In the recent case of IN THE MATTER OF THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN THE COLUMNS OF MR. AMADO P. MACASAET PUBLISHED IN MALAYA DATED P20,000.00, in accordance with Sections 3(d) and 7, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The case stemmed from certain articles that appeared in the “Business Circuit” column of Amado P. Macasaet in the
Bribery in the Court
A lady justice (I have not been told whether she is from the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals) did not report for a day last week.
Her secretary received a gift-wrapped box about the size of two dozen milk cans.
Believing that the “gift” might be something perishable, she opened the box. Indeed, it was a gift – estimated at P10 million. Posthaste, the secretary informed the magistrate about the gift. She thought she was doing her job. The lady justice fired her instead.
She would not have anybody catch her accepting a bribe. But she practically did.
The stupidity here is that the bribe-giver – what else would we call him or her – did not check whether the lady justice was in the office or not. Better still he or she could have the box full of money delivered to her home. But then her family would get to know about and ask who was the kind soul that was so liberal with money – a boxful of it.
The Supreme Court cannot let this pass. A full investigation should be conducted. The magistrate who was sent the bribe should be impeached.
The gift gives proof to the pernicious rumor that the courts are dirty. This time, the lady justice is with a higher court.
The court is like a basket of apples. There a few which are rotten that makes the whole basket rotten.
The names and reputation of highly-respected jurists must be saved from suspicions they are thieves.
Here’s the clue
The Court employee who was fired by the lady jurist is a niece of another lady justice who earlier retired. The worker was inherited by the incumbent lady justice.
My problem with this report is that while my source is definite about the employee opening a gift-wrapped box that contained at least P10 million, he won’t confide to me the identity of the jurist.
Unless the employee who was fired talks against her boss – and she should as a matter of duty – we will never know who this justice really is. The members of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan are all called justices.
The head of the Office of Government Corporate Counsel is also honored by being addressed as such. So is the head of the Court of Tax Appeals.
Since the employee was fired for opening the box which she thought contained perishable goods but turned out there was an estimated P10 million in it, she should be loyal to her duty of telling the truth.
That way, she would have rendered a great service to the justice system. Without her talking, every lady with the title of Justice is suspect. There are more than a dozen of them in different courts but only one was caught red-handed taking a bribe. Her name should be known so that the Supreme Court can act swiftly on a clear case of bribery.
Otherwise, this case becomes one where the pot calls the kettle black. Or is that the reason the employee would not talk, that her former boss could spill the beans on her peers?
The Bribe Giver
I learned from some lawyers that the bribe money given to a lady justice came from a Chinese-Filipino businessman who has been criminally charged.
It is funny that the delivery of five boxes of money (I said only one earlier) coincided on the day the lady justice, obviously acting as ponente, acquitted the prospect.
The secretary of the lady justice who took the bribe made five trips to the guardhouse to pick up the boxes.
Incidentally, this secretary is a namesake of her aunt, a deceased associate justice of the Supreme Court.
I dare say that if her name is Cecilia, it is entirely possible that the lady justice is a member of the Supreme Court. The late justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma is the only lady justice I know who retired and died at a ripe old age and left behind a reputation of decency and integrity.
We are coming closer and closer to the truth. The lady justice shamed her court. She should resign or be impeached.
That is the only way the soiled reputation of the
Cecilia, please save the court
I have established the lady justice’s secretary who opened one of the five milk boxes containing bribe money is a niece of the late, respected and honorable Associate Justice Cecilia Muñoz Palma from Batangas.
The secretary is a niece of the late justice and a namesake.
Cecilia, you have a duty to honor the memory of your aunt, who, during her stay in the court, was known for having balls.
More important than that, you have a duty to save the sagging reputation of the Supreme Court.
Cecilia, you must tell the Court en banc everything you know about the money that was sent in five boxes to your boss.
