or nearest relatives cannot be located, or if they refuse to take custody, the child may be released to any of the following:

"(a) A duly registered nongovernmental or religious organization;

"(b) A barangay official or a member of the Barangay Council for the Protection of Children (BCPC);

"(c) A local social welfare and development officer; or, when and where appropriate, the DSWD.

"If the child has been found by the local social welfare and development officer to be dependent, abandoned, neglected or abused by his/her parents and the best interest of the child requires that he/she be placed in a youth care facility or ‘Bahay Pag-asa’, the child’s parents or guardians shall execute a written authorization for the voluntary commitment of the child: Provided, That if the child has no parents or guardians or if they refuse or fail to execute the written authorization for voluntary commitment, the proper petition for involuntary commitment shall be immediately filed by the DSWD or the Local Social Welfare and Development Office (LSWDO) pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, otherwise known as ‘The Child and Youth Welfare Code’ and the Supreme Court rule on commitment of children: Provided, further, That the minimum age for children committed to a youth care facility or ‘Bahay Pag-asa’ shall be twelve (12) years old."

"SEC. 20-A. Serious Crimes Committed by Children Who Are Exempt From Criminal Responsibility. – A child who is above twelve (12) years of age up to fifteen (15) years of age and who commits parricide, murder, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention where the victim is killed or raped, robbery, with homicide or rape, destructive arson, rape, or carnapping where the driver or occupant is killed or raped or offenses under Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) punishable by more than twelve (12) years of imprisonment, shall be deemed a neglected child under Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, and shall be mandatorily placed in a special facility within the youth care faculty or ‘Bahay Pag-asa’ called the Intensive Juvenile Intervention and Support Center (IJISC).

"In accordance with existing laws, rules, procedures and guidelines, the proper petition for involuntary commitment and placement under the IJISC shall be filed by the local social welfare and development officer of the LGU where the offense was committed, or by the DSWD social worker in the local social welfare and development officer’s absence, within twenty-four (24) hours from the time of the receipt of a report on the alleged commission of said child. The court, where the petition for involuntary commitment has been filed shall decide on the petition within seventy-two (72) hours from the time the said petition has been filed by the DSWD/LSWDO. The court will determine the initial period of placement of the child within the IJISC which shall not be less than one (1) year. The multi-disciplinary team of the IJISC will submit to the court a case study and progress report, to include a psychiatric evaluation report and recommend the reintegration of the child to his/her family or the extension of the placement under the IJISC. The multi-disciplinary team will also submit a report to the court on the services extended to the parents and family of the child and the compliance of the parents in the intervention program. The court will decide whether the child has successfully completed the center-based intervention program and is already prepared to be reintegrated with his/her family or if there is a need for the continuation of the center-based rehabilitation of the child. The court will determine the next period of assessment or hearing on the commitment of the child."

"SEC. 20-B. Repetition of Offenses. – A child who is above twelve (12) years of age up to fifteen (15) years of age and who commits an offense for the second time or oftener: Provided, That the child was previously subjected to a community-based intervention program, shall be deemed a neglected child under Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, and shall undergo an intensive intervention program supervised by the local social welfare and development officer: Provided, further, That, if the best interest of the child requires that he/she be placed in a youth care facility or ‘Bahay Pag-asa’, the child’s parents or guardians shall execute a written authorization for the voluntary commitment of the child: Provided, finally, That if the child has no parents or guardians or if they refuse or fail to execute the written authorization for voluntary commitment, the proper petition for involuntary commitment shall be immediately filed by the DSWD or the LSWDO pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended."

"SEC. 20-C. Exploitation of Children for Commission of Crimes. – Any person who, in the commission of a crime, makes use, takes advantage of, or profits from the use of children, including any person who abuses his/her authority over the child or who, with abuse of confidence, takes advantage of the vulnerabilities of the child and shall induce, threaten or instigate the commission of the crime, shall be imposed the penalty prescribed by law for the crime committed in its maximum period."

"SEC. 20-D. Joint Parental Responsibility. – Based on the recommendation of the multi-disciplinary team of the IJISC, the LSWDO or the DSWD, the court may require the parents of a child in conflict with the law to undergo counseling or any other intervention that, in the opinion of the court, would advance the welfare and best interest of the child.

