Thursday, December 13, 2012

The Top 10 TED Talks for Lawyers, Litigators and Litigation Support

The Top 10 TED Talks for Lawyers, Litigators and Litigation Support

Filipino lawyers can learn from TED talks.


"x x x.


The Top 10 TED Talks for Lawyers, Litigators and Litigation Support


TED talks lawyers litigators litigation support videosby Ken Lopez
Founder & CEO
A2L Consulting
In the 1980s, a small conference was started in California focused on topics related to technology, entertainment and design. Now known by the acronym TED, what was once a small conference is now an international movement devoted to the dissemination of "Ideas Worth Spreading." 
The format is simple. Compelling speakers with compelling messages are invited to speak for between five and 20 minutes to a live audience. The talks are video recorded and generally posted online. These online TED Talks have been viewed over one billion times worldwide.
Some TED Talks are among the most popular educational materials on the Internet, and there is a lot that lawyers, litigators and litigation support professionals can learn from them. Whereas a PSY video may be the most watched video of all time on YouTube, TED Talks are the viral videos of the intellectually curious.
While the TED Talks are a pricey conference to attend live, there are now TEDx events as well. These are locally organized TED Talks that are only loosely affiliated with the parent. On average five occur every day somewhere in the world in over 1,200 cities, and they are inexpensive or free to attend.
I regularly attend TEDx talks that are close to me. They are inspiring, they are motivating, they aremoving, and sometimes you even find a major law firm litigation partner speaking at one. I recommend youfind one near you to attend.
Here are 10 TED videos that I believe are especially helpful to lawyers, litigators and litigation support professionals.
1) Changing How You Are Perceived by Changing Your Body Language: Whether you are trying a case in front of a jury, negotiating a deal, or managing a litigation support team, how you are perceived will change how people react to your message. Oddly, it turns out that by purposefully changing your body language, you will not only change how you are perceived, you will measurably change your own body chemistry.

2) Inspire and Persuade Others by Speaking in this Order: If you see me speaking somewhere or if I am advising on the development of an opening statement, you'll notice that I follow the teachings of Simon Sinek. I have recommended his golden circle talk before, and I still think it is among the best TED Talks, because it is just so easy to implement. 

3) How Lawyers Can Tell a Great Story (R-Rated): The writer of Toy Story, WALL-E and others reminds us of something critical to any trial presentation, "Make me care!" Learning to tell better storiesmay be one of the best skills a litigator can learn. Making an emotional connection with your audience is how you get them on your side - not by overloading them with facts, details and backup.

4) How to Structure a Great Talk: Nancy Duarte does a great job of explaining how to structure a good story and offers a format that can be applied easily to any briefopening or closing statement

5) Persuading the Rational Decision-maker: The speaker reminds us that decisions are made on emotion and justified on fact. This is true in sales, and it is true in the jury deliberation room. To persuade, we must trigger people's encoded memories and their emotions. Even if your role is that of litigation support on a trial team, it is critical to remind trial counsel of the importance of these lessons. Remember, you can always forward this article.

6) How Statistics Fool Juries: We've written before on topics related to statistics including the use of trial graphics to teach statistics for trial and statistical significance as it relates to litigation. For anyone making a Daubert challenge, this is an especially useful talk.

7) Negotiating Effectively from the author of Getting to Yes: He shares his journey of walking in the steps of Abraham and how it may serve as a model for Middle East peace. In the process, he reminds us of how to negotiate effectively as lawyers, litigators and litigation support professionals by looking at the third side.

8) Let's Simplify Legal Jargon: As a designer with a law degree and a passion for simplicity, my eyes open wide any time someone says they want to simplify legal things. Here, in less than five minutes, another designer who has spent some time in law school, Alan Siegal, shows how he simplified IRS notices and credit card statements.

9) Battling Bad Science and How Evidence Can Be Distorted: An epidemiologist reminds us of how science can easily be interpreted incorrectly. Since we often consult on litigation where human health effects are alleged, sometimes on a mass scale, I find this talk helpful. It reminds me how often evidence is distorted to try to create liability.

10) Harnessing the Power of Introverts: I saw former corporate lawyer Susan Cain speak at a conference recently, and I found her talk eye-opening. Not only did I re-discover some of my buried but natural introvert roots, but I learned better techniques for leading introverted members of my team. Whether you lead a trial team, a litigation support group or a law firm, this is an important talk to hear for leaders.

I hope you've enjoyed the videos. If you've watched a number of them, you'll notice a similar presentation style. It's one that you might compare to a Steve Jobs keynote, or like that of Garr Reynolds, or Cliff Atkinson would follow. This style is one that I want to see more litigators embrace during opening and closing arguments.
Notice the lack of bullet points throughout the presentations. We wrote about avoiding the use of bullet points in July, and it has been one of our most popular articles ever.  And I don't think a TED Talk is all that dissimilar from an opening or closing statement.

Other great A2L Video Posts for lawyers, litigators and litigation support professions:

Free E-Book - Click to DownloadGuide to Engaging Trial Technicians


About A2L Consulting

A2L Consulting is leading national litigation consulting firm founded in 1995. A2L has consulted for all major law firms on 10,000+ cases with trillions of dollars at stake.  A2L Consulting offers the following litigation support services:

x x x."

Monday, December 10, 2012

Corona’s fat allowances not taxed: Same, same still at SC? « Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism

Corona’s fat allowances not taxed: Same, same still at SC? « Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism

"x x x.

THE WEALTH OF THE ‘GODS OF FAURA’

Corona’s fat allowances not
taxed: Same, same still at SC?

