"Locus standi" of citizens-taxpayers

"Locus Standi.

"The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing."145

Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they "dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury."146 Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question the validity of the existing "Pork Barrel System" under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law,147 as in these cases.

Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the issues they have raised may be classified as matters "of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest."148 The CoA Chairperson‘s statement during the Oral Arguments that the present controversy involves "not merely a systems failure" but a "complete breakdown of controls"149 amplifies, in addition to the matters above-discussed, the seriousness of the issues involved herein. Indeed, of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.150 All told, petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases."




G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,

vs.

HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 208493

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,

vs.

HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HONORABLE FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 209251

PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former Provincial Board Member -Province of Marinduque, Petitioner,

vs.

PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.


Link - https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/nov2013/gr_208566_2013.html

"Political Question" doctrine

"Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine.

The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies‖ carries the assurance that "the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government."138 Essentially, the foregoing limitation is a restatement of the political question doctrine which, under the classic formulation of Baker v. Carr,139 applies when there is found, among others, "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department," "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it" or "the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non- judicial discretion." Cast against this light, respondents submit that the "the political branches are in the best position not only to perform budget-related reforms but also to do them in response to the specific demands of their constituents" and, as such, "urge the Court not to impose a solution at this stage."140

The Court must deny respondents‘ submission.

Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal questions which are within its province to resolve. A political question refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure."141 The intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government are incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cannot be any clearer: "The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. It includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." In Estrada v. Desierto,142 the expanded concept of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution and its effect on the political question doctrine was explained as follows:143

To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. x x x (Emphases supplied)

It must also be borne in mind that ― when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature or the executive, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution."144 To a great extent, the Court is laudably cognizant of the reforms undertaken by its co-equal branches of government. But it is by constitutional force that the Court must faithfully perform its duty. Ultimately, it is the Court‘s avowed intention that a resolution of these cases would not arrest or in any manner impede the endeavors of the two other branches but, in fact, help ensure that the pillars of change are erected on firm constitutional grounds. After all, it is in the best interest of the people that each great branch of government, within its own sphere, contributes its share towards achieving a holistic and genuine solution to the problems of society. For all these reasons, the Court cannot heed respondents‘ plea for judicial restraint."




G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,

vs.

HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 208493

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,

vs.

HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HONORABLE FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 209251

PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former Provincial Board Member -Province of Marinduque, Petitioner,

vs.

PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.


Link - https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/nov2013/gr_208566_2013.html

"Moot and academic" principle, when inapplicable

"Even on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence, nevertheless, dictates that "the moot and academic‘ principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case." The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.129

The applicability of the first exception is clear from the fundamental posture of petitioners – they essentially allege grave violations of the Constitution with respect to, inter alia, the principles of separation of powers, non-delegability of legislative power, checks and balances, accountability and local autonomy.

The applicability of the second exception is also apparent from the nature of the interests involved

– the constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of public funds have been and continue to be utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a situation of exceptional character as well as a matter of paramount public interest. The present petitions, in fact, have been lodged at a time when the system‘s flaws have never before been magnified. To the Court‘s mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, the accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and the government‘s own recognition that reforms are needed "to address the reported abuses of the PDAF"130 demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which only underscores the importance of the matter. It is also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners‘ claims as not merely theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by the Court to the findings made by the CoA which is the constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the government. In Delos Santos v. CoA,131 a recent case wherein the Court upheld the CoA‘s disallowance of irregularly disbursed PDAF funds, it was emphasized that:

The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and ultimately the people's, property. The exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and balance system inherent in our form of government.

It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings. x x x. (Emphases supplied)

Thus, if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases, the Court deems the findings under the CoA Report to be sufficient.

The Court also finds the third exception to be applicable largely due to the practical need for a definitive ruling on the system‘s constitutionality. As disclosed during the Oral Arguments, the CoA Chairperson estimates that thousands of notices of disallowances will be issued by her office in connection with the findings made in the CoA Report. In this relation, Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) pointed out that all of these would eventually find their way to the courts.132 Accordingly, there is a compelling need to formulate controlling principles relative to the issues raised herein in order to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious resolution of the anticipated disallowance cases, but more importantly, so that the government may be guided on how public funds should be utilized in accordance with constitutional principles.

Finally, the application of the fourth exception is called for by the recognition that the preparation and passage of the national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence.133 The relevance of the issues before the Court does not cease with the passage of a "PDAF -free budget for 2014."134 The evolution of the "Pork Barrel System," by its multifarious iterations throughout the course of history, lends a semblance of truth to petitioners‘ claim that "the same dog will just resurface wearing a different collar."135 In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,136 the government had already backtracked on a previous course of action yet the Court used the "capable of repetition but evading review" exception in order "to prevent similar questions from re- emerging."137 The situation similarly holds true to these cases. Indeed, the myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence, must not evade judicial review."



G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,

vs.

HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 208493

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,

vs.

HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HONORABLE FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 209251

PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former Provincial Board Member -Province of Marinduque, Petitioner,

vs.

PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.


Link - https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/nov2013/gr_208566_2013.html

"Actual case" and "judicial power"

"Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy.

By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy.120 This is embodied in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which pertinently states that "judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable x x x." Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which "involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.121 In other words, "there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence."122 Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. "A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action."123 "Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions."124

Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases.

The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization – such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund – are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.

As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related thereto had been rendered moot and academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.125 Differing from this description, the Court observes that respondents‘ proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither will the President‘s declaration that he had already "abolished the PDAF" render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. By constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law may be done either by Congress, through the passage of a repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality. Instructive on this point is the following exchange between Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Justice Carpio) and the Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments:126

Justice Carpio: The President has taken an oath to faithfully execute the law,127 correct? Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.

Justice Carpio: And so the President cannot refuse to implement the General Appropriations Act, correct?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: Well, that is our answer, Your Honor. In the case, for example of the PDAF, the President has a duty to execute the laws but in the face of the outrage over PDAF, the President was saying, "I am not sure that I will continue the release of the soft projects," and that started, Your Honor. Now, whether or not that … (interrupted)

Justice Carpio: Yeah. I will grant the President if there are anomalies in the project, he has the power to stop the releases in the meantime, to investigate, and that is Section 38 of Chapter 5 of Book 6 of the Revised Administrative Code128 x x x. So at most the President can suspend, now if the President believes that the PDAF is unconstitutional, can he just refuse to implement it?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor, as we were trying to say in the specific case of the PDAF because of the CoA Report, because of the reported irregularities and this Court can take judicial notice, even outside, outside of the COA Report, you have the report of the whistle-blowers, the President was just exercising precisely the duty ….

x x x x

Justice Carpio: Yes, and that is correct. You‘ve seen the CoA Report, there are anomalies, you stop and investigate, and prosecute, he has done that. But, does that mean that PDAF has been repealed?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor x x x.

x x x x

Justice Carpio: So that PDAF can be legally abolished only in two (2) cases. Congress passes a law to repeal it, or this Court declares it unconstitutional, correct?

Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.

Justice Carpio: The President has no power to legally abolish PDAF. (Emphases supplied). "



G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,

vs.

HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 208493

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,

vs.

HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HONORABLE FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 209251

PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former Provincial Board Member -Province of Marinduque, Petitioner,

vs.

PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.


