Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr. - lcmlaw@gmail.com

Friday, May 1, 2020

Explained: life sentence, reclusion perpetua, parole, probation, pardon, amnesty,

See - https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/fast-facts/218269-things-to-know-commonly-confused-legal-terms

"x x x.

Life imprisonment vs reclusion perpetua

Life imprisonment and reclusion perpetua are often treated as interchangeable or a translation of the other, even by trial judges. In 1992, the confusion prompted former Chief Justice Andres Narvasa to issue Administrative Circular No. 6-92 where he clarified that “both are different and distinct penalties.”

The same clarification was emphasized by then-Supreme Court spokesperson Theodore Te when reports used the terms interchangeably after Janet Lim-Napoles was sentenced with reclusion perpetua in 2015.

Reclusion perpetua falls under the list of penalties given for crimes prescribed in the Revised Penal Code. It entails imprisonment of at least 20 years and one day to a maximum of 40 years, after which the convicted would be eligible for parole* unless otherwise specified. (READ: Plunder cases in the Philippines: Was anyone punished?)

Life imprisonment, as the name suggests, does not have a definite duration for imprisonment. It is a sentence given under special law, and does not carry accessory penalties (unlike reclusion perpetua), which include:

Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification
Perpetual or temporary special disqualification
Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the profession or calling
Civil interdiction
Indemnification
Forfeiture or confiscation of instruments and proceeds of the offense; and
Payment of costs

Life imprisonment also does not have any specific provision on the possibility of parole*.

Amnesty vs pardon
In September this year, the revocation of Senator Antonio Trillanes IV’s amnesty as ordered by President Rodrigo Duterte sparked interest in what distinguishes amnesty from pardon. While both administered under the president’s powers, the two have major differences. (READ: TIMELINE: Trillanes, from mutiny to amnesty)

On the one hand, amnesty is a public act by the president that should have the concurrence of Congress, while pardon is "pleaded and proved” privately by the person involved.

Amnesty may be "granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction." Meanwhile, pardon may be granted to a person after conviction. (READ: FAST FACT: Presidential pardons)

Amnesty also "looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself,” while pardon only absolves the convicted of the consequences of the offense. It does not automatically restore one's political rights (unless restored by the terms of pardon) and does not absolve the person from paying civil indemnity.

Parole vs probation

Parole and probation are more related to one another in that they are often seen as “alternatives” to imprisonment. In both cases, people charged are supervised by correction officers, and are required to follow a set of rules – otherwise, the grant will be nullified.

But one significant difference between the two is entitlement. A convict who has been sentenced to less than 6 years imprisonment without recourse to an appeal may apply for probation. On the other hand, parole may be applied for only after a person has served the minimum of the imposed prison sentence (i.e., the lower range of any sentence). For instance, if sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the convict may start applying for parole only after serving 20 years and one day.

Republic Act 4103 or the Indeterminate Sentence Law defines parole as the “conditional release of a prisoner from correctional institution after serving the minimum period of prison sentence.” It acts as temporary liberty, still holding the person under continuous custody of the state.

Probation, on the other hand, is a privilege of remaining in the community instead of going to prison after conviction. Convicted persons under probation are still subject to regulations they have to strictly follow for a certain period.

Probation can be awarded to first-time offenders, while parole is allowed for individuals who have had previous, but no pending, criminal cases. (READ: Philippine detention centers and the price of criminal justice)

In both cases when conditions are violated, the parolee or probationer may face imprisonment and serve the original sentence imposed.

– with a report from Michael Bueza and Vernise Tantuco/Rappler.com."

Self-defense - Unlawful aggression refers to an assault to attack, or threat in an imminent and immediate manner, which places the defendant’s life in actual peril. Mere threatening or intimidating attitude will not suffice. There must be actual physical force or actual use of weapon.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. BAYANI DE LEON, ANTONIO DE LEON, DANILO DE LEON and YOYONG DE LEON, Accused-Appellants. G.R. No. 197546, March 23, 2015.

"X x x.

Before us is a reversed trial. As one of the accused-appellants, Antonio, pleaded self-defense, he admitted authorship of the crime. At this juncture, the burden of proof is upon the accused-appellants to prove with clear and convincing evidence the elements of self-defense: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the attack; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself, which the defense failed to discharge. [People v. Placer, G.R. No. 181753, 9 October 2013, 707 SCRA 199, 207].

Unlawful Aggression

Unlawful aggression refers to an assault to attack, or threat in an imminent and immediate manner, which places the defendant’s life in actual peril. Mere threatening or intimidating attitude will not suffice. There must be actual physical force or actual use of weapon. [People v. Nugas, G.R. No. 172606, 23 November 2011, 661 SCRA 159, 167-168].

