| DANILO L. PAREL, Petitioner,
- versus -
HEIRS OF SIMEON PRUDENCIO, Respondents. |
| G.R. No. 192217
Present:
CORONA, C.J., VELASCO, JR., DE CASTRO, DEL CASTILLO, PEREZ, JJ.
Promulgated:
March 2, 2011 |
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D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
x x x.
The Ruling of This Court
Danilo questions the following order of the CA:
Further, appellee is hereby ordered to pay appellant P2,0000/month [sic] for use or occupancy thereof from April 1988 until the former actually vacates the same, and the sum of P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees. And costs of suit.[14]
We resolve to grant the petition.
Danilo argues that he vacated the subject premises in April 1994 and claims that he stated this fact in his Comment on Simeon’s Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution dated May 9, 2007 and in his Motion for Reconsideration before this Court on June 12, 2006. He, thus, argues that the monthly rentals he should pay should only be from April 1988 to March 1994. He alleges that the CA committed an error in law in upholding the RTC Orders dated February 15, 2008 and July 31, 2008.
The questioned February 15, 2008 RTC Order stated:
x x x The defendant should have filed his comment on any appropriate pleading before the Court or in the Supreme Court at the time when he actually vacated the premises, but he did not. Perhaps, still hoping that the decision of the higher courts would be in his favor. All told, the defendant never intended to surrender the premises to the plaintiff even after he vacated it in April 1994. For this reason, he should now suffer the consequences.
It must be reiterated that this Court cannot now modify the decision of the higher courts which has now become final and executory.[15]
On July 31, 2008, the RTC ruled:
While the alleged supervening facts and circumstances which changed the situation of the parties in the instant case occurred before finality of the judgment, as in Morta vs. Bagagnan, the factual backdrop in the aforecited jurisprudence does not call for its application in the present case. In the cited case, the complainants have been ousted from the subject premises pursuant to the decision of the DARAB in two cases involving the same parcel of lot before the decision of the Supreme Court attained finality. In the case at bar, defendant claims to have vacated the subject premises as early as April 1994. This allegation however was belied by the fact that he did not turn[over] the premises to the plaintiff, a fact which has been stipulated by the parties. Defendant did not effectively and completely relinquish possession of the subject premises to the plaintiff thereby depriving the latter of effective possession and beneficial use thereof. To reiterate, defendant never intended to surrender the premises to the plaintiff even after he vacated it in 1994. Defendant’s failure to seasonably bring to the attention of either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of the supposed change in the circumstances of the parties cannot be excused. Had the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court been seasonably informed of such fact, the appellate Courts would have considered the same in their respective decisions. It must be noted that defendant had more than enough time from April 1994 to June 2006, a total of 12 years, within which he could have informed the two appellate Courts of the supposed change in the circumstances of the parties, but he did not. He only belatedly informed the Supreme Court in its motion for reconsideration after the latter Court issued it decision, in the hope of reducing the full payment of back rentals.[16]
It is true that Danilo should have brought to the Court’s attention the date he actually left the subject premises at an earlier time. The RTC is also correct in ruling that the judgment involved was already final and executory. However, it would be inequitable to order him to pay monthly rentals “until he actually vacates” when it has not been determined when he actually vacated the ground floor of Simeon’s house. He would be paying monthly rentals indefinitely.
The RTC should have determined via hearing if Danilo’s allegation were true and accordingly modified the period Danilo is to be held accountable for monthly rentals.
Unjustified delay in the enforcement of a judgment sets at naught the role of courts in disposing justiciable controversies with finality.[17] Once a judgment becomes final and executory, all the issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest. All that remains is the execution of the decision which is a matter of right.[18]
Banaga v. Majaducon,[19] however, enumerates the instances where a writ of execution may be appealed:
1) the writ of execution varies the judgment;
2) there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or unjust;
3) execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution;
4) it appears that the controversy has never been subject to the judgment of the court;
5) the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation thereof; or
6) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority;
In these exceptional circumstances, considerations of justice and equity dictate that there be some mode available to the party aggrieved of elevating the question to a higher court. That mode of elevation may be either by appeal (writ of error or certiorari), or by a special civil action of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus.
The instant case falls under one of the exceptions cited above. The fact that Danilo has left the property under dispute is a change in the situation of the parties that would make execution inequitable or unjust.
Moreover, there are exceptions that have been previously considered by the Court as meriting a relaxation of the rules in order to serve substantial justice. These are: (1) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (2) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (3) the merits of the case; (4) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (5) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (6) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.[20] We find that Danilo’s situation merits a relaxation of the rules since special circumstances are involved; to determine if his allegation were true would allow a final resolution of the case.
Applicable, too, is what Sec. 5, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court states as one of the powers of a court:
Section 5. Inherent powers of the courts.¾Every court shall have power:
x x x x
(g) To amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice.
Thus, the Court ruled in Mejia v. Gabayan:[21]
x x x The inherent power of the court carries with it the right to determine every question of fact and law which may be involved in the execution. The court may stay or suspend the execution of its judgment if warranted by the higher interest of justice. It has the authority to cause a modification of the decision when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it. The court is also vested with inherent power to stay the enforcement of its decision based on antecedent facts which show fraud in its rendition or want of jurisdiction of the trial court apparent on the record. (Emphasis supplied.)
The writ of execution sought to be implemented does not take into consideration the circumstances that merit a modification of judgment. Given that there is a pending issue regarding the execution of judgment, the RTC should have afforded the parties the opportunity to adduce evidence to determine the period within which Danilo should pay monthly rentals before issuing the writ of execution in the instant case. Should Danilo be unable to substantiate his claim that he vacated the premises in April 1994, the period to pay monthly rentals should be until June 19, 2007, the date he informed the CA that he had already left the premises.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 105709 is hereby SET ASIDE. The RTC, Branch 60 in Baguio City is ORDERED to determine the actual date petitioner left the subject premises before issuing the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 2493-R that will be based on the resolution of said issue.
SO ORDERED.
[1] Rollo, pp. 20-27. Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion and concurred in by Associate Justices Rebecca de Guia-Salvador and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe.
[2] Id. at 33.
[3] CA rollo, p. 21.
[4] Id.
[5] Id.
[6] Rollo, p. 22. Penned by Judge Pastor V. de Guzman.
[7] Id. at 103-112. Penned by Associate Justice Corona Ibay-Somera and concurred in by Associate Justices Portia Aliño Hormachuelos and Elvi John Asuncion.
[8] Id. at 129; 487 SCRA 405. Penned by then Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez and concurred in by then Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban and then Associate Justices Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Romeo S. Callejo, Sr. and Minita V. Chico-Nazario.
[9] Id. at 48-50.
[10] Id. at 51-54.
[11] Id. at 63.
[12] Id. at 69-70. Penned by Judge Edilberto T. Claravall.
[13] Id. at 92.
[14] Supra note 7.
[15] Rollo, p. 63.
[16] Id. at 69.
[17] Aguilar v. Manila Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 157911, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 354, 382.
[18] National Power Corporation v. Laohoo, G.R. No. 151973, July 23, 2009, 593 SCRA 564, 580.
[20] PCI Leasing and Finance v. Milan, G.R. No. 151215, April 5, 2010, 617 SCRA 258, 279.