Disqualification cases; rule of succession applies (Sec. 44, Local Government Code)

In DISQUALIFICATION CASES, if the winning candidate is INELIGIBLE OR DISQUALIFIED, the COMELEC is NOT EMPOWERED by law and jurisprudence TO PROCLAIM AS WINNER the candidate who obtained THE SECOND HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES.

(The doctrine applies to the DISQUALIFICATION CASE against Marcos Jr. pending in the Supreme Court, assuming the Court disqualifies him) -

JURISPRUDENCE:

In the 2006 case decided by the Supreme Court en banc in the case of DATU ISRAEL SINSUAT, ET. AL. VS. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET. AL., docketed as GR NO. 169106, June 23, 2006, 525 Phil. 473 and written by Justice Leonardo Quisumbing, the Court held that it was a SETTLED DOCTRINE that the COMELEC was NOT empowered by law and jurisprudence TO PROCLAIM as winner the candidate who obtained the SECOND HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES in case the winning candidate was INELIGIBLE OR DISQUALIFIED.

According to the Court, there were two requisites for the EXCEPTION to the above-mentioned general rule, to wit:

(1) the candidate who OBTAINED THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES WAS DISQUALIFIED; and

(2) the ELECTORATE WAS FULLY AWARE in fact and in law of the CANDIDATE'S DISQUALIFICATION, so as to bring such awareness within the realm of NOTORIETY, but WOULD NONETHELESS CAST THEIR VOTES IN FAVOR OF THE INELIGIBLE CANDIDATE.

In the case at bar, the COMPLAINT FOR DISQUALIFICATION of the candidate Gunsi was FILED BEFORE THE ELECTION but the COMELEC en banc DISQUALIFIED HIM SUBSEQUENT TO THE ELECTION.

Thus, WHEN THE ELECTORATE VOTED Gunsi for mayor on May 10, 2004, it was UNDER THE BELIEF THAT HE WAS QUALIFIED.

There was NO PRESUMPTION THAT THE ELECTORATE AGREED to the INVALIDATION of their votes as STRAY VOTES IN CASE of Gunsi’s DISQUALIFICATION.

The Court DID NOT adhere to petitioner Israel’s contention that the votes cast in favor of Gunsi were STRAY VOTES.

The Court held that the SUBSEQUENT FINDING of the COMELEC en banc that Gunsi WAS INELIGIBLE DID NOT RETROACT TO THE DATE OF THE ELECTION SO AS TO INVALIDATE the votes cast for him.

At the time of the election, he was NOT NOTORIOUSLY KNOWN BY THE PUBLIC TO BE INELIGIBLE to run for mayor.

Conformably then, according to the Supreme Court, the RULES ON SUCCESSION under the LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE WAS APPLICABLE, thus,

"SECTION 44. PERMANENT VACANCIES in the Office of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor.—If a PERMANENT VACANCY occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. . . .

x x x x.

For purposes of this Chapter, a PERMANENT VACANCY arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, FAILS TO QUALIFY, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office."


Considering that Gunsi had FAILED TO QUALIFY as mayor of South Upi, the PROCLAIMED VICE-MAYOR SUCCEEDED HIM AS MAYOR.


LAWS AND CASES CITED:

Omnibus Election Code, Art. XX, Sec. 241.

Local Government Code of the Philippines, SECTION 44.

COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 18, Sec. 13(b).

Chu v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 135423, November 29, 1999, 319 SCRA 482, 491.

Patoray v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 125798, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 470, 480.

Lucman v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 166229, June 29, 2005, 462 SCRA 299, 308.

Dumayas, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 141952-53, April 20, 2001, 357 SCRA 358, 367.

Bautista v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 154796-97, October 23, 2003, 414 SCRA 299, 323-324.

Grego v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 125955, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 481, 501.

Domino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999, 310 SCRA 546, 575.

Source:

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/jun2006/gr_169106_2006.html#fnt26