Applying the aforesaid legal precept, Emilio’s act of pulling "something" out from his jacket while he was three (3) to four (4) meters away from accused-appellant Antonio cannot amount to unlawful aggression. Neither can the act of pulling "something" out amount to physical force or actual use of weapon, or even threat or intimidating attitude. Even if accused-appellant Antonio’s account of the incident is truthful, that Emilio had motive to kill accused-appellant Antonio, giving accused-appellant reasonable grounds to believe that his life and limb was in danger, and that the "something" was indeed a "sumpak", it can hardly be recognized as unlawful aggression to justify self-defense. [People v. Bayocot, 256 Phil. 27, 34-35 (1989)]. There is no showing that accused-appellant Antonio’s life was in peril by the act of pulling "something" out. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, "it must be noted that appellant never said that Emilio aimed or pointed the "sumpak" at him or at least made an attempt to shoot him". The threat on accused-appellant Antonio’s life is more imagined than real. As we already held in a catena of cases, the act of pulling "something" out cannot constitute unlawful aggression. [People v. Anies, 203 Phil. 332, 351 (1982)]. Accused-appellant Antonio cannot allege that it was Emilio who instigated the incident; that Emilio’s fate was brought about by his own actuations. There is no sufficient provocation, nay, provocation at all in the act of pulling "something" out.

X x x."

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Read also:

1] Guevarra, et al. v. People, 726 Phil. 183, 194 (2014); People v. Fontanilla, 680 Phil. 155, 165 (2012).

[2] Dela Cruz v. People, et al., 747 Phil. 176, 384-385 (2014).

[3] Oriente v. People, 542 Phil. 335, 347 (2007).

[4] People v. Enrique Reyes (G.R. No. 224498, January 11, 2018).

[5] People v. Enrique Reyes (G.R. No. 224498, January 11, 2018).

[6] People v. Enrique Reyes (G.R. No. 224498, January 11, 2018).

REDUCED BAIL, RECOGNIZANCE DURING CORONA VIRUS QUARANTINE PERIOD.

ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 38 – 2020, April 30, 2020.
REDUCED BAIL, RECOGNIZANCE DURING CORONA VIRUS QUARANTINE PERIOD.

"In view of the foregoing, and upon consultation with the Members of the

Court, considering the urgent need to further decongest our detention facilities,

especially during this time of public health emergency, to promote social and

restorative justice, bail and recognizance for indigent Persons Deprived of

Liberty (PDLs) shall be granted as follows, pending the continuation of the

criminal proceedings and resolution of cases against them:

1. For those charged with a crime punishable with the maximum period

of reclusion temporal or twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years,

the bail shall be computed by getting the medium period multiplied by Three

Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) for every year of imprisonment;

2. For those charged with a crime punishable with the maximum period

of prision mayor or six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, the bail

shall be computed by getting the medium period multiplied by Two Thousand

Pesos (P2,000.00) for every year of imprisonment;

3. For those charged with a crime punishable with the maximum period

of prision correccional or six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, the

bail shall be computed by getting the medium period multiplied by One

Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) for every year of imprisonment;

4. For those charged with a crime punishable by arresto mayor or one (1)

month and one (1) day to six (6) months, and arresto menor or one (1) day to

thirty (30) days, they may be released on their own recognizance;

Any violation of the undertaking or conditions imposed on the bail or

recognizance shall be a ground for the cancellation of the said bail or

recognizance which will justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the

accused."

Perjury; venue - Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code

"X x x. To reiterate for the guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury committed through the making of a false affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When the crime is committed through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement is submitted, venue may either be at the place where the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the oath and the submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases, determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the crime committed.

X x x."

UNION BANK OF THE, PHILIPPINES and DESI TOMAS, Petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. EN BANC, G.R. No. 192565, February 28, 2012.

Execution - Effect of reversal of executed judgment. – Where the executed judgment is reversed totally or partially, or annulled, on appeal or otherwise, the trial court may, on motion, issue such orders of restitution or reparation of damages as equity and justice may warrant under the circumstances.

SPS. DAVID ESERJOSE and ZENAIDA ESERJOSE, Petitioners, vs. ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION and PACITA UY, Respondents. G.R. No. 180105, April 23, 2014.

“x x x.

This case is about the effect of a reduction in the course of appeal of the judgment amount after the execution sale of the defendant's properties to satisfy the trial court's judgment had already taken place.

X x x.

Contrary to the Eserjoses’ argument, the CA did not alter the RTC Decision of January 31, 2003 in their favor as modified by this Court’s Resolution of March 19, 2005. Notably, neither the RTC nor this Court awarded legal interest on the amounts due. Consequently, the RTC exceeded its jurisdiction when, in executing the judgment, it added interest on the damages it awarded, raising the total award to over P5,000,000.00. The Eserjoses are entitled to only P4,000,000.00 in damages and P50,000.00 in attorney’s fees.

When this Court substantially reduced the amounts of damages that the RTC awarded the Eserjoses, it in effect partially reversed the executed judgment issued in the case. Section 5, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure applies to such a situation. It provides:

SEC. 5. Effect of reversal of executed judgment. – Where the executed judgment is reversed totally or partially, or annulled, on appeal or otherwise, the trial court may, on motion, issue such orders of restitution or reparation of damages as equity and justice may warrant under the circumstances.

Here, the RTC executed on a judgment debt of P8,050,000 when what was later determined to be due was only P4,050,000. Clearly, the trial court had the discretion to order restitution and reparation of damages. Its exercise of that discretion must, however, be fair to all the parties concerned.

The CA was right in holding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in not allowing for the restitution of the properties improperly auctioned for substantially wrong amounts considering that the registration of titles in the names of the Eserjoses and the turnover of possession of such properties to them had not yet taken place. There is no legal impediment to ABC and Uy being allowed to pay the judgment debt in cash, the preferred mode of satisfaction of money judgment.

X x x.”