Not in retaliation for your dismissal, but for no other reason than as a duty to your country and, I must again say, to honor the memory of your late illustrious aunt, a legal luminary and staunch defender of the Constitution.
The other reason you must spill the beans is that if you do not, other lady justices are suspects. That is not fair to them.
Wrong date, same facts
On verification, I discovered that the secretary of a lady justice of the Supreme Court who was said to have accepted five milk boxes of money, was fired as early as March. Not last week as I mistakenly reported.
It turns out that Cecilia Muñoz-Delis from Bicol picked up the last five boxes several times in March.
She never opened the first four boxes which she picked up from the guardhouse of the Court.
She opened the last and saw the money because the lady justice was absent on that day. Forthwith, she was fired. Cecilia, who is from Bicol, never opened any of the first four boxes delivered on various dates (I have not been told when). She picked up all of them from the Supreme Court guardhouse and left them with the lady justice. She wouldn’t dare open the first four because the lady justice was in her office. She opened the fifth one because the lady justice did not report for work on that day.
Cecilia thought that the gift-wrapped box contained some perishables like food. What she found was money instead. She was fired.
Whenever a gift for lady justice comes, she would order Cecilia to pick it up from the guardhouse. So the fifth she picked up was one of those errands.
Where is Cecilia?
I cannot get any information on the present whereabouts of Cecilia. However, if the Supreme Court has intentions to investigate what I have been saying, maybe the Chief Justice himself should find out where she could be sent an invitation to appear before an investigation group in the Court.
Better still, as I said, yesterday, Cecilia should disclose everything she knows regarding the box before the Court en banc.
Farthest thing from my mind is to embarrass the lady justice whose identity I do not know up to now.
It is my conviction that the Court should investigate reports of wrongdoing by any of its peers. Justice is served that way.
The Chief Justice and the rest of the justices should not have a problem finding out who she is.
It is a simple job of asking a clerk to go to personnel department of the Court and find out who Cecilia worked for.
Also on
1. On
2. We have gathered from three sources that you received a cash gift of P10 million after you issued the decision early September. Please comment.
3. We’re checking if this is accurate. Your secretary, who opened the gift-wrapped box thinking that it contained perishable items, found cash instead. It was after this incident that you removed her.
Upon receipt of the faxed letter, Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago called for ACA Marquez, showed him the letter of Dañguilan-Vitug, and requested him to tell Dañguilan-Vitug that she (Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago) had been consistent on her position in the Go case, that she never reversed herself, that she never received a cash gift, and that no secretary was terminated for opening a gift-wrapped box containing money. Accordingly, ACA Marquez went back to his office, called up Dañguilan-Vitug and told her what Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago told him.
Upon the request of Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago, the Chief Justice instructed ACA Marquez to have the 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st September 2007 Business Circuit columns of respondent Macasaet included in the
On
In her affidavit, Delis stated that she “had nothing to do with, nor did x x x have any knowledge of such alleged attempted bribery,” and that she executed her affidavit “to allow Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago to defend her honor,” and “for the purpose of correcting the erroneous information of Mr. Macasaet.”
That same morning, too, despite the prior telephone conversation between ACA Marquez and Dañguilan-Vitug, Newsbreak posted an on-line article written by Danguilan-Vitug herself and Aries Rufo, which was regularly updated, entitled “Supreme Court Justice Suspected of Accepting Payoff (update)” with the picture of Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago.
Later that morning, Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago called ACA Marquez to her office and gave him copies of her written statement “categorically deny(ing) the accusations and insinuations, all malicious and unfounded, published in Malaya and in Newsbreak;” and underscoring “that these are blatant lies clearly aimed at smearing and maligning my character and person, and the integrity of the Judiciary which (she has) been faithfully serving for 34 years now.” Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago also gave ACA Marquez copies of Delis’ letter to respondent Macasaet and her affidavit, which Delis herself had brought to Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago earlier that morning.