"As used in this Act, ‘parents’ shall mean any of the following:

"(a) Biological parents of the child; or

"(b) Adoptive parents of the child; or

"(c) Individuals who have custody of the child.

"A court exercising jurisdiction over a child in conflict with the law may require the attendance of one or both parents of the child at the place where the proceedings are to be conducted.

"The parents shall be liable for damages unless they prove, to the satisfaction of the court, that they were exercising reasonable supervision over the child at the time the child committed the offense and exerted reasonable effort and utmost diligence to prevent or discourage the child from committing another offense."

"SEC. 20-E. Assistance to Victims of Offenses Committed by Children. – The victim of the offense committed by a child and the victim’s family shall be provided the appropriate assistance and psychological intervention by the LSWDO, the DSWD and other concerned agencies."

Section 7. Section 22 of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 22. Duties During Initial Investigation. – The law enforcement officer shall, in his/her investigation, determine where the case involving the child in conflict with the law should be referred.

"The taking of the statement of the child shall be conducted in the presence of the following: (1) child’s counsel of choice or in the absence thereof, a lawyer from the Public Attorney’s Office; (2) the child’s parents, guardian, or nearest relative, as the case may be; and (3) the local social welfare and development officer. In the absence of the child’s parents, guardian, or nearest relative, and the local social welfare and development officer, the investigation shall be conducted in the presence of a representative of an NGO, religious group, or member of the BCPC.

"The social worker shall conduct an initial assessment to determine the appropriate interventions and whether the child acted with discernment, using the discernment assessment tools developed by the DSWD. The initial assessment shall be without prejudice to the preparation of a more comprehensive case study report. The local social worker shall do either of the following:

"(a) Proceed in accordance with Section 20 if the child is fifteen (15) years or below or above fifteen (15) but below eighteen (18) years old, who acted without discernment; and

"(b) If the child is above fifteen (15) years old but below eighteen (18) and who acted with discernment, proceed to diversion under the following chapter."

Section 8. Section 33 of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 33. Preliminary Investigation and Filing of Information. – The prosecutor shall conduct a preliminary investigation in the following instances: (a) when the child in conflict with the law does not qualify for diversion; (b) when the child, his/her parents or guardian does not agree to diversion as specified in Sections 27 and 28; and (c) when considering the assessment and recommendation of the social worker, the prosecutor determines that diversion is not appropriate for the child in conflict with the law.

"Upon serving the subpoena and the affidavit of complaint, the prosecutor shall notify the Public Attorney’s Office of such service, as well as the personal information, and place of detention of the child in conflict with the law.

"Upon determination of probable cause by the prosecutor, the information against the child shall be filed before the Family Court within forty-five (45) days from the start of the preliminary investigation. The information must allege that the child acted with discernment."

Section 9. Section 49 of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 49. Establishment of ‘Bahay Pag-Asa’. – Each province and highly-urbanized city (the LGUs) shall be responsible for building, funding and operating a ‘Bahay Pag-asa’ within their jurisdiction following the standards that will be set by the DSWD and adopted by the JJWC.

"Every ‘Bahay Pag-asa’ will have a special facility called the IJISC. This Center will be allocated for children in conflict with the law in accordance with Sections 20, 20-A and 20-B hereof. These children will be required to undergo a more intensive multi-disciplinary intervention program. The JJWC in partnership with, but not limited to, the DSWD, the DOH, the DepED and the DILG, will develop and set the standards for the implementation of the multi-disciplinary intervention program of the IJISC. Upon institutionalization of the IJISC program, the JJWC will continue to monitor and provide technical assistance to the multi-disciplinary teams operating the said centers."

Section 10. Section 50 of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 50. Care and Maintenance of the Child in Conflict with the Law. – x x x

"The LGUs expected expenditures on the local juvenile intervention program for children at risk and children in conflict with the law shall be included in the LGUs annual budget. Highly-urbanized cities and provincial governments should include a separate budget for the construction and maintenance of the ‘Bahay Pag-asa’ including the operation of the IJISC within the ‘Bahay Pag-asa’."

Section 11. Section 57 of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 57. Status Offenses. – Any conduct not considered an offense or not penalized if committed by an adult shall not be considered an offense and shall not be punished if committed by a child."

