Judicial clemency or recall of disqualification in lawyer disciplinary proceedings

Spouses Andre and Ma. Fatima Chambon vs. Atty. Christopher S. Ruiz, A.C. No. 11478 (Nov. 26, 2024) (resolution) / earlier decision (Sept. 5, 2017) 

I. Facts

• Parties / background

• Spouses Andre and Ma. Fatima Chambon were creditors of one Suzette Camasura Remoreras, with an obligation secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land (with improvements) covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). 

• When Remoreras defaulted, the Chambons initiated extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property. 

• In the course of that, the Chambons learned that Remoreras had filed a “Notice of Loss / Affidavit of Loss” for the TCT (or duplicate thereof) in connection with a new Owner’s Duplicate Copy. This affidavit was notarized by Atty. Christopher Ruiz. 

• The Chambons contended that (a) the jurat of the affidavit lacked the “competent evidence of identity” of Remoreras; (b) various essential particulars (title/description of instrument, names/addresses, identity evidence, date/time, type of notarial act) were left blank in the instrument; (c) the entries in Ruiz’s notarial register were also left incomplete or blank; (d) there was no showing that Ruiz personally knew Remoreras to dispense with the requirement of competent proof of identity. 

• Ruiz denied having notarized a “Release of Mortgage” document (alleged by the Chambons), attributing any register entries to his office secretary or mislabelling of an instrument (claiming that an entry indicated as “SPA” was actually a deed of absolute sale) and imputing negligence to his staff. 

• In the administrative / disciplinary proceedings (investigated by IBP-CBD), the Investigating Officer recommended revocation of Ruiz’s notarial commission for 4 years; the IBP Board adopted this but modified it to disqualification from reappointment for 3 years and suspension from practice for 3 years. 

• Procedural posture / issue now

• In 2017, the Supreme Court (En Banc) rendered a decision finding Ruiz guilty of violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, revoking his commission, perpetually disqualifying him from being notary, and suspending him from law practice for one (1) year. 

• In 2024 (Nov. 26), in the resolution form (A.C. No. 11478), the Court addressed a petition for judicial clemency filed by Ruiz, seeking recall (or mitigation) of his perpetual disqualification. 

Thus, the 2024 decision is a resolution on judicial clemency / recall of disqualification, rather than a fresh merits judgment on the underlying violation.

II. Issues

The Supreme Court faced principally:

• Whether judicial clemency / recall of perpetual disqualification (from being notary) may be granted in the circumstances (i.e. whether Ruiz is eligible).

• If so, whether the petitioner (Ruiz) satisfactorily established the requisites for clemency (rehabilitation, remorse, time elapsed, good record, etc.).

• Whether, if clemency is granted, the perpetual disqualification should be modified (e.g. to a fixed disqualification period) and under what terms / conditions.

Thus, the core legal issue is the availability, nature, and conditions of judicial clemency in lawyer discipline / notarial disqualification, and whether in Ruiz’s case the clemency petition should prosper.

III. Ruling(s) / Holding(s)

From the 2024 resolution:

• The petition for recall of perpetual disqualification is DENIED. (i.e., Ruiz’s perpetual disqualification stands) 

• The Court reaffirmed the 2017 disciplinary judgment: that Ruiz was guilty of violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice; his notarial commission is revoked; he is perpetually disqualified from holding a notarial commission; and he was suspended from the practice of law for one year (effective immediately at that time). 

• The Court elaborated on the doctrine of judicial clemency: it is not a right, but an extraordinary remedy; courts may consider it but must weigh relevant factors such as the seriousness of the offense, the lawyer’s conduct since, proof of rehabilitation, absence of repeated offenses, etc. 

• In Ruiz’s case, the Court found that he had not met the stringent criteria to warrant lifting or limiting the disqualification. The perniciousness and gravity of his breach of the notarial rules, and insufficient showing of enduring rehabilitation, militated against clemency. 

Thus, the ultimate judgment is: the perpetual disqualification remains; the clemency petition fails.

IV. Ratio Decidendi / Legal Principles

From reading the decision and attendant commentary, the following legal principles and rationales may be distilled (i.e. the ratio decidendi):

• Judicial clemency in lawyer discipline is an extraordinary remedy, not a matter of right.

The Court holds that clemency is not something automatically granted; the disciplinary authority retains discretion, and the petitioner must satisfactorily establish the requisites. 

• Perpetual disqualification arising from serious violation is not lightly recalled; the gravity of the offense is a crucial factor.

In determining whether recall is warranted, the Court must assess the nature, context, and severity of the misconduct (in this case, a notarial act with multiple and fundamental lapses). The more serious and damaging the violation, the harder clemency should be granted. 

• Evidence of genuine, sustained rehabilitation and remorse is essential.

The petitioner must show credible proof that after the disciplinary sanction, he or she has reformed, not committed new violations, maintained good character, and is fit to be restored (at least partially) to the exercise of functions previously barred. Mere passage of time, or general assertion of remorse, is insufficient without demonstrable proof. 

• The disciplinary court must balance public interest and the integrity of the bar / notarial office against the petitioner’s interests.

The decision to grant clemency does not rest solely on mercy toward the petitioner, but must consider the protection of the public, the preservation of trust in the notarial institution, and deterrence of similar misconduct by others. The Court must ensure that clemency does not undermine the sanctity and reliability of notarial acts. 

• Once disqualification is perpetual, the bar is high for its recall.