In the afternoon of
On
Upon evaluation of the columns “Business Circuit” of Amado P. Macasaet in the
WHEREFORE, Amado P. Macasaet is ORDERED to EXPLAIN why no sanction should be imposed on him for indirect contempt of court in accordance with Section 3(d), (Rule 71) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, within five (5) days from receipt hereof. Ynares-Santiago, J., no part.
The following day,
On
From
The Committee invited respondent Macasaet, Dañguilan-Vitug, Delis, and ACA Marquez to a preliminary meeting, in which they were requested to submit their respective affidavits which served as their testimonies on direct examination. They were then later cross-examined on various dates: respondent Macasaet on
AMADO P. MACASAET testified on
The pay-off was allegedly discovered when Cecilia Muñoz-Delis (not the Lady Justice’s secretary but a judicial staff officer V of the PET or Presidential Electoral Tribunal) who is a niece and namesake of retired Supreme Court Justice Cecilia Muñoz Palma, allegedly opened the “last” box (according to his column of
By his “own conclusion,” the boxes of money were delivered on different dates because “I don’t think a bribe giver will deliver five boxes at the same time” (87, tsn,
Macasaet testified that his “source” is not a relative of his, nor a government employee, certainly not an employee of the judiciary, and, that he (Macasaet) has known him for some 10 to 15 years (12-20, tsn,
Significantly, in his column of
He emphatically declared on the witness chair that he trusts his source “with my heart and soul” and believes his word “as coming straight out of the Bible” (94, 113, tsn,
Notwithstanding the lack of confirmation and the paucity of details as to the identity of the Lady Justice and of the High Court where she sits, Macasaet believes that “the bribery had actually taken place” because “I trust my source with my heart and soul” (93-94, 113, tsn,
He decided to go ahead and publish the story because he “thought that eventually my effort at consistently x x x exposing the alleged bribery, one day sooner or later somebody will come up and admit or deny (it). And I think that (was) what really happened” (29, tsn,
He found out that the Lady Justice involved is Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago of the Supreme Court, after he received a letter dated
So, when did the bribery happen? The date was never made certain, for in his first column of
However, the next day,
However, when he returned to the witness chair on
On
The following statements in Macasaet’s columns appear to the Supreme Court to be “innuendoes (that) tend, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice, within the purview of Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.”
1) From the column of Tuesday,
“The gift gives proof to the pernicious rumor that the courts are dirty. This time, the lady justice is with a higher court.
The court is like a basket of apples. There (are) a few which are rotten. That makes the whole basket rotten.
The names and reputation of highly-respected jurists must be saved from suspicion that they are thieves.
Her name should be known so that the Supreme Court can act swiftly on a clear case of bribery. Otherwise, this case becomes one where the pot calls the kettle black. Or, is that the reason the employee would not talk, that her former boss could spill the beans on her peers?”
2) From the column of Wednesday,
“The lady justice shamed her court. She should resign or be impeached. That is the only way the soiled reputation of the
3) From the column of Thursday,
“Cecilia x x x you have a duty to save the sagging reputation of the Supreme Court.”
Inasmuch as Macasaet’s snide remarks about the courts, particularly the Highest Court, and about the justices being suspected as thieves, appear to have [been] provoked by the rumored bribery in the Court, the Investigating Committee was constrained to find out how true the accusations were and whether the columnist had exercised due care and diligence in checking out the credibility of his informant and the veracity of the derogatory information fed to him before he published it in his columns in the Malaya.
Consequently, the Committee concluded –
In view of its tenuous underpinnings, we find the bribery story in Macasaet’s columns of September 18-21, 2007, and in Ms. Vitug’s Newsbreak issue of
x x x x
The Committee considers this case not just another event that should pass unnoticed for it has implications far beyond the allocated ramparts of free speech. Needless to say, that while we espouse the enjoyment of freedom of expression by media, particularly, it behooves it to observe great circumspection so as not to destroy reputations, integrity and character so dear to every individual, more so to a revered institution like the Supreme Court. Everyone deserves respect and dignity.