Link - https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/nov2013/gr_208566_2013.html

Constitutionality of a law

"The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry,117 namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity ; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.118 Of these requisites, case law states that the first two are the most important119 and, therefore, shall be discussed forthwith."



G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,

vs.

HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 208493

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,

vs.

HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HONORABLE FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 209251

PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former Provincial Board Member -Province of Marinduque, Petitioner,

vs.

PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.

Link - https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/nov2013/gr_208566_2013.html

Pork barrel issues

"Controversies in the Philippines.

Over the decades, "pork" funds in the Philippines have increased tremendously,89 owing in no small part to previous Presidents who reportedly used the "Pork Barrel" in order to gain congressional support.90 It was in 1996 when the first controversy surrounding the "Pork Barrel" erupted. Former Marikina City Representative Romeo Candazo (Candazo), then an anonymous source, "blew the lid on the huge sums of government money that regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks."91 He said that "the kickbacks were ‘SOP‘ (standard operating procedure) among legislators and ranged from a low 19 percent to a high 52 percent of the cost of each project, which could be anything from dredging, rip rapping, sphalting, concreting, and construction of school buildings."92 "Other sources of kickbacks that Candazo identified were public funds intended for medicines and textbooks. A few days later, the tale of the money trail became the banner story of the Philippine Daily Inquirer issue of August 13, 1996, accompanied by an illustration of a roasted pig."93 "The publication of the stories, including those about congressional initiative allocations of certain lawmakers, including ₱3.6 Billion for a Congressman, sparked public outrage."94

Thereafter, or in 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF as enacted in the 2004 GAA for being unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for lack of "any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress," the petition was dismissed.95

Recently, or in July of the present year, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into allegations that "the government has been defrauded of some ₱10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost projects."96 The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation – "JLN" standing for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) – had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire decade. While the NGOs were supposedly the ultimate recipients of PDAF funds, the whistle-blowers declared that the money was diverted into Napoles‘ private accounts.97 Thus, after its investigation on the Napoles controversy, criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers‘ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.98

On August 16, 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a three-year audit investigation99 covering the use of legislators' PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during the last three (3) years of the Arroyo administration. The purpose of the audit was to determine the propriety of releases of funds under PDAF and the Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)100 by the DBM, the application of these funds and the implementation of projects by the appropriate implementing agencies and several government-owned-and-controlled corporations (GOCCs).101 The total releases covered by the audit amounted to ₱8.374 Billion in PDAF and ₱32.664 Billion in VILP, representing 58% and 32%, respectively, of the total PDAF and VILP releases that were found to have been made nationwide during the audit period.102 Accordingly, the Co A‘s findings contained in its Report No. 2012-03 (CoA Report), entitled "Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)," were made public, the highlights of which are as follows:103

● Amounts released for projects identified by a considerable number of legislators significantly exceeded their respective allocations.

● Amounts were released for projects outside of legislative districts of sponsoring members of the Lower House.

● Total VILP releases for the period exceeded the total amount appropriated under the 2007 to 2009 GAAs.

● Infrastructure projects were constructed on private lots without these having been turned over to the government.

● Significant amounts were released to implementing agencies without the latter‘s endorsement and without considering their mandated functions, administrative and technical capabilities to implement projects.

● Implementation of most livelihood projects was not undertaken by the implementing agencies themselves but by NGOs endorsed by the proponent legislators to which the Funds were transferred.

● The funds were transferred to the NGOs in spite of the absence of any appropriation law or ordinance.

● Selection of the NGOs were not compliant with law and regulations.

● Eighty-Two (82) NGOs entrusted with implementation of seven hundred seventy two (772) projects amount to ₱6.156 Billion were either found questionable, or submitted questionable/spurious documents, or failed to liquidate in whole or in part their utilization of the Funds.

● Procurement by the NGOs, as well as some implementing agencies, of goods and services reportedly used in the projects were not compliant with law.

As for the "Presidential Pork Barrel", whistle-blowers alleged that" at least ₱900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO."104 According to incumbent CoA Chairperson Maria Gracia Pulido Tan (CoA Chairperson), the CoA is, as of this writing, in the process of preparing "one consolidated report" on the Malampaya Funds.105"


G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,

vs.

HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 208493

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,

vs.

HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HONORABLE FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 209251


PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Formr Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former Provincial Board Member -Province of Marinduque, Petitioner,

vs.

PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.

Link - https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/nov2013/gr_208566_2013.html

Pork barrel

"Pork Barrel: General Concept.

"Pork Barrel" is political parlance of American -English origin.3 Historically, its usage may be traced to the degrading ritual of rolling out a barrel stuffed with pork to a multitude of black slaves who would cast their famished bodies into the porcine feast to assuage their hunger with morsels coming from the generosity of their well-fed master.4 This practice was later compared to the actions of American legislators in trying to direct federal budgets in favor of their districts.5 While the advent of refrigeration has made the actual pork barrel obsolete, it persists in reference to political bills that "bring home the bacon" to a legislator‘s district and constituents.6 In a more technical sense, "Pork Barrel" refers to an appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's district.7 Some scholars on the subject further use it to refer to legislative control of local appropriations.8

In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature,9 although, as will be later discussed, its usage would evolve in reference to certain funds of the Executive."


G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,

vs.

HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 208493

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,

vs.

HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HONORABLE FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 209251

PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former Provincial Board Member -Province of Marinduque, Petitioner,

vs.

PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.

Link - https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/nov2013/gr_208566_2013.html

Is a Several Judgment Proper if there is a Common Cause of Action against the Defendants? - Prof. Manuel Riguera

"xxx.

Section 4, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court regarding several judgments provides as follows:

“SECTION 4. Several judgments. – In an action against several defendants, the court may, when a several judgment is proper, render judgment against one or more of them, leaving the action to proceed against the others.”

Section 5 of Rule 36, on the other hand, is the provision governing separate judgments.

“SECTION 5. Separate judgments. – When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, the court, at any stage, upon a determination of the issues material to a particular claim and all counterclaims arising out of the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the claim, may render a separate judgment disposing of such claim. The judgment shall terminate the action with respect to the claim so disposed of and the action shall proceed as to the remaining claims….”

A comparison of Section 4 on several judgments with Section 5 on separate judgments shows that in a several judgment there is a plurality of defendants while in a separate judgment there is a plurality of claims or causes of actions.

Would a several judgment be proper if the complaint asserts a common cause of action against the defendants? Logically, the answer should be in the affirmative because if separate causes of action would be required, there would be no practical distinction between a several judgment and a separate one. Moreover, there is nothing in the text of Section 4 that the complaint should not assert a common cause of action.

In Municipality of Orion v. Concha, 50 Phil. 679, 682 (1927), the Court held that a several judgment may be rendered against defendants who are jointly and severally liable. Joint and several liability among the defendants means that a common cause of action was pleaded against them.

Section 4 of Rule 36 was copied almost verbatim from Section 579 of the California Code of Civil Procedure.[1] Decisions of the California courts thus have strong persuasive value. The Supreme Court of California has held that a several judgment may be rendered against one of two joint tort-feasors[2] while allowing the action to proceed against the other (Cole v. Roebling Construction Co., 156 Cal. 443 [105 P. 255]).