Second of Four Parts
MANY PUBLIC officials like to say that accepting a government post is like taking a vow of poverty, given the supposedly paltry pay in government service.
What officials neglect to say, however, is that aside from their basic pay, many of them receive all sorts of allowances, bonuses, and other benefits that can jack up their income by as much as 300 percent.
This seems to be the case with the justices of the Supreme Court, all of whom are receiving millions of pesos more in allowances and other monetary perks on top of their basic annual pay.
But the justices may be enjoying another privilege not accorded other public officials. Says one Cabinet member who declines to be named: “Taxes and allowances are rather skewed in favor of the courts, the justices. It’s a double-standard system in their favor.”
“If we are to apply to the court the same rules on taxation that are being observed in other government agencies,” he adds, “we might collect more taxes and support more reforms in the court.”
He hints that other public officials have not exactly been pleased with the arrangement and in fact covet the same privilege. Many officials have been grumbling about the 30-percent tax on their bonuses and allowances, says the Cabinet member, and now, “officials in some government agencies have invoked that practice – the withholding tax is not even applied to the allowances of the justices.”
This runs contrary to the National Internal Revenue Code of the Philippines (The Tax Reform Act of 1997 or Republic Act No. 8424), which requires the withholding agent/payor “who is either an individual or non-individual required to deduct and withhold taxes on both the “compensation paid to employees” and “income payments subject to final withholding taxes.”
The Code clarifies that “compensation” refers to “any remuneration received for services performed by an employee from his employer under an employee-employer relationship.”
It also states that “gross income” includes, but is not limited to the following: Compensation for services, in whatever form paid, including but not limited to fees, salaries, wages, commissions and similar item; gross income derived from the conduct of trade or business or the exercise of profession; gains derived from dealings in property; interest; rents; royalties; dividends; annuities; prizes and winnings; pensions; partner's distributive share from the net income of the general professional partnerships.
According to some Supreme Court justices, though, they have been paying appropriate taxes, including those on their allowances.
Did they pay taxes?
With the exception of newly appointed Associate Justice Mario Victor F. Leonen, all sitting justices of the Supreme Court were asked by PCIJ if they paid the taxes due on their allowances and other monetary benefits, among other things.
Of the seven who replied to PCIJ’s queries, only five addressed the question on their allowances and the taxes due on these. Two also suggested that PCIJ address such queries to the Supreme Court’s payroll office. All five, however, apparently assumed that the high court’s finance office had done “substituted filing” of their tax returns through what have been called ‘alpha lists.’
Associate Justice Teresita Leonardo-de Castro, who was the sole magistrate to reply with a list of the kinds of allowances and bonuses she receives aside from her basic pay, said, “Taxes are withheld and paid for the taxable income.”
Associate Justice Presbitero C. Velasco Jr., whose allowances, bonuses, and other benefits reach more than P3.5 million according to the Commission on Audit (COA), also wrote in his reply to PCIJ, “Taxes on allowances and compensation are withheld at source as prescribed by law.”
Ask SC finance
Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, whose declared income was the only one among the justices that overshot the figure COA said he earned in 2011, echoed this, saying, “Taxes were withheld from our income. Moreover, the B.I.R. ITRs (Bureau of Internal Revenue income tax returns) bear that we even paid additional taxes aside from those withheld. This only shows that income from other sources was taxed.”
Associate Justice Martin Villarama Jr., who visited the PCIJ office to deliver his reply letter, meanwhile wrote, “I stand by my declaration of P2,992,298.02 annual salary as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court for the year 2011.”
“However,” he said, “I would not know with specificity the breakdown for salary, allowances, etc. and the taxes I have paid for these. You may consult the Chief Accountant and/or other appropriate Supreme Court officials regarding this matter.”
Finally, Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo, who was abroad at the time but emailed through a staff his reply, wrote: “As a government employee taxed on pure compensation income, my employer, the Supreme Court, withholds all required taxes on my income.”
“This issue,” Del Castillo said, “should therefore be more properly addressed to the administrative authorities of the Supreme Court as the withholding agent of taxes due on our income.”
Taxed, not taxed
A tax lawyer interviewed by the PCIJ says that under BIR regulations, “substituted filing” must comply with three conditions: the filer has only one employer as his only source of income; the amount withheld is correct; and if not correct, the taxpayer must file his or her own income tax return.
For public officials, the tax lawyer says that “there’s only one provision: that allowances should be only 50 percent equivalent of your basic salary to be exempted from tax. Anything beyond that is not exempted.”xx`
As for bonuses, P30,000 is the maximum amount that could be exempted from tax per person, and beyond that, taxes kick in, the lawyer says.
Fringe benefits, meanwhile, must also be taxed and the question only is whether the employer or the employee will carry the cost.
The taxpayer, according to the tax lawyer, must declare the composite amount of all that he or she had received as compensation. “You have to add everything, and if the proper withholding tax was not deducted, you have to pay.”
As for extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses or EME and other discretionary funds that the COA report showed had been set aside for the justices, the full amount must be liquidated and supported by receipts, the lawyer says. “It should not be included as personal compensation because it is intended for office use,” says the expert. “If it’s not liquidated, then that’s malversation.”
One problem facing the justices of the Supreme Court is that while they seem to assume the Court’s financial office had transmitted the necessary taxes to the BIR, documents submitted by the high court’s finance personnel to the Senate during the impeachment trial of Corona indicate otherwise.
In fact, the documents point to the probability that over the years, the appropriate taxes on the justices’ allowances and other compensation may not have been withheld and remitted to the BIR.
PCIJ secured from the Senate copies of these documents that had been marked in exhibit for both the defense and prosecution panels.
Corona’s defense lawyers had summoned the court’s payroll officer, Araceli C. Bayuga, to testify at the impeachment trial in March 2012, apparently to show proof that in part because of his salaries and fat allowances, Corona could well afford to purchase expensive real estate properties.
Yet instead of proving that Corona had the financial wherewithal to acquire a massive, pricey estate, the documents only called attention to the apparent tax liabilities that Corona had incurred because of the court’s failure to remit the appropriate taxes on his fat allowances and bonuses.
Cash and checks
A high court employee since 1973, Bayuga said that she is the custodian of all monies, cash items, and official receipts of the court.
Too, she said that she “signs and encashes checks of cash advances for salaries, allowances, and other benefits of the court employees, including the honorable justices”; “supervises the counting and distribution of salaries, allowances, and other emoluments” of the court employees and justices; and signs and submits to the BIR the annual return of income tax withheld on compensation and the alphabetical list of court employees and officials “from whom taxes are withheld.”
Her report on Corona’s compensation while he was in the Supreme Court and the taxes paid on these on his behalf could therefore only be reflective of how similar matters were handled for the other justices.
In the yearend report or alphabetical list (alpha list) of gross compensation received by the high court’s employees that she submitted to the BIR for the year 2005, Bayuga listed the “taxable” salaries and other (emoluments)” of Corona at only P466,347, and his “taxable” total “bonus/benefits,” P15,425.
Allowed, not allowed
The high court’s alpha list for 2005 Bayuga gave the Senate showed that Corona was not taxed, as revenue rules allow, for the following: P30,000 in bonus/benefits, P18,753 contributions to the GSIS (Government Service Insurance System), Philhealth (Philippine Health Corp.) and HDMF (Home Development Mutual Fund), and P32,000 in personal exemption.
After these exemptions and lawful deductions, Bayuga’s alpha list showed that the high court remitted only P109,931.60 in taxes withheld from Corona for 2005.
Saying she prepared the alpha list herself, Bayuga certified that Corona’s taxable “gross compensation income” for the year was only P466,347.00, and P15,425 in “bonus/benefits.”
Bayuga’s report to the Senate was signed and authorized by Corazon G. Ferrer-Flores, deputy clerk of court and chief of the Fiscal Management and Budget Office of the Supreme Court.
Two months earlier on Jan. 25, 2012, BIR Commissioner Kim Jacinto-Henares had testified before the Senate impeachment.
In 2002 and 2003, Henares said the high court did not submit alpha lists to the BIR, and neither did Corona file an income tax return. Corona still did not file his return in 2004 and 2005.
From 2006 to 2010, Henares, reading from BIR documents, disclosed that the Supreme Court has been withholding only small sums of taxes and reporting only small sums of gross compensation income, on Corona’s behalf:
  • In 2006, Corona’s withholding tax was only P109,706.60, based on reported “gross compensation” of only P465,597.
  • In 2007, withholding tax of P117,399.31, reported gross income of only P488,156.57.
  • In 2008, withholding tax of P154,057.75, gross income of only P621,528.62.
  • In 2009, withholding tax of P155,556.20, gross income of only P621,528.62.
  • In 2010, withholding tax of P176,577.32, on gross income of only P657,755.57.
True, full details
Yet in another document dated March 8, 2012 that she also furnished the Senate, Bayuga reported on all the salaries, emoluments, and allowances that Corona had received from April 9, 2002 to Dec. 31, 2011. In this, Bayuga revealed a more complete story.