Finding sufficient basis to hold respondent Macasaet in indirect contempt of court, the Committee recommended –
The Committee finds that the statements of respondent Amado P. Macasaet about the Supreme Court in his “Business Circuit” columns in the September 18-21, 2007 issues of the newspaper
WHEREFORE, the Committee believes there exist valid grounds for this Honorable Court, if it is so minded, to cite Amado P. Macasaet for indirect contempt within the purview of Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. (Emphasis supplied)
In Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, the Court ruled that “[f]rom the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right (to free expression) is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. The realities of life in a complex society preclude, however, a literal interpretation. Freedom of expression is not absolute. It would be too much to insist that, at all times and under all circumstances, it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal values that press for recognition.”
In Lagunzad v. Vda. De Gonzales, it was held that while the right of freedom of expression occupies a preferred position in the hierarchy of civil liberties, it is not without limitations. As the revered Holmes once said, the limitation on one’s right to extend one’s fist is when it hits the nose of another.
In Zaldivar v. Gonzalez, the Court said that “freedom of speech and expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community.”
Judges have an affirmative duty to defend and uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary. The courts need to be able to sanction those who obstruct their processes. The judiciary itself must continue to be a voice that explains and preserves its own independence. The respect accorded to judges is an adjunct of the social-contract necessity for impartial judges in the creation of a civil society.
In Perkins v. Director of Prisons, the Court had an occasion to examine the fundamental foundations of the power to punish for contempt: “The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and, consequently, to the due administration of justice.”
In the 1995 case People v. Godoy, the Court, citing In Re: Vicente Sotto, had the opportunity to define the relations of the courts and of the press. Quoting the statements made by Judge Holmes in U.S. v. Sullen, the Court said:
The administration of justice and the freedom of the press, though separate and distinct, are equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the other. The press and the courts have correlative rights and duties and should cooperate to uphold the principles of the Constitution and laws, from which the former receives its prerogative and the latter its jurisdiction. x x x In a clear case where it is necessary in order to dispose of judicial business unhampered by publications which reasonably tend to impair the impartiality of verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice, the Court will not hesitate to exercise undoubted power to punish for contempt. This Court must be permitted to proceed with the disposition of its business in an orderly manner free from outside interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as an individual exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal. (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, in the more recent 2007 case Roxas v. Zuzuarregui, the Court en banc in a unanimous per curiam resolution imposed a P30,000 fine on Atty. Romeo Roxas for making “unfair and unfounded accusations against a member of this Court, and mocking the Court for allegedly being part of the wrongdoing and being a dispenser of injustice.” We found the letter of Atty. Roxas full of “contemptuous remarks that tended to degrade the dignity of the Court and erode public confidence that should be accorded to it.” We also said that his invocation of free speech and privacy of communication “will not, however, free him from liability. As already stated, his letter contained defamatory statements that impaired public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. The making of contemptuous statements directed against the Court is not an exercise of free speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be used to impair the independence and efficiency of courts or public respect therefore and confidence therein. Free expression must not be used as a vehicle to satisfy one’s irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy this Court and its magistrates.” Accordingly, Atty. Roxas was found guilty of indirect contempt of court and fined P30,000.00, with a warning that a repetition of a similar act would warrant a more severe penalty.
Respondent has absolutely no basis to call the Supreme Court a court of “thieves” and a “basket of rotten apples.” These publications directly undermine the integrity of the justices and render suspect the Supreme Court as an institution. Without bases for his publications, purely resorting to speculation and “fishing expeditions” in the hope of striking – or creating – a story, with utter disregard for the institutional integrity of the Supreme Court, he has committed acts that degrade and impede the orderly administration of justice.