However, Justice Florenz D. Regalado wrote that a several judgment is not proper if there is a common cause of action against the defendants and hence a several judgment is not proper in an action against solidary debtors. (FLORENZ D. REGALADO, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM 375 [7th rev. ed.]). The comment of Justice Regalado was cited by the Supreme Court in De Leon v. Court of Appeals, 383 SCRA 216 (2002), where the Court held that a several judgment is not proper where a common cause of action exists against the defendants, as in actions against solidary debtors. A perusal of De Leon, however, shows that this holding of the court was merely an obiter dictum.

In De Leon, the petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for a sum of money against the spouses Avelino and Estelita. The complaint averred that Estelita had executed a promissory note in favor of the petitioner for a ₱500,000 loan. The spouses filed an answer. Estelita admitted the loan obligation, but Avelino denied liability on the ground that his wife was not the designated administrator and thus had no authority to bind the conjugal partnership and on the ground that his wife contracted the debt without his knowledge and consent.

The petitioner moved for a “partial” judgment on the pleadings against Estelita which was granted. Accordingly, a partial judgment on the pleadings was rendered against Estelita in 1996. Estelita did not appeal from this judgment. The case then proceeded against Avelino who was also adjudged liable in a judgment rendered in 1997. Avelino and Estelita appealed the 1997 judgment.

The issue was whether Estelita’s failure to appeal from the 1996 judgment made it final and executory. The Court first stated that the 1996 judgment against Estelita was not a several judgment because the complaint asserted a common cause of action against the defendants spouses. The court instead termed the judgment as a “partial” judgment. It held that a partial judgment was not a final judgment that was appealable; hence, the fact that Estelita did not appeal therefrom did not make it final and executory. The 1997 judgment was the one which may properly be appealed.

Regardless of whether the Court described the judgment as “partial” or “several,” the fact of the matter is that the action filed by the petitioner was against two defendants and that a judgment was rendered against one of them (Estelita), leaving the action to proceed against the other (Avelino).[3] The semantic ambiguity should not detract from the undeniable fact that the judgment was a several one. If a several judgment involving a common cause of action were not proper, the court should have struck down the 1996 judgment instead of renaming it and tacitly upholding its propriety. That it did not do so meant that the several judgment was validly rendered.

In fine, De Leon impliedly recognizes that a several judgment may be properly rendered even if the complaint asserts a common cause of action against the defendants. It should be stressed that the issue in De Leon was the appealability of the 1996 judgment and not its propriety; the propriety of the judgment was unquestioned. Thus, the Court’s statement that a several judgment is not proper where a common cause of action exists against the defendants was merely obiter.

My view therefore is that a several judgment does not require a plurality of causes of action. In fact, a reading of Section 4 of Rule 36 in relation to Section 5 of Rule 36 shows that a several judgment by its nature has only one cause of action asserted against the several defendants. Otherwise, the judgment would be a separate judgment.

Furthermore, Section 4, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court was copied virtually verbatim from Section 579 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. It must therefore be understood as promulgated in our jurisdiction with the construction placed upon it by the Courts of the State of California (see Pando v. Kette, 54 Phil. 683).

-oOo-

[1] § 579. In an action against several defendants, the Court may, in its discretion, render judgment against one or more of them, leaving the action to proceed against the others, whenever a several judgment is proper.

[2] Joint tort-feasors are solidarily liable.

[3] In American procedural law, a partial judgment is another term for a separate judgment (see Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54[b]). Another judgment which may be termed “partial” is one rendered after a partial new trial or reconsideration under Section 8, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court.

Xxx."

Source -

 https://legisperit.com/2022/11/07/is-a-several-judgment-proper-if-there-is-a-common-cause-of-action-against-the-defendants/

Rape - penalty, damages.

"xxx.

Under Article 266-B of the RPC, death penalty shall be imposed in a crime of rape through sexual intercourse:

1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim.

In order to qualify the rape, the minority of the victim and his or her relationship with the offender should both be alleged in the Information and proven beyond reasonable doubt during trial.46 The raison d' etre is that the special qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship have the effect of altering the nature of the rape and its corresponding penalty.47 Otherwise, death penalty cannot be imposed upon the offender.48

AAA's minority at the time the crimes were committed against her, was properly alleged and proven during trial. Evidence also proved that Tuyor had carnal knowledge of AAA without the latter's consent, with the use of force, threat and intimidation, and by taking advantage of his moral ascendancy. However, in the five Informations, the allegation that AAA is the "stepdaughter" of Tuyor, is inaccurate. Neither AAA is the stepdaughter of Tuyor nor is the latter the stepfather of the former, because such a relationship presupposes a legitimate relationship between the appellant and the victim's mother.49 A stepdaughter is the daughter of one's wife or husband by a former marriage, or a stepfather is the husband of one's mother by virtue of a marriage subsequent to that of which the person spoken of is the offspring50

During trial, the prosecution failed to establish the stepparent-stepdaughter relationship between Tuyor and AAA. No proof of marriage was presented to establish Tuyor's relationship with AAA's mother. On the contrary, AAA's testimony shows that Tuyor was the live-in partner of AAA's mother, to wit:

Pros. Dumaual : How were you related to the accused?

Witness : He is my stepfather, sir.

Pros. Dumaual : How did he become your stepfather?

Witness : He is the live-in partner of my mother, sir.51

x x x x

COURT : Is the accused married to your mother?

Witness : No, Your Honor.52

Although the State has successfully proven the common-law relationship, the crime is only simple rape where the information does not properly allege the qualifying circumstance of relationship between the accused and the victim.53 This is because the accused's right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him is inviolable54 Tuyor can only be convicted of simple rape, and not of qualified rape.

The Penalties

In Criminal Cases No. B-2008-767, B-2008-768, B-2008-770, B-2008-771, Rape through Sexual Intercourse, under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A, were committed without any of the qualifying or aggravating circumstances enumerated under Article 266-B, where the penalty for each count of rape shall be reclusion perpetua.

The Damages

For the four (4) counts of rape, the award of civil indemnities, moral and exemplary damages are proper.Ꮮαwρhi৷

Jurisprudence has settled that an award of civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon a finding of the fact of rape, while moral damages may be automatically awarded in rape cases without need of proof of mental and physical suffering.55 The award of exemplary damages is also proper to set a public example, to serve as deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter from sexual abuse.56

For the crime of simple rape under Article 266-A(1), the penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua57 with civil indemnity of P75,000.00, moral damages of P75,000.00, and exemplary damages of P75,000.00; in accordance with People v. Jugueta.58

In consonance with prevailing jurisprudence, the amount of damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until said amounts are fully paid.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated October 9, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Bacoor City in Criminal Cases No. B-2008-767 to B-2008-771, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals Decision dated December 15, 2017 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08607 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. We find accused-appellant Danilo Tuyor y Banderas:

1 Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Simple Rape under Article 266-A(1)(a) and penalized in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, in Criminal Case No. B-2008-767, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and with modification as to the award of damages. Accused-appellant is ORDERED to PAY AAA the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages.

2 Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Simple Rape under Article 266-A(1)(a) and penalized in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, in Criminal Case No. B-2008-768, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and with modification as to the award of damages. Accused-appellant is ORDERED to PAY AAA the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages.

3 Not guilty of Simple Rape under Article 266-A(l)(a) and penalized in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, in Criminal Case No. B-2008-769, considering his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Accused-appellant is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

4 Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Simple Rape under 266-A(1)(a) and penalized in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, in Criminal Case No. B-2008-770, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and with modification as to the award of damages. Accused-appellant is ORDERED to PAY AAA the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages.