She certified to the Senate that Corona had received four times more money, or P1,841,943.79 in 2005, with salaries, emoluments, allowances, fringe benefits, bonuses, etc. all thrown in.
In the same report to the Senate, Bayuga listed Corona as having received in 2005 “salaries” of only P485,100.00 – or almost the same amount she reported to the BIR was Corona’s taxable “gross compensation income” for the year.
But then again, Bayuga testified that on top of these “salaries,” Corona also received in 2005 a slew of allowances, bonuses, fringe benefits, etc. amounting to P1.36 million, which was apparently not taxed.
This bigger balance of Corona’s income was not disclosed in Bayuga’s alpha list to the BIR for 2005.
Undisclosed, not taxed
Bayuga’s report to the Senate revealed an apparent pattern of the high court’s payroll personnel to underdeclare Corona’s gross income, and as a consequence, let him pay much smaller withholding tax.
She informed the Senate that in 2011, Corona’s total salaries and allowances had further risen to twice more, or P3,678,435.70.
Last Aug. 30, three months after he was fired and barred from holding public office again on a 20-3 vote of the senators sitting as impeachment court, Corona found himself facing the taxman.
The BIR filed a P120.5-million tax evasion case against Corona, inclusive of surcharges and interests. BIR said Corona failed to file income tax returns or supplied inaccurate tax information in 2003, 2005, 2007, 2008, and 2010, in violation of revenue regulations.
After assessing the value of his peso bank accounts and property titles against his declared net worth in his SALNs from 2002 to 2009, BIR found that Corona had also “under-reported assets, under-declared assets, and unreported cash.”
Section 254 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 penalizes avoidance of payment of tax liabilities, while Section 255 penalizes failure to file income tax returns and provide correct and accurate tax information.
Corona had thrice requested more time to prepare his counter-affidavit to the 323-page BIR complaint. When he finally filed it on Oct. 15 through lawyer Anacleto Diaz, who is also a lawyer of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Corona said the case was proof positive of his continuing “political persecution” by the Aquino administration.
The Department of Justice has summoned Corona to personally attend a hearing on the case on Dec. 18, and respond to the BIR’s 34-page rejoinder to his motion to quash the case. – PCIJ, December 2012

x x x."

Air passenger bill of rights to take effect Dec 21 | ABS-CBN News

Air passenger bill of rights to take effect Dec 21 | ABS-CBN News

"x x x.


MANILA, Philippines (UPDATE) - The government on Monday released the "Air Passenger Bill of Rights", a measure which seeks to protect consumers from certain airline practices such as overbooking and "misleading" promo fares. 

Transportation Secretary Joseph Emilio Aguinaldo Abaya  and Trade Secretary Gregory L. Domingo on Monday signed the Joint Administrative Order (JAO) No. 1 or the Air Passenger Bill of Rights.
It will take effect on December 21.

The Air Passenger Bill of Rights was crafted by the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and Department of Trade and Industry in response to the increasing number of complaints against airlines. 

The order covers all Philippine-based carriers operating domestic and international flights, as well as foreign carriers operating flights from the Philippines. 

Under the order, passengers affected by delayed or cancelled flights will receive compensation from the airline, such as free food, drinks and even hotel accommodations. 

Flight cancellations, delays

In case of flight cancellation attributable to the airline, the passenger is entitled to the following rights:

(a) Be notified beforehand via public announcement, written/published notice and flight status update service (text);
(b) Be provided with the following, if he/she is already at the airport at the time of the announcement of the flight cancellation: sufficient refreshments or meals (e.g. snacks consisting of at least  a bottle of water and a sandwich, or breakfast, lunch, or dinner, or a voucher for the same, as the case may be); hotel accommodation (conveniently accessible from the airport); transportation from the airport to the hotel, v.v.; free phone calls, text or emails, and first aid, if necessary; and
(c) Reimbursement of the value of the fare, including taxes and surcharges, of the flight cancelled, or both in case the passenger decides not to fly; 
(d) Be endorsed to another air carrier without paying any fare difference, at the option of the passenger, and provided that space permit such re-accommodation; or
(e) Rebook the ticket, without additional charge, to the next flight with available space, or, within 30 days, to a future trip within the period of validity of the ticket. However, for rebooking made over 30 days, fees and fare difference will paply.
In case the airline decides to cancel a flight at least 24 hours before departure, it will not be liable for any amenities except to notify the passenger, and to rebook or reimburse the passenger. 
Passengers who are affected by flight delays or at least 3 hours, whether it is attributed to the airline or not, would be entitled to refreshments or meals; free phone calls, text or e-mails; first aid; and ticket rebooking or refund. 

Overbooking

The order also addresses the airlines' practice of overbooking. "No passenger may be denied boarding without his/her consent," the order stated. 

Any expense or inconvenience caused by overbooking to affected passengers must be borne by the airline:
  • The airline shall determine the number of passengers in excess of the actual seat capacity of the aircraft; 
  • The carrier shall announce that the flight is overbooked, and that it is looking for volunteers willing to give up their seats in exchange for air carrier compensation.
  • It shall provide the interested passengers or volunteers a list of amenities and offers, which they can choose from, which list of amenities shall always include the option to be given priority booking in the next flight with available space or to be endorsed to another air carrier upon payment of any fare difference, and provided that space and other circumstances permit such accommodation, at the option of the passenger, and/or a cash incentive.
At present, airlines are allowed to overbook 10% of its seats per flight but the order removed the limit.

Lost luggage

The bill of rights also addresses passengers' complaints about lost, delayed or damaged luggage. 