"SEC. 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances. – Ordinances enacted by local governments concerning juvenile status offenses such as, but not limited to, curfew violations, truancy, parental disobedience, anti-smoking and anti-drinking laws, as well as light offenses and misdemeanors against public order or safety such as, but not limited to, disorderly conduct, public scandal, harassment, drunkenness, public intoxication, criminal nuisance, vandalism, gambling, mendicancy, littering, public urination, and trespassing, shall be for the protection of children. No penalty shall be imposed on children for said violations, and they shall instead be brought to their residence or to any barangay official at the barangay hall to be released to the custody of their parents. Appropriate intervention programs shall be provided for in such ordinances. The child shall also be recorded as a ‘child at risk’ and not as a ‘child in conflict with the law’. The ordinance shall also provide for intervention programs, such as counseling, attendance in group activities for children, and for the parents, attendance in parenting education seminars."

Section 12. Mandatory Registry of Children in Conflict with the Law. – All duty-bearers, including barangay/BCPC workers, law enforcers, teachers, guidance counselors, social workers and prosecutors who will receive report, handle or refer cases of children in conflict with the law, shall ensure a faithful recordation of all pertinent information, such as age, residence, gender, crime committed or accused of and the details of the intervention or diversion, as the case may be, under which they will undergo or has undergone, of all children in conflict with the law to guarantee the correct application of the provisions of this Act and other laws. The JJWC shall lead in the establishment of a centralized information management system on children in conflict with the law. This provision is however without prejudice to Section 43 of this Act.

Section 13. Section 63 of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 63. Appropriations. – The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be charged against the current year’s appropriations of the JJWC under the budget of the Department of Justice. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the continued implementation of this Act shall be included in the budget of the DSWD under the annual General Appropriations Act: Provided, That the amount of Four hundred million pesos (P400,000,000.00) shall be appropriated for the construction of ‘Bahay Pag-asa’ rehabilitation centers in provinces or cities with high incidence of children in conflict with the law to be determined and identified by the DSWD and the JJWC on a priority basis: Provided, further, That the said amount shall be coursed through the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) for its proper implementation.

"The LGUs concerned shall make available, from its own resources or assets, their counterpart share equivalent to the national government contribution of Five million pesos (P5,000,000.00) per rehabilitation center.

"In addition, the Council may accept donations, grants and contributions from various sources, in cash or in kind, for purposes relevant to its functions, subject to the usual government accounting and auditing rules and regulations."

Section 14. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – The JJWC shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of this Act.

Section 15. Separability Clause. – If any provision of this Act is held unconstitutional, other provisions not affected thereby shall remain valid and binding.

Section 16. Repealing Clause. – All laws, decrees, ordinances and rules inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby modified or repealed accordingly.

Section 17. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after the completion of its publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

This Act which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 3324 and House Bill No. 6052 was finally passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives on June 5, 2013.

Illegally dismissed or unjustly suspended public employees are entitled to back salaries.

See - http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/august2011/187858.htm

THE CIVIL SERVICE  COMMISSION vs. RICHARD G. CRUZ,  G.R. No. 187858, AUGUST 9, 2011.

"x x x.

THE COURTS RULING

We deny the petition for lack of merit.

The issue of entitlement to back salaries, for the period of suspension pending appeal,[13] of a government employee who had been dismissed but was subsequently exonerated is settled in our jurisdiction. The Courts starting point for this outcome is the no work-no pay principle public officials are only entitled to compensation if they render service. We have excepted from this general principle and awarded back salaries even for unworked days to illegally dismissed or unjustly suspended employees based on the constitutional provision that no officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law;[14] to deny these employees their back salaries amounts to unwarranted punishment after they have been exonerated from the charge that led to their dismissal or suspension.[15]
The present legal basis for an award of back salaries is Section 47, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987.

Section 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. x x x.

(4) An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in case the penalty is suspension or removal, the respondent shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins an appeal. (italics ours)

This provision, however, on its face, does not support a claim for back salaries since it does not expressly provide for back salaries during this period; our established rulings hold that back salaries may not be awarded for the period of preventive suspension[16] as the law itself authorizes its imposition so that its legality is beyond question.

