Tuesday, March 31, 2015

The issue of whether the corporation’s acts in violation of complainant’s rights, and the incidental issue of whether piercing of the corporate veil is warranted, should be determined in a single proceeding.




"x x x.
Hence, when the directors, as in this case, are impleaded in a case against a corporation, alleging malice orbad faith on their part in directing the affairs of the corporation, complainants are effectively alleging that the directors and the corporation are not acting as separate entities. They are alleging that the acts or omissions by the corporation that violated their rights are also the directors’ acts or omissions.90 They are alleging that contracts executed by the corporation are contracts executed by the directors. Complainants effectively pray that the corporate veilbe pierced because the cause of action between the corporation and the directors is the same.

In that case, complainants have no choice but to institute only one proceeding against the parties.1âwphi1 Under the Rules of Court, filing of multiple suits for a single cause of action is prohibited. Institution of more than one suit for the same cause of action constitutes splitting the cause of action, which is a ground for the dismissal ofthe others. Thus, in Rule 2:

Section 3. One suit for a single cause of action. — A party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. (3a)

Section 4. Splitting a single cause of action;effect of. — If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others. (4a)

It is because the personalities of petitioners and the corporation may later be found to be indistinct that we rule that petitioners may be compelled to submit to arbitration.

However, in ruling that petitioners may be compelled to submit to the arbitration proceedings, we are not overturning Heirs of Augusto Salas wherein this court affirmed the basic arbitration principle that only parties to an arbitration agreement may be compelled to submit to arbitration. In that case, this court recognizedthat persons other than the main party may be compelled to submit to arbitration, e.g., assignees and heirs. Assignees and heirs may be considered parties to an arbitration agreement entered into by their assignor because the assignor’s rights and obligations are transferred to them upon assignment. In other words, the assignor’s rights and obligations become their own rights and obligations. In the same way, the corporation’s obligations are treated as the representative’s obligations when the corporate veil is pierced. Moreover, in Heirs of Augusto Salas, this court affirmed its policy against multiplicity of suits and unnecessary delay. This court said that "to split the proceeding into arbitration for some parties and trial for other parties would "result in multiplicity of suits, duplicitous procedure and unnecessary delay."91 This court also intimated that the interest of justice would be best observed if it adjudicated rights in a single proceeding.92 While the facts of that case prompted this court to direct the trial court to proceed to determine the issues of thatcase, it did not prohibit courts from allowing the case to proceed to arbitration, when circumstances warrant.

Hence, the issue of whether the corporation’s acts in violation of complainant’s rights, and the incidental issue of whether piercing of the corporate veil is warranted, should be determined in a single proceeding. Such finding would determine if the corporation is merely an aggregation of persons whose liabilities must be treated as one with the corporation.

However, when the courts disregard the corporation’s distinct and separate personality from its directors or officers, the courts do not say that the corporation, in all instances and for all purposes, is the same as its directors, stockholders, officers, and agents. It does not result in an absolute confusion of personalities of the corporation and the persons composing or representing it. Courts merely discount the distinction and treat them as one, in relation to a specific act, in order to extend the terms of the contract and the liabilities for all damages to erring corporate officials who participated in the corporation’s illegal acts. This is done so that the legal fiction cannot be used to perpetrate illegalities and injustices.

Thus, in cases alleging solidary liability with the corporation or praying for the piercing of the corporate veil, parties who are normally treated as distinct individuals should be made to participate in the arbitration proceedings in order to determine ifsuch distinction should indeed be disregarded and, if so, to determine the extent of their liabilities.

x x x."


G.R. No. 174938, October 1, 2014.
GERARDO LANUZA, JR. AND ANTONIO O. OLBES, Petitioners, vs. BF CORPORATION, SHANGRI-LA PROPERTIES, INC., ALFREDO C. RAMOS, RUFO B. COLAYCO, MAXIMO G. LICAUCO III, AND BENJAMIN C. RAMOS, Respondents.

Piercing the veil of corporate fiction.




"x x x.

Because a corporation’s existence is only by fiction of law, it can only exercise its rights and powers through itsdirectors, officers, or agents, who are all natural persons. A corporation cannot sue or enter into contracts without them.

A consequence of a corporation’s separate personality is that consent by a corporation through its representatives is not consent of the representative, personally. Its obligations, incurred through official acts of its representatives, are its own. A stockholder, director, or representative does not become a party to a contract just because a corporation executed a contract through that stockholder, director or representative.

Hence, a corporation’s representatives are generally not bound by the terms of the contract executed by the corporation. They are not personally liable for obligations and liabilities incurred on or in behalf of the corporation. Petitioners are also correct that arbitration promotes the parties’ autonomy in resolving their disputes. This court recognized in Heirs of Augusto Salas, Jr. v. Laperal Realty Corporation79 that an arbitration clause shall not apply to persons who were neither parties to the contract nor assignees of previous parties, thus:

A submission to arbitration is a contract. As such, the Agreement, containing the stipulation on arbitration, binds the parties thereto, as well as their assigns and heirs. But only they.80 (Citations omitted)

Similarly, in Del Monte Corporation-USA v. Court of Appeals,81 this court ruled:

The provision to submit to arbitration any dispute arising therefrom and the relationship of the parties is part of that contract and is itself a contract. As a rule, contracts are respected as the law between the contracting parties and produce effect as between them, their assigns and heirs. Clearly, only parties to the Agreement . . . are bound by the Agreement and its arbitration clause as they are the only signatories thereto.82 (Citation omitted)

This court incorporated these rulings in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.83 and Stanfilco Employees v. DOLE Philippines, Inc., et al.84

As a general rule, therefore, a corporation’s representative who did not personally bind himself or herself to an arbitration agreement cannot be forced to participate in arbitration proceedings made pursuant to an agreement entered into by the corporation. He or she is generally not considered a party to that agreement.