Airlines would now have to compensate passengers P2,000 for every 24 hours their baggage is missing. After 7 days, the baggage would be deemed lost. 

No to misleading ads 

The order also requires airlines to fully disclose restrictions on rebookability or refundability attached to certain promo fares. 
Airlines are now required to disclose the following information on fare advertisements: 

(a) Conditions and restrictions attached to the fare type;
(b) Refund and rebooking policies, if any;
(c) Baggage allowance policies;
(d) Government taxes and fuel surcharges;
(e) Other mandatory fees and charges;
(f) Contact details of the carrier (i.e. phone number, website, e-mail, etc.); and
(g) Other information necessary to apprise the passenger of the conditions and the full/total price of the ticket purchased.
For promo fares such as the popular "piso fares" or "zero fares", airlines would now be required to also include the following information: 
(h) Number of seats offered on a per sector basis;
(i) The duration of the promo; and
(j) The CAB Approval No. of Fares.

"Consistent with the declared policy of the State to protect the interests of the consumers, which includes protection from misleading and fraudulent sales promotion practices, all sales promotion campaigns and activities of air carriers shall be carried out with honesty, transparency and fairness, and in accordance with the requirements of the Consumer Act of the Philippines, and its IRR," the order stated.

Airlines are now required to provide the DTI with a copy of its promo materials, in addition to securing approval from the CAB. 
This year, there has been a growing number of complaints against airline companies, ranging from delayed flights to overbooking to misleading promo fare ads. This has prompted the DOTC and DTI to take a closer look at the airlines' practices and craft the Air Passenger Bill of Rights.
x x x."

SC: Danding's shares in UCPB are owned by state | ABS-CBN News

SC: Danding's shares in UCPB are owned by state | ABS-CBN News

"x x x.


MANILA, Philippines - The Supreme Court declared “conclusively” that the 72.2% of shares held by business tycoon Eduardo “Danding” Cojuangco Jr. in the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) are owned by the state.
In one of the biggest rulings concerning the coco-levy funds, the high court affirmed a Sandiganbayan ruling in July 2003 awarding the disputed shares in UCPB in favor of the government. 

By using “conclusively,” the high court is therefore making evidence presented in the case as incontrovertible.

The affirmed portion of the anti-graft court ruling states that: “The [UCPB shares] transferred to defendant Cojuangco are hereby declared conclusively owned by the Republic of the Philippines to be used only for the benefit of all coconut farmers and for the development of the coconut industry, and ordered reconveyed to the Government.”

In a decision penned by Associate Justice Presbitero Velasco and promulgated last November, the high court noted: “As the coconut levy funds partake of the nature of taxes and can only be used for public purpose, and importantly, for the purpose for which it was exacted, i.e., the development, rehabilitation and stabilization of the coconut industry, they cannot be used to benefit––whether directly or indirectly–– private individuals…”

The Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) used the Coconut Consumer Stabilization Fund to purchase 72.2 percent of the First United Bank (which later became UCPB) in 1975 from Pedro Cojuangco, the father of former President Corazon Aquino.

Danding was the middle man in the transaction. The commission he got was pegged on the contract to sell the UCPB shares at P200 per share supposedly for his “vaunted entrepreneurial skills in, ironically, the simple task of bringing the buyer and the seller together," the government via the PCGG earlier said.

Nine magistrates voted in favor, the others inhibited. 
 
x x x."

2013 Bar Exams will be 80% essay type, 20% multiple choice — SC | News | GMA News Online | The Go-To Site for Filipinos Everywhere

See - 2013 Bar Exams will be 80% essay type, 20% multiple choice — SC | News | GMA News Online | The Go-To Site for Filipinos Everywhere

"x x x.

The Bar Examinations in 2013 will be mostly made up of essay-type questions rather than multiple choice, according to the Supreme Court.

In a bulletin issued last Friday, the court said the Bar Exams, which will be held on the four Sundays of October 2013, would consist of 20 percent multiple choice questions (MCQ) and 80 percent essay-type questions.

The 20-percent MCQ portion of the exam will be divided into four or five fact situation from which the MCQs shall be asked. The 80-percent essay portion, on the other hand, will be divided into eight divisions of 10 points each, with a maximum of two facts per division from which questions will be drawn.

"The corresponding weight of each question shall properly be indicated in the questionnaire, together with estimated answering time, to allow the examinee proper allotment of his or her exam time," the Supreme Court said.

The high court only introduced multiple-choice questions during the 2011 Bar Exams.

However, for two years, or until this year's recently concluded exams, results for the MCQ weighed more (60 percent) than the results for essay-type questions (40 percent) in computing for the final grade.

"Whether MCQ or essay, the questions shall be based on a given set of facts, presented as briefly but as clearly and completely as possible, taking into account that every examinee needs reading, understanding, consideration of the applicable law, and answering time for every question," the Supreme Court said.

The examination dates would be as follows:

October 6:
8 a.m. - 12 noon - Political Law
2 p.m. - 6 p.m.  - Labor Law

October 13:
8 a.m. - 12 noon - Civil Law
2 p.m. - 6 p.m.  - Taxation

October 20:
8 a.m. - 12 noon - Commercial Law
2 p.m. - 6 p.m.  - Criminal Law

October 27:  
8 a.m. - 12 noon - Remedial Law
2 p.m.  - 6 p.m  - Legal Ethics

The high court said the Office of the Bar Confidant, which handles administrative matters connected to the exam, can be reached via landline (5257929; 5268122; 5268119),  cellular  phone (09088864293; and e-mail (baroffice@sc.judiciary.goy.ph). — Mark D. Merueñas/KBK, GMA News

x x x."

Wednesday, December 5, 2012

Top 3 Reasons Why Studying Law Part Time on the Weekend is the Best Thing that Makes Me Want to Die Inside — Bitter Lawyer

Top 3 Reasons Why Studying Law Part Time on the Weekend is the Best Thing that Makes Me Want to Die Inside — Bitter Lawyer

"x x x.


Top 3 Reasons Why Studying Law Part Time on the Weekend is the Best Thing that Makes Me Want to Die Inside

by WEEKEND WARRIOR on DECEMBER 5, 2012
Post image for Top 3 Reasons Why Studying Law Part Time on the Weekend is the Best Thing that Makes Me Want to Die Inside
Since I started law school  a few weeks ago everyone’s been asking me how it’s going. My Zen-like answer is that the best and worst things about studying law are one and the same.

1. Best:  I’m keeping my job!

First some background. I’m what you might call a value-oriented law student. I chose to go not to the highest-ranked school I got into, but rather the one that offered me the best deal financially. It didn’t hurt that I clicked best with the people there but ultimately money was a huge part of my decision. I’ll get a JD and get away with a minimal debt burden.
Going part time is a big part of that. I’ve got an established career, a good salary, benefits and financial goals I don’t feel like foregoing. By going to school part time, I keep my whole salary while finally getting my legal education moving. Win-win, right?

