Extrajudicial confession given by accused to reporters and mayor without assistance of counsel; admissibility of - "Clearly, appellant's confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue influence from the police authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters when they interviewed appellant. 44 They were not acting under the direction and control of the police. They were there to check appellant's confession to the mayor. They did not force appellant to grant them an interview and reenact the commission of the crime. 45 In fact, they asked his permission before interviewing him. They interviewed him on separate days not once did appellant protest his innocence. Instead, he repeatedly confessed his guilt to them. He even supplied all the details in the commission of the crime, and consented to its reenactment. All his confessions to the news reporters were witnessed by his family and other relatives. There was no coercive atmosphere in the interview of appellant by the news reporters. We rule that appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual. 46 It governs the relationship between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents. They confirm that certain rights of the individual exist without need of any governmental grant, rights that may not be taken away by government, rights that government has the duty to protect. 47 Governmental power is not unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays down these limitations to protect the individual against aggression and unwarranted interference by any department of government and its agencies. 48"

See - https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1997/mar1997/gr_116437_1997.html


G.R. No. 116437 March 3, 1997, EN BANC

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PABLITO ANDAN y HERNANDEZ @ BOBBY, accused-appellant.

"x x x.

The trial court based its decision convicting appellant on the testimonies of the three policemen of the investigating team, the mayor of Baliuag and four news reporters to whom appellant gave his extrajudicial oral confessions. It was also based on photographs and video footages of appellant's confessions and reenactments of the commission of the crime.

Accused-appellant assails the admission of the testimonies of the policemen, the mayor and the news reporters because they were made during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel. Section 12, paragraphs (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) . . .

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

(4) . . .

Plainly, any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right (1) to remain silent; (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be informed of such rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. 20 Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible in evidence against him. 21 The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent. 22 The incommunicado character of custodial interrogation or investigation also obscures a later judicial determination of what really transpired. 23

It should be stressed that the rights under Section 12 are accorded to "[a]ny person under investigation for the commission of an offense." An investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense. 24 As intended by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, this covers "investigation conducted by police authorities which will include investigations conducted by the municipal police, the PC and the NBI and such other police agencies in our government." 25

When the police arrested appellant, they were no longer engaged in a general inquiry about the death of Marianne. Indeed, appellant was already a prime suspect even before the police found him at his parents' house. This is clear from the testimony of SPO4 Danilo S. Bugay, the police chief investigator of the crime, viz:

COURT How did you come about in concluding that it was accused who did this act?

WITNESS: First, the place where Marianne was last found is at the backyard of the house of the accused. Second, there were blood stains at the pigpen, and third, when we asked Romano Calma who were his other companions in the house, he said that, it was Pablito Andan who cannot be found at that time and whose whereabouts were unknown, sir.

Q: So you had a possible suspect?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: You went looking for Pablito Andan?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And then, what else did you do?

A: We tried to find out where we can find him and from information we learned that his parents live in Barangay Tangos in Baliuag. We went there, found him there and investigated him and in fact during the investigation he admitted that he was the culprit. 26

Appellant was already under custodial investigation when he confessed to the police. It is admitted that the police failed to inform appellant of his constitutional rights when he was investigated and interrogated. 27 His confession is therefore inadmissible in evidence. So too were the two bags recovered from appellant's house. SPO2 Cesar Canoza, a member of the investigating team testified:

Atty. Valmores: You told the court that you were able to recover these bags marked as Exhs. B and B-1 because accused pointed to them, where did he point these bags?

A: At the police station, sir, he told us that he hid the two (2) bags beneath the canal of the toilet.

Q: In other words, you were given the information where these two (2) bags were located?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And upon being informed where the two (2) bags could be located what did you do?

A: We proceeded to the place together with the accused so that we would know where the two (2) bags were hidden, sir.

Q: And did you see actually those two (2) bags before the accused pointed to the place where the bags were located?

A: After he removed the broken pots with which he covered the canal, he really showed where the bags were hidden underneath the canal, sir. 28

The victim's bags were the fruits of appellant's uncounselled confession to the police. They are tainted evidence, hence also inadmissible. 29

The police detained appellant after his initial confession. The following day, Mayor Trinidad visited the appellant. Appellant approached the mayor and requested for a private talk. They went inside a room and appellant confessed that he alone committed the crime. He pleaded for forgiveness. Mayor Trinidad testified, viz:

Mayor Trinidad: . . . . During the investigation when there were already many people from the media, Andan whispered something to me and requested that he be able to talk to me alone, so what I did was that, I brought him inside the office of the chief of police.

