The recent case of DANTE T. TAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 173637, April 21, 2009, deals with the issues of speedy trial and double jeopardy. Although the doctrinal pronouncements therein are not novel, I deem it useful to digest the case, as a refresher material for the legal researchers visiting this law blog.
(Note: As widely known in Philippine business circles, the criminal cases involving the petitioner Dante Tan, who was a crony of past Philippine president Joseph Estrada, were somehow related to the murder of publicist Bubby Dacer some years back. The recent reopening of the preliminary investigation of the Dacer murder case by Justice Secretary Raul Gonzalez, now the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, will surely drag the names of Estrada and his former national police chief and now Sen. Panfilo Lacson into the proceedings).
A digest of the abovementioned Supreme Court decision follows hereinbelow.
On 19 December 2000, a Panel of Prosecutors of the Department of Justice (DOJ), on behalf of the People of the Philippines (People), filed three Informations against Dante T. Tan the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. The cases pertained to allegations that petitioner employed manipulative devises in the purchase of Best World Resources Corporation (BW) shares and the alleged failure of petitioner to file with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a sworn statement of his beneficial ownership of BW shares. In two other related cases, two Informations were filed against a certain Jimmy Juan and Eduardo G. Lim for violation of the Revised Securities Act involving BW shares of stock. On the same day, the DOJ, through Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Nilo C. Mariano, filed a Motion for Consolidation praying that the cases be consolidated together which the trial court granted. Petitioner was arraigned on 16 January 2001, and pleaded not guilty to the charges. On 6 February 2001, the pre-trial was concluded, and a pre-trial order set, among other things, the first date of trial on 27 February 2001.
At the crux of the controversy was the issue of whether there was a violation of petitioner Dante Tan’s right to speedy trial.
Petitioner assailed the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals which determined that he “impliedly agreed” that his case would not be tried until after termination of the other related cases.
Offhand, the Court stated that an accused’s right to “have a speedy, impartial, and public trial” is guaranteed in criminal cases by Section 14(2) of Article III of the Constitution. This right to a speedy trial may be defined as one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its “salutary objective” being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. The oft-repeated adage “justice delayed is justice denied” requires the expeditious resolution of disputes, much more so in criminal cases where an accused is constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy trial.
The Court added that following the policies incorporated under the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as “The Speedy Trial Act of 1998,” was enacted, with Section 6 of said act limiting the trial period to 180 days from the first day of trial. Aware of problems resulting in the clogging of court dockets, the Court implemented the law by issuing Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98, which has been incorporated in the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, Section 2 of Rule 119.
The Court emphasized qualified that a balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis. In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for such delay. Different weights should be assigned to different reasons or justifications invoked by the State.
In the case at bar, it was established that from the initial hearing on 27 February 2001 until the time the prosecution filed its formal offer of evidence for Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832 on 25 November 2003, both prosecution and defense admitted that no evidence was presented for Criminal Case No. 119830. Hence, for a period of almost two years and eight months, the prosecution did not present a single evidence for Criminal Case No. 119830. The question was whether there was vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay. To this, the Court applied the four-factor test previously mentioned. It stated that in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts are required to do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is clearly insufficient, and particular regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
In previous cases the Court ruled that there was no violation of the right to speedy trial and speedy disposition where the delay was attended by the frequent amendments of procedural laws by presidential decrees, the structural reorganizations in existing prosecutorial agencies and the creation of new ones by executive fiat, resulting in changes of personnel, preliminary jurisdiction, and the functions and powers of prosecuting agencies. The Court also considered the failure of the accused to assert such right, the complexity of the issues, the conduct of the lawyers of the accused, and the lack of prejudice caused by the delay to the accused.
Petitioner’s objection to the prosecution’s stand that he gave an implied consent to the separate trial of Criminal Case No. 119830 is belied by the records of the case. No objection was interposed by his defense counsel when this matter was discussed during the initial hearing. Petitioner’s conformity thereto can be deduced from his non-objection at the preliminary hearing when the prosecution manifested that the evidence to be presented would be only for Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832. His failure to object to the prosecution’s manifestation that the cases be tried separately is fatal to his case. The acts, mistakes and negligence of counsel bind his client, except only when such mistakes would result in serious injustice. In fact, petitioner’s acquiescence is evident from the transcript of stenographic notes during the initial presentation of the People’s evidence in the five BW cases on 27 February 2001, which the Court quoted extensively.
The Court stressed that although periods for trial have been stipulated, these periods were not absolute. Where periods had been set, certain exclusions were allowed by law. After all, the Court and the law recognize the fact that judicial proceedings did not exist in a vacuum and had to contend with the realities of everyday life. In spite of the prescribed time limits, jurisprudence continued to adopt the view that the fundamentally recognized principle was that the concept of speedy trial was a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.
As to the assertion that delay in the presentation of evidence for Criminal Case No. 119830 has prejudiced petitioner because the witnesses for the defense may no longer be available at this time, the Court stated that suffice it to say that the burden of proving his guilt rests upon the prosecution. Should the prosecution fail for any reason to present evidence sufficient to show his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, petitioner would be acquitted. Unless the prosecution discharges its burden to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt, the latter need not even offer evidence in his behalf.
On a related issue, the Court stated that there was no merit to petitioner’s claim that a reversal of the RTC’s Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 119830 was a violation of his constitutional right against double jeopardy which dismissal was founded on an alleged violation of his right to speedy trial.
The constitutional protection against double jeopardy shields one from a second or later prosecution for the same offense. Article III, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution declares that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, providing further that if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Following the above constitutional provision, Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court found it apt to stipulate:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. – When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
For double jeopardy to attach then, the following elements in the first criminal case must be present:
(a) The complaint or information or other formal charge was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction;
(b) The court had jurisdiction;
(c) The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and
(d) He was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
In the case at bar, the Court held that double jeopardy had not attached, considering that the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 119830 on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial was without basis and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Where the right of the accused to speedy trial had not been violated, there was no reason to support the initial order of dismissal. Although it was true that in an unbroken line of cases, the Court had held that dismissal of cases on the ground of failure to prosecute was equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense, it stressed, however, that these dismissals were predicated on the clear right of the accused to speedy trial. Double jeopardy did not apply to this case, considering that there was no violation of petitioner’s right to speedy trial.
Indeed, the Court held that for justice to prevail, the scales must balance, for justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. Evidently, the task of the pillars of the criminal justice system was to preserve our democratic society under the rule of law, ensuring that all those who appeared before or were brought to the bar of justice were afforded a fair opportunity to present their side. The State, like any other litigant, was entitled to its day in court, and to a reasonable opportunity to present its case. A hasty dismissal, instead of unclogging dockets, had actually increased the workload of the justice system and unwittingly prolonged the litigation.
Finally, the Court reiterated that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court were shields, not weapons. Courts were tasked to give meaning to that intent. There being no capricious, vexatious, oppressive delay in the proceedings, and no postponements unjustifiably sought, it dismissed the petition.
