"x x x.
The Respondent respectfully submits that the failure of her former counsel to introduced in the past pleadings prepared by him the exculpating supplemental evidence that are now being sought by the Respondent in this pleading to be admitted by this Honorable Office constituted gross negligence resulting in a grave miscarriage of justice and in a grave violation of the fundamental constitutional rights of the Respondent:
The Respondent respectfully submits that the failure of her former counsel to introduced in the past pleadings prepared by him the exculpating supplemental evidence that are now being sought by the Respondent in this pleading to be admitted by this Honorable Office constituted gross negligence resulting in a grave miscarriage of justice and in a grave violation of the fundamental constitutional rights of the Respondent:
(a) the
right to procedural and substantive due process of
law,
(b) the
right to equal protection of the law, and
(c) the
right to competent and independent counsel
-- which warrant a RE-OPENING of the preliminary
investigation of this case to enable the Respondent, in the interest of truth
and justice, to present crucial exculpating supplemental evidence, with the
assistance of her new counsel (LASERNA
CUEVA-MERCADER LAW OFFICES, Las Pinas City) for purposes of filing this particular
pleading with this Honorable Office.
The
Respondent is aware of the jurisprudence that, as a general rule, “a client is
bound by the mistakes of his counsel”. (Villa Rhecar Bus vs.
Dela Cruz, No. L-78936, January 7, 1988, 157 SCRA 13).
However,
jurisprudence allows an exception, that is, “x x x when the negligence of the counsel is so gross, reckless and
inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court”.
In
such instance, “the remedy is to reopen the case and allow the
party who was denied his day in court to adduce evidence”. (Producers Bank of the Philippines vs. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 126620, April 17, 2002, 381 SCRA 185, 192).
In
the case of CALLANGAN VS. PEOPLE, G.R.
NO. 153414, June 27, 2006, it was held, inter
alia, that “the rule that the negligence of counsel binds the client admits of exceptions, to wit:
(a)
where reckless or gross negligence of counsel
deprives the client of due process of law,
(b)
when its application will result in outright deprivation
of the client’s liberty or property or
(c)
where the interests of justice so require.”
The aforecited case of CALANGAN
further held:
“x x x.
However, in view of the circumstances of this case,
outright deprivation of liberty will be the consequence of petitioner’s
criminal conviction based solely on the evidence for the prosecution. Thus, to
prevent a miscarriage of justice and to
give meaning to the due process clause of the
Constitution, the Court deems it wise to allow petitioner to present evidence
in her defense.
The rule that the negligence of counsel binds the client
admits of exceptions. The recognized exceptions are: (1) where reckless or
gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, (2) when
its application will result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or
property or (3) where the interests of justice so require. In such cases,
courts must step in and accord relief to a party-litigant.
The omissions of petitioner’s counsel amounted to an
abandonment or total disregard of her case. They show conscious indifference to
or utter disregard of the possible repercussions to his client. Thus, the chronic
inaction of petitioner’s counsel on important incidents and stages of the
criminal proceedings constituted gross negligence.
X x x.
In criminal cases, the right of the accused to be
assisted by counsel is immutable. Otherwise, there will be a grave denial
of due process. The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental
principle of due process which basically means that a person must be heard
before being condemned.
X x x.
Petitioner was accorded grossly insufficient legal
assistance by a counsel who did not devote himself to the defense of her cause.
Counsel’s utter lack of action after the prosecution rested its case revealed
an extreme shortcoming on his part. Such
inaction definitely proved infidelity to and abandonment of petitioner’s cause.
Considering that this case involved personal liberty, the
gross negligence of counsel shocks our sense of justice. It should not be
allowed to prejudice petitioner’s constitutional right to be heard. The
Court’s pronouncement in Reyes v. Court of Appeals, applies
strongly in this case:
The judicial conscience certainly cannot rest easy on a
conviction based solely on the evidence of the prosecution just because the
presentation of the defense evidence had been barred by technicality. Rigid application
of rules must yield to the duty of courts to render justice where justice is
due – to secure to every individual all possible legal means to prove his
innocence of a crime with which he or she might be charged.
Otherwise, the likelihood of convicting and
punishing an innocent man and of inflicting a serious injustice on him becomes
great.
X x x.
Therefore, in consonance with the demands of justice and
to prevent any outright deprivation of liberty, the Court deems it best to give
petitioner a chance to present evidence in her defense. The case should
be remanded to the MTC for acceptance and appraisal of petitioner’s evidence.
Petitioner does not seek her exoneration but the opportunity to present evidence in her
defense. Considering the gross negligence of her counsel on whom she
reposed her trust to protect her rights, justice demands that she be given that
chance.
In sum, it is better to allow petitioner another occasion
to present her evidence than to let her conviction stand based solely on the
evidence of the prosecution. In accordance with Rule 121, Section 6 of the
Rules of Court, the evidence of the prosecution shall be understood preserved,
subject to the right of the prosecution to supplement it and/or to rebut the
evidence which petitioner may present.
X x x.”
Finally, by analogy, the
Respondent hereby cites the spirit of
Sec. 24, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which provides that:
“x x x (A)t any
time before finality of the judgment of conviction, the judge may, motu proprio or upon motion, with
hearing in either case, REOPEN the proceedings to avoid a MISCARRIAGE OF
JUSTICE x x x x”.
x x x."
