The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
The equivalent provisions in the next preceding Constitution did not explicitly require this oath from the President. In the 1973 Constitution, for instance, the provision simply gives the President control over the ministries.[149] A similar language, not in the form of the President's oath, was present in the 1935 Constitution, particularly in the enumeration of executive functions.[150] By 1987, executive power was codified not only in the Constitution, but also in the Administrative Code:[151]
SECTION 1. Power of Control. — The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, the duty to faithfully execute the laws of the land is inherent in executive power and is intimately related to the other executive functions. These functions include the faithful execution of the law in autonomous regions;[152] the right to prosecute crimes;[153] the implementation of transportation projects;[154] the duty to ensure compliance with treaties, executive agreements and executive orders;[155] the authority to deport undesirable aliens;[156] the conferment of national awards under the President's jurisdiction;[157] and the overall administration and control of the executive department.[158]
These obligations are as broad as they sound, for a President cannot function with crippled hands, but must be capable of securing the rule of law within all territories of the Philippine Islands and be empowered to do so within constitutional limits. Congress cannot, for instance, limit or take over the President's power to adopt implementing rules and regulations for a law it has enacted.[159]
More important, this mandate is self-executory by virtue of its being inherently executive in nature.[160] As Justice Antonio T. Carpio previously wrote,[161]
[i]f the rules are issued by the President in implementation or execution of self-executory constitutional powers vested in the President, the rule-making power of the President is not a delegated legislative power. The most important self-executory constitutional power of the President is the President's constitutional duty and mandate to "ensure that the laws be faithfully executed." The rule is that the President can execute the law without any delegation of power from the legislature.
The import of this characteristic is that the manner of the President's execution of the law, even if not expressly granted by the law, is justified by necessity and limited only by law, since the President must "take necessary and proper steps to carry into execution the law."[162] Justice George Malcolm states this principle in a grand manner:[163]
The executive should be clothed with sufficient power to administer efficiently the affairs of state. He should have complete control of the instrumentalities through whom his responsibility is discharged. It is still true, as said by Hamilton, that "A feeble executive implies a feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be in practice a bad government." The mistakes of State governments need not be repeated here.
x x x x
Every other consideration to one side, this remains certain — The Congress of the United States clearly intended that the Governor-General's power should be commensurate with his responsibility. The Congress never intended that the Governor-General should be saddled with the responsibility of administering the government and of executing the laws but shorn of the power to do so. The interests of the Philippines will be best served by strict adherence to the basic principles of constitutional government.
In light of this constitutional duty, it is the President's prerogative to do whatever is legal and necessary for Philippine defense interests. It is no coincidence that the constitutional provision on the faithful execution clause was followed by that on the President's commander-in-chief powers,[164] which are specifically granted during extraordinary events of lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. And this duty of defending the country is unceasing, even in times when there is no state of lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. At such times, the President has full powers to ensure the faithful execution of the laws.
It would therefore be remiss for the President and repugnant to the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution to do nothing when the call of the moment requires increasing the military's defensive capabilities, which could include forging alliances with states that hold a common interest with the Philippines or bringing an international suit against an offending state.
The context drawn in the analysis above has been termed by Justice Arturo D. Brion's Dissenting Opinion as the beginning of a "patent misconception."[165] His dissent argues that this approach taken in analyzing the President's role as executor of the laws is preceded by the duty to preserve and defend the Constitution, which was allegedly overlooked.[166]
In arguing against the approach, however, the dissent grossly failed to appreciate the nuances of the analysis, if read holistically and in context. The concept that the President cannot function with crippled hands and therefore can disregard the need for Senate concurrence in treaties[167] was never expressed or implied. Rather, the appropriate reading of the preceding analysis shows that the point being elucidated is the reality that the President's duty to execute the laws and protect the Philippines is inextricably interwoven with his foreign affairs powers, such that he must resolve issues imbued with both concerns to the full extent of his powers, subject only to the limits supplied by law. In other words, apart from an expressly mandated limit, or an implied limit by virtue of incompatibility, the manner of execution by the President must be given utmost deference. This approach is not different from that taken by the Court in situations with fairly similar contexts.
Thus, the analysis portrayed by the dissent does not give the President authority to bypass constitutional safeguards and limits. In fact, it specifies what these limitations are, how these limitations are triggered, how these limitations function, and what can be done within the sphere of constitutional duties and limitations of the President.:
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016 ]
RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, FRANCISCO "DODONG" NEMENZO, JR., SR. MARY JOHN MANANZAN, PACIFICO A. AGABIN, ESTEBAN "STEVE" SALONGA, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., EVALYN G. URSUA, EDRE U. OLALIA, DR. CAROL PAGADUAN-ARAULLO, DR. ROLAND SIMBULAN, AND TEDDY CASINO, PETITIONERS, VS. EXECUTIVE PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE SECRETARY VOLTAIRE GAZMIN, OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERT DEL ROSARIO, JR., DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO ABAD, AND ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL EMMANUEL T. BAUTISTA, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 212444]
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN), REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M. REYES, JR., BAYAN MUNA PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES NERI J. COLMENARES AND CARLOS ZARATE, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES LUZ ILAGAN AND EMERENCIANA DE JESUS, ACT TEACHERS PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE ANTONIO L. TINIO, ANAKPAWIS PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE FERNANDO HICAP, KABATAAN PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE TERRY RIDON, MAKABAYANG KOALISYON NG MAMAMAYAN (MAKABAYAN), REPRESENTED BY SATURNINO OCAMPO AND LIZA MAZA, BIENVENIDO LUMBERA, JOEL C. LAMANGAN, RAFAEL MARIANO, SALVADOR FRANCE, ROGELIO M. SOLUTA, AND CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, PETITIONERS, VS. DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (DND) SECRETARY VOLTAIRE GAZMIN, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERT DEL ROSARIO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL EMMANUEL T. BAUTISTA, DEFENSE UNDERSECRETARY PIO LORENZO BATINO, AMBASSADOR LOURDES YPARRAGUIRRE, AMBASSADOR J. EDUARDO MALAYA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE UNDERSECRETARY FRANCISCO BARAAN III, AND DND ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR STRATEGIC ASSESSMENTS RAYMUND JOSE QUILOP AS CHAIRPERSON AND MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE NEGOTIATING PANEL FOR THE PHILIPPINES ON EDCA, RESPONDENTS.
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON, ELMER LABOG, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE), REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT FERDINAND GAITE, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT JOSELITO USTAREZ, NENITA GONZAGA, VIOLETA ESPIRITU, VIRGINIA FLORES, AND ARMANDO TEODORO, JR., PETITIONERS-IN-INTERVENTION,
RENE A.Q. SAGUISAG, JR., PETITIONER-IN-INTERVENTION.
D E C I S I O N
SERENO, C.J.:
https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/61546
