The present action is devoid of merit.
For convenient reference, the dispositive portion of the judgment sought to be executed, namely our Decision in G.R. No. 90983, is re-quoted as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The private respondent is ORDERED to pay the petitioner the sum ofP252,000.00. Costs against the private respondent. [22]
As can be readily observed, the Court ordered the payment of the sum of P252,000.00, nothing more, nothing less. While the body of the Decision quoted the agreement of the parties stating the compensation as “20% contingent fee computed on the value to be recovered by favorable judgment on the cases,”[23] this Court specifically ordered BCBI to pay the Armovit Law Firm the aforementioned sum only, in addition to the P300,000.00 already paid. BCBI was therefore held to be liable for the total amount ofP552,000.00, representing 20% of the P2,760,000.00 received by BCBI as rental payments from GSIS. Significantly, the order upon GSIS to reimburse BCBI for rental payments constitutes the only monetary award in favor of BCBI in the final and executory Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 09361.[24] This Court confined its award to the said sum despite the fact that the Armovit Law Firm prayed for a much greater amount in its Memorandum:
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays for judgment declaring respondent trial court’s orders (Annexes “N” and “Q”) and respondent Court of Appeals’ confirmatory decisions (Annexes “R” and “T”) null and void ab initio, and instead directing that petitioner be paid his attorney’s fees of 20% of all monies and properties received and to be received by respondent BCBI in consequence of the final judgment secured for them by petitioner (Annex “E” in rel. annex “G”), as follows –
a) 20% of P2,760,000.00, the rental arrearages due and already received by BCBI, which amounts toP552,000.00, minus the P300,000.00 paid unto petitioner, or a net balance of P252,000.00 due petitioner;
b) 20% of P15 million, the market value of the commercial lots, multi-story buildings and residential lots and houses, already placed in BCBI’s possession, which amounts to P3,000,000.00 still due petitioner; and
c) 20% of P20 million worth of hotel and movie machines and equipment units, centralized air conditioning facilities, etc., to be paid in cash to BCBI,which amounts to P4,000,000.00 in unpaid fees to petitioner –
or, in the alternative, should trial of facts be deemed appropriate, that the case be remanded for further proceedings to receive petitioner’s evidence on the amount of his attorney’s fees due and unpaid, the same to be presided over by another trial judge chosen by proper raffle; that respondent judge Genaro Gines be prohibited from any further intervention in Civil Case No. 2794; and at all events, that treble costs be fixed and imposed upon respondents.
Petitioner also prays for such other reliefs as may be just and equitable in the premises.[25] (Emphases supplied.)
As stated above, the Armovit Law Firm did not file a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision in G.R. No. 90983 to protest the exclusion in the dispositive portion of several items it specifically prayed for in its pleadings. The Decision thus became final and executory on December 17, 1991.[26] The Armovit Law Firm cannot now ask the trial court, or this Court, to execute the Decision in G.R. No. 90983 as if these items prayed for were actually granted.
The Armovit Law Firm, in insisting on its claim, pins its entire case on the statement in the body of the Decision that “we do not find Atty. Armovit’s claim for ‘twenty percent of all recoveries’ to be unreasonable.”[27] In this regard, our ruling in Grageda v. Gomez [28] is enlightening:
It is basic that when there is a conflict between the dispositive portion or fallo of a Decision and the opinion of the court contained in the text or body of the judgment, the former prevails over the latter. An order of execution is based on the disposition, not on the body, of the Decision. This rule rests on the theory that the fallo is the final order while the opinion in the body is merely a statement ordering nothing.
Indeed, the foregoing rule is not without an exception. We have held that where the inevitable conclusion from the body of the decision is so clear as to show that there was a mistake in the dispositive portion, the body of the decision will prevail. x x x.[29]
Applying this ruling to the case at bar, it is clear that the statement in the body of our 1991 Decision (that “we do not find Atty. Armovit’s claim for ‘twenty percent of all recoveries’ to be unreasonable”[30]) is not an order which can be the subject of execution. Neither can we ascertain from the body of the Decision an inevitable conclusion clearly showing a mistake in the dispositive portion. On the contrary, the context in which the statement was used shows that it is premised on the interpretation that Atty. Armovit’s valid claim is only for an additional P252,000.00 in attorney’s fees:
Contingent fees are valid in this jurisdiction. It is true that attorney's fees must at all times be reasonable; however, we do not find Atty. Armovit's claim for "twenty percent of all recoveries" to be unreasonable. In the case of Aro v. Nañawa, decided in 1969, this Court awarded the agreed fees amid the efforts of the client to deny him fees by terminating his services. In parallel vein, we are upholding Atty. Armovit's claim for P252,000.00 more — pursuant to the contingent fee agreement — amid the private respondent's own endeavours to evade its obligations.[31] (Emphases supplied.)
The confusion created in the case at bar shows yet another reason why mere pronouncements in bodies of Decisions may not be the subject of execution: random statements can easily be taken out of context and are susceptible to different interpretations. When not enshrined in a clear and definite order, random statements in bodies of Decisions can still be the subject of another legal debate, which is inappropriate and should not be allowed in the execution stage of litigation.
Consequently, the trial court cannot be considered to have committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the execution of the statement in the body of our 1991 Decision that “we do not find Atty. Armovit’s claim for ‘twenty percent of all recoveries’ to be unreasonable.”[32] All things considered, it was the interpretation of petitioner Armovit Law Firm, not that of the trial court, which had the effect of varying the final and executory Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 90983. The instant Petition for Certiorari should therefore fail.