However, there are instances when the distinction between personalities of directors, officers,and representatives, and of the corporation, are disregarded. We call this piercing the veil of corporate fiction.

Piercing the corporate veil is warranted when "[the separate personality of a corporation] is used as a means to perpetrate fraud or an illegal act, or as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation, the circumvention of statutes, or to confuse legitimate issues."85 It is also warranted in alter ego cases "where a corporation is merely a farce since it is a mere alter ego or business conduit of a person, or where the corporation is so organized and controlled and its affairs are so conducted as to make it merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct of another corporation."86

When corporate veil is pierced, the corporation and persons who are normally treated as distinct from the corporation are treated as one person, such that when the corporation is adjudged liable, these persons, too, become liable as if they were the corporation.

Among the persons who may be treatedas the corporation itself under certain circumstances are its directors and officers. Section 31 of the Corporation Code provides the instances when directors, trustees, or officers may become liable for corporate acts:

Sec. 31. Liability of directors, trustees or officers. - Directors or trustees who willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or who are guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the corporation or acquire any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors or trustees shall be liable jointly and severally for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation, its stockholders or members and other persons.

When a director, trustee or officer attempts to acquire or acquires, in violation of his duty, any interest adverse to the corporation in respect of any matter which has been reposed inhim in confidence, as to which equity imposes a disability upon him to deal in his own behalf, he shall be liable as a trustee for the corporation and must account for the profits which otherwise would have accrued to the corporation. (n)

Based on the above provision, a director, trustee, or officer of a corporation may be made solidarily liable with it for all damages suffered by the corporation, its stockholders or members, and other persons in any of the following cases:
a) The director or trustee willfully and knowingly voted for or assented to a patently unlawful corporate act;
b) The director or trustee was guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing corporate affairs; and
c) The director or trustee acquired personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with his or her duties as director or trustee.

Solidary liability with the corporation will also attach in the following instances:
a) "When a director or officer has consented to the issuance of watered stocks or who, having knowledge thereof, did not forthwith file with the corporate secretary his written objection thereto";87
b) "When a director, trustee or officer has contractually agreed or stipulated to hold himself personally and solidarily liable with the corporation";88 and
c) "When a director, trustee or officer is made, by specific provision of law, personally liable for his corporate action."89

When there are allegations of bad faith or malice against corporate directors or representatives, it becomes the duty of courts or tribunals to determine if these persons and the corporation should be treated as one. Without a trial, courts and tribunals have no basis for determining whether the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced. Courts or tribunals do not have such prior knowledge. Thus, the courts or tribunals must first determine whether circumstances exist towarrant the courts or tribunals to disregard the distinction between the corporation and the persons representing it. The determination of these circumstances must be made by one tribunal or court in a proceeding participated in by all parties involved, including current representatives of the corporation, and those persons whose personalities are impliedly the sameas the corporation. This is because when the court or tribunal finds that circumstances exist warranting the piercing of the corporate veil, the corporate representatives are treated as the corporation itself and should be held liable for corporate acts. The corporation’s distinct personality is disregarded, and the corporation is seen as a mere aggregation of persons undertaking a business under the collective name of the corporation.

Hence, when the directors, as in this case, are impleaded in a case against a corporation, alleging malice orbad faith on their part in directing the affairs of the corporation, complainants are effectively alleging that the directors and the corporation are not acting as separate entities. They are alleging that the acts or omissions by the corporation that violated their rights are also the directors’ acts or omissions.90 They are alleging that contracts executed by the corporation are contracts executed by the directors. Complainants effectively pray that the corporate veilbe pierced because the cause of action between the corporation and the directors is the same.

x x x."


G.R. No. 174938, October 1, 2014.
GERARDO LANUZA, JR. AND ANTONIO O. OLBES, Petitioners, vs. BF CORPORATION, SHANGRI-LA PROPERTIES, INC., ALFREDO C. RAMOS, RUFO B. COLAYCO, MAXIMO G. LICAUCO III, AND BENJAMIN C. RAMOS, Respondents.