5 Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Simple Rape under 266-A(1)(a) and penalized in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, in Criminal Case No. B-2008-771, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and with modification as to the award of damages. Accused-appellant is ORDERED to PAY AAA the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum is imposed on all damages awarded from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

Xxx."


G.R. No. 241780, October 12, 2020 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. DANILO TUYOR Y BANDERAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/oct2020/gr_241780_2020.html

Medico-legal report, admissibility of. - Expert witness' testimony, probative value. - Handwriting, authentication of.

"xxx.

After establishing that the medico-legal report shall be given weight and credence, Dr. Madrid's testimony that she is familiar with Dr. Baluyut's signature and her interpretations of Dr. Baluyut's medico-legal report, shall also be given weight and credence.

The medico-legal report shall be given weight and credence, even if the physician who examined and prepared it, was not presented in court.

First, Dr. Baluyut's issuance of the medico-legal report falls under one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule.

Under Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, "Entries in official records made in the performance of [her] duty [as] a public officer of the Philippines, x x x are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated."

Dr. Baluyut, a government doctor, and who by actual practice and by virtue of her oath as civil service official, is competent to examine persons and issue medico-legal reports. There is a presumption of regularity in the performance of Dr. Baluyut's functions and duties when she issued the medico-legal reports. In the absence of evidence proving the contrary, Dr. Baluyut's finding that AAA had sexual intercourse with Tuyor, and was seven weeks pregnant when she was examined, are conclusive.

Second, when Dr. Madrid testified in court, she identified the signature of Dr. Baluyut in Medico-Legal Report No. 2007-4907, and mentioned that she is familiar with Dr. Baluyut's signature because she saw Dr. Baluyut sign a document, to wit:

Pros. Dumaual :I am showing you a Medico[-]Legal [Rjeport prepared by Dr. Irene D. Baluy[u]t. Will you go over this document[?]. Where is the Medico[-]Legal Report that you are referring to?

Witness :This is the one. This is the Medico[-]Legal Report No. 2007-4907 prepared by Dr. Baluy[u]t and this is her signature, sir.

x x x x

Pros. Dumaual :And how did you come to know that is the signature of Dr. Baluy[u]t?

Witness : I already saw her signing a document, sir.25

Under Section 50(b), Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, "[T]he opinion of a witness x x x may be received in evidence regarding x x x [a] handwriting with which [s]he has sufficient familiarity."

Since Dr. Madrid was familiar with Dr. Baluyut's signature, because both of them work at the Philippine General Hospital (PGH), and she saw Dr. Baluyut sign a document, Dr. Madrid's testimony with regard to Dr. Baluyut's signature is admissible as an opinion of an ordinary witness.

Third, Dr. Madrid, a doctor from the Child Protection Unit (CPU) of the PGH, is an expert witness:

Pros. Dumaual : Madam Witness, since when have you been a doctor of CPU-PGH?

Witness : Since January, 1997, sir.

Pros. Dumaual : [Doctor,] [y]ou said that you were already connected with the PGH since 1997.

Witness : Yes, sir.

Pros. Dumaual : And on October 26, 2007[,] how long have you been a medico legal officer?

Witness : 10 years, sir.26

Under Section 49 of the Rules of Evidence, "The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which [s]he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence."

The prosecution was able to establish Dr. Madrid's expertise in the relevant medical field. Dr. Madrid's interpretation of the entries made by Dr. Baluyut in the medico-legal report is admissible as expert testimony.

With respect to the probative value of Dr. Madrid's expert testimony, this will depend on her credibility as an expert witness and the relevance of her testimony to the issue at hand. As a rule, the trial judge's assessment of the witnesses' testimonies and findings of fact are accorded great respect on appeal.27 In the absence of any substantial reason to justify the reversal of the trial court's assessment and conclusion, like when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded, the reviewing court is generally bound by the former's findings.28 The rule is even more stringently applied if the appellate court has concurred with the trial court.29

Dr. Madrid testified as regards Dr. Baluyut's findings contained in the medico-legal report, to wit:

Pros. Dumaual : Can you tell us the case of [AAA] based on the data record?

Witness : Based on the record [AAA] appeared before Dr. Baluy[u]t on October 26, 2007 and conducted the examination and attached to the record the picture of the said victim, sir.

x x x x

Pros. Dumaual : What can you say about the findings of Dr. Baluy[u]t to [AAA]?

Witness : Based on the medical examination of Dr. Baluy[u]t that there is a definite evidence of sexual abuse on the genitalia of the victim on the 5:00 o'clock position, sir.30

There is no substantial reason to justify the reversal of the RTC's assessment and conclusion on the probative value of Dr. Madrid's expert testimony. Moreso, the CA concurred with the RTC on the matter. The relevance of Dr. Madrid's testimony to the issue at hand was also established where she testified that based on the medico-legal report, AAA was sexually abused.

Xxx."


G. R. No. 241780, October 12, 2020

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. DANILO TUYOR Y BANDERAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

https://lawphil.net/judjris/juri2020/oct2020/gr_241780_2020.html

Doubts that tainted the May 2022 automated election system

From NengQHip, @NengHip, on Twitter, quoting the arguments of TNTrio, represented by Ret. BGen. ELISE RIO, Jr., former NTC & DICT Exec., on the doubts that tainted the May 2022 automated election of Marcos Jr. :

"A certain Atty @EmilMaranon lll became an unofficial spokesman of COMELEC and came out with the following statements that clearly show that he does not know what he is talking about.

1.) The “Transparency Server” (TS) has NOTHING to do with the official counts which are the basis of all proclamations,local or national.

The official count is sourced from a DIFFERENT transmission,going through a SEPARATE ladderized system of transmission as required by law.

Ans: The Transparency Server Count and the Official Count both come fr only ONE SOURCE - the Accumulated VCM Transmissions. We have shown that on 8:02pm of May 9, 2022, the Transparency Server count was 20M+ votes while the official accumulated VCM transmissions can only account for 12M+ votes. Clearly in the first hour after voting closed the Transparency Server count was manipulated to condition the minds of the public what the “official” results of the election will be. It must also be emphasized that the VCMs transmit thier ERs to the Transparency Server and the other servers that handle the official count AT THE SAME TIME.

2.) The accumulation of figures in the Transparency Server is FAST because it has been intended and designed to be FAST.

Its speed is a feature, not a glitch or proof of fraud. Speed is a desired feature meant to protect votes.

Ans: Speed is not the question here.

The question is where did the 20M votes shown to public by the TS on 8:02pm come from when the official VCM transmissions at that time was only 12M votes?

3.) Voting ended last May 9, 2022 at 7:00 pm and the generation of the precinct result is instantaneous as all ballots at that point had already been counted. Remember, ballots are counted right at the moment that they are fed by the voters.

Ans: COMELEC General Instructions require that after the voting officially closed, 8 copies of the precinct Election Results must be printed before the VCM can transmit the ER. This takes at least 30 minutes. So the first transmissions on May 9 would occur no earlier than 7:30pm. Yet, the TS was able to count 20M votes from 7:30pm to 8pm and at the next hour, from 8pm to 9pm, the TS was able to count only 13.2M votes, when logically more VCMs should be able to transmit at that second hour because the printing requirement would have been done. This fact already makes the TS count QUESTIONABLE.

4.) There is nothing wrong when most results are sent to the Transparency Server between 7:30-8:00 pm.