To resolve the seeming conflict, the Court crafted two conditions before an employee may be entitled to back salaries: a) the employee must be found innocent of the charges and b) his suspension must be unjustified.[17] The reasoning behind these conditions runs this way: although an employee is considered under preventive suspension during the pendency of a successful appeal, the law itself only authorizes preventive suspension for a fixed period; hence, his suspension beyond this fixed period is unjustified and must be compensated.

The CSCs rigid and mechanical application of these two conditions may have resulted from a misreading of our rulings on the matter; hence, a look at our jurisprudence appears in order.

Basis for award of back salaries

The Court had the occasion to rule on the issue of entitlement to back salaries as early as 1941,[18] when Section 260 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 (RAC)[19] was the governing law. The Court held that a government employee, who was suspended from work pending final action on his administrative case, is not entitled to back salaries where he was ultimately removed due to the valid appointment of his successor. No exoneration or reinstatement, of course, was directly involved in this case; thus, the question of back salaries after exoneration and reinstatement did not directly arise. The Court, however, made the general statement that:

As a general proposition, a public official is not entitled to any compensation if he has not rendered any service, and the justification for the payment of salary during the period of suspension is that the suspension was unjustified or that the official was innocent. Hence, the requirement that, to entitle to payment of salary during suspension, there must be either reinstatement of the suspended person or exoneration if death should render reinstatement impossible.[20] (emphasis and underscoring ours)

In Austria v. Auditor General,[21] a high school principal, who was penalized with demotion, claimed payment of back salaries from the time of his suspension until his appointment to the lower position to which he was demoted. He argued that his later appointment even if only to a lower position of classroom teacher amounted to a reinstatement under Section 260 of the RAC. The Court denied his claim, explaining that the reinstatement under Section 260 of the RAC refers to the same position from which the subordinate officer or employee was suspended and, therefore, does not include demotional appointments. The word reinstatement was apparently equated to exoneration.

In the 1961 case of Gonzales v. Hon. Hernandez, etc. and Fojas[22] interpreting the same provision, the Court first laid down the requisites for entitlement to back salaries. Said the Court:

A perusal of the decisions of this Court[23] x x x show[s] that back salaries are ordered paid to an officer or an employee only if he is exonerated of the charge against him and his suspension or dismissal is found and declared to be illegal. In the case at bar, [the employee] was not completely exonerated, because although the decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service [ordering separation from service] was modified and [the employee] was allowed to be reinstated, the decision [imposed upon the employee the penalty of two months suspension without pay]. [emphasis and underscoring ours]

Obviously, no exoneration actually resulted and no back salary was due; the liability for the offense charged remained, but a lesser penalty was imposed.

In Villamor, et al. v. Hon. Lacson, et al.,[24] the City Mayor ordered the dismissal from the service of city employees after finding them guilty as charged. On appeal, however, the decision was modified by considering the suspension of over one year x x x, already suffered x x x [to be] sufficient punishment[25] and by ordering their immediate reinstatement to the service. The employees thereupon claimed that under Section 695 of the RAC, the punishment of suspension without pay cannot exceed two (2) months. Since the period they were not allowed to work until their reinstatement exceeded two months, they should be entitled to back salaries corresponding to the period in excess of two months. In denying the employees claim for back salaries, the Court held:

The fallacy of [the employees] argument springs from their assumption that the modified decision had converted the penalty to that of suspension. The modified decision connotes that although dismissal or resignation would be the proper penalty, the separation from work for the period until their reinstatement, would be deemed sufficient. Said decision did not, in the least, insinuate that suspension should have been the penalty.

x x x [T]he modified decision did not exonerate the petitioners. x x x And even if we consider the punishment as suspension, before a public official or employee is entitled to payment of salaries withheld, it should be shown that the suspension was unjustified or that the employee was innocent of the charges proffered against him.[26]

On the whole, these rulings left the application of the conditions for the award of back salaries far from clear. Jurisprudence did not strictly observe the requirements earlier enunciated in Gonzales as under subsequent rulings, the innocence of the employee alone served as basis for the award of back salaries.

The innocence of the employee as sole basis for an award of back salaries
In Tan v. Gimenez, etc., and Aguilar, etc.,[27] we ruled that the payment of back salary to a government employee, who was illegally removed from office because of his eventual exoneration on appeal, is merely incidental to the ordered reinstatement.