Corporate powers




"x x x.
A corporation is an artificial entity created by fiction of law.76 This means that while it is not a person, naturally, the law gives it a distinct personality and treats it as such. A corporation, in the legal sense, is an individual with a personality that is distinct and separate from other persons including its stockholders, officers, directors, representatives,77 and other juridical entities. The law vests in corporations rights,powers, and attributes as if they were natural persons with physical existence and capabilities to act on their own.78 For instance, they have the power to sue and enter into transactions or contracts. Section 36 of the Corporation Code enumerates some of a corporation’s powers, thus:

Section 36. Corporate powers and capacity.– Every corporation incorporated under this Code has the power and capacity:
1. To sue and be sued in its corporate name;

2. Of succession by its corporate name for the period of time stated in the articles of incorporation and the certificate ofincorporation;

3. To adopt and use a corporate seal;

4. To amend its articles of incorporation in accordance with the provisions of this Code;

5. To adopt by-laws, not contrary to law, morals, or public policy, and to amend or repeal the same in accordance with this Code;

6. In case of stock corporations, to issue or sell stocks to subscribers and to sell treasury stocks in accordance with the provisions of this Code; and to admit members to the corporation if it be a non-stock corporation;

7. To purchase, receive, take or grant, hold, convey, sell, lease, pledge, mortgage and otherwise deal with such real and personal property, including securities and bonds of other corporations, as the transaction of the lawful business of the corporation may reasonably and necessarily require, subject to the limitations prescribed by law and the Constitution;

8. To enter into merger or consolidation with other corporations as provided in this Code;

9. To make reasonable donations, including those for the public welfare or for hospital, charitable, cultural, scientific, civic, or similar purposes: Provided, That no corporation, domestic or foreign, shall give donations in aid of any political party or candidate or for purposes of partisan political activity;

10. To establish pension, retirement, and other plans for the benefit of its directors, trustees, officers and employees; and

11. To exercise such other powers asmay be essential or necessary to carry out its purpose or purposes as stated in its articles of incorporation. (13a)

x x x."


G.R. No. 174938, October 1, 2014.
GERARDO LANUZA, JR. AND ANTONIO O. OLBES, Petitioners, vs. BF CORPORATION, SHANGRI-LA PROPERTIES, INC., ALFREDO C. RAMOS, RUFO B. COLAYCO, MAXIMO G. LICAUCO III, AND BENJAMIN C. RAMOS, Respondents.

State policy to encourage arbitration and to favor interpretations that would render effective an arbitration clause; Republic Act No. 9285




"x x x.

Thus, we rule that petitioners may be compelled to submit to the arbitration proceedings in accordance with Shangri-Laand BF Corporation’s agreement, in order to determine if the distinction between Shangri-La’s personality and their personalities should be disregarded.
This jurisdiction adopts a policy in favor of arbitration. Arbitration allows the parties to avoid litigation and settle disputes amicably and more expeditiously by themselves and through their choice of arbitrators.

The policy in favor of arbitration has been affirmed in our Civil Code,69 which was approved as early as 1949. It was later institutionalized by the approval of Republic Act No. 876,70 which expressly authorized, made valid, enforceable, and irrevocable parties’ decision to submit their controversies, including incidental issues, to arbitration. This court recognized this policy in Eastboard Navigation, Ltd. v. Ysmael and Company, Inc.:71

As a corollary to the question regarding the existence of an arbitration agreement, defendant raises the issue that, even if it be granted that it agreed to submit its dispute with plaintiff to arbitration, said agreement is void and without effect for it amounts to removing said dispute from the jurisdiction of the courts in which the parties are domiciled or where the dispute occurred. It is true that there are authorities which hold that "a clause in a contract providing that all matters in dispute between the parties shall be referred to arbitrators and to them alone, is contrary to public policy and cannot oust the courts of jurisdiction" (Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transportation Co., 57 Phil., 600, 603), however, there are authorities which favor "the more intelligent view that arbitration, as an inexpensive, speedy and amicable method of settling disputes, and as a means of avoiding litigation, should receive every encouragement from the courts which may be extended without contravening sound public policy or settled law" (3 Am. Jur., p. 835). Congress has officially adopted the modern view when it reproduced in the new Civil Code the provisions of the old Code on Arbitration. And only recently it approved Republic Act No. 876 expressly authorizing arbitration of future disputes.72 (Emphasis supplied)

In view of our policy to adopt arbitration as a manner of settling disputes, arbitration clauses are liberally construed to favor arbitration. Thus, in LM Power Engineering Corporation v. Capitol Industrial Construction Groups, Inc.,73 this court said:

Being an inexpensive, speedy and amicable method of settling disputes, arbitration — along with mediation, conciliation and negotiation — is encouraged by the Supreme Court. Aside from unclogging judicial dockets, arbitration also hastens the resolution of disputes, especially of the commercial kind. It is thus regarded as the "wave of the future" in international civil and commercial disputes. Brushing aside a contractual agreement calling for arbitration between the parties would be a step backward.

Consistent with the above-mentioned policy of encouraging alternative dispute resolution methods, courts should liberally construe arbitration clauses. Provided such clause is susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute, an order to arbitrate should be granted. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of arbitration.74(Emphasis supplied)

A more clear-cut statement of the state policy to encourage arbitration and to favor interpretations that would render effective an arbitration clause was later expressed in Republic Act No. 9285:75

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.- It is hereby declared the policy of the State to actively promote party autonomy in the resolution of disputes or the freedom of the party to make their own arrangements to resolve their disputes. Towards this end, the State shall encourage and actively promote the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) as an important means to achieve speedy and impartial justice and declog court dockets. As such, the State shall provide means for the use of ADR as an efficient tool and an alternative procedure for the resolution of appropriate cases. Likewise, the State shall enlist active private sector participation in the settlement of disputes through ADR. This Act shall be without prejudice to the adoption by the Supreme Court of any ADR system, such as mediation, conciliation, arbitration, or any combination thereof as a means of achieving speedy and efficient means of resolving cases pending before all courts in the Philippines which shall be governed by such rules as the Supreme Court may approve from time to time.
. . . .
SEC. 25. Interpretation of the Act.- In interpreting the Act, the court shall have due regard to the policy of the law in favor of arbitration.Where action is commenced by or against multiple parties, one or more of whomare parties who are bound by the arbitration agreement although the civil action may continue as to those who are not bound by such arbitration agreement. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, if there is an interpretation that would render effective an arbitration clause for purposes ofavoiding litigation and expediting resolution of the dispute, that interpretation shall be adopted. x x x. 

x x x."