Private Prosecutor Principe: And so what happened inside the office of the Chief of Police, mayor?

A: While inside the office of the headquarters he told me "Mayor patawarin mo ako,! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne." So when he was telling this to me, I told him to wait a while, then I opened the door to allow the media to hear what he was going to say and I asked him again whether he was the one who did it, he admitted it, sir. This was even covered by a television camera. 30

x x x x x x x x x

Q: During that time that Pablito Andan whispered to you that he will tell you something and then you responded by bringing him inside the office of the Chief of Police and you stated that he admitted that he killed Marianne . . .

Court: He said to you the following words . . .

Atty. Principe: He said to you the following words "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! Ako ang pumatay kay Marianne," was that the only admission that he told you?

A: The admission was made twice. The first one was, when we were alone and the second one was before the media people, sir.

Q: What else did he tell you when you were inside the room of the Chief of Police?

A: These were the only things that he told me, sir. I stopped him from making further admissions because I wanted the media people to hear what he was going to say, sir. 31

Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession before the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the local police 32 and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the latter. 33 In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights. 34 Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. 35 What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. 36 Hence, we hold that appellant's confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.

Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. We have held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary an are admissible in evidence. 37

The records show that Alex Marcelino, a television reporter for "Eye to Eye" on Channel 7, interviewed appellant on February 27, 1994. The interview was recorded on video and showed that appellant made his confession willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of his wife, child and other relatives. 38 Orlan Mauricio, a reporter for "Tell the People" on Channel 9 also interviewed appellant on February 25, 1994. He testified that:

Atty. Principe: You mentioned awhile ago that you were able to reach the place where the body of Marianne was found, where did you start your interview, in what particular place?

Mr. Mauricio: Actually, I started my newsgathering and interview inside the police station of Baliuag and I identified myself to the accused as I have mentioned earlier, sir. At first, I asked him whether he was the one who raped and killed the victim and I also learned from him that the victim was his cousin.

Q: And what was the response of Pablito Andan?

A: His response was he is a cousin of the victim and that he was responsible for raping and killing the victim, sir. And then I asked him whether his admission was voluntary or that there was a threat, intimidation or violence that was committed on his person because I knew that there were five other suspects in this case and he said that he was admitting it voluntarily to the policemen. I asked him whether he was under the influence of drugs but he said no, and "nakainom lang," sir.

Q: You mentioned earlier that the uncle of the accused was present, was the uncle beside him at the time that you asked the question?

A: The uncle was there including the barangay captain whose name I cannot recall anymore. A barangay captain of the place, I don't know if it is the place of the crime scene or in the place where Marianne Guevarra resides but . . . All throughout the scene inside the office of the Station Commander, there was no air of any force or any threatening nature of investigation that was being done on the suspect, that is why, I was able to talk to him freely and in a voluntary manner he admitted to me that he was the one who raped and killed, so we went to the next stage of accompanying me to the scene of the crime where the reenactment and everything that transpired during the killing of Marianne Guevarra.

Q: Before you started that interview, did you inform or ask permission from the accused Pablito Andan that you were going to interview him?

A: Yes, sir.

x x x x x x x x x

Q: You mentioned that after interviewing the accused at the office of the Baliuag PNP, you also went to the scene of the crime?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Who accompanied you?

A: I was accompanied by some Baliuag policemen including Mayor Trinidad and some of the relatives of the accused.

Q: At this time, did you see the wife of the accused, Pablito Andan?

A: Yes, sir, I saw her at the place where the body of Guevarra was recovered.

Q: How many relatives of accused Pablito Andan were present, more or less?

A: There were many, sir, because there were many wailing, weeping and crying at that time when he was already taken in the patrol jeep of the Baliuag police, sir.

Q: Now, Mr. Mauricio, upon reaching the scene of the crime in Concepcion, Baliuag, Bulacan, what transpired?

A: I started my work as a reporter by trying to dig deeper on how the crime was committed by the accused, so we started inside the pigpen of that old house where I tried to accompany the accused and asked him to narrate to me and show me how he carried out the rape and killing of Marianne Guevarra, sir.