Worst: I’m keeping my job.

At my school “part time” means 11 credits, which is only one class less than our classmates in the traditional, full time program. Consequently when I’m not working, I’m studying, and that’s about it. I study in the morning, I study at night. I study on the bus to and from work. I study over lunch. I often study through dinner and I stay up late, studying. I’m not complaining – I chose this and, fortunately, I’m loving it – but the truth is I’m barely keeping pace.  It’s literally all I can do just to keep up with the assigned reading, note-taking and oh yeah, outlining (evidently it’s a thing) and the homework for my legal research and writing class. I’d love to spend time reading hornbooks, listening to Sum and Substance or meeting with my professors outside of class (not to mention networking, volunteering, etc) but I just can’t. Not because I’m not motivated, not because I don’t want to but because I simply don’t have time. And the only reason I don’t have the time is that every single day I squander the best of my waking hours being gainfully employed.
Forty hours never seemed like that much work until I had to explain Pennoyer v. Neff. If I had that much time, or even half of it, just to study, I would be pimp shit. Instead I’m settling, at least for now, for being merely excellent.
For their part, my employers have been extremely encouraging about me going back to school. But they’ve also been completely clear that they’re not interested in renegotiating my schedule. So if I want to give more time and energy to law school, it’s easy, I either have to quit working or quit sleeping.

2. Best: I go to class on the weekend!

My school is one of just a couple in the nation to offer a weekend part-time program. Again, it’s great that I get to keep working and earning, but in addition, the people I’m studying with are a unique bunch. They’re much older than traditional law students—median age in my section is 34. We’ve got two practicing doctors, a COO for a large local company, a dean from another college, a couple of engineers, a bunch of compliance officers, a former prison guard and one guy who manages a gas station. If I was nervous about one thing about law school it was the other students. A system based on the socratic method depends on quality student contributions and let’s face it, in undergrad most of your classmates are morons. Not so with these folks.

Worst: I go to class on the weekend.

Again, I chose this, and I’m not complaining. I knew my social life would get punched in the face. My friends have been great very understanding, supportive and excited for me. It sucks having to skip social events or head home earlier than I might otherwise, but it’s not like I crawled into my grave.
What’s actually most distressing is not that I’m a student on the weekend but that I am not a student the rest of the week. Saturday and Sunday I’m typically at school from 8 in the morning until at least 4:30 in the afternoon, sometimes longer if I stay late to study (which I almost always do). The entire time I’m there I’m engaged in the most demanding intellectual enterprise I’ve ever been a part of. It’s intense—it’s law school. And then it’s over. I’m ejected back into the real world which has always continued rolling along quite uninterrupted by my epic little adventure.
I don’t socialize with the other students outside of class. Like I said, they’ve got kids, careers and other things going on. A bunch of them don’t even live in town. And besides, who’s got the time? Consequently it’s just me and the books. I’m definitely in law school, but I feel like I’m not really a real law student.
Also, there’s just no football for me this year, or the next four. Let me know how it goes.

3. Best: Everyone thinks I’m doing something really impressive.

From friends to family to colleagues in the office and people in the street, everyone I meet is impressed that I’m in law school. I’ll take whatever props people want to throw my way, but what I really appreciate is that I don’t actually have to explain my job or what I’m doing with my life any more. The magic words “law school” are enough to derail basically any conversation that might require me to explain my weird job, my creative endeavors, hobbies or anything else I consider personal. People congratulate me all the time just for getting in and all I can think is I only took the LSAT because it doesn’t contain any math

Worst: Everyone thinks I am now somehow a lawyer.

I knew this could happen but I didn’t expect it to happen so soon. Right away, before class even started, it was Hey, you’re in law school, I’ve got this problem . . . . Fortunately most people understand that I cannot give legal advice, but they seem oddly crestfallen when I explain that, even after a few weeks of school, the only thing I really know about the law is that I don’t know anything about the law. One day I’ll be happy to help folks out, but in the meantime, I tell them, find yourself a lawyer. I hear there are plenty out there looking for work.
So will I if I don’t stop screwing around on Bitter Lawyer and get back to civ pro . . . .
Post image via Shutterstock.
x x x."

Beyond Google: 10 Specialty Search Engines

Beyond Google: 10 Specialty Search Engines

"x x x.


Research

9. Wolfram Alpha – A service that answers factual queries directly by computing the answer from structured, curated data, rather than providing a list of documents or web pages that might contain the answer as a search engine might

Legal

10. Quest – Search across the Law.com network of sites and the legal web, including hundreds of hand-picked law firm websites and legal blogs. A disappointingly basic search engine from a content-rich behemoth that should be offering something more robust. Still a good place to discover law related articles you may not find elsewhere.
x x x."

Tuesday, December 4, 2012

Lease; rescission of lease contract - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/november2012/192108.pdf

sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/november2012/192108.pdf

"x x x.


Article 1191 of the Civil Code provides that the power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him. A lease contract is a reciprocal contract.  By signing the lease agreement, the lessor grants possession over his/her property to the lessee for a period of time in exchange for rental payment.                                                          

Indeed, rescission is statutorily recognized in a contract of lease.  Article 1659 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 1659.  If the lessor or the lessee should not comply with the obligations set forth in articles  1654 and 1657, the aggrieved party may ask for the rescission of the contract and indemnification for damages, or only the latter, allowing the contract to remain in force.

Article 1659 outlines the remedies for non-compliance with the reciprocal obligations in a lease contract, which obligations are cited in Articles 1654 and 1657:

Article 1654.  The lessor is obliged:
 
(1) To deliver the thing which is the object of the contract in such a conditions as to render it fit for the use intended;
(2) To make on the same during the lease all the necessary repairs in order to keep it suitable for the use to which it has been devoted, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary;
(3) To maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration of the contract.

Article 1657.  The lessee is obliged:
(1) To pay the price of the lease according to the terms stipulated;
(2) To use the thing leased as a diligent father of a family, devoting it to the use stipulated; and in the absence of stipulation, to that which may be inferred from the nature of the thing leased, according to the custom of the place;
(3) To pay the expenses for the deed of lease.  (Boldfacing supplied).

The aggrieved party is given the option to the aggrieved party to ask for: (1) the rescission of the contract; (2) rescission and indemnification for damages; or (3) only indemnification for damages, allowing the contract to remain in force.

x x x."

Lawyer's mistakes - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/november2012/176834.pdf

sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/november2012/176834.pdf

"x x x.