G.R. No. 174938, October 1, 2014.

GERARDO LANUZA, JR. AND ANTONIO O. OLBES, Petitioners, vs. BF CORPORATION, SHANGRI-LA PROPERTIES, INC., ALFREDO C. RAMOS, RUFO B. COLAYCO, MAXIMO G. LICAUCO III, AND BENJAMIN C. RAMOS, Respondents.

Penalty for child abuse




"x x x.
The penalty for the child abuse committed by the petitioner is that prescribed in Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610, viz:

Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's Development. –

(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by Atiicle 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.

x x x x

The CA revised the penalty fixed by the R TC by imposing the indeterminate penalty of four years, two months and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as the maximum, on the ground that the offense was aggravated by the petitioner being a public schoolteacher.23 It cited Section 3 l(e) of Republic Act No. 7610, which commands that the penalty provided in the Act "shall be imposed in its maximum period if the offender is a public officer or employee." Her being a public schoolteacher was alleged in the information and established by evidence as well as admitted by her. The revised penalty was erroneous, however, because Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610 punishes the crime committed by the petitioner with prision mayor in its minimum period, whose three periods are six years and one day to six years and eight months, for the minimum period; six years, eight months and one day to seven years and four months, for the medium period; and seven years, four months and one day to eight years, for the maximum period. The maximum of the indeterminate sentence should come from the maximum period, therefore, and the Court fixes it at seven years, four months and one day of prision mayor. The minimum of the indeterminate sentence should come from prision correccional in the maximum period, the penalty next lower than prision mayor in its minimum period, whose range is from four years, two months and one day to six years.1âwphi1 Accordingly, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence is four years, nine months and 11 days, and the maximum is seven years, four months and one day of prision mayor.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on May 11, 2005, subject to the MODIFICATIONS that: (a) the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of pr is ion mayor, as the maximum; (b) the petitioner shall pay to Michael Ryan Gonzales P20,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P20,000.00 as temperate damages, plus interest at the rate of 6% per annum on each item of the civil liability reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment; and (c) the petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.

x x x."


G.R. No. 173988, October 8, 2014
FELINA ROSALDES, Petitioner,  vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Judgment of conviction,




"x x x.
It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express mandate under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court to have the judgment, if it was of conviction, state: "(1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation ofthe accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived." Their disregard compels us to actas we now do lest the Court be unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves seek the correction of the omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action because the Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also the duty to correct at any time a matter of law and justice.
1âwphi1
We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs that the parties are properly entitled to by law or in equity under the established facts. Their judgments will not be worthy of the name unless they thereby fully determine the rights and obligations of the litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for only by a full determination of such rights and obligations would they betrue to the judicial office of administering justice and equity for all. Courts should then be alert and cautious in their rendition of judgments of conviction in criminal cases. They should prescribe the legal penalties, which is what the Constitution and the law require and expect them to do. Their prescription of the wrong penalties will be invalid and ineffectual for being done without jurisdiction or in manifest grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They should also determine and set the civil liability ex delictoof the accused, in order to do justice to the complaining victims who are always entitled to them. The Rules of Court mandates them to do so unless the enforcement of the civil liability by separate actions has been reserved or waived.22

x x x."


G.R. No. 173988, October 8, 2014
FELINA ROSALDES, Petitioner,  vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

"Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child

G.R. No. 173988, October 8, 2014
FELINA ROSALDES, Petitioner,  vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.



"x x x.
Secondly, the petitioner contends that she did not deliberately inflict the physical injuries suffered by MichaelRyan to maltreat or malign him in a manner that would debase, demean or degrade his dignity. She characterizes her maltreatment as anact of discipline that she as a school teacher could reasonably do towards the development of the child. She insists that her act further came under the doctrine of in loco parentis.

The contention of the petitioner is utterly bereft of merit.

Although the petitioner, as a school teacher, could duly discipline Michael Ryan as her pupil, her infliction of the physical injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy even fainted from the violence suffered at her hands.13 She could not justifiably claim that she acted only for the sake of disciplining him. Her physical maltreatment of him was precisely prohibited by no less than the Family Code, which has expressly banned the infliction of corporal punishmentby a school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority (i.e., in loco parentis), viz:

Article 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority over the person of the child as the parents.