Tan was subsequently reiterated in Taala v. Legaspi, et al.,[28] a case involving an employee who was administratively dismissed from the service following his conviction in the criminal case arising from the same facts as in the administrative case. On appeal, however, he was acquitted of the criminal charge and was ultimately ordered reinstated by the Office of the President. Failing to secure his actual reinstatement, he filed a mandamus petition to compel his superiors to reinstate him and to pay his back salaries from the date of his suspension to the date of his actual reinstatement. We found merit in his plea and held:

[The employee] had been acquitted of the criminal charges x x x, and the President had reversed the decision x x x in the administrative case which ordered his separation from the service, and the President had ordered his reinstatement to his position, it results that the suspension and the separation from the service of the [employee] were thereby considered illegal. x x x.

x x x [In this case,] by virtue of [the Presidents order of reinstatement], [the employees] suspension and separation from the service x x x was thereby declared illegal, so that for all intents and purposes he must be considered as not having been separated from his office. The lower court has correctly held that the [employee] is entitled to back salaries.[29]

The Taala ruling was reiterated in Cristobal v. Melchor,[30] Tan, Jr. v. Office of the President,[31] De Guzman v. CSC[32] and Del Castillo v. CSC[33] - cases involving government employees who were dismissed after being found administratively liable, but who were subsequently exonerated on appeal.

In Garcia v. Chairman Commission on Audit,[34] the Court held that where the employee, who was dismissed after being found administratively liable for dishonesty, was acquitted on a finding of innocence in the criminal case (for qualified theft) based on the same acts for which he was dismissed the executive pardon granted him in the administrative case (in light of his prior acquittal) entitled him to back salaries from the time of his illegal dismissal up to his actual reinstatement.

The above situation should be distinguished from the case of an employee who was dismissed from the service after conviction of a crime and who was ordered reinstated after being granted pardon. We held that he was not entitled to back salaries since he was not illegally dismissed nor acquitted of the charge against him.[35]

Incidentally, under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,[36] if the public official or employee is acquitted of the criminal charge/s specified in the law, he is entitled to reinstatement and the back salaries withheld during his suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.

In Tan, Jr. v. Office of the President,[37] the Court clarified that the silence of Section 42 (Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation) of the Civil Service Decree[38] on the payment of back salaries, unlike its predecessor,[39] is no reason to deny back salaries to a dismissed civil servant who was ultimately exonerated.

Section 42 of P.D. No. 807, however, is really not in point x x x [as] it does not cover dismissed civil servants who are ultimately exonerated and ordered reinstated to their former or equivalent positions. The rule in the latter instance, just as we have said starting with the case of Cristobal vs. Melchor is that when "a government official or employee in the classified civil service had been illegally dismissed, and his reinstatement had later been ordered, for all legal purposes he is considered as not having left his office, so that he is entitled to all the rights and privileges that accrue to him by virtue of the office that he held."[40]

These cited cases illustrate that a black and white observance of the requisites in Gonzales is not required at all times. The common thread in these cases is either the employees complete exoneration of the administrative charge against him (i.e., the employee is not found guilty of any other offense), or the employees acquittal of the criminal charge based on his innocence. If the case presented falls on either of these instances, the conditions laid down in Gonzales become the two sides of the same coin; the requirement that the suspension must be unjustified is automatically subsumed in the other requirement of exoneration.

Illegal suspension as sole basis for an award of back salaries

By requiring the concurrence of the two conditions, Gonzales apparently made a distinction between exoneration and unjustified suspension/dismissal. This distinction runs counter to the notion that if an employee is exonerated, the exoneration automatically makes an employees suspension unjustified. However, in Abellera v. City of Baguio, et al.,[41] the Court had the occasion to illustrate the independent character of these two conditions so that the mere illegality of an employees suspension could serve as basis for an award of back salaries.

Abellera, a cashier in the Baguio City Treasurers Office, was ordered dismissed from the service after being found guilty of dishonesty and gross negligence. Even before the period to appeal expired, the City of Baguio dismissed him from the service. On appeal, however, the penalty imposed on him was reduced to two months suspension, without pay although the appealed decision was affirmed in all other respects.

When the issue of Abelleras entitlement to back salaries reached the Court, we considered the illegality of Abelleras suspension - i.e.,from the time he was dismissed up to the time of his actual reinstatement to be a sufficient ground to award him back salaries.