Q: Did he voluntarily comply?

A: Yes, sir, in fact, I have it on my videotape.

Q: It is clear, Mr. Mauricio, that from the start of your interview at the PNP Baliuag up to the scene of the crime, all the stages were videotaped by you?

A: Yes, sir. 39

Journalist Berteni Causing of "People's Journal Tonite" likewise covered the proceedings for three successive days. 40 His testimony is as follows:

Atty. Principe: You mentioned that you had your own inquiries?

A: We asked first permission from the mayor to interrupt their own investigation so that we can have a direct interview with the suspect.

Q: Were there people?

A: The people present before the crowd that included the mayor, the deputy chief of police, several of the policemen, the group of Inday Badiday and several other persons. I asked the suspect after the mayor presented the suspect to us and after the suspect admitted that he was the one who killed Marianne. I reiterated the question to the suspect. Are you aware that this offense which is murder with . . . rape with murder is a capital offense? And you could be sentenced to death of this? And he said, Yes. So do you really admit that you were the one who did it and he repeated it, I mean, say the affirmative answer.

Q: And that was in the presence of the crowd that you mentioned a while ago?

A: Yes, yes, sir. And if I remember it right, as I took my camera to take some pictures of the suspect, the mayor, the policemen and several others, I heard the group of Inday Badiday asking the same questions from the suspect and the suspect answered the same.

Q: Also in the presence of so many people that you mentioned?

A: The same group of people who were there, sir.

Q: You mentioned that the answer was just the same as the accused answered you affirmatively, what was the answer, please be definite?

Court: Use the vernacular.

A: I asked him the question, after asking him the question," Ikaw ba talaga and gumawa ng pagpatay at pag-rape sa kay Marianne? Ang sagot nya, "Oo." Alam mo ba itong kasalanang ito, kamatayan ang hatol, inaamin mo pa ba na ikaw and gumawa sa pagpatay at pag-rape kay Marianne?" Sagot pa rin siya ng "Oo."

x x x x x x x x x

Q: Did you ask him, why did you kill Marianne?

A: I asked him, your Honor and the reason he told me was because a devil gripped his mind and because of that according to him, your Honor, were the pornographic magazines, pornographic tabloids which he, according to him, reads almost everyday before the crime.

Atty. Principe: At the time of your interview, Mr. Reporter, will you tell the court and the public what was the physical condition of accused Pablito Andan?

A: As I observed him that time, there was no sign on his body that he was really down physically and I think he was in good condition.

Court: So he was not happy about the incident?

A: He even admitted it, your Honor.

Court: He was happy?

A: He admitted it. He was not happy after doing it.

Court: Was he crying?

A: As I observed, your Honor, the tears were only apparent but there was no tear that fell on his face.

Court: Was he feeling remorseful?

A: As I observed it, it was only slightly, your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx 41

Another journalist, Rey Domingo, of "Bandera" interviewed appellant on February 26, 1994. 42 He also testified that:

Atty. Principe: Now, Mr. Witness, did the accused Pablito Andan give you the permission that you asked from him?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And when he allowed you to interview him, who were present?

A: The first person that I saw there was Mayor Trinidad, policemen from Baliuag, the chief investigator, SPO4 Bugay, and since Katipunan, the chief of police was suspended, it was the deputy who was there, sir.

Q: Were they the only persons who were present when you interviewed the accused?

A: There were many people there, sir. The place was crowded with people. There were people from the PNP and people from Baliuag, sir.

Q: How about the other representatives from the media?

A: Roy Reyes, Orlan Mauricio arrived but he arrived late and there were people from the radio and from TV Channel 9.

Q: How about Channel 7?

A: They came late. I was the one who got the scoop first, sir.

Q: You stated that the accused allowed you to interview him, was his wife also present?

A: Yes, sir, and even the son was there but I am not very sure if she was really the wife but they were hugging each other and she was crying and from the questions that I asked from the people there they told me that she is the wife, sir.

Q: How about the other members of the family of the accused, were they around?

A: I do not know the others, sir. but there were many people there, sir.

Q: Now, according to you, you made a news item about the interview. May we know what question did you ask and the answer.

A: My first question was, is he Pablito Andan and his answer was "Yes."

Q: What was the next question?

A: I asked him how he did the crime and he said that, he saw the victim aboard a tricycle. He called her up. She entered the house and he boxed her on the stomach.