In fact, transmission can immediately start after the close of polls at 7:00 pm, except for those w/ long lines or transmission issues.

Ask those who served last elections.

Ans: Almost all poll watchers we asked claim that their precincts’ VCM started transmitting the ERs past 8pm, most wondering how come 20M votes were already counted by 8:02pm when they have not yet transmitted. And the official accumulated VCM transmissions can only account for 12M votes at 8:02. Again, where did that 20M votes come from?

5.) It is expected that results from all over the country can flood the Transparency Server at the same time since voting ends at the same time and all transmissions almost occur at the same period. When you see the average of consolidated large data, movements should be fast.

Ans: If the official source transmitted only 12M votes, and the TS had counted 20M votes at that same time, that is definitely FRAUDULENT!!

6.) There had been post-election auditing of the 2022 results, attended by all political parties.

PPCRV did the comparison between the precinct level election returns (ERs) and those received at the other end of the transmission to rule out hacking at the transmission level.

LENTE did the mandatory Random Manual Audit (RMA) or manual recount of the ballots from the randomly selected precincts fr all over the country to check the correctness of the VCM count.

Both audits showed no cause for alarm or any evidence of fraud.

Ans: PPCRV only manually counted the ERs given them by COMELEC. It was like counting d carbon copy of what was already transmitted in the official channel,immediately shown by the TS to the public. PPCRV has no independent way of verifying if the ERs given to them by COMELEC actually reflect d actual count that the voters cast in their ballots.

NAMFREL/LENTE were the watchdog for the Random Manual Audit (RMA),but they could not assure the voting public that there was no tampering of ballots while in transit from the 750 randomly selected precincts all over the country to Diamond Hotel. COMELEC said that they invited poll watchers to accompany the ballot boxes while in transit, but NAMFREL/LENTE who only stayed at Diamond Hotel cannot attest that each ballot box brought to the hotel were all accompanied by independent poll watchers who can give sworn statements that d ballot boxes were never tampered from d precincts to Diamond Hotel.

Ret. BGen. ELISE RIO, Jr.
Former NTC & DICT Exec."



Links -

https://twitter.com/NengHip/status/1588690596096782336?s=19

https://twitter.com/NengHip/status/1588690906060058624?s=19

https://twitter.com/NengHip/status/1588691093134401537?s=19

https://twitter.com/NengHip/status/1588691284201738240?s=19

https://twitter.com/NengHip/status/1588691493006737408?s=19

https://twitter.com/NengHip/status/1588691646933512193?s=19

https://twitter.com/NengHip/status/1588691798058504193?s=19

https://twitter.com/NengHip/status/1588691949267345409?s=19

https://twitter.com/NengHip/status/1588692086181986304?s=19

https://twitter.com/NengHip/status/1588692279510052865?s=19

https://twitter.com/NengHip/status/1588692401824333825?s=19

https://twitter.com/NengHip/status/1588692535077376000?s=19

https://twitter.com/NengHip/status/1588692670087860224?s=19

https://twitter.com/NengHip/status/1588692843522318336?s=19

https://twitter.com/NengHip/status/1588693088410931202?s=19

https://twitter.com/NengHip/status/1588693354275307521?s=19

https://twitter.com/NengHip/status/1588693456867962880?s=19

https://twitter.com/NengHip/status/1588693874247368704?s=19

May an Indorser of a Check be Held Criminally Liable for Estafa or for the Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law? - Prof. Manuel Riguera

"xxx.

May an indorser of a check be held criminally liable for estafa or for the violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22) if the check later bounces?

In Bautista v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143375, 6 July 2001, the Court stated that an indorser who passes a bad check may be held liable under B.P. Blg. 22 if there was evidence that he was aware of the insufficiency of funds to cover the check at the time of his indorsement. A perusal of the case, however, shows that the statement was merely obiter since the accused therein was the drawer, not the indorser, of the check.

In Juaquico v. People, 5 March 2018, the Court held that the indorser could not be held criminally liable under Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code because there was no showing of deceit. Implicit from Juaquico is that an indorser could be held liable under Article 315(2)(d) if deceit was proved. The accused was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt but was held civilly liable to the offended party.

My opinion is that an indorser of a check, as a rule, cannot be held criminally liable for estafa under Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code or for the violation of B.P. Blg. 22, even if he knew of the insufficiency of the funds when he indorsed the check. This view is based on the text of both laws.

Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code punishes any person who shall defraud another by postdating a check or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no such funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover the check within 3 days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that the check has been dishonored shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.

B.P. Blg. 22 provides that any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check; or who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain credit to cover the check if presented within a period of 90 days from the check’s date, for which reason the check is dishonored by the drawee bank shall be punished with imprisonment or fine, or both.

Under B.P. Blg. 22, the drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within 90 days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within 5 banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.

Either under Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code or under B.P. Blg. 22, it is only the drawer or issuer who is liable for the crime. Both laws do not mention the indorser of a check. It is axiomatic that a criminal law is construed liberally in favor of the accused and that no person should be brought within the terms of a criminal statute who is clearly not within them. The obiter in Bautista was based on the deliberations in the legislature leading to the passage of B.P. Blg. 22. Whatever may have been said during the deliberations should not prevail over the text of the law, which punishes only the drawer or issuer.*

Even if we assume that an indorser could be prosecuted for estafa or for the violation of B.P. Blg. 22, as a practical matter it would be quite difficult to obtain a conviction since the prosecution cannot avail of the presumption of deceit or the presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds as these can be availed of only against the drawer or issuer.

The only instance when an indorser may be held criminally liable for estafa or the violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is if the indorser acted in conspiracy with the issuer of the check. Thus, in Ramos-Andan v. People, G.R. 136388, 14 March 2006, the Supreme Court held that the indorser of a check was liable for estafa under Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code because the indorser acted in conspiracy with the drawer of the check in defrauding the offended party.

The Supreme Court has held that Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code on conspiracy may be applied in a suppletory manner to violations of B.P. Blg. 22, pursuant to Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, an indorser may be held liable for the violation of B.P. Blg. 22 if he acted in conspiracy with the drawer (See Ladonga v. People, 451 SCRA 673, 683 [2005]).

-oOo-

* Issue means the first delivery of an instrument, complete in form, to a person who takes it as holder (Sec. 191, Negotiable Instruments Law).

Xxx."

Source -

https://legisperit.com/2022/10/30/may-an-indorser-of-a-check-be-held-criminally-liable-for-estafa-or-for-the-violation-of-the-bouncing-checks-law/

The constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against COMPULSORY TESTIMONIAL SELF-INCRIMINATION.

"xxx.

Fully conscious that we are resolving a most extreme case in a sense, which on first impression is a shock to one's sensibilities, we must nevertheless enforce the constitutional provision in this jurisdiction in accord with the policy and reason thereof, undeterred by merely sentimental influences. Once again we lay down the rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is LIMITED to a prohibition against COMPULSORY TESTIMONIAL SELF-INCRIMINATION. The corollary to the proposition is that, an OCULAR INSPECTION OF THE BODY of the accused is PERMISSIBLE. The proviso is that TORTURE of force shall be AVOIDED. Whether facts fall within or without the rule with its corollary and proviso must, of course, be decided as cases arise.

It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and disinterested physicians due care will be taken not to use violence and not to embarass the patient any more than is absolutely necessary. Indeed, no objection to the physical examination being made by the family doctor of the accused or by doctor of the same sex can be seen.

