On
the matter of iniquitous and unconscionable interest rate, it will be noted
that in September 2009, the Supreme Court promulgated its decision in Ileana Dr. Macalino vs. Bank of the
Philippines Islands, G.R. No. 175490, September 17, 2009,
and held that the interest rate of
1.5% per month on credit card payments should be reduced to 1% per month.
In
Sps. Isagani & Diosdada Castro
vs. Angelina de Leon Tan, G.R. No. 168940. November 24, 2009, the Supreme Court
again faced the issue of whether the interest rate imposed (this time under a
loan agreement) is excessive. Here, the loan agreement (denominated as Kasulatan
ng Sanglaan ng Lupa at Bahay) provided for an interest rate of 5% per month, compounded monthly.
The principal amount of the loan was PhP30,000.
In
the said case, the Supreme Court held:
“While we agree with
petitioners that parties to a loan agreement have wide latitude to stipulate on
any interest rate in view of the Central
Bank Circular No. 905 s. 1982 which
suspended the Usury Law ceiling on interest effective January 1, 1983, it
is also worth stressing that interest
rates whenever unconscionable may still be declared illegal. There is
certainly nothing in said circular which grants lenders carte blanche authority
to raise interest rates to levels which will either enslave their borrowers or
lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets.
In several cases, we
have ruled that stipulations authorizing iniquitous or unconscionable interests
are contrary to morals, if not against the law. In Medel v. Court of Appeals, we annulled a stipulated 5.5% per month or 66% per annum interest on a
P500,000.00 loan and a 6% per month or
72% per annum interest on a P60,000.00 loan, respectively, for being
excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant. In Ruiz v. Court of Appeals, we declared a 3% monthly interest imposed on four separate loans to be excessive.
In both cases, the interest rates were reduced
to 12% per annum.
In this case, the 5% monthly interest rate, or 60% per annum,
compounded monthly, stipulated in the Kasulatan is even higher than the 3%
monthly interest rate imposed in the Ruiz case. Thus, we similarly hold the 5%
monthly interest to be excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant,
contrary to morals, and the law. It is therefore void ab initio for being
violative of Article 1306 of the Civil Code. With this, and in accord with the
Medel and Ruiz cases, we hold that the Court of Appeals correctly imposed the
legal interest of 12% per annum in place of the excessive interest stipulated
in the Kasulatan.”
In the same case, the Supreme Court also ruled that the
imposition by the Court of a 12% rate per annum does not violate the freedom of
contract:
“Petitioners allege
that the Kasulatan was entered into by the parties freely and voluntarily. They
maintain that there was already a meeting of the minds between the parties as
regards the principal amount of the loan, the interest thereon and the property
given as security for the payment of the loan, which must be complied with in good
faith. Hence, they assert that the Court of Appeals should have given due
respect to the provisions of the Kasulatan. They also stress that it is a
settled principle that the law will not relieve a party from the effects of an
unwise, foolish or disastrous contract, entered into with all the required
formalities and with full awareness of what he was doing.
Petitioners’
contentions deserve scant consideration. In Abe
v. Foster Wheeler Corporation, we held that the freedom of contract is not absolute. The same is understood to
be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of
public health, morals, safety and welfare. One such legislative regulation is
found in Article 1306 of the Civil Code
which allows the contracting parties to “establish such stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy.”
To reiterate, we
fully agree with the Court of Appeals in holding that the compounded interest
rate of 5% per month, is iniquitous and unconscionable. Being a void
stipulation, it is deemed inexistent from the beginning. The debt is to be
considered without the stipulation of the iniquitous and unconscionable
interest rate. Accordingly, the legal interest of 12% per annum must be imposed
in lieu of the excessive interest stipulated in the agreement. . .
From the foregoing,
it is clear that there is no unilateral alteration of the terms and conditions
of the Kasulatan entered into by the parties. Surely, it is more consonant with
justice that the subject interest rate be equitably reduced and the legal
interest of 12% per annum is deemed fair and reasonable.”
