ERWIN TULFO Vs. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES and ATTY. CARLOS T. SO, G.R. No.
161032; and the accompanying case: SUSAN
CAMBRI, REY SALAO, JOCELYN BARLIZO, and PHILIP PICHAY
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and CARLOS SO, G.R. No. 161176, September 16, 2008
“x x x.
Having discussed the issue of qualified privileged
communication and the matter of the identity of the person referred to in the
subject articles, there remains the petition of the editors and president
of Remate, the paper on which the subject articles appeared.
In sum, petitioners
Cambri, Salao, Barlizo, and Pichay all claim that they had no participation in
the editing or writing of the subject articles, and are thus not liable.
The argument must
fail.
The language of Art. 360 of the RPC is plain. It lists
the persons responsible for libel:
Art. 360. Persons
responsible.Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the publication
or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be
responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or
business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be
responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he
were the author thereof.
The claim that they had no participation does not shield
them from liability. The provision in the RPC does not provide absence of
participation as a defense, but rather plainly and specifically states the
responsibility of those involved in publishing newspapers and other
periodicals. It is not a matter of whether or not they conspired in
preparing and publishing the subject articles, because the law simply so states
that they are liable as they were the author.
Neither the publisher nor the editors can disclaim liability
for libelous articles that appear on their paper by simply saying they had no
participation in the preparation of the same. They cannot say that Tulfo
was all alone in the publication of Remate, on which the subject
articles appeared, when they themselves clearly hold positions of authority in
the newspaper, or in the case of Pichay, as the president in the publishing
company.
As Tulfo cannot simply say that he is not liable because he
did not fulfill his responsibility as a journalist, the other petitioners
cannot simply say that they are not liable because they did not fulfill their
responsibilities as editors and publishers. An editor or manager of a
newspaper, who has active charge and control of its management, conduct, and
policy, generally is held to be equally liable with the owner for the
publication therein of a libelous article. (Smith v. Utley, 92 Wis 133, 65 NW 744; Faulkner v. Martin, 133 NJL 605, 45
A2d 596; World Pub. Co. v. Minahan,
70 Okla 107, 173 P 815).
On the theory that it is the duty of the editor or manager
to know and control the contents of the paper, it is held that said person
cannot evade responsibility by abandoning the duties to employees, so
that it is immaterial whether or not the editor or manager knew the contents of
the publication. (Faulkner,
supra; Goudy v. Dayron Newspapers, Inc., 14 Ohio App 2d 207, 43 Ohio Ops 2d 444, 237 NE2d 909).
In Fermin v.
People of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 157643, March 20, 2008, the Court held that the publisher could not
escape liability by claiming lack of participation in the preparation and
publication of a libelous article. The Court cited U.S. v. Ocampo,
stating the rationale for holding the persons enumerated in Art. 360 of the RPC
criminally liable, and it is worth reiterating:
According to the legal doctrines and jurisprudence of
the United States, the printer of a publication containing libelous matter is
liable for the same by reason of his direct connection therewith and his
cognizance of the contents thereof. With regard to a publication in which
a libel is printed, not only is the publisher but also all other persons who in
any way participate in or have any connection with its publication are liable
as publishers.
x x x x
In the case of State
vs. Mason (26 L.R.A., 779; 26 Oreg., 273, 46 Am. St. Rep., 629), the
question of the responsibility of the manager or proprietor of a newspaper was
discussed. The court said, among other things (pp. 782, 783):
The question then recurs as to whether the manager or
proprietor of a newspaper can escape criminal responsibility solely on the
ground that the libelous article was published without his knowledge or
consent. When a libel is published in a newspaper, such fact alone is
sufficient evidence prima facie to charge the manager or proprietor with the
guilt of its publication.
The manager and proprietor of a newspaper, we think ought to
be held prima facie criminally for whatever appears in his paper; and it should
be no defense that the publication was made without his knowledge or consent, x
x x.
One who furnishes the means for carrying on the publication
of a newspaper and entrusts its management to servants or employees whom he
selects and controls may be said to cause to be published what actually
appears, and should be held responsible therefore, whether he was individually
concerned in the publication or not, x x x. Criminal responsibility for
the acts of an agent or servant in the course of his employment necessarily
implies some degree of guilt or delinquency on the part of the publisher; x x
x.
We think, therefore, the mere fact that the libelous article
was published in the newspaper without the knowledge or consent of its proprietor
or manager is no defense to a criminal prosecution against such proprietor or
manager.
In the case of Commonwealth
vs. Morgan (107 Mass., 197), this same question was considered and the
court held that in the criminal prosecution of a publisher of a newspaper in
which a libel appears, he is prima facie presumed to have
published the libel, and that the exclusion of an offer by the defendant to
prove that he never saw the libel and was not aware of its publication until it
was pointed out to him and that an apology and retraction were afterwards
published in the same paper, gave him no ground for exception. In this
same case, Mr. Justice Colt, speaking for the court, said:
It is the duty of the proprietor of a public paper, which
may be used for the publication of improper communications, to use reasonable
caution in the conduct of his business that no libels be
published. (Whartons Criminal Law, secs. 1627, 1649; 1 Bishops Criminal
Law, secs. 219, 221; People vs. Wilson, 64 Ill., 195; Commonwealth vs. Damon,
136 Mass., 441.)
The above doctrine is also the doctrine established by the
English courts. In the case of Rex vs. Walter (3 Esp., 21), Lord Kenyon
said that he was clearly of the opinion that the proprietor of a newspaper was
answerable criminally as well as civilly for the acts of his servants or agents
for misconduct in the management of the paper.
This was also the opinion of Lord Hale, Mr. Justice Powell,
and Mr. Justice Foster.
Lofft, an English author, in his work on Libel and Slander, said:
An information for libel will lie against the publisher of a
papers, although he did not know of its being put into the paper and stopped
the sale as soon as he discovered it.
In the case of People
vs. Clay (86 Ill., 147) the court held that
A person who makes a defamatory
statement to the agent of a newspaper for publication, is liable both civilly
and criminally, and his liability is shared by the agent and all others who aid
in publishing it. [U.S. v.
Ocampo, 18 Phil. 1, 50-52 (1910)].
X x x.”