Although the order of the trial judge, acceding to the request of the assistant fiscal for an examination of the person of the defendant by physicians was phrased in absolute terms, it should, nevertheless, be understood as subject to the limitations herein mentioned, and therefore legal. The writ of habeas corpus prayed for is hereby denied. The costs shall be taxed against the petitioner. So ordered.

Xxx."

BANC
G.R. No. 16444 September 8, 1920

EMETERIA VILLAFLOR, petitioner,
vs.
RICARDO SUMMERS, sheriff of the City of Manila, respondent.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1920/sep1920/gr_16444_1920.html

REPUBLIC ACT No. 10154 - AN ACT REQUIRING ALL CONCERNED GOVERNMENT AGENCIES TO ENSURE THE EARLY RELEASE OF THE RETIREMENT PAY, PENSIONS, GRATUITIES AND OTHER BENEFITS OF RETIRING GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES

REPUBLIC ACT No. 10154

AN ACT REQUIRING ALL CONCERNED GOVERNMENT AGENCIES TO ENSURE THE EARLY RELEASE OF THE RETIREMENT PAY, PENSIONS, GRATUITIES AND OTHER BENEFITS OF RETIRING GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

Section 1. Declaration of State Policy. - It is hereby declared that it is the policy of the State to ensure the timely and expeditious release of the retirement pay, pensions, gratuities and other benefits of all retiring employees of the government. Public officers and employees who have spent the best years of their lives serving the government and the public should not be made to wait to receive benefits which are due to them under the law. Accordingly, it is hereby mandated that highest priority shall be given to the payment and/or settlement of the pensions, gratuities and/or other retirement benefits of retiring government employees.

Section 2. Period for Release of Retirement Benefits. - The head of the government agency concerned, the President and other responsible officers of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), the President and other responsible officers of the Home Development Mutual Fund (Pag-IBIG Fund) and/or the Secretary and other responsible officers of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) shall ensure the release of the retirement pay, pensions, gratuities, and other benefits of a retiring government employee within a period of thirty (30) days from the date of the actual retirement of said employee: Provided, That all requirements are submitted to the concerned government agency at least ninety (90) days prior to the effective date of retirement: Provided, further, That in the case of the GSIS, it shall pay the retirement benefits of the retiring employee on his/her last day of his/her service to the government, pursuant to the GSIS Charter.

Section 3. Retiring Employees With Pending Cases, - In the case of retiring government employees with pending cases and whose retirement benefits are being lawfully withheld due to possible pecuniary liability, the head of the agency where such case is pending shall ensure that the said case shall be terminated and/or resolved within a period of three (3) months from the date of the retirement of the concerned, employee: Provided, That in case the concerned agency fails td terminate and/or resolve the case within the said period without any justifiable reason(s), the retirement benefits -due to the employee shall: be immediately released to him/her without prejudice to the ultimate resolution of the case; except, when the delay is deliberately caused by the retiring employee.

Section 4. Coverage. - This Act shall cover all branches, agencies and/or instrumentalities of the government, including government-owned and/or controlled corporations (GOCCs), excluding personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and shall be applicable both to applications for compulsory retirement and optional or early retirement as authorized by law.

Section 5. Penal Provisions. - The unjustified failure and/or refusal to release the pension, gratuities and other retirement benefits due to a retiring government employee within the periods prescribed above or to comply with any provision of this Act shall be a ground for the filing of administrative disciplinary action against the erring officer(s) and/or employee(s). Such erring officer(s) and/or employee(s) shall, after hearing and due proceedings, be penalized with suspension from the service without pay from six (6) months to one (1) year, at the discretion of the disciplining authority.

This penalty shall not apply if the release of the retirement benefits could not be accomplished due to force majeure and other insuperable causes. In such cases, the thirty (SO)-day period shall be counted from the time such cause(s) cease(s) to exist.

Section 6. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – The Civil Service Commission (CSC), after consultation and coordination with the government agencies and/or instrumentalities affected by this Act, including, but not limited to, the GSIS, the Pag-IBIG Fund, the Constitutional Commissions, the Legislature and the Judiciary as well as the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) and the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), shall promulgate and issue the appropriate rules and regulations for the proper implementation of this Act.1avvphi1

Such rules and regulations shall include provisions prescribing uniform periods for the advance filing of retirement applications in the different agencies concerned, as well as standard periods for the processing and release of claims for retirement benefits, gratuities and allowances which will pinpoint responsibility in case of delay in the release thereof.

Section 7. Separability Clause. - If any provision, part or portion of this Act shall be held as invalid, the provisions, parts or portions of this Act not otherwise affected thereby shall remain valid and effective.

Section 8. Repealing Clause. - All laws, executive issuances, orders and rules and regulations contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of this Act or any part thereof are hereby repealed, amended and/or modified accordingly.

Section 9. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation in the country.

Appeals in Summary Procedure - Prof. Manuel Riguera

"xxx.

The new Rule on Summary Procedure (RSP), incorporated as Rule III in the Rules on Expedited Procedures in the First Level Courts, took effect on 11 April 2022. The new RSP is a substantial overhaul of the more than three decades old 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure (RRSP). Except for small claims, probate proceedings, maritime and admiralty cases, habeas corpus cases, and delegated land registration cases, the new RSP brought virtually all MTC cases within the ambit of the summary procedure rather than the regular procedure. This is the result of bumping up the threshold limit to the jurisdictional amount of the MTCs, that is, ₱2 million.

Section 1, Rule III(C) of the new RSP provides for an appeal from a judgment or final order of the MTC in a summary procedure case.

“SECTION 1. Ordinary appeal. — Any judgment, final order, or final resolution in a Summary Procedure case may be appealed to the appropriate Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territory under Rule 40 for civil cases and Rule 122 for criminal cases, of the Rules of Court. xxx”

Like the 1991 RRSP, the new RSP applies also to ejectment cases. There is however a special rule under Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court on the immediate execution of an MTC’s appealed judgment against the defendant unless the defendant posts the supersedeas bond and makes the periodic deposit provided therein. It is submitted that this section, which is not in conflict with the new RSP, is still applicable in ejectment cases. Likewise, Section 19 of Rule 70, providing for the remedy of preliminary mandatory injunction on appeal, should be considered as still in force.

Section 2, Rule III(C) of the new RSP reads as follows:

“SEC. 2. Remedy from judgment on appeal. — The judgment of the Regional Trial Court on the appeal shall be final, executory, and unappealable.” [Emphasis supplied]

My opinion is that this section applies only to civil cases in line with Sec. 11(c), Rule 122 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that “upon perfection of the appeal, the execution of the judgment or final order appealed from shall be stayed as to the appealing party.” It should also be noted that Section 21 of the 1991 RRSP had limited the rule regarding immediate execution of the RTC judgments to civil cases.

There is a similar provision in Rule 70 of the Rules of Court concerning appeals from judgments of the RTC in appealed ejectment cases.

“SEC. 21. Immediate execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. – The judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom.” [Emphasis supplied]

My view is that in appealed ejectment cases, the appealed RTC judgment would be immediately executory only if it is against the defendant. Hence, an RTC judgment in an appealed ejectment case which is in favor of the defendant is not immediately executory. Section 2, Rule III(C) of the new RSP should be read in conjunction with Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.