The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of procedural technique. The basis is the tenet that an act  performed  by counsel  within the scope of a  “general  or  implied authority” is regarded as an act of the client. While the application of this general  rule  certainly  depends  upon  the  surrounding  circumstances  of  a given  case,  there  are  exceptions  recognized  by  this  Court:  “(1)  where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of
law; (2) when its application will result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property; or (3) where the interests of justice so require.”

x x x."

Applicable interest in credit card cases - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/november2012/200868.pdf

sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/november2012/200868.pdf

"x x x.


II.
Whether Alcaraz v. Court of Appeals, instead of Macalinao v. BPI, is applicable.

Ledda contends that the case of Alcaraz v. Court of Appeals,
instead of Macalinao v. Bank of the Philippine Islands  which the Court of Appeals invoked, is applicable in the computation of the interest rate on the unpaid credit card obligation. Ledda claims that similar to Alcaraz, she was a “prescreened” client who did not sign any credit card application form or terms and conditions prior to the issuance of the credit card.  Like Alcaraz, Ledda asserts that the provisions of the Terms and Conditions, particularly on the interests, penalties and other charges for non-payment of any outstanding obligation, are not binding on her as such Terms and Conditions were never
shown to her nor did she sign it.

We agree with Ledda.  The ruling in  Alcaraz v. Court of Appeals applies squarely to the present case. In  Alcaraz, petitioner there, as a prescreened client of Equitable Credit Card Network, Inc., did not submit or sign any application form or document before the issuance of the credit card.
There is no evidence that petitioner Alcaraz was shown a copy of the terms and conditions before or after the issuance of the credit card in his name, much less that he has given his consent thereto.

In this case, BPI issued a pre-approved credit card to Ledda who, like Alcaraz, did not sign any credit card application form prior to the issuance of the credit card.  Like the credit card issuer in Alcaraz, BPI, which has the burden  to  prove  its  affirmative  allegations,  failed  to  establish  Ledda’s
agreement with the Terms and Conditions governing the use of the credit card.  It must be noted that BPI did not present as evidence the Terms and Conditions  which  Ledda allegedly  received  and  accepted.

 Clearly,  BPI failed  to  prove  Ledda’s  conformity  and  acceptance  of  the  stipulations contained in the Terms and Conditions.  Therefore, as the Court held in Alcaraz, the Terms and Conditions do not bind petitioner (Ledda in this
case) “without a clear showing that x x x petitioner was  aware of and consented to the provisions of [such] document.”

On the other hand,  Macalinao v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, which the Court of Appeals cited, involves a different set of facts.  There, petitioner  Macalinao  did   not  challenge  the  existence  of  the Terms  and Conditions Governing the Issuance and Use of the BPI Credit Card and  her consent to its provisions, including the imposition of interests and other
charges  on  her  unpaid  BPI  credit   card  obligation.

Macalinao  simply questioned the legality of the stipulated interest rate and penalty charge, claiming  that  such  charges  are  iniquitous.  In  fact,  one  of  Macalinao’s assigned errors before this Court reads: “The reduction of interest rate, from
9.25% to 2%, should be upheld since the  stipulated rate of interest was unconscionable  and  iniquitous,  and  thus  illegal.”

  Therefore,  there  is evidence that Macalinao was fully aware of the stipulations contained in the Terms and Conditions Governing the Issuance and Use of the Credit Card, unlike in this case where there is no evidence that Ledda was aware of or consented to the Terms and Conditions for the use of the credit card.

Since there is no dispute that Ledda received, accepted and used the BPI credit card issued to her and that she defaulted in the payment of the total amount arising from the use of such credit card,  Ledda is liable to pay BPI P322,138.58 representing the principal amount of her unpaid credit card
obligation.

Relevantly,  Ledda  states  in  paragraph  28  of  her  petition  that:   “Assuming,  arguendo, that  respondent was able to establish a cause of action against petitioner, the same will only be limited Consistent with  Alcaraz,  Ledda must also pay interest on the total unpaid credit card amount at the rate of 12% per annum since her credit card obligation consists of a loan or forbearance of money.

  In Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained:

1. When an obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be  that  which  may  have  been  stipulated  in  writing.  Furthermore,  the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially
demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.

We  reject  Ledda’s  contention  that,  since  there  was  no  written agreement to pay a higher interest rate, the interest rate should only be 6%. Ledda erroneously invokes Article 2209 of the Civil Code.

  Article 2209 refers to indemnity for damages and not interest on loan or forbearance of money, which is the case here.  In  Sunga-Chan v. Court of Appeals, the Court held:

Eastern  Shipping  Lines,  Inc.  synthesized  the  rules  on  the
imposition of interest, if proper, and the applicable rate, as follows: The 12% per annum rate under CB Circular No. 416 shall apply only to loans  or  forbearance  of  money,  goods,  or  credits,  as  well  as  to judgments involving such loan or forbearance of money, goods, or credit, while the 6% per annum under Art. 2209 of the Civil Code applies “when the transaction involves the payment of indemnities in the  concept  of  damage  arising  from  the  breach  or a  delay  in  the performance of obligations in general,” with the application of both rates reckoned “from the time the complaint was filed until the [adjudged] amount is fully paid.” In either instance, the reckoning period for the commencement of the running of the legal interest shall be subject to the condition “that the courts are vested with discretion, depending on the equities of each case, on the award of interest. (Emphasis supplied)

Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six per cent per annum. (Emphasis supplied)

In  accordance  with  Eastern  Shipping  Lines,  Inc.,  the  12%  legal interest shall be reckoned from the date BPI extrajudicially demanded from Ledda the payment of her overdue credit card obligation.  Thus, the 12% legal interest shall be computed from 2 October 2007, when Ledda, through
her niece Sally D. Ganceña, received BPI’s letter dated 26 September 2007  demanding  the  payment  of   the  alleged  overdue  amount  of P548,143.73.

x x x."

Inefficient judge - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/november2012/RTJ-12-2334.pdf

sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/november2012/RTJ-12-2334.pdf

"x x x.


Judge Garcia failed to meet this three-month deadline.  He explained his delay by saying that “[t]he Motion for Reconsideration was inadvertently not acted upon by the Court for an unreasonable length of time,” because it
noticed its pendency only when it conducted an inventory of its cases in July 2011.  Unfortunately for Judge Garcia, such poor excuse merits no weight for his exoneration from the charge.  It, in fact, demonstrates serious errors in Judge Garcia’s performance of his duties and the management of his                                                
court.  For such error, even Judge Garcia has admitted that the delay in resolving the motion to reconsider  has dragged on for an “unreasonable length of time.”

  Furthermore, we observe  that he should have been
prompted to take immediate action by the two motions to resolve that were filed by Hebron, yet even these two motions remained unacted upon.