The rule on payment of back salaries during the period of suspension of a member of the civil service who is subsequently ordered reinstated, is already settled in this jurisdiction. Such payment of salaries corresponding to the period when an employee is not allowed to work may be decreed not only if he is found innocent of the charges which caused his suspension (Sec. 35, RA 2260), but also when the suspension is unjustified.

In the present case, upon receipt of the [Civil Service Commissioners] decision x x x finding [Abellera] guilty, but even before the period to appeal had expired, [the Baguio City officials] dismissed [Abellera] from the service and another one was appointed to replace him. [Abelleras] separation x x x before the decision of the Civil Service Commissioner had become final was evidently premature. [The Baguio City officials] should have realized that [Abellera] still had the right to appeal the Commissioner's decision to the Civil Service Board of Appeals within a specified period, and the possibility of that decision being reversed or modified.[42] As it did happen on such appeal x x x the penalty imposed by the Commissioner was reduced x x x to only 2 months suspension. And yet, by [the Baguio City officials] action, [Abellera] was deprived of work for more than 2 years. Clearly, Abelleras second suspension from office [i.e., from the time he was dismissed up to his actual reinstatement] was unjustified, and the payment of the salaries corresponding to said period is, consequently, proper.[43] (emphases and underscoring ours)

The import of the Abellera ruling was explained by the Court in the subsequent case of Yarcia v. City of Baguio[44] that involved substantially similar facts. The Court clarified that the award of back salaries in Abellera was based on the premature execution of the decision (ordering the employees dismissal from the service), resulting in the employees unjustified second suspension. Under the then Civil Service Rules, the Commissioner of Civil Service had the discretion to order the immediate execution of his decision in administrative cases in the interest of public service. Unlike in Abellera, this discretion was exercised in Yarcia; consequently, the employees separation from the service pending his appeal remained valid and effective until it was set aside and modified with the imposition of the lesser penalty.[45]

The unjustified second suspension mentioned in Abellera actually refers to the period when the employee was dismissed from the service up to the time of his actual reinstatement. Under our present legal landscape, this period refers to suspension pending appeal.[46]

In Miranda v. Commission on Audit,[47] the Court again had the occasion to consider the illegality of the suspension of the employee as a separate ground to award back salaries. Following the filing of several administrative charges against him, Engr. Lamberto Miranda was preventively suspended from June 2, 1978 to May 7, 1986. He was reinstated on May 22, 1986. On October 7, 1986, the administrative case against him was finally dismissed for lack of evidence. When his claim for back salaries (from the time he was preventively suspended up to his actual reinstatement) was denied by the Commission on Audit, he brought a certiorari petition with this Court.

In granting the petition, the Court ruled that since the law[48] limits the duration of preventive suspension to a fixed period, Engr. Mirandas suspension for almost eight (8) years is unreasonable and unjustified. Additionally, the Court observed that the dropping of the administrative case against Engr. Miranda for lack of evidence is even an eloquent manifestation that the suspension is unjustified.[49] The Court held:

This being so, Engineer Miranda is entitled to backwages during the period of his suspension as it is already settled in this jurisdiction that a government official or employee is entitled to backwages not only if he is exonerated in the administrative case but also when the suspension is unjustified.[50] (emphases and underscoring ours)

Jurisprudential definition of exoneration

The mere reduction of the penalty on appeal does not entitle a government employee to back salaries if he was not exonerated of the charge against him. This is the Courts teaching in City Mayor of Zamboanga v. CA.[51] In this case, the employee was initially found guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct and was given the penalty of dismissal by the City Mayor of Zamboanga. On appeal, however, the CA limited the employees guilt to improper conduct and correspondingly reduced the penalty to six-months suspension without pay with a stern warning that repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely."[52] The CA also awarded him full backwages.[53]

We held that the CA erred in awarding back salaries by reiterating the principle that back salaries may be ordered paid to an officer or employee only if he is exonerated of the charge against him and his suspension or dismissal is found and declared to be illegal.[54]

The Court had the occasion to explain what constitutes exoneration in Bangalisan v. Hon. CA,[55] the respondents cited case. In this case, the Secretary of Education found the public school teachers guilty as charged and imposed on them the penalty of dismissal. On appeal, the CSC affirmed the Secretarys ruling but reduced the penalty imposed to suspension without pay. However, the CSC found one of the teachers (Mariano) guilty only of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations, and only penalized her with reprimand. None of the petitioning public school teachers were awarded back salaries.