Under Section 2, Rule III(C) of the new RSP, not only is the RTC judgment immediately executory, but it is also immediately final and executory. Section 22 of the 1991 RRSP had provided that the immediately executory nature of the RTC judgment was “without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom.” The new RSP took away this further appeal.

It is submitted with due respect that the portion of Section 2, Rule III(C) providing that the RTC judgment is unappealable should be re-examined

Section 2, Rule III(C) would in effect amend the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals provided for under the Judiciary Act of 1948 and B.P. Blg. 129, particularly, Section 22 of the latter. Section 22 provides that the Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over judgments of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Moreover, the right to appeal is a statutory and substantive right which may be withdrawn only by statute.*

-oOo-

* For similar reasons, reservation is expressed on the provision under the Rule on Small Claims that a decision thereunder shall be final, executory, and unappealable.

Xxx."


Source -

https://legisperit.com/2022/10/17/appeals-in-summary-procedure/

Mandatory drug testing of arrested suspect

NETIZENS are asking why the PDEA did not compel the son of Justice Secretary Remulla to undergo MANDATORY DRUG TESTING upon his arrest.

His son was charged by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pinas City with ILLEGAL POSSESSION (after a "CONTROLLED DELIVERY" of IMPORTED kush or high-grade marijuana) before the Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas City. The son was not charged with ILLEGAL USE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS OR ILLEGAL IMPORTATION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS.

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pinas has REFERRED to the Office of the City Prosecutor of PASAY CITY the PDEA complaint for ILLEGAL IMPORTATION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS, considering that the act of IMPORTATION or the MAIN ELEMENTS thereof were CONSUMMATED within the TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION of Pasay City.

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City is mandated by the RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE to conduct a preliminary investigation of the PDEA complaint for ILLEGAL IMPORTATION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS.

NO Information or criminal charge has been filed, as of now, by the Office of the City Prosecutor of PASAY CITY against the son of Remulla for ILLEGAL IMPORTATION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City.

The PDEA argues that mandatory drug testing is IRRELEVANT to the Information filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pinas (ILLEGAL POSSESSION DANGEROUS DRUGS) against the son of Remulla before the Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas City, hence, its agents did not compel the son of Remulla to undergo mandatory drug testing under Section 38 of RA 9165, known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002".

SECTION 11 of RA 9165, which is the LEGAL BASIS of the Information or criminal charge for ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pinas City before the Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas City, is quoted in full below:

"SECTION 11. POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug in the following quantities, regardless of the degree of purity thereof:

(1) 10 grams or more of opium;

(2) 10 grams or more of morphine;

(3) 10 grams or more of heroin;

(4) 10 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride;

(5) 50 grams or more of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu";

(6) 10 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;

(7) 500 grams or more of marijuana; and

(8) 10 grams or more of other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDA) or "ecstasy", paramethoxyamphetamine (PMA), trimethoxyamphetamine (TMA), lysergic acid diethylamine (LSD), gamma hydroxyamphetamine (GHB), and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements, as determined and promulgated by the Board in accordance to Section 93, Article XI of this Act.

Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall be graduated as follows:

(1) Life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" is ten (10) grams or more but less than fifty (50) grams;

(2) Imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are five (5) grams or more but less than ten (10) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu", or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy", PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or three hundred (300) grams or more but less than five (hundred) 500) grams of marijuana; and

(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu", or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy", PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or less than three hundred (300) grams of marijuana."

Section 38 ("LABORATORY EXAMINATION OR TEST ON APPREHENDED/ARRESTED OFFENDERS") of RA 9165. provides that "SUBJECT TO SECTION 15 (USE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS) of this Act, any person apprehended or arrested for violating the provisions of this Act shall be subjected to screening laboratory examination or test within twenty-four (24) hours, IF THE APPREHENDING OR ARRESTING OFFICER HAS REASONABLE GROUND TO BELIEVE that the person apprehended or arrested, on account of PHYSICAL SIGNS OR SYMPTOMS OR OTHER VISIBLE OR OUTWARD MANIFESTATION, is under the influence of dangerous drugs. X x x".

The son of Remulla was charged with ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS under Section 11, and not with ILLEGAL USE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS under Section 15 referred to in Section 38.

Section 38 of RA 9165 is quoted in full below:

"SECTION 38. LABORATORY EXAMINATION OR TEST ON APPREHENDED/ARRESTED OFFENDERS. – SUBJECT TO SECTION 15 (USE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS) of this Act, any person apprehended or arrested for violating the provisions of this Act shall be subjected to screening laboratory examination or test within twenty-four (24) hours, IF THE APPREHENDING OR ARRESTING OFFICER HAS REASONABLE GROUND TO BELIEVE that the person apprehended or arrested, on account of PHYSICAL SIGNS OR SYMPTOMS OR OTHER VISIBLE OR OUTWARD MANIFESTATION, is under the influence of dangerous drugs. If found to be positive, the results of the SCREENING LABORATORY EXAMINATION or test SHALL BE CHALLENGED within fifteen (15) DAYS AFTER RECEIPT OF THE RESULT through a CONFIRMATORY TEST conducted in any ACCREDITED ANALYTICAL LABORATORY EQUIPMENT with a gas CHROMATOGRAPH/MASS SPECTROMETRY EQUIPMENT or some such modern and accepted method, IF CONFIRMED the same shall be PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE that such person has USED dangerous drugs, which is without prejudice for the prosecution for other violations of the provisions of this Act: PROVIDED, That A POSITIVE SCREENING LABORATORY TEST MUST BE CONFIRMED FOR IT TO BE VALID IN A COURT OF LAW."

As the prefatory part of the language of Section 38 provides, it is SUBJECT TO SECTION 15, which, in turn, refers to ILLEGAL USE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS.

Section 15 (USE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS), to which Section 38 is subject, is quoted in full below:

"SECTION 15. USE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS. – A person apprehended or arrested, who is found to be POSITIVE for USE of any dangerous drug, AFTER A CONFIRMATORY TEST, shall be imposed a penalty of a minimum of six (6) months REHABILITATION in a government center for the FIRST OFFENSE, subject to the provisions of Article VIII of this Act. If apprehended using any dangerous drug for the SECOND TIME, he/she shall suffer the penalty of IMPRISONMENT ranging from SIX (6) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY TO TWELVE (12) YEARS and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00): PROVIDED, That this Section SHALL NOT BE APPLICABLE where the person tested is ALSO FOUND to have in his/her POSSESSION such quantity of any dangerous drug provided for under SECTION 11 of this Act, IN WHICH CASE THE PROVISIONS STATED THEREIN SHALL APPLY."

The position of PDEA that MANDATORY DRUG TESTING was IRRELEVANT with respect to the case of the son of Remulla for ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS, as filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of LAS PINAS CITY before the Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas City, appears to be supported by the language of SECTION 38 in relation to SECTION 15 of RA 9165.

The son of Remulla was arrested, pursuant to a VALID WARRANTLESS ARREST under RULE 113 of the RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (during a "CONTROLLED DELIVERY" of imported dangerous drugs which is ANALOGOUS to a BUY-BUST OPERATION), for ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS under Section 11. He was NOT arrested under SECTION 15 for ILLEGAL USE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS.


READ THE RELATED JURISPRUDENCE -

(1) SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), petitioner, vs. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA), respondents. G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008.
(2) ATTY. MANUEL J. LASERNA, JR., petitioner, vs. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, respondents. G.R. No. 158633, November 3, 2008.
(3) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents. G.R. No. 161658, November 3, 2008.