Q: What was the next question that you asked him?

A: He also said that he raped her and he said that the reason why he killed the victim was because he was afraid that the incident might be discovered, sir.

Q: Now, after the interview, are we correct to say that you made a news item on that?

A: Yes, sir, based on what he told me. That's what I did.

Q: Were there other questions propounded by you?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: "Ano iyon?"

A: He said that he threw the cadaver to the other side of the fence, sir.

Q: Did he mention how he threw the cadaver of Marianne to the other side of the fence?

A: I cannot remember the others, sir.

Q: But can you produce the news item based on that interview?

A: I have a xerox copy here, sir.

xxx xxx xxx 43

Clearly, appellant's confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue influence from the police authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters when they interviewed appellant. 44 They were not acting under the direction and control of the police. They were there to check appellant's confession to the mayor. They did not force appellant to grant them an interview and reenact the commission of the crime. 45 In fact, they asked his permission before interviewing him. They interviewed him on separate days not once did appellant protest his innocence. Instead, he repeatedly confessed his guilt to them. He even supplied all the details in the commission of the crime, and consented to its reenactment. All his confessions to the news reporters were witnessed by his family and other relatives. There was no coercive atmosphere in the interview of appellant by the news reporters.

We rule that appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual. 46 It governs the relationship between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents. They confirm that certain rights of the individual exist without need of any governmental grant, rights that may not be taken away by government, rights that government has the duty to protect. 47 Governmental power is not unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays down these limitations to protect the individual against aggression and unwarranted interference by any department of government and its agencies. 48

x x x."

Credibility of evidence - "Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances (People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342 [1968], citing Daggers v. Van Dyke, 37 N.J. Eg. 130; see also People v. Sarda, 172 SCRA 651 [1989]; People v. Sunga, 123 SCRA 327 [1983]); Castañares v. CA, 92 SCRA 567 [1979])."

See - https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1991/jan1991/gr_81561_1991.html


G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.


"x x x.

Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances (People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342 [1968], citing Daggers v. Van Dyke, 37 N.J. Eg. 130; see also People v. Sarda, 172 SCRA 651 [1989]; People v. Sunga, 123 SCRA 327 [1983]); Castañares v. CA, 92 SCRA 567 [1979]). As records further show, appellant did not even bother to ask Michael's full name, his complete address or passport number. Furthermore, if indeed, the German national was the owner of the merchandise, appellant should have so indicated in the contract of shipment (Exh. "B", Original Records, p. 40). On the contrary, appellant signed the contract as the owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to the presumption that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point, appellant is therefore estopped to claim otherwise.

x x x."

Fruit of the poisonouse tree; exception - "Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an act of the State would result in serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution."

See - https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1991/jan1991/gr_81561_1991.html


G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.

"x x x.

1. Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and therefore argues that the same should be held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III).

Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure had its origin in the 1935 Charter which, worded as follows:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (Sec. 1 [3], Article III)

was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment ** to the United States Constitution. As such, the Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United States Federal Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction.

Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp v. Ohio by the US Federal Supreme Court (367 US 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed. 1081 [1961]), this Court, in Stonehill v. Diokno (20 SCRA 383 [1967]), declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a defective search and seizure warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling earlier adopted in Moncado v. People's Court (80 Phil. 1 [1948]) wherein the admissibility of evidence was not affected by the illegality of its seizure. The 1973 Charter (Sec. 4 [2], Art. IV) constitutionalized the Stonehill ruling and is carried over up to the present with the advent of the 1987 Constitution.

In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck down the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures. (Bache & Co., (Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299 [1975]; People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [1986]; Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 [1987]; See also Salazar v. Hon. Achacoso, et al., GR No. 81510, March 14, 1990).

It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence so obtained were invariably procured by the State acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other authorized government agencies.

On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and participation of State authorities. Under the circumstances, can accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated? Stated otherwise, may an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State?

We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.

As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]:

1. This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government, included in which is his residence, his papers, and other possessions. . . .

. . . There the state, however powerful, does not as such have the access except under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. . . . (Cf. Schermerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966] and Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616 [1886]; Emphasis supplied).

