ESTEBAN YAU vs. RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR., G.R. No. 158848, February 4, 2008; with companion case: ARTURO MACAPAGAL vs. HON. IRENEO LEE GAKO, JR., et. al., G.R. No. 171994, February 4, 2008
“x x x.
The principal and common issue in both petitions is whether the Decision rendered by the RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-2058 may no longer be enforced against Silverio and Macapagal since more than five (5) years have already lapsed from its finality.
X x x.
Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended provides:
Section 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. – A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.
It is clear from the above Rule that a judgment may be executed on motion within five years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. Thereafter, before barred by the statute of limitations, by action. However, there are instances where this Court allowed execution by motion even after the lapse of five years upon meritorious grounds.
In Francisco Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[1] this Court held that in computing the time limit for enforcing a final judgment, the general rule is that there should not be included the time when execution is stayed, either by agreement of the parties for a definite time, by injunction, by the taking of an appeal or writ of error so as to operate as a supersedeas, by the death of a party or otherwise. Any interruption or delay occasioned by the debtor will extend the time within which the writ may be issued without scire facias. Thus, the time during which execution is stayed should be excluded, and the said time will be extended by any delay occasioned by the debtor.
There had been many instances where this Court allowed the execution by motion even after the lapse of five years. These exceptions have one common denominator, and that is, the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment debtor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage.[2]
Here, the judgment of the trial court sought to be executed became final and executory on December 26, 1991. The writ of execution was issued on September 17, 1992. It could not be enforced for the full satisfaction of the judgment within the five-year period because Macapagal and Silverio filed with the Court of Appeals and this Court petitions challenging the trial court’s judgment and the writ of execution. Such petitions suspended or interrupted the further enforcement of the writ.
X x x.
Every litigation must come to an end. While a litigant’s right to initiate an action in court is fully respected, however, once his case has been adjudicated by a competent court in a valid final judgment, he should not be permitted to initiate similar suits hoping to secure a favorable ruling, for this will result to endless litigations detrimental to the administration of justice.[3]
Let it be stressed that with respect to Macapagal and Silverio the Decision of the trial court has attained finality. Such definitive judgment is no longer subject to change, revision, amendment or reversal. Upon finality of the judgment, the court loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Except for correction of clerical errors or the making of nunc pro tunc entries which causes no prejudice to any party, or where the judgment is void, the judgment can neither be amended nor altered after it has become final and executory. This is the principle of immutability of final judgment.
In Lim v. Jabalde,[4] this Court further explained the necessity of adhering to the doctrine of immutability of final judgments, thus:
“Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be, not through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them.”
Every litigation must come to an end once a judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable. For just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by the execution and satisfaction of the judgment, which is the “life of the law.” Any attempt to thwart this rigid rule and deny the prevailing litigant his right to savour the fruit of his victory must immediately be struck down.[5] The statute of limitations has not been devised against those who wish to act but cannot do so, for causes beyond their control.[6]
X x x.”
[1] G.R. Nos. 117622-23, October 23, 2006, 505 SCRA 8, citing Lancita v. Magbanua, 7 SCRA 42 (1963).
[2] Camacho v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118339, March 19, 1998, 287 SCRA 611, citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 344 (1996).
[3] Id.
[4] G.R. No. 36786, April 17, 1989, 172 SCRA 211 cited in Seven Brother Shipping Corporation v. Oriental Assurance Corporation, supra.
[5] Seven Brother Shipping Corporation v. Oriental Assurance Corporation, supra, citing In Re: Petition for Clarification as to the Validity and Forceful Effect of Two (2) Final and Executory but Conflicting Decisions of the Honorable Supreme Court, G.R. No. 123780, September 24, 2002, 389 SCRA 493.
[6] Lancita v. Magbanua, supra at footnote 9.