LINK TO THE RELATED JURISPRUDENCE -
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/nov2008/gr_157870_2008.html


READ MY RELATED FACEBOOK POST -
https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=5495930807159897&id=100002290961177

Random, suspicionless and mandatory drug testing

On the matter of RANDOM AND SUSPICIONLESS MANDATORY DRUG TESTING, Paragraph (f) of Section 36 of REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, June 7, 2002, known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002", provides that "ALL PERSONS CHARGED BEFORE THE PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE WITH A CRIMINAL OFFENSE HAVING AN IMPOSSIBLE PENALTY OF IMPRISONMENT OF NOT LESS THAN SIX (6) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY SHALL HAVE TO UNDERGO A MANDATORY DRUG TEST. "

For reference, Section 36 of RA 9165 is quoted in full below:

"Section 36. Authorized Drug Testing. – Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of test results. The DOH shall take steps in setting the price of the drug test with DOH accredited drug testing centers to further reduce the cost of such drug test. The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of the drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. Drug test certificates issued by accredited drug testing centers shall be valid for a one-year period from the date of issue which may be used for other purposes. The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:

(a) Applicants for driver's license. – No driver's license shall be issued or renewed to any person unless he/she presents a certification that he/she has undergone a mandatory drug test and indicating thereon that he/she is free from the use of dangerous drugs;

(b) Applicants for firearm's license and for permit to carry firearms outside of residence. – All applicants for firearm's license and permit to carry firearms outside of residence shall undergo a mandatory drug test to ensure that they are free from the use of dangerous drugs: Provided, That all persons who by the nature of their profession carry firearms shall undergo drug testing;

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. – Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained in the school's student handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing: Provided, That all drug testing expenses whether in public or private schools under this Section will be borne by the government;

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. – Officers and employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the company's work rules and regulations, which shall be borne by the employer, for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;

(e) Officers and members of the military, police and other law enforcement agencies. – Officers and members of the military, police and other law enforcement agencies shall undergo an annual mandatory drug test;

(f) ALL PERSONS CHARGED BEFORE THE PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE WITH A CRIMINAL OFFENSE HAVING AN IMPOSSIBLE PENALTY OF IMPRISONMENT OF NOT LESS THAN SIX (6) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY SHALL HAVE TO UNDERGO A MANDATORY DRUG TEST; and

(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for dangerous drugs use shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15 of this Act."

For your information, in the case entitled "ATTY. MANUEL J. LASERNA, JR., petitioner, vs. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, respondents" ("Laserna Petition"), docketed as G.R. No. 158633, November 3, 2008, the Supreme Court declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL Paragraph (f) of Section 36 of RA 9165 for being violative of the right to PRIVACY, the right against UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE, and the right against SELF-INCRIMINATION.

The ratio decidendi of the Supreme Court in the Laserna Petition (GR 158633) is quoted below:

"x x x.

LASERNA PETITION
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d],
[f], and [g] of RA 9165)

Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.

We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor's office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and "suspicionless." In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their RIGHT TO PRIVACY. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' RIGHT TO PRIVACY guaranteed under SEC. 2, ART. III OF THE CONSTITUTION. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably FORCED TO INCRIMINATE THEMSELVES.

X x x."

The dispositive part of the Supreme Court decision in the LASERNA PETITION (GR 158633), which was CONSOLIDATED with the "SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY PETITION" (GR 157870) and the "AQUILINO PIMENTEL JR. PETITION" (GR 161658), is quoted below:

"WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declares Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned agencies are, accordingly, permanently enjoined from implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165. No costs.

SO ORDERED."


APPLICABLE LAW -

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, June 7, 2002, known and cited as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002".


Link to the Cited Jurisprudence -

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/nov2008/gr_157870_2008.html

"Caesar's wife" doctrine and Remulla

THE essence of "CAESARS WIFE" DOCTRINE, by analogy, should apply to REMULLA. For him to RESIGN, not only inhibit himself, would be a NOBLE ACT. -

JURISPRUDENCE:

"Under the foregoing circumstances, the Salonga doctrine that JUDICIAL "DISCRETION should be exercised in a way that the PEOPLE’S FAITH IN COURTS OF JUSTICE should not be impaired" becomes relevant. Given the prosecution’s APPARENT LACK OF FAITH IN RESPONDENT JUDGE, she was placed in a DIFFICULT POSITION. Should she acquit the accused, her decision will APPEAR TO BE TAINTED WITH BIAS. Such a situation is HIGHLY DETRIMENTAL, not only to the IMAGE of the TRIAL COURT, but to the INTEGRITY of the JUDICIAL SYSTEM. Like CAESAR’S WIFE, a judge must be BEYOND SUSPICION and that he should maintain nothing less than COLD NEUTRALITY AND IMPARTIALITY. Otherwise, the wisest course for a judge would be to DISQUALIFY HIMSELF. Thus, respondent judge SHOULD HAVE INHIBITED HERSELF from further hearing Criminal Cases Nos. 1316-P and 1317-P. At any rate, this issue has become moot considering that she had retired from the service on January 7, 2006."

G.R. Nos. 154150-51 December 10, 2007

NIDA ALEJO, FRANCISCA ALEJO and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,

vs.

THE HONORABLE JUDGE ERLINDA PESTAÑO-BUTED, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, ARTHUR SERNA and JONG LINSANGAN, respondents.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/dec2007/gr_154150_2007.html

EFFECT OF REVERSAL OF EXECUTED JUDGMENT

"xxx.

Secondly, the petitioners raise the question of res judicata and/or mootness of the present petition brought about by the Court of Appeals Decision in an entirely separate case, i.e., CA-G.R. CV No. 76188,[43] relating to a May 29, 2002 Order of the RTC denying respondent UBP's Motion to Quash Writ of Execution and Notice to Pay, whereby the appellate court affirmed the same paving the way for the implementation of the May 4, 2000 and June 10, 2000 Orders of the RTC. But the Court of Appeals' Resolution dated April 19, 2006 fully explained why the petitioners' position is patently erroneous, viz.:

Indeed, CA-GR CV No. 76188 is limited to the propriety of the EXECUTION of the partial summary judgment while CA-GR SP No. 67931 involves the validity of the PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT itself. EXECUTION of the questioned judgment WILL NOT PRECLUDE determination of the MERITS of such judgment x x x. In fact, the Rules of Court provides for RESTITUTION in case an EXECUTED JUDGMENT is REVERSED ON APPEAL, x x x Section 5 of Rule 39 reads:

SEC. 5. EFFECT OF REVERSAL OF EXECUTED JUDGMENT - Where the judgment executed is reversed totally or partially on appeal, the trial court, on motion, after the case is REMANDED to it, may issue such ORDERS OF RESTITUTION as EQUITY AND JUSTICE may warrant under the circumstances.

Thus, the complete release of a portion of the disputed account is no obstacle to our August 26, 2005 Decision. RESTITUTION of said amount is in order, the PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT which authorized its release having been NULLIFIED. [44]

Xxx."

FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 172552, September 02, 2015 ]

SPOUSES BRENDA GURANGO-REDOR, AND MORENO O. REDOR, AND MA. VICTORIA SAMONTE, JOINTLY WITH HER HUSBAND LAWRENCE C. SAMONTE, PETITIONERS, V. UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT

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