On appeal to this Court, we awarded back salaries to Mariano. We explained that since the factual premise of the administrative charges against him - i.e., his alleged participation in the illegal mass actions, and his suspension - was amply rebutted, then Mariano was in effect exonerated of the charges against him and was, thus, entitled to back salaries for the period of his suspension pending appeal.

With respect to petitioner Rodolfo Mariano, payment of his back wages is in order. A reading of the resolution of the [CSC] will show that he was exonerated of the charges which formed the basis for his suspension. The Secretary of the DECS charged him with and he was later found guilty of grave misconduct x x x [and] conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service x x x for his participation in the mass actions x x x. It was his alleged participation in the mass actions that was the basis of his preventive suspension and, later, his dismissal from the service.

However, the [CSC], in the questioned resolution, made [the] finding that Mariano was not involved in the "mass actions" but was absent because he was in Ilocos Sur to attend the wake and interment of his grandmother. Although the CSC imposed upon him the penalty of reprimand, the same was for his violation of reasonable office rules and regulations because he failed to inform the school or his intended absence and neither did he file an application for leave covering such absences.

x x x x

However, with regard to the other petitioners, the payment of their back wages must be denied. Although the penalty imposed on them was only suspension, they were not completely exonerated of the charges against them. The CSC made specific findings that, unlike petitioner Mariano, they indeed participated in the mass actions. It will be noted that it was their participation in the mass actions that was the very basis of the charges against them and their subsequent suspension.[56]

Bangalisan clearly laid down the principle that if the exoneration of the employee is relative (as distinguished from complete exoneration), an inquiry into the factual premise of the offense charged and of the offense committed must be made. If the administrative offense found to have been actually committed is of lesser gravity than the offense charged, the employee cannot be considered exonerated if the factual premise for the imposition of the lesser penalty remains the same. The employee found guilty of a lesser offense may only be entitled to back salaries when the offense actually committed does not carry the penalty of more than one month suspension or dismissal.[57]

Bangalisan reiterated that the payment of back salaries, during the period of suspension of a member of the civil service who is subsequently ordered reinstated, may be decreed only if the employee is found innocent of the charges which caused the suspension andwhen the suspension is unjustified. This pronouncement was re-echoed in Jacinto v. CA,[58] De la Cruz v. CA,[59] and Hon. Gloria v. CA.[60] Taking off from Bangalisan, the Court in De la Cruz categorically stated:

The issue of whether back wages may be awarded to teachers ordered reinstated to the service after the dismissal orders x x x were commuted by the CSC to six (6) months suspension is already settled.

In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals, we resolved the issue in the negative on the ground that the teachers were neither exonerated nor unjustifiably suspended, two (2) circumstances necessary for the grant of back wages in administrative disciplinary cases.[61]

In Hon. Gloria, involving the same factual situation as Bangalisan, the CA awarded the public school teachers back salaries - for the period beyond the allowable period of preventive suspension - since they were ultimately exonerated. In affirming the CA, the Court distinguished preventive suspension from suspension pending appeal for the purpose of determining the extent of an employees entitlement to back salaries. The Court ruled that under Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292, there are two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees who are charged with offenses punishable by removal or suspension: (i) preventive suspension pending investigation[62] and (ii) preventive suspension pending appeal;[63] compensation is due only for the period of preventive suspension pending appeal should the employee be ultimately exonerated.[64] Citing Floyd R. Mechem's A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers,[65] Hon. Gloriaruled:

Thus, it is not enough that an employee is exonerated of the charges against him. In addition, his suspension must be unjustified. The case of Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals itself similarly states that "payment of salaries corresponding to the period [1] when an employee is not allowed to work may be decreed if he is found innocent of the charges which caused his suspension and [2] when the suspension is unjustified.[66] (emphases and underscoring ours)

A careful reading of these cases would reveal that a strict observance of the second condition for an award of back salaries becomes important only if the employee is not totally innocent of any administrative infraction. As previously discussed, where the employee is completely exonerated of the administrative charge or acquitted in the criminal case arising from the same facts based on a finding of innocence, the second requirement becomes subsumed in the first. Otherwise, a determination of the act/s and offense/s actually committed and of the corresponding penalty imposed has to be made.