Respondent Macasaet’s wanton disregard for the truth was exhibited by his apathetic manner of verifying the veracity of the information he had gathered for his
Respondent admited to having written his articles as means to “fish out” the Lady Justice involved in an alleged bribery fed to him by his source, with reckless disregard of whether or not such bribery indeed took place. It defies reason why any responsible journalist would go on to publish any material in a newspaper of general circulation without having ascertained even the five W’s and one H of the story.
That he could not, through his extensive network of informants, confirm the approximate date when the alleged bribery took place, the identities of the persons involved, or any other important detail, before he began his series of articles only leads to the rational conclusion that he did not care whether or not the story he published was true. His aim, as he admits, was to go on a fishing expedition to see if someone would confirm or deny his now clearly baseless accusations. This practice of “fishing” for information by publishing unverified information in a manner that leads the reading public to believe such is true cannot be tolerated.
Aggravating respondent’s affront to the dignity of the Court is his unwillingness to show any remorse or repentance for his contemptuous acts. In fact, as he made clear in his testimony before the Investigating Committee when asked what his thoughts were about his having published the instant articles, he replied that he was “happy in the sense that [he] did a job in [his] best lights and the effort ended up in the creation of [the investigating panel].”
Respondent claims that there is a violation of his right to due process. From the time his articles were published, no formal charge has been filed against him as required under Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Respondent fails to see, however, that under Section 4 of the same Rule, proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed, by an order or any other formal charge requiring respondent to show why he should not be punished for contempt. The Resolution dated
Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure pertinently provides:
SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt.
x x x x
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
x x x x
SEC. 7. Punishment for indirect contempt. – If the respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect contempt committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both. x x x (Underscoring supplied)
A free press is regarded as a key pillar of democracy. Reporters must be free to report, expose, and hold government officials and agencies – including an independent judiciary – accountable. Press attention surrounding the judiciary ensures public accountability. Such publicity acts as a check on judicial competence and integrity, exposes inefficiencies and irregularities, keeps vigil over various public interest cases, and puts pressure on responsible judicial officials. This freedom has been used and has benefited the cause of justice. The press has become an important actor – a judicial watchdog – in the ongoing judicial transformation. When properly validated, its acts are protected speech from an accepted function.
Freedom, however, has not guaranteed quality journalism. The press has been vulnerable to a host of legitimate criticisms such as incompetence, commercialism, and even corruption. By disproportionately informing the public about specific court processes, or by spreading unsubstantiated allegations about corruption and other forms of judicial misconduct, the press dramatically undermines the public’s faith in the courts and threatens the very foundation of our democratic government.
Oftentimes, journalists writing about the judiciary and court cases lack basic knowledge of the law and judicial procedures, on the basis of which they draw faulty conclusions which they pass on to their readers as gospel truths. Trial by publicity also influences the independence of judges as the public is fed with partial information and vocal opinions, and judges are pressured to decide in accordance with the public opinion. Faith in the judiciary is undermined when judges rule against the expectations of the public which has been brainwashed by dramatic reports and graphic comments. In some cases, unchecked rumors or allegations of irregularities are immediately published because journalists lack professional competence to verify the information, or are simply eager to break the news and attract a wider readership.
The role of the press in relation to the judiciary needs to be regulated. This can be done through voluntary codes of conduct on the part of the press and through judicial policies, such as the rule on sub judice and contempt of court rulings. The absence of clear voluntary codes developed by the press, as its self-regulator, strengthens the need for the Court to use its power in the meantime to cite critics for contempt. This is necessary in cases where such criticism is obviously malicious or in violation of the sub judice rule, or where there is an evident attempt to influence the outcome of a case. Judges have the duty to defend and uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary. They should sanction those who obstruct or impede the judicial processes. The effective administration of justice may only be realized with the strong faith and confidence of the public in the competence and integrity of the judiciary, free from political and popular pressure.
Criticism at every level of government is certainly welcome. After all, it is an essential part of the checks and balances in our republican system of government. However, criticisms should not impede or obstruct an integral component of our republican institutions from discharging its constitutionally-mandated duties.