To the Court, the volume of Judge Garcia’s pending cases did not justify the delay.  In Angelia v. Grageda, we held:

In consonance with the Constitutional mandate that all lower
courts decide or resolve cases or matters within three (3) months from their date of submission, the Code  of Judicial Conduct in Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule 3.05 of Canon 3, provide:

 
Rule 1.02 – A judge should administer justice impartially
and without delay.

Rule 3.05 – A judge should dispose of the court’s business
promptly and decide cases within the required periods.

x x x x

   The Court, however, finds  no merit in Judge Grageda’s
explanation that the reason for the delay in resolving the motion was the pressure from equally urgent matters in connection with the 800 pending cases before his sala.   Firstly, he is duty-bound to comply with the above-cited rules under the Canons in the Code of Judicial Conduct, and the administrative guidelines laid down by this Court.  Secondly, as this Court is not unmindful of the circumstances that may delay the speedy disposition of cases assigned to judges, respondent Judge Grageda should have seasonably filed a request for an extension to resolve the subject motion.  For failing to do so, he cannot evade administrative liability.
 
   Judges must decide cases and resolve matters with dispatch
because any delay in the administration of justice deprives litigants of their right to a speedy disposition  of their case and undermines the people’s faith in the judiciary.  Indeed, justice delayed is justice denied.

  (Emphasis ours)

The failure to decide cases and other matters within the reglementary period of ninety (90) days constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction against the erring judge.  This is not only a blatant transgression of the Constitution but also of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which enshrines the significant duty of magistrates to decide cases promptly.

  Under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of
Court, delay in rendering a decision or order is considered a less serious offense that is punishable by either (1) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three months, or (2) a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.  The sheer volume of
Judge Garcia’s work may, at most, only serve to mitigate the penalty to be imposed upon him, as in the case of Angelia where the fine was reduced to P5,000.00 given therein respondent judge’s 800 pending cases before his
sala.

x x x."

Service of pleadings. - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/november2012/178789.pdf

sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/november2012/178789.pdf

"x x x.


There is no question that the Arcinues’ motion failed to comply with the requirement of Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provides:

 SECTION 11.  Priorities in modes  of service and filing. —
Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally.  Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation, why the service or filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed.
                                                 

  Section 4.  Answer to complaint-in-intervention. — The answer to the complaint-in-intervention shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the order admitting the same, unless a different period is fixed by the court. (2[d]a, R12)

But the above does not provide for  automatic sanction should a party fail  to  submit  the  required  explanation.  It  merely  provides  for  that possibility considering its use of the term "may."  The question is whether or not the  RTC  gravely  abused  its  discretion  in  not  going  for  the sanction  of
striking out the erring motion.

The Court finds  no such grave  abuse  of discretion here.  As  the RTC pointed out,  notwithstanding that the Arcinues'  failed to  explain their resort to service  by registered mail rather than  by  personal service, the fact  is  that Lim's  counsel  expressly  admitted  having received  a  copy  of the  Arcinues' motion for judgment by default  on  December 7,  1998  or  I 0  days  before  its scheduled  hearing.  This  means  that  the  Arcinues  were  diligent  enough  to
file their motion by registered mail long before the scheduled hearing.

Personal  service  is  required  precisely  because  it  often  happens  that hearings do not push through because, while a copy of the motion may have been  served  by  registered  mail  before  the  date  of  the  hearing,  such  is received  by  the  adverse  patiy  already  after  the  hearing.  Thus,  the  rules
prefer  personal  service.  But  it  does  not  altogether  prohibit  service  by registered  mail  when  such  service,  when  adopted,  ensures  as  in  this  case receipt by the adverse party.

x x x."

Rule on appeal; question of law explained.


In Macawiwili Gold Mining and Development Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court summarized the rule on appeals as follows:

(1)  In all cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, appeal may be made to the Court of Appeals by mere notice of appeal where the appellant raises questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law;
(2)  In all cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction where the appellant raises only questions of law, the appeal must be taken to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule
(3)  All appeals from judgments rendered by the RTC in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, regardless of whether the appellant raises questions of fact, questions of law, or mixed questions of fact and
                                                   
As cited in Sevilleno v. Carilo, G.R. No. 146454, September 14, 2007, 533 SCRA 385, 388.Decision 6 G.R. No. 181664
law, shall be brought to the Court of Appeals  by filing a petition for review under Rule 42.

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the
same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is
clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same;
rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact.


Rule 65; certiorari - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/november2012/199433.pdf

sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/november2012/199433.pdf

"x x x.


We stress that in a special civil action for certiorari, the petitioner carries the burden of proving not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the part of the public respondent for his issuance of the impugned order.

  Grave abuse of discretion is present “when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.”

  In other words, the tribunal or administrative body must have issued the assailed decision, order or resolution in a capricious or despotic manner.

  Petitioner failed to discharge that burden and perforce the petition must fail.

x x x."

Moot and academic - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/november2012/197466.pdf

sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/november2012/197466.pdf

"x x x.


Accordingly, there no longer exists an actual controversy between the parties and resolving the merits of this case would no longer serve any useful purpose.  As  we  held  in  Ocampo  v.  House  of Representatives  Electoral Tribunal:

At  any  rate,  the  petition  has  become  moot  and  academic.  The Twelfth Congress formally adjourned on June  11, 2004.  And on May  17, 2004,  the  City  Board  of Canvassers  proclaimed  Bienvenido  Abante  the duly  elected Congressman of the  Sixth District of Manila pursuant to the
May 1 0, 2004 elections.

In the recent case of Enrile vs.  Senate Electoral Tribunal, we ruled that a  case becomes moot and academic when there is  no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing  upon  the  merits.  Worth  reiterating  is  our  pronouncement  in Gancho-on vs.  Secretary of Labor and Employment, thus:

"It  is  a  rule  of universal  application,  almost,  that courts of justice constituted to  pass  upon substantial rights will  not consider questions in which no  actual interests  are involved;  they  decline  jurisdiction  of moot  cases.  And where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be  of  no  practical  use  or  value.  There  is  no  actual substantial relief to  which petitioner would  be  entitled  and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition."

(Emphasis supplied)

x x x."

Liability of corporate officers in labor cases - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/november2012/152642.pdf

sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/november2012/152642.pdf

" x x x.


The key issue that Gumabay, et al. present is whether or not the 2nd paragraph of Section 10, R.A. 8042, which holds the corporate directors, officers, and partners of recruitment and placement agencies jointly and solidarily liable for money claims  and damages that may be adjudged against the latter agencies, is unconstitutional.
 
 In G.R. 167590 (the PASEI case), the Quezon City RTC
unconstitutional the last sentence of the 2nd
 paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. 8042.  It pointed out that, absent sufficient proof that the corporate officers
and directors of the erring company had knowledge of and allowed the illegal recruitment, making them automatically liable would violate their right to due process of law.  