In Burdeau v. McDowell (256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct. 547; 65 L.Ed. 1048), the Court there in construing the right against unreasonable searches and seizures declared that:

(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures, and as shown in previous cases, its protection applies to governmental action. Its origin and history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies; as against such authority it was the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to secure the citizen in the right of unmolested occupation of his dwelling and the possession of his property, subject to the right of seizure by process duly served.

The above ruling was reiterated in State v. Bryan (457 P.2d 661 [1968]) where a parking attendant who searched the automobile to ascertain the owner thereof found marijuana instead, without the knowledge and participation of police authorities, was declared admissible in prosecution for illegal possession of narcotics.

And again in the 1969 case of Walker v. State (429 S.W.2d 121), it was held that the search and seizure clauses are restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon private individuals (citing People v. Potter, 240 Cal. App.2d 621, 49 Cap. Rptr, 892 (1966); State v. Brown, Mo., 391 S.W.2d 903 (1965); State v. Olsen, Or., 317 P.2d 938 (1957).

Likewise appropos is the case of Bernas v. US (373 F.2d 517 (1967). The Court there said:

The search of which appellant complains, however, was made by a private citizen — the owner of a motel in which appellant stayed overnight and in which he left behind a travel case containing the evidence*** complained of. The search was made on the motel owner's own initiative. Because of it, he became suspicious, called the local police, informed them of the bag's contents, and made it available to the authorities.

The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do not require exclusion of evidence obtained through a search by a private citizen. Rather, the amendment only proscribes governmental action."

The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without the latter transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged.

Appellant, however, would like this court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure of the evidence later on used in prosecuting the case which resulted in his conviction.

The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to be clarified in two days. In both instances, the argument stands to fall on its own weight, or the lack of it.

First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that NBI agents conducted an illegal search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise. Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts (TSN, October 6 & 7, 1987, pp. 15-18; pp. 7-8; Original Records, pp. 119-122; 167-168).

It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he took samples of the same to the NBI and later summoned the agents to his place of business. Thereafter, he opened the parcel containing the rest of the shipment and entrusted the care and custody thereof to the NBI agents. Clearly, the NBI agents made no search and seizure, much less an illegal one, contrary to the postulate of accused/appellant.

Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135). Where the contraband articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution (US v. Lee 274 US 559, 71 L.Ed. 1202 [1927]; Ker v. State of California 374 US 23, 10 L.Ed.2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v. State, 429 SW2d 122 [1968]).

In Gandy v. Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was likewise held that where the property was taken into custody of the police at the specific request of the manager and where the search was initially made by the owner there is no unreasonable search and seizure within the constitutional meaning of the term.

That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. True, the liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must always be subject to protection. But protection against whom? Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights answers the query which he himself posed, as follows:

First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy. Protection against whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the relation between individuals, between a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder. (Sponsorship Speech of Commissioner Bernas , Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986; Emphasis supplied)

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.

If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of the 1935 Constitution has been modified by the present phraseology found in the 1987 Charter, expressly declaring as inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against illegal search and seizure, it matters not whether the evidence was procured by police authorities or private individuals (Appellant's Brief, p. 8, Rollo, p. 62).

The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in laying down the principles of the government and fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between individuals. Moreover, it must be emphasized that the modifications introduced in the 1987 Constitution (re: Sec. 2, Art. III) relate to the issuance of either a search warrant or warrant of arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility of the judge in the issuance thereof (See Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 [1988]; Circular No. 13 [October 1, 1985] and Circular No. 12 [June 30, 1987]. The modifications introduced deviate in no manner as to whom the restriction or inhibition against unreasonable search and seizure is directed against. The restraint stayed with the State and did not shift to anyone else.

Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an act of the State would result in serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution.

Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual effected through private seizure equally applies, in pari passu, to the alleged violation, non-governmental as it is, of appellant's constitutional rights to privacy and communication.

x x x."

Legal effect of the "waiver" of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, re: "maximum police detention time" while undergoing "inquest proceedings" before an inquest prosecutor based on a "valid warantless arrest" pursuant to Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Remember: PNP, NBI, et al cannot detain a suspect indefinitely.

Legal effect of the "waiver" of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, re: "maximum police detention time" while undergoing "inquest proceedings" before an inquest prosecutor based on a "valid warantless arrest" pursuant to Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

 Supreme Court en banc decision  c. 2017:

 "The rule is that a person subject of a warrantless arrest must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