In the case of Dolores S. Bago vs. Judge Ernesto P. Pagayatan, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2058 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 06-2422--RTJ), April 7, 2009, the Philippine Supreme Court imposed a fine of P20, 000.00 on the respondent Judge for gross ignorance of the law. The judge, in effect, allowed himself to be subjugated by the Executive Branch of Government in the adjudication of a case pending before him, for which reason he was disciplined by the Court.
The Court stated that Judge Pagayatan failed to make an independent assessment of the merits of Criminal Case No. R-4295 for Murder, making no reference to or taking no consideration of the evidence on record or in the possession of the public prosecutor, when he granted the motion of the public prosecutor to file a Third Amended Information (which excluded several of the accused from the case and, in effect, dropped or withdrew the criminal charges against them). Judge Pagayatan relied solely on the directive of Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño to the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor. He displayed gross ignorance of the law when he abandoned his duty to personally and independently evaluate the prosecution’s motion to admit the third amended Information, which excluded several accused therefrom, and relied entirely on the directive of Chief State Prosecutor Zuño ordering such an amendment. His actions patently indicated his insufficient grasp of the law.
Gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge under Rule 140, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10 SC; and penalized under Section 11 of the same Rule, which provides that if the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations: Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20, 000.00 but not exceeding P40, 000.00.
Let me digest the said decision of the Court to serve as a guide and as a refresher for legal practitioners of the Philippines that when an accused has been indicted by the Office of the Public Prosecutor and an Information has been filed in court, it is the court and not the public prosecutor that has complete control as to the disposition, dismissal or withdrawal of the Information.
The Court reiterated the rule that once a complaint or information is filed before the trial court, any disposition of the case, as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests on the sound discretion of the said court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already before the trial court, the fiscal cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The trial court is the best and sole judge of what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the trial court which has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.
This Court likewise held that once a case has been filed with the trial court, it is that court, no longer the prosecution, which has full control of the case, so much so that the Information may not be dismissed without its approval. Significantly, once a motion to dismiss or withdraw the Information is filed, the court may grant or deny it, in the faithful exercise of judicial discretion. In doing so, the trial judge must himself be convinced that there was indeed no sufficient evidence against the accused, and this conclusion can be arrived at only after an assessment of the evidence in the possession of the prosecution. What was imperatively required was the trial judge's own assessment of such evidence, it not being sufficient for the valid and proper exercise of judicial discretion merely to accept the prosecution's word for its supposed insufficiency.
Also significant is Marcelo v. Court of Appeals, in which this Court ruled that although it is more prudent to wait for a final resolution of a motion for review or reinvestigation from the Secretary of Justice before acting on a motion to dismiss or a motion to withdraw an Information, a trial court, nonetheless, should make its own study and evaluation of said motion and not rely merely on the awaited action of the Secretary. The trial court has the option to grant or deny the motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal, whether before or after the arraignment of the accused, and whether after reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary who reviewed the records of the investigation, provided that such grant or denial is made from its own assessment and evaluation of the merits of the motion.
Once a motion to dismiss or withdraw the information is filed, the trial judge may grant or deny it, not out of subservience to the Secretary of Justice, but in faithful exercise of judicial prerogative. Indeed, it bears stressing that the trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice since it is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case and it may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice would be an abdication of the trial court’s duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case.
The trial court may make an independent assessment of the merits of the case based on the affidavits and counter-affidavits, documents, or evidence appended to the Information; the records of the public prosecutor which the court may order the latter to produce before it; or any evidence already adduced before the court by the accused at the time the motion is filed by the public prosecutor.
Judge Pagayatan clearly failed to comply with his mandate and to discharge his duty to judiciously and independently rule upon the Motion to Admit Third Amended Information. He obviously lost sight of the fact that Criminal Case No. R-4295 was already filed before his court and was under his control; and he was not bound by the actuations or resolutions of the prosecution, or even by the directive coming from the Chief Prosecutor himself. He had the discretion to grant or deny the prosecution’s motion based on his personal and independent evaluation or assessment of the evidence before him.
By merely echoing the directive of Chief State Prosecutor Zuño, Judge Pagayatan abdicated his duty as a judge of a court of law, allowing his court to be subjugated to an administrative agency. Also, in failing to make a personal and independent determination of the propriety of dropping the charges against several of the accused in Criminal Case No. R-4295, and depending entirely on Chief State Prosecutor Zuño’s finding, Judge Pagayatan relinquished the discretion he was obliged to exercise under the circumstances, thus, violating the decree of this Court in Crespo v. Mogul. In effect, it was the prosecution, through the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor, which decided what to do with the accused in Criminal Case No. R-4295 and the RTC was reduced to a mere rubber-stamping body.
Admittedly, judges cannot be held to account for erroneous judgments rendered in good faith. However, this defense has been all too frequently cited to the point of staleness. In truth, good faith in situations of infallible discretion inheres only within the parameters of tolerable judgment and does not apply where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal principle evident and basic as to be beyond permissible margins of error. Indeed, while a judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous order or decision he renders, that relative immunity is not a license to be negligent or abusive and arbitrary in performing his adjudicatory prerogatives.
Judge Pagayatan failed to conform to the high standards set under Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which requires a judge to uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary by adhering to the following mandates:
Rule 1.01 - A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence.
Rule 3.01 - A judge shall x x x maintain professional competence.
Competence is a mark of a good judge. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the public’s confidence in the competence of our courts. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles.
As a judge, Judge Pagayatan must have the basic rules at the palm of his hands, as he is expected to maintain professional competence at all times. Indeed, a judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. He must be conversant with basic legal principles and well-settled doctrines. He should strive for excellence and seek the truth with passion. The failure to observe the basic laws and rules is not only inexcusable, but renders him susceptible to administrative sanction for gross ignorance of the law from which no one is excused, and surely not a judge.
A judge owes it to himself and his office to know by heart basic legal principles and to harness his legal know-how correctly and justly. When a judge displays utter unfamiliarity with the law and the rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in the courts. Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice. As an advocate of justice and a visible representation of the law, a judge is expected to be proficient in the interpretation of our laws. When the law is so elementary, not to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses no one - not even judges. Ignorantia juris quod quisque scire tenetur non excusat. As the Court held in Monterola v. Judge Caoibes, Jr. :
Observance of the law, which respondent ought to know, is required of every judge. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; anything les than that is either deliberate disregard thereof or gross ignorance of the law. It is a continuing pressing responsibility of judges to keep abreast with the law and changes therein. Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses no one -not even judges - from compliance therewith x x x. Canon 4 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics requires that the judge should be studious of the principles of law. Canon 18 mandates that he should administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law. Indeed, it has been said that when the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider a basic and elementary rule, a law or principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and the title he holds or is to vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. x x x.
Ignorantia legis non excusat remains a valid dictum. When an officer of the court such as Judge Pagayatan, who is supposed to know the law, displays such ignorance, then he must be called to account.
