🏛️ Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., G.R. No. 103702, December 6, 1994
Ponente: Justice Jose Vitug
Citation: Lawphil.net link
Counsel for Petitioner: Atty. Manuel Laserna Jr.
I. Case Background and Factual Antecedents
In 1959, then-President Carlos P. Garcia issued Executive Order No. 353, creating the Municipal District of San Andres, carved out of the territory of San Narciso, Quezon. This included the barrios of San Andres, Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy, Camflora, Tala, and various sitios.
Subsequently, Executive Order No. 174 issued by President Diosdado Macapagal on October 5, 1965, converted San Andres into a fifth-class regular municipality effective July 1, 1963, pursuant to RA 1515.
For almost three decades, San Andres operated as an independent municipality. However, on June 5, 1989, the Municipality of San Narciso, through its counsel Atty. Manuel Laserna Jr., filed a petition for quo warranto and prohibition against San Andres’s elected officials, asserting that its creation was unconstitutional, as it was done by executive fiat without legislative enactment. The action relied on the doctrine laid down in Pelaez v. Auditor General (1965), which held that only Congress may create municipalities.
II. Core Issues
• Was the creation of San Andres via EO 353 and EO 174 valid, or was it unconstitutional under Pelaez?
• Has the action been barred by laches due to inaction for nearly 30 years?
• Did San Andres acquire the status of a de facto municipality under the law?
• Did the enactment of the 1991 Local Government Code cure the defect in San Andres’s creation?
III. Supreme Court Ruling and Legal Reasoning
A. On the Constitutionality of the Executive Orders
The Court reaffirmed the Pelaez doctrine: the President has no authority to create municipalities, as such is a purely legislative function. Thus, EO 353 was legally infirm.
B. On Laches and Estoppel
Despite the constitutional infirmity, the Court ruled that the petitioner municipality of San Narciso was guilty of laches. Having waited over 25 years to challenge the creation of San Andres, San Narciso’s prolonged inaction amounted to estoppel. The Court emphasized that legal remedies must be pursued “with reasonable dispatch,” especially when public interest and stability of governance are involved.
C. On De Facto Municipal Status
San Andres had, for decades, functioned with an elected government, recognized by the national government, and exercised full municipal powers. This constituted a de facto municipal corporation, invoking the principle that the validity of a municipality cannot be attacked collaterally after long and recognized existence.
D. On the Curative Provision of the 1991 Local Government Code
Citing Section 442(d) of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the Court held that Congress expressly recognized and legalized municipalities created by executive orders prior to the Code’s effectivity, provided they had been in existence and functioning continuously. Thus, San Andres was legally "cured" of any infirmities and deemed a validly constituted municipality under Philippine law.
IV. Disposition
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding San Andres’s status and municipal officials. The Court placed a premium on administrative continuity, public interest, and legislative ratification.
V. Commentary and Reflections by Counsel (Atty. Manuel Laserna Jr.)
As former counsel for the Municipality of San Narciso, I advocated for constitutional discipline under Pelaez, seeking to reinforce the separation of powers and the exclusive legislative prerogative in municipal creation. Though we lost, the case highlighted key doctrinal shifts:
• The primacy of equity and public reliance over pure formalism;
• The institutional acceptance of de facto municipalities;
• The power of curative legislation to validate executive acts.
This case continues to be cited in jurisprudence on local government formation and the doctrine of de facto public corporations. It is also a reminder that procedural delay (laches) may override even strong legal arguments when public interest is at stake.
VI. Doctrine Reaffirmed and Extended
• Only Congress may create municipalities (Pelaez v. Auditor General).
• De facto status may validate municipal corporations in factually operative situations.
• Laches bars stale claims in public governance.
• Section 442(d), RA 7160 validates LGUs created via EOs if they existed prior to the Code.
Generated by ChatGPT AI app, July 2, 2025. Reviewed and edited by Atty. Manuel Laserna Jr.
