Gender equality and the use of surname

"xxx.

The fundamental equality of women and men before the law shall be ensured by the State. This is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution,51 a statute,52 and an international convention to which the Philippines is a party.

In 1980, the Philippines became a signatory to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and is thus now part of the Philippine legal system. As a state party to the Convention, the Philippines bound itself to the following:

Article 2

. . . .

(f) to take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women;

. . . .

Article 5

. . . .

(a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women[.]53

Non-discrimination against women is also an emerging customary norm. Thus, the State has the duty to actively modify what is in its power to modify, to ensure that women are not discriminated.

Accordingly, Article II, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution reiterated the State's commitment to ensure gender equality:

SECTION 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.

In keeping with the Convention, Article II, Section 14 of the Constitution requires that the State be active in ensuring gender equality. This provision is even more noticeably proactive than the more widely-invoked equal protection and due process clauses under the Bill of Rights. In Racho v. Tanaka,54 this Court observed:

This constitutional provision provides a more active application than the passive orientation of Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution does, which simply states that no person shall "be denied the equal protection of the laws." Equal protection, within the context of Article III, Section 1 only provides that any legal burden or benefit that is given to men must also be given to women. It does not require the State to actively pursue "affirmative ways and means to battle the patriarchy — that complex of political, cultural, and economic factors that ensure women's disempowerment."55 (Citation omitted)

Article II, Section 14 implies the State's positive duty to actively dismantle the existing patriarchy by addressing the culture that supports it.

With the Philippines as a state party to the Convention, the emerging customary norm, and not least of all in accordance with its constitutional duty, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7192, or the Women in Development and Nation Building Act. Reiterating Article II, Section 14, the law lays down the steps the government would take to attain this policy:

SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. — The State recognizes the role of women in nation building and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. The State shall provide women rights and opportunities equal to that of men.

To attain the foregoing policy:

(1) A substantial portion of official development assistance funds received from foreign governments and multilateral agencies and organizations shall be set aside and utilized by the agencies concerned to support programs and activities for women;

(2) All government departments shall ensure that women benefit equally and participate directly in the development programs and projects of said department, specifically those funded under official foreign development assistance, to ensure the full participation and involvement of women in the development process; and

(3) All government departments and agencies shall review and revise all their regulations, circulars, issuances and procedures to remove gender bias therein.56

Courts, like all other government departments and agencies, must ensure the fundamental equality of women and men before the law. Accordingly, where the text of a law allows for an interpretation that treats women and men more equally, that is the correct interpretation.

Thus, the Regional Trial Court gravely erred when it held that legitimate children cannot use their mothers' surnames. Contrary to the State policy, the trial court treated the surnames of petitioner's mother and father unequally when it said:

In the case at bar, what the petitioner wishes is for this Court to allow him to legally change is [sic] his given and registered first name from Anacleto III to Abdulhamid and to altogether disregard or drop his registered surname, Alanis, the surname of his natural and legitimate father, and for him to use as his family name the maiden surname of his mother Ballaho, which is his registered middle name, which petitioner claims and in fact presented evidence to be the name that he has been using and is known to be in all his records.

In denying the herein petition, this Court brings to the attention of the petitioner that, our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father. The Family Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the father's surname. Legitimate children, such as the petitioner in this case, has [sic] the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on Surnames, and it is so provided by law that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.57 (Citations omitted)

This treatment by the Regional Trial Court was based on Article 174 of the Family Code, which provides:

ARTICLE 174. Legitimate children shall have the right:

(1) To bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on Surnames[.]

In turn, Article 364 of the Civil Code provides:

ARTICLE 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.

The Regional Trial Court's application of Article 364 of the Civil Code is incorrect. Indeed, the provision states that legitimate children shall "principally" use the surname of the father, but "principally" does not mean "exclusively." This gives ample room to incorporate into Article 364 the State policy of ensuring the fundamental equality of women and men before the law, and no discernible reason to ignore it. This Court has explicitly recognized such interpretation in Alfon v. Republic:58

The only reason why the lower court denied the petitioner's prayer to change her surname is that as legitimate child of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon she should principally use the surname of her father invoking Art. 364 of the Civil Code. But the word "principally" as used in the codal-provision is not equivalent to "exclusively" so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its mother to which it is equally entitled. Moreover, this Court in Haw Liong vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-21194, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 677, 679, said:

"The following may be considered, among others, as proper or reasonable causes that may warrant the grant of a petitioner for change of name; (1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a consequence of a change of status, such as when a natural child is acknowledged or legitimated; and (3) when the change is necessary to avoid confusion (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed., Vol. 1, p. 660)."59

Given these irrefutable premises, the Regional Trial Court patently erred in denying petitioner's prayer to use his mother's surname, based solely on the word "principally" in Article 364 of the Civil Code.

Xxx."


G.R. No. 216425, November 11, 2020

ANACLETO BALLAHO ALANIS HI, PETITIONER, V. COURT OF APPEALS, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, AND HON. GREGORIO Y. DE LA PENA III, PRESIDING JUDGE, BR. 12, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ZAMBOANGA CITY, RESPONDENTS


https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/nov2020/gr_216425_2020.html