Considering the tendency of Filipino trial lawyers to file motions for inhibition of judges who have denied their incidental prayers or against whom they have filed certiorari petitions, perhaps it is wise to reiterate the holding of the Philippine Supreme Court in the case of PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR, respondents, G.R. No. 129120, July 2, 1999, which stated, inter alia, that mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough; that there should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality; that bare allegations of partiality and prejudgment will not suffice; and that bias and prejudice cannot be presumed especially if weighed against a judge‘s sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer justice . Thus:
"X x x.
In a string of cases decided by this Court we said that while bias and prejudice, which are relied upon by petitioner, have been recognized as valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of the judge under Rule 137, sec.1, par. 2, the rudimentary rule is that mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality. Bare allegations of partiality and prejudgment will not suffice. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed especially if weighed against a judge‘s sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer justice without respect to person and do equal right to the poor and the rich.
In our more recent decisions, we reiterated parameters that mere suspicion that a judge was partial to a party is not enough; that there should be adequate evidence to prove the charge; that there must be showing that the judge had an interest, personal or otherwise, in the prosecution of the case at bar; and that to be disqualifying, the bias and prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case.
The belief of the prosecution that Pacificador will be acquitted by Judge Duremdes for the same reasons he granted bail, has no basis and unduly imputes bias. An erroneous ruling on the grant of bail does not constitute evidence of bias. Aptly stated by respondent court, the erroneous order issued by the judge can be remedied and was actually corrected, as in this case militating against the disqualification of the judge on the ground of bias and partiality.
To disqualify a judge on the ground of bias and prejudice, the movant must prove the same by clear and convincing evidence. Mere allegation and perception of bias from tenor and the language of a judge alone is insufficient to show prejudgment. Neither can the perception that the pleadings of the parties have become personal and loaded with insulting innuendoes be the basis for inhibition. Allowing inhibition for these reasons would open the flood gates to forum-shopping. Unless, there is concrete proof that a judge has a personal interest in the case and his bias is shown to have stemmed from an extra-judicial source, this Court shall always commence from the presumption that a judge shall decide on the merits of a case with an unclouded vision of its facts.
X x x."