As the Court said in In Re: Almacen:
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect critical evaluation of their performance. For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizen whom it is expected to serve.
x x x x
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. x x x
All told, illegitimate and uninformed criticisms against the courts and judges, those which cross the line and attempt to subvert the judicial process, must be avoided. They do a great disservice to the Constitution. They seriously mislead the public as to the proper functioning of the judiciary. While all citizens have a right to scrutinize and criticize the judiciary, they have an ethical and societal obligation not to cross that too important line.
Atty. MANUEL J. LASERNA JR.
LCM LAW, Las Pinas City, Philippines
lcmlaw@gmail.com
See:
Blackstone, W., Commentaries, 145 (1876).
Record of the Constitutional Commission: Proceedings and Debates (1987), p. 758.
De Jesus, M.Q., Overview, Press Freedom in the
Teodoro, L.V., Survey of Media, Press Freedom in the
Guidebook for Journalists Covering the Courts: Strengthening Judiciary-Media Relations, Asian Institute of Journalism and Communication (2004), p. 13.
Jacobson, M.K., Assault on the Judiciary: Judicial Response to Criticism Post-Schiavo, 61 U.
Attorney-General v. Leveller Magazine, Ltd., AC 440 (1979); Scott v. Scott, AC 417 (1913).
Coker, H.C., Responding to Judicial Criticism, 73
Blatz, K., The State of the Judiciary, 62 Bench & B.
Constitution (1987), Art. VIII, Sec. 1.
See Abrahamson, S.S., Remarks of the Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson before the American Bar Association Commission on the Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence, Washington, D.C.,
Kelson, S., Judicial
G.R. No. L-27833,
Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, id. at 858.
G.R. No. L-32066,
In Re: Lozano, 54 Phil. 801 (1929).
G.R. Nos. 79690-707 & L-80578,
Zaldivar v. Gonzalez, id. at 354, citing the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Pennekamp v. Florida, 328
Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by the UN General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI),
E.T.S. No. 5, adopted
Adopted at
Adopted at
Locke, J., Second Treatise of Government (1689), §§ 124-126, reprinted in Locke, J., Political Writings 325 (1985 ed.).
In the matter of the proceedings against Marcelino Aguas for contempt of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, id. at 2.
In Re: Amzi B. Kelly, 35 Phil. 944 (1916).
In Re: Vicente Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 (1949).
In the Matter of Proceedings for Disciplinary Action Against Atty. Wenceslao Laureta and of Contempt Proceedings Against Eva Maravilla-Illustre in G.R. No. 68635, entitled “Eva Maravilla-Illustre vs. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,” G.R. No. 68635,
Perkins v. Director of Prisons, id. at 274, citing Ex parte Terry, 128 US 225, 32 L Ed., 405; In re Kelly, 35 Phil. 944; State v. Magee Publishing Company, 38 ALR 142, 144.
4 Lewis’ Bl. Com., Sec. 286, p. 1675; Oswald, Contempt, Canadian ed., pp. 1-3, 6 RCL 489; State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 390; State ex rel. Rodd v. Verage, 177 Wis. 295, 23 ALR 491, 187 NW 830; and People ex rel. Brundage v. Peters, 305 Ill. 223; 26 ALR 16, 137 NE 118.
In Re: Vicente Sotto, supra note 59.
Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-24864,
People v. Godoy, supra note 71, at 1003.
G.R. Nos. 152072 & 152104,
Khanna, H.R., Freedom of Expression with Particular Reference to Freedom of the Media, 2 SCC (Jour) 1 (1982).
Rollo, pp. 344-345; Report and Recommendation (Re: In the Matter of the Allegations Contained in the Columns of Mr. A.P. Macasaet Published in
In Re: Emil P. Jurado, A.M. No. 93-2-037 SC,
Constitution (1987), Art. III, Sec. 14 (2).