The pertinent portion of Section 10 provides:

SEC. 10.  Money Claims. – x x x
 
 The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any  and all claims under this section shall be joint and several.  This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval.  The performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for
all money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers.  If the recruitment/placement agency is a  juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. (Emphasis supplied)

 But the Court has already held, pending adjudication of this case, that the liability of corporate directors and  officers is not automatic.  To make them jointly and solidarily liable with their company, there must be a finding that they were remiss in directing the affairs of that company, such as sponsoring or tolerating the conduct of illegal activities.

  In the case of Becmen and White Falcon, while there is evidence that these companies were at fault in not investigating the cause of Jasmin’s death, there is no
mention of any evidence in the case against them that intervenors Gumabay, et al., Becmen’s corporate officers and directors, were personally involved in their company’s particular actions or omissions in Jasmin’s case.  

x x x."

Excise tax - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/november2012/183553.pdf

sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/november2012/183553.pdf

"x x x.


Excise taxes partake of the nature of indirect taxes. Diageo bases its claim for refund  on Section 130 of the Tax Code
which reads:

 Section 130.Filing of Return and Payment of Excise Tax on
Domestic Products. – xxx

(A) Persons Liable to File a Return, Filing of Return on
Removal and Payment of Tax.-
(1) Persons Liable to File a Return. – Every person liable to pay excise tax imposed under this Title shall file a separate return for each place of production setting forth, among
others, the description and quantity or volume of products to be removed, the applicable tax base and the amount of tax due
thereon;  Provided however, That in the case of indigenous
petroleum, natural gas or liquefied natural gas, the excise tax shall be paid by the first buyer, purchaser or transferee for local sale, barter or transfer, while the excise tax on exported products shall be paid by the owner, lessee, concessionaire or operator of the mining claim.Should domestic products be removed from the place of production without the payment of the tax, the owner or person having possession thereof shall be liable for the tax due thereon.

x xxx

 (D)  Credit for Excise tax on Goods Actually Exported.- When
goods locally produced or manufactured are removed and actually exported without returning to the Philippines, whether so exported in their original state or as ingredients or parts of any manufactured goods or products, any excise tax paid thereon shall be credited or refunded upon
submission of the proof of actual  exportation and upon receipt of the corresponding foreign exchange payment:
Provided, That the excise tax on mineral products, except coal and coke, imposed under Section 151 shall not be creditable or refundable even if the mineral products are actually
exported.

 A reading of the foregoing provision, however, reveals that contrary to the position of Diageo, the right to claim a refund or be credited with the excise taxes belongs to its supplier.  The phrase “any excise tax paid thereon shall be credited or refunded” requires that the claimant be the same person
who paid the excise tax. In Silkair (Singapore) Pte, Ltd. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Court has categorically  declared that “[t]he proper party to question, or seek a refund of, an indirect tax is the statutory taxpayer, the person on whom the tax is imposed by law and who paid the
same even if he shifts the burden thereof to another.”

Excise taxes imposed under Title VI of the Tax Code are taxes on property  which are imposed on “goods manufactured or produced in the Philippines for domestic sales or consumption or for any other disposition and to things imported.”

 Though excise taxes are paid by the manufacturer or producer before removal of domestic products from the place of production  or by the owner or importer before the release of imported articles from the customshouse, the same partake of the nature of indirect taxes when it is passed on to the subsequent purchaser.

 Indirect taxesare defined asthose wherein the liability for the payment of the tax falls on one person but the burden thereof can be shifted to another person. When the seller passes on the tax to his buyer, he, in effect, shifts the tax burden, not the liability to pay it, to the purchaser as part of the price of goods sold or services rendered.

 Accordingly, when the excise taxes paid by the supplier were passed on to Diageo, what was shifted is not the tax per se but an additional cost of the goods sold. Thus, the supplier remains the statutory taxpayer even if Diageo, the purchaser, actually shoulders the burden of tax.

x x x."

Interlocutory order - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/november2012/192975.pdf

sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/november2012/192975.pdf

" x x x.


An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits.

  Thus, as a general rule, the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.

However, when the denial of the motion to dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be justified.

  By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

  The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.

x x x."

Indirect contempt - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/november2012/178622.pdf

sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/november2012/178622.pdf

"x x x.


Anent the issue of citing respondents in contempt of court
A charge for indirect contempt, such as disobedience to a court’s lawful order, is initiated either  motu proprio by order of or a formal charge by  the offended court, or by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned.

   It cannot be initiated by a mere motion, such as the one that
petitioner filed.  Further, petitioner failed to substantiate his allegation that respondents violated the TRO.  The entries in the barangay and police blotters attached to his motion carry little weight or probative value as they are not conclusive evidence of the truth thereof but merely of the fact that these entries were made.

The pictures depicting bulldozing activities likewise contained no indication that they were taken after the Court’s issuance of the restraining order.  Simply, the Court has no way of gauging the veracity of petitioner’s factual allegations.  On the basis of the foregoing, the Court resolves to deny petitioner’s motion.

x x x."

Duty of client - sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/november2012/178431.pdf

sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/november2012/178431.pdf

"x x x.


It is incumbent upon the client to exert all efforts to retain the services of new counsel.   VCP knew since August 29, 2006, seven months before the CA rendered its Decision, that it had no counsel.  Despite its knowledge, it did not immediately hire a lawyer to attend to its affairs.  Instead, it waited until the last minute, when it had already received the adverse CA Decision on April 10, 2007, to search for a counsel; and even then, VCP did not rush to meet the deadline.  It asked for an extension of 30 days to file a Motion for Reconsideration.

  It finally retained the services of a new counsel on May 24, 2007, nine months from the time that its former counsel withdrew her appearance.  VCP did not even attempt
to explain its inaction.  The Court cannot grant equity where it is clearly undeserved by a grossly negligent party.

  As the Court pronounced in another case:


x x x Both parties have a right to a speedy resolution of their case.  Not only petitioners, but also the respondents, have a right to have the case finally settled without delay.

Furthermore, the failure to file x x x on time was due primarily to petitioners’ unwise choices x x x.  [T]hey hired their subsequent lawyers too late.  It must be pointed out that petitioners had a choice of whether to continue the services of their original lawyer or consent to let him go. x x x
[T]hey delayed in engaging their replacement lawyer. Their poor choices and lack of sufficient diligence x x x are the main culprits for the situation they now find themselves in.  It would not be fair to pass on the bad consequences of their
choices to respondents. Petitioners’ low regard for the rules or nonchalance toward procedural requirements x x x has in fact contributed much to the delay, and hence frustration of justice, in the present case.

x x x."