Unjustified suspension
On the suspension/dismissal aspect, this second condition is met upon a showing that the separation from office is not warranted under the circumstances because the government employee gave no cause for suspension or dismissal. This squarely applies in cases where the government employee did not commit the offense charged, punishable by suspension or dismissal (total exoneration); or the government employee is found guilty of another offense for an act different from that for which he was charged.

Bangalisan, Jacinto and De la Cruz illustrate the application of the two conditions

Both the CA and the respondent applied Bangalisan to justify the award of back salaries. The CSC argues against this position with the claim that the rulings in Jacinto and De la Cruz, not Bangalisan, should apply. After due consideration, we see no reason why the cited rulings and their application should be pitted against one another; they essentially espouse the same conclusions after applying the two conditions for the payment of back salaries.

Bangalisan, Jacinto and De la Cruz all stemmed from the illegal mass actions of public school teachers in Metro Manila in 1990. The teachers were charged with grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, and gross violation of civil service law, rules and regulations, among others. The then Secretary of Education found them guilty and dismissed them from the service. The CSC, on appeal, ordered the teachers reinstated, but withheld the grant of their back salaries. The CSC found the teachers liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and imposed on them the penalty of suspension. The CSC reasoned that since the teachers were not totally exculpated from the charge (but were found guilty of a lesser offense), they could not be awarded back salaries.

When these cases reached the Court, the issue of the teachers entitlement to back salaries was raised. The teachers claimed that they were entitled to back salaries from the time of their dismissal or suspension until their reinstatement, arguing that they were totally exonerated from the charges since they were found guilty only of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

Under this factual backdrop, we applied the two conditions and distinguished between the teachers who were absent from their respective classes because they participated in the illegal mass action, on one hand, and the teachers who were absent for some other reason, on the other hand.

With respect to the teachers who participated in the illegal mass actions, we ruled that they were not entitled to back salaries since they were not exonerated. We explained that liability for a lesser offense, carrying a penalty less than dismissal, is not equivalent to exoneration. On the second condition, we ruled that their suspension is not unjustified since they have given a ground for their suspension i.e., the unjustified abandonment of their classes to the prejudice of their students, the very factual premise of the administrative charges against them for which they were suspended.

With respect to the teachers who were away from their classes but did not participate in the illegal strike, the Court awarded them back salaries, considering that: first, they did not commit the act for which they were dismissed and suspended; and second, they were found guilty of another offense, i.e., violation of reasonable office rules and regulations which is not penalized with suspension or dismissal. The Court ruled that these teachers were totally exonerated of the charge, and found their dismissal and suspension likewise unjustified since the offense they were found to have committed only merited the imposition of the penalty of reprimand.

These cases show the Courts consistent stand in determining the propriety of the award of back salaries. The government employees must not only be found innocent of the charges; their suspension must likewise be shown to be unjustified.

The Present Case

We find that the CA was correct in awarding the respondent his back salaries during the period he was suspended from work, following his dismissal until his reinstatement to his former position. The records show that the charges of grave misconduct and dishonesty against him were not substantiated. As the CSC found, there was no corrupt motive showing malice on the part of the respondent in making the complained utterance. Likewise, the CSC found that the charge of dishonesty was well refuted by the respondents evidence showing that he rendered overtime work on the days in question.

We fully respect the factual findings of the CSC especially since the CA affirmed these factual findings. However, on the legal issue of the respondents entitlement to back salaries, we are fully in accord with the CAs conclusion that the two conditions to justify the award of back salaries exist in the present case.

The first condition was met since the offense which the respondent was found guilty of (violation of reasonable rules and regulations) stemmed from an act (failure to log in and log out) different from the act of dishonesty (claiming overtime pay despite his failure to render overtime work) that he was charged with.

The second condition was met as the respondents committed offense merits neither dismissal from the service nor suspension (for more than one month), but only reprimand.

In sum, the respondent is entitled to back salaries from the time he was dismissed by the CMWD until his reinstatement to his former position - i.e., for the period of his preventive suspension pending appeal. For the period of his preventive suspension pending investigation, the respondent is not entitled to any back salaries per our ruling in Hon. Gloria.[67]

x x x."