ZAMBOANGA BARTER TRADERS KILUSANG BAYAN, INC., et. al. vs.
HON. JULIUS RHETT J. PLAGATA, et. al., G.R. No. 148433, September 30, 2008
"X x x.
Was public respondent Labor Arbiter justified in issuing the second alias writ of execution when the motion asking for the same was filed on 18 December 1989 beyond five years after the decision of the NLRC became final and executory on 18 January 1984?
We believe so.
We find that private respondent Mendoza need not file an independent action to enforce the NLRC decision. The motion he filed on 18 December 1989 to execute the judgment is sufficient in light of his two prior motions[1] filed within the five-year period and the non-satisfaction of the judgment for causes beyond his control.
Section 6 of Rule 39[2] of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. – A judgment may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.
The purpose of the law (or rule) in prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgments or actions is to prevent obligors from sleeping on their rights.[3]
It is clear from the above rule that a judgment may be executed on motion within five years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.[4] If the prevailing party fails to have the decision enforced by a mere motion after the lapse of five years from the date of its entry (or from the date it becomes final and executory), the said judgment is reduced to a mere right of action in favor of the person whom it favors and must be enforced, as are all ordinary actions, by the institution of a complaint in a regular form.[5] However, there are instances in which this Court allowed execution by motion even after the lapse of five years upon meritorious grounds.[6] In Lancita v. Magbanua,[7] the Court declared:
In computing the time limited for suing out an execution, although there is authority to the contrary, the general rule is that there should not be included the time when execution is stayed, either by agreement of the parties for a definite time, by injunction, by the taking of an appeal or writ of error so as to operate as a supersedeas, by the death of a party, or otherwise. Any interruption or delay occasioned by the debtor will extend the time within which the writ may be issued without scire facias.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,[8] we ruled:
To be sure, there had been many instances where this Court allowed execution by motion even after the lapse of five years, upon meritorious grounds. These exceptions have one common denominator, and that is: the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment debtor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage.
In Gonzales v. Court of Appeals,[9] we emphasized that if the delays were through no fault of the prevailing party, the same should not be included in computing the 5-year period to execute a judgment by motion.
In the case under consideration, the decision of the NLRC was promulgated on 15 November 1983, and it became final and executory on 18 January 1984 (not December 1983 as ruled by the Court of Appeals). On 2 July 1984, a writ of execution was issued by Executive Labor Arbiter Abdulwahid. Said writ was returned unsatisfied. From the return of the sheriff, there is no doubt that he was threatened by Atty. Hasan G. Alam, President of ZBTKBI, who told him to “clad himself with iron dress” if he would enforce the writ Thereafter a motion for issuance of an alias writ of execution dated 23 October 1984 was filed by Mendoza, because the lifespan of the first writ of execution expired without being satisfied. Consequently, an Alias Writ of Execution was issued on 19 November 1984. The writ remained unsatisfied. At this point, two writs of execution were already issued but were not satisfied. On 18 December 1989, Mendoza filed a Motion for Issuance of (Second) Alias Writ of Execution, which public respondent Executive Labor Arbiter Rhett Julius J. Plagata issued on 2 January 1990.
It cannot be disputed that Mendoza had not slept on his rights. In fact, he filed three motions so that the judgment in his favor could be executed and satisfied. The judgment was satisfied by virtue of the second alias writ of execution, which was issued upon a motion filed beyond the five-year period. The satisfaction of the judgment was not successful during the first two writs of execution. The delay in the enforcement of the two writs was clearly caused by petitioner through its President, Atty. Alam. Said delay was indeed beneficial and advantageous to petitioner, because the judgment against it, at that time, was yet to be implemented. It is very clear that if not for the threats received by the sheriff tasked to implement the writs of execution, the satisfaction of judgment would not have been delayed.
Under the circumstances obtaining, we hold that the five-year period allowed for enforcement of a judgment by motion was deemed to have been interrupted by petitioner. The prevention of the satisfaction of the judgment on the first two writs of execution cannot be blamed on Mendoza. The satisfaction of the judgment was already beyond his control. He did what he was supposed to do – file the requisite motions so that writs of execution would be issued. In view of the foregoing and for reasons of equity, we deem that the Motion for Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution filed by Mendoza on 18 December 1989 has been filed within the five-year period.
X x x."
[1] One was filed on 13 July 1983 even prior to the decision becoming final and executory.
[2] Prior to 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[3] Francisco Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 117622-23, 23 October 2006, 505 SCRA 8, 26.
[4] Camacho v. Court of Appeals, 351 Phil. 108, 113.
[5] Macias v. Lim, G.R. No. 139284, 4 June 2004, 431 SCRA 20, 39.
[6] Yau v. Silverio, Sr., G.R. Nos. 158848 and 171994, 4 February 2008, 543 SCRA 520, 529.
[7] 117 Phil. 39, 44-45 (1963).
[8] 329 Phil. 115, 121-122 (1996).
[9] G.R. No. 62556, 13 August 1992, 212 SCRA 595.