In no case shall the school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority inflict corporal punishment upon the child. (n)

Proof of the severe results of the petitioner’s physical maltreatment of Michael Ryan was provided by Dr. Teresita Castigador, the Medico-Legal Officer of the Dr. Ricardo Y. Ladrido Memorial Hospital in Iloilo who examined the victim at about 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon of February 13, 1996, barely three hours from the timethe boy had sustained his injuries. Her Medical Report stated as follows:
1. Petechiae and tenderness of both external ears 1x2 cm. and 1x1 cm.;
2. Lumbar pains and tenderness at area of L3-L4;
3. Contusions at left inner thigh 1x1 and 1x1 cm.;
4. Tenderness and painful on walking especially at the area of femoral head.
Reflecting her impressions of the physical injuries based on the testimonial explanations of Dr. Castigador, the trial judge observed in the decision of June 26, 2003:

A petechiae (wound no. 1), according to Dr. Castigador is a discoloration of the skin caused by the extravasation of blood beneath it. She opined that the petechiae and tenderness of the ears of the victim could have been caused by pinching. As to the lumbar pain and tenderness at the third and fourth level of the vertebrae (wound no. 2), the doctor testified that during her examination of the victim the latter felt pain when she put pressure on the said area. She stated that this could be caused by pressure or contact with a hard object. Wound No. 3 is located on the victim’sleft inner thigh. According to her this could not have been caused by ordinary pinching with pressure. Wound No. 4 is located on the upper part of the left thigh. Dr. Castigador testified that she noticed that the boy was limping as he walked.14

Section 3 of RepublicAct No. 7610 defines child abusethusly:
x x x x
(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
x x x x
In the crime charged against the petitioner, therefore, the maltreatment may consist of an act by deeds or by words that debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being. The act need not be habitual. The CA concluded that the petitioner "went overboard in disciplining Michael Ryan, a helpless and weak 7-year old boy, when she pinched hard Michael Ryan on the left thigh and when she held him in the armpits and threw him on the floor[; and as] the boy fell down, his body hit the desk causing him to lose consciousness [but instead] of feeling a sense of remorse, the accused-appellant further held the boy up by his ears and pushed him down on the floor."15 On her part, the trial judge said that the physical pain experienced by the victim had been aggravated by an emotional trauma that caused him to stop going to school altogether out of fear of the petitioner, compelling his parents to transfer him to another school where he had to adjust again.16 Such established circumstances proved beyond reasonable doubt thatthe petitioner was guilty of child abuse by deeds that degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of Michael Ryan as a human being.

x x x."

When the Supreme Court may review findings of fact by the lower courts

G.R. No. 173988, October 8, 2014
FELINA ROSALDES, Petitioner,  vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.



"x x x.
It is true that the limitation of the review to errors of law admits of exceptions. Under Section 4, Rule 3 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, the following situations are the exceptions in which the Court may review findings of fact by the lower courts, to wit: (a) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (b) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (c) there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) the collegial appellate courts went beyond the issues of the case, and their findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) the findings of fact of the collegial appellate courts are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) the facts set forth in the petition aswell as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; (j) the findings of fact of the collegial appellate courts are premised on the supposed evidence, but are contradicted by the evidence on record; and (k) all other similar and exceptional cases warranting a review of the lower courts’ findings of fact. A further exception is recognized when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed bythe parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.12 Yet, none of the exceptions applies herein.
x x x."

Child abuse; RA 7610 vs. Rev. Penal Code; when and what law to apply




G.R. No. 173988, October 8, 2014
FELINA ROSALDES, Petitioner,
vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.


"The petitioner, a public schoolteacher, was charged with and found guilty of child abuse, a violation of Republic Act No. 7610.1 The victim was her own Grade 1 pupil whom she physically maltreated for having accidentally bumped her knee while she was drowsing off on a bamboo sofa as he entered the classroom. Her maltreatment left him with physical injuries, as duly certified by a physician.

Whether or not the petitioner thereby committed child abuse is the question that this appeal must determine, in light of the Court's pronouncement in Bongalon v. People of the Philippines2 that:


Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child abuse under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610. Only when the laying of hands is shown beyond reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being should it be punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it is punished under the Revised Penal Code."

Private complainants in criminal cases are not precluded from filing a motion for reconsideration and subsequently an appeal on the civil aspect of a decision acquitting the accused.




"x x x.

When the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto is instituted with the criminal action, whether by choice of private complainant (i.e., no reservation is made or no prior filing of a separate civil action) or as required by the law or rules, the case will be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor.63 The civil action cannot proceed independently of the criminal case. This includes subsequent proceedings on the criminal action such as an appeal. In any case, Ferro Chemicals, Inc. joined the public prosecutor in filing the petition for certiorari before this court. Ramon Garcia, President of Ferro Chemicals, Inc., signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping of the petition for certiorari.64

We must clarify, however, that private complainants in criminal cases are not precluded from filing a motion for reconsideration and subsequently an appeal on the civil aspect of a decision acquitting the accused. An exception to the rule that only the Solicitor General can bring actions in criminal proceedings before the Court of Appeals or this court is "when the private offended party questions the civil aspect of a decision of a lower court."65 As discussed in Mobilia Products, Inc. v. Hajime Umezawa:66

In a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the offended party is limited to the civil liability arising there from. Hence, if a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, a reconsideration of the order of dismissal or acquittal may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, insofar as the criminal aspect there of is concerned and may be made only by the public prosecutor; or in the case of an appeal, by the State only, through the OSG. The private complainant or offended party may not undertake such motion for reconsideration or appeal on the criminal aspect of the case.However, the offended party or private complainant may file a motion for reconsideration of such dismissal or acquittal or appeal therefrom but only insofar as the civil aspect thereof is concerned. In so doing, the private complainant or offended party need not secure the conformity of the public prosecutor. If the court denies his motion for reconsideration, the private complainant or offended party may appeal or file a petition for certiorarior mandamus,if grave abuse amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown and the aggrieved party has no right of appeal or given an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.67 (Citations omitted)

This is in consonance with the doctrine that:

[T]he extinction of the penal action does not necessarily carry with it the extinction ofthe civil action, whether the latter is instituted with or separately from the criminal action. The offended party may still claim civil liability ex delictoif there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the liability may arise exists. Jurisprudence has enumerated three instances when, notwithstanding the accused’s acquittal, the offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto: (a) if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) if the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil;and (c) if the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted.68


However, if the state pursues an appeal on the criminal aspect of a decision of the trial court acquitting the accused and private complainant/s failed to reserve the right to institute a separate civil action,the civil liability ex delictothat is inherently attached to the offense is likewise appealed. The appeal of the civil liability ex delictois impliedly instituted with the petition for certiorari assailing the acquittal of the accused. Private complainant cannot anymore pursue a separate appeal from that of the state without violating the doctrine of non-forum shopping.
On the other hand, the conclusion isdifferent if private complainant reserved the right to institute the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto before the Regional Trial Court orinstitute a separate civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case in accordance with Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. In these situations, the filing of an appealas to the civil aspect of the case cannot be considered as forum shopping.1âwphi1 This is not the situation here.

x x x."

See:

G.R. No. 172505, October 1, 2014
ANTONIO M. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs. FERRO CHEMICALS, INC., Respondent.

The test for determining the existence of forum shopping



"x x x.
Forum shopping is defined as "theact of a litigant who ‘repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in, or already resolved adversely by some other court . . . to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another’."52 Once clearly established that forum shopping was committed willfully and deliberately by a party or his or her counsel, the case may be summarily dismissed with prejudice, and the act shall constitute direct contempt and a cause for administrative sanctions.53

Forum shopping is prohibited, and sanctions are imposed on those who commit forum shopping as "it trifles with the courts, abuses their processes, degrades the administration of justice and adds to the already congested court dockets."54 This court has said:

What is critical is the vexation brought upon the courts and the litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes and grant the same or substantially the same reliefs and in the process creates the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issues, regardless of whether the court in which one of the suits was brought has no jurisdiction over the action.55 (Citation omitted)
The test and requisites that must concur to establish when a litigant commits forum shopping are the following:

The test for determining the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis pendentiaare present, or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res judicatain another. Thus, there is forum shopping when the following elements are present: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties asrepresent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicatain the action under consideration; said requisites are also constitutive of the requisites for auter action pendant or lis pendens.56 (Citation omitted)

There is no question that Ferro Chemicals, Inc. committed forum shopping when it filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals and a petition for certiorari before this court assailing the same trial court decision. This is true even if Ferro Chemicals, Inc.’s notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals was entitled "Notice of Appeal Ex Gratia Abudantia Ad Cautelam (Of The Civil Aspect of the Case)."57 The "civil aspect of the case" referred to by Ferro Chemicals, Inc. is for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto. However, it failed to make a reservation before the trial court to institute the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delictoor institute a separate civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case.

There is identity of parties. Petitioner, Antonio Garcia, and respondent, Ferro Chemicals, Inc., are both parties in the appeal filed before the Court of Appeals and the petition for certiorari before this court.

There is identity of the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for in both actions. At a glance, it may appear that Ferro Chemicals, Inc. asserted different rights: The appeal before the Court of Appeals is purely on the civil aspect of the trial court’s decision while the petition for certiorari before this court is allegedly only onthe criminal aspect of the case. However, the civil liability asserted by Ferro Chemicals, Inc. before the Court of Appeals arose from the criminal act. It is in the nature of civil liability ex delicto. Ferro Chemicals, Inc. did not reserve the right to institute the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delictoor institute a separate civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case.58 Thus, it is an adjunct of the criminalaspect of the case.1âwphi1 As held in Lim v. Kou Co Ping:59

The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delictois based on the acts or omissions that constitute the criminal offense; hence, its trial is inherently intertwined with the criminal action.For this reason, the civil liability ex delictois impliedly instituted with the criminal offense. If the action for the civil liability ex delictois instituted prior to or subsequent to the filing of the criminal action, its proceedings are suspended until the final outcome of the criminal action. The civil liability based on delict is extinguished when the court hearing the criminal action declares that ‘the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist’."60 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted).
When the trial court’s decision was appealed as to its criminal aspect in the petition for certiorari before thiscourt, the civil aspect thereof is deemed included in the appeal. Thus, the relief prayed for by Ferro Chemicals, Inc., that is, recovery of civil liability ex delicto, is asserted in both actions before this court and the Court of Appeals.

x x x."

See:
G.R. No. 172505, October 1, 2014

ANTONIO M. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs. FERRO CHEMICALS, INC., Respondent.

The assailed decision is void, considering that it originates from a void decision of the Regional Trial Court for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.




"x x x.

The Regional Trial Court did not have jurisdiction

Jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter is vested by law.46 In criminal cases, the imposable penalty of the crime charged in the information determines the court that has jurisdiction over the case.47

The information charged Antonio Garcia with violation of Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code, which is punishable by arresto mayor, or imprisonment for a period of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months. Article 318 states:

ART. 318: Other deceits. – The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of not less than the amount of the damage caused and not more than twice such amount shall be imposed upon any person who shall defraud or damage another by any other deceit not mentioned in the preceding articles of this chapter.

Any person who, for profit or gain, shall interpret dreams, make forecasts, tell fortunes, or take advantage of the credulity of the public in any other similar manner, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayoror a fine not exceeding 200 pesos.

When the information was filed on September 3, 1990, the law in force was Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 before it was amended by Republic Act No. 7691. Under Section 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Metropolitan Trial Court had jurisdiction over the case:

SEC. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in criminal cases.–
. . . .
2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos. (Emphasis supplied)

The Regional Trial Court did not have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. This lack of jurisdiction resulted in voiding all of the trial court’s proceedings and the judgment rendered.48 Although the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction was never raised as an issue in any part of the proceedings and even until it reached this court, we proceed with resolving the matter.

In Pangilinan v. Court of Appeals,49 this court held:

Thus, we apply the general rule thatjurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or waived by the parties. Even on appeal and even if the reviewing parties did not raise the issue of jurisdiction, the reviewing court is not precluded fromruling that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the case[.]
. . . .
Having arrived at the conclusion that the Regional Trial Court did not have jurisdiction to try the case against the appellant, it is no longer necessary to consider the other issues raised as the decision of the Regional Trial Court is null and void.50

The trial court’s lack of jurisdiction cannot be cured by the parties’ silence on the matter.51 The failure of the parties to raise the matter of jurisdiction also cannot be construed as a waiver of the parties. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and cannot be waived by the parties.

The assailed decision is void, considering that it originates from a void decision of the Regional Trial Court for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

x x x."



See:

G.R. No. 172505, October 1, 2014
ANTONIO M. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs. FERRO CHEMICALS, INC., Respondent.

Issues on appeal




"x x x.
There are pertinent and important issues that the parties failed to raise before the trial court, Court of Appeals, and this court. Nonetheless, we resolve to rule on these issues.

As a general rule, this court through its appellate jurisdiction can only decide on matters or issues raised by the parties.42 However, the rule admits of exceptions.43 When the unassigned error affects jurisdiction over the subject matter44 or when the consideration of the error is necessary for a complete resolution of the case,45 this court can still decide on these issues.

We cannot turn a blind eye on glaring misapplications of the law or patently erroneous decisions or resolutions simply because the parties failed to raise these errors before the court. Otherwise, we will be allowing injustice by reason of the mistakes of the parties’ counsel and condoning reckless and negligent acts of lawyers to the prejudice of the litigants. Failure to rule on these issues amounts to an abdication of our duty to dispense justice to all parties.

The issues are:
I. Whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the case

II. Whether the act of FerroChemicals, Inc. in filing the notice of appeal before the Court of Appeals and the petition for certiorari assailing the same trial court decision amounted to forum shopping

III. Whether Ferro Chemicals, Inc. was entitled to the awards given as civil liability ex delicto

x x x."


See:

G.R. No. 172505, October 1, 2014
ANTONIO M. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs. FERRO CHEMICALS, INC., Respondent.

Attempted rape




"x x x.

Conformably with this limitation, our review focuses only on determining the question of law of whether or not the petitioner’s climbing on top of the undressed AAA such that they faced each other, with him mashing her breasts and touching her genitalia with his hands, constituted attempted rape, the crime for which the RTC and the CA convicted and punished him. Based on the information, supra, he committed such acts "with intent of having carnal knowledge ofher by means of force, and if the accused did not accomplish his purpose that is to have carnal knowledge of the said AAA it was not because of his voluntary desistance but because the said offended party succeeded in resisting the criminal attempt of said accused to the damage and prejudice of said offended party."

There is an attempt, according to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than this own spontaneous desistance. In People v. Lamahang,14 the Court, speaking through the eminent Justice Claro M.Recto, eruditely expounded on what overt acts would constitute anattempted felony, to wit:

It is our opinion that the attempt to commit an offense which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical relation to a particular, concrete offense; that, which is the beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and consummation. The attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, inasmuch as its nature in relation to its objective is ambiguous, is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code. xxxx But it is not sufficient, for the purpose of imposing penal sanction, that an act objectively performed constitute a mere beginning of execution; it is necessary to establish its unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of the cause and its effect, with the deed which, upon its consummation, will develop into one of the offenses defined and punished by the Code; it is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. x x x x.

"It must be borne in mind (I Groizard, p. 99) that in offenses not consummated, as the material damage iswanting, the nature of the action intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be ascertained, but the same must be inferred from the nature of the acts of execution (accion medio). Hence, the necessity that these acts be such that by their very nature, by the facts to which they are related, by the circumstances of the persons performing the same, and by the things connected therewith, they must show without any doubt, that they are aimed at the consummation of a crime. Acts susceptible of double interpretation, that is, in favor as well as against the culprit, and which show an innocent aswell as a punishable act, must not and cannot furnish grounds by themselves for attempted or frustrated crimes. The relation existing between the facts submitted for appreciation and the offense of which said facts are supposed to produce must be direct; the intention must be ascertainedfrom the facts and therefore it is necessary, in order to avoid regrettable instance of injustice, that the mind be able to directly infer from them the intention of the perpetrator to cause a particular injury. This must have been the intention of the legislator in requiring that in order for an attempt to exist, the offender must commence the commission of the felony directly by overt acts, that is to say, that the acts performed must be such that, withoutthe intent to commit an offense, they would be meaningless."15

To ascertain whether the acts performed by the petitioner constituted attempted rape, we have to determine the law on rape in effect on December 21, 1993, when the petitioner committed the crime he was convicted of. That law was Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, which pertinently provided as follows:

Article 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived ofreason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
x x x x

The basic element of rape then and now is carnal knowledge of a female. Carnal knowledge isdefined simply as "theact of a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman,"16 which explains why the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates the rape. In other words, rape is consummated once the peniscapable of consummating the sexual act touches the external genitalia of the female.17 In People v. Campuhan,18 the Court has defined the extent of "touching" by the penis in rape in the following terms:

[T]ouching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim’s vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeedtouched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape. As the labias, which are required to be "touched" bythe penis, are by their natural situsor location beneath the mons pubisor the vaginal surface, to touch them with the penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface, hence, the conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape.

The pudendumor vulvais the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible in the perineal area, e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubisis the rounded eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly visible within the surface. The next layer is the labia majoraor the outer lips of the female organ composed of the outer convex surface and the inner surface. The skin of the outer convex surface is covered with hair follicles and is pigmented, while the inner surface is a thin skin which does not have any hair but has many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia majorais the labia minora. Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majoramust be entered for rape to be consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. xxxx Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubisof the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendumby the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness. [Bold emphasis supplied]

It is noteworthy that in People v. Orita,19 the Court clarified that the ruling in People v. Eriñia20 whereby the offender was declared guilty of frustrated rapebecause of lack of conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the offended party, was a stray decisionfor not having been reiterated in subsequent cases. As the evolving case law on rape stands, therefore, rape in its frustrated stage is a physical impossibility, considering that the requisites of a frustrated felony under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Codeare that: (1) the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony; and (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator’s will. Obviously, the offender attains his purpose from the moment he has carnal knowledge of his victim, because from that moment all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished, leaving nothing more to be done by him.21

Nonetheless, rape admits of an attempted stage. In this connection, the character of the overt actsfor purposes of the attempted stage has been explained in People v. Lizada:22

An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The raison d’etrefor the law requiring a direct overtact is that, in a majority of cases, the conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to be a commencement of the commission of the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the crime itself has been committed, and this is so for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with certainty what the intent of the accused is.It is necessary that the overt act should have been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was the "first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are made." The act done need not constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however, that the attempt must have a causal relation to the intended crime. In the words of Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense. (Bold emphasis supplied)

In attempted rape, therefore, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender does not perform all the acts of execution of having carnal knowledge. If the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates rape, and rape in its attempted stage requires the commencement of the commission of the felony directly by overt actswithout the offender performing all the acts of execution that should produce the felony, the only means by which the overt acts performed by the accused can be shown to have a causal relation to rape as the intended crime is to make a clear showing of his intent to lie with the female. Accepting that intent, being a mental act, is beyond the sphere of criminal law,23 that showing must be through his overt acts directly connected with rape. He cannot be held liable for attempted rape withoutsuch overt acts demonstrating the intent to lie with the female. In short, the State, to establish attempted rape, must show that his overt acts, should his criminalintent be carried to its complete termination without being thwarted by extraneous matters, would ripen into rape,24 for, as succinctly put in People v. Dominguez, Jr.:25 "The gauge in determining whether the crime of attempted rape had been committed is the commencement of the act of sexual intercourse, i.e., penetration of the penis into the vagina, before the interruption."

The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim, and was already touching her genitalia with his hands and mashing her breasts when she freed herself from his clutches and effectively ended his designs on her. Yet, inferring from such circumstances thatrape, and no other,was his intended felony would be highly unwarranted. This was so, despite his lust for and lewd designs towards her being fully manifest. Such circumstances remained equivocal, or "susceptible of double interpretation," as Justice Recto put in People v. Lamahang, supra, such that it was not permissible to directly infer from them the intention to cause rape as the particular injury. Verily, his felony would not exclusively be rapehad he been allowed by her to continue, and to have sexual congress with her, for some other felony like simple seduction (if he should employ deceit to have her yield to him)26 could also be ultimate felony.

We clarify that the direct overt acts of the petitioner that would have produced attempted rape did not include equivocal preparatory acts. The former would have related to his acts directly connected to rape as the intended crime, but the latter, whether external or internal, had no connection with rape as the intended crime. Perforce, his perpetration of the preparatory acts would not render him guilty of an attempt to commit such felony.27 His preparatory acts could include his putting up of the separate tents, with one being for the use of AAA and BBB, and the other for himself and his assistant, and his allowing his wife to leave for Manila earlier that evening to buy more wares. Such acts, being equivocal, had no direct connection to rape. As a rule, preparatory acts are not punishable under the Revised Penal Codefor as long as they remained equivocal or of uncertain significance, because by their equivocality no one could determine with certainty what the perpetrator’s intent really was.28

x x x."


See:

G.R. No. 166441, October 8, 2014

NORBERTO CRUZ y BARTOLOME, Petitioner,
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.