A perpetual disqualification imposed after a serious violation is not easily undone. The default presumption is that it should remain, absent a compelling showing of change. Hence, the petitioner bears a heavy burden, and clemency should not be granted unless the case is exceptional. (This flows from the Court’s treatment in Ruiz.) 

• The original findings of violation must remain undisturbed in the absence of grave error; clemency does not reopen merits unless exceptional.

In the 2024 resolution, the Court did not reexamine the factual or legal correctness of the 2017 decision (as that was final), but considered only whether the sanction may be relaxed via clemency. The clemency mechanism does not become a de facto appeal of the merits. 

V. Observations & Significance for Legal Practice

• This decision clarifies the standard and boundaries for judicial clemency or recall of disqualification in lawyer disciplinary proceedings — particularly where the sanction is perpetual disqualification from notarial functions.

• It underscores that serious breach of notarial norms (e.g. omission of proof of identity, blank entries, failure to verify) are treated severely, given the centrality of notarial acts to public reliance.

• For lawyers and those supervising notarial acts, the Ruiz case is a caution: non-compliance with the mandatory formalities of notarial practice (as embodied in the 2004 Rules) can yield irrevocable consequences.

• From a doctrinal standpoint, the decision helps delineate the limits of mercy in legal ethics enforcement: the Court remains cautious that clemency not erode accountability or public trust.

EN BANC

[ A.C. No. 11478, November 26, 2024 ]

SPOUSES ANDRE AND MA. FATIMA CHAMBON, COMPLAINANTS, 

VS. 

ATTY. CHRISTOPHER S. RUIZ, RESPONDENT.

References:

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/sep2017/ac_11478_2017.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com

https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/decisions/?citationMarker=43dcd9a7-70db-4a1f-b0ae-981daa162054 

https://www.digest.ph/decisions/spouses-chambon-v-ruiz?tab=digests&utm_source=chatgpt.com

https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/digest/chambon-v-ruiz?utm_source=chatgpt.com

https://www.asglawpartners.com/legal-ethics/2024/11/26/judicial-clemency-in-the-philippines-when-can-disqualified-lawyers-be-forgiven/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

* Assisted by ChatGPT AI app, October 1, 2025.

IMPLIED TRUST - Article 1448, Civil Code.

"The Ruling of the Court

Considering the varying findings of the RTC and the CA, the Court deems it proper to give due course to the arguments raised by the Heirs of Ferdinand, albeit they involve factual issues.36

The Court grants the Petition.

Article 1448 of the Civil Code states:

ARTICLE 1448. There is an implied trust when property is sold, and the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property. The former is the trustee, while the latter is the beneficiary. However, if the person to whom the title is conveyed is a child, legitimate or illegitimate, of the one paying the price of the sale, no trust is implied by law, it being disputably presumed that there is a gift in favor of the child.

The implied trust under Article 1448 is called a purchase money resulting trust, which has the following elements: (a) an actual payment of money, property or services, or an equivalent, constituting valuable consideration; and (b) such consideration must be furnished by the alleged beneficiary of a resulting trust. The party alleging the existence of the trust bears the burden of proving it.37

Notably, the last sentence of Article 1448 states that if the title is conveyed to a child of the one paying the price of the sale, the disputable presumption is that there is a gift in favor of the child. There being no question that Ferdinand is the child of Melania, and that Melania paid the purchase price for the subject lot, there is a disputable presumption that Melania intended to donate the subject lot to Ferdinand.

Being a disputable presumption, it may be overturned by contrary evidence. In Tong v. Go Tiat Kun,38 the Court held that the presumption was overturned because of several factors. First, the child under whose name the property was titled did not prove that he had the means to pay for it. Second, the parent and his other children always had possession of the property. Third, the property remained undivided even though it was registered in the name of one child. The surviving heirs of the child under whose name it was titled only claimed ownership after the death of said child. Fourth, the surviving heirs of the child admitted that their predecessor-in-interest did not send any letter claiming ownership over the property and that they had their own residence. Finally, the parent paid the real property taxes.39

The Court disagrees with the CA that the Heirs of Melania successfully overturned the presumption in favor of Ferdinand.

Ferdinand admittedly did not pay for the subject lot. In addition, the subject lot was not divided. But the similarities with Tong end there.(awÞhi( It was Ferdinand and his heirs who paid for the real property taxes on the subject lot.40 Melania also consistently asked Ferdinand to permit Paul to stay in the subject lot and the house she had built. This showed that she respected Ferdinand as the owner of the subject lot. More, the Heirs of Ferdinand are in possession of TCT No. T-16657.

Melania's act of building a house on the subject lot, paying the taxes for said house,41 and renting out a portion thereof,42 do not negate her donative intent. As explained by Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa (Associate Justice Caguioa), "these actions pertain only to the exercise of the right to the possession, use, and fruits of the lot."43"

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 254452, November 27, 2024 ]

HEIRS OF FERDINAND ROXAS, NAMELY: ANGELA MARGARITA T. ROXAS, DYAN PAULA T. ROXAS, MICHAEL JUDE T. ROXAS, AND MARIA KATRINA T. ROXAS, PETITIONERS, 

VS. 

HEIRS OF MELANIA ROXAS, NAMELY: MANUEL A. ROXAS, MARIA ROSARIO ROXAS-URETA, ALEXANDER A. ROXAS, SALOME ROXAS-PANTALEON, PAUL GERARDO ROXAS, ELAINE ROXAS GAMBOA, MA. IMELDA ROXAS-CRUZ, AND DAVID ANTHONY ROXAS, RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N

INTING, J.:

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2024/nov2024/gr_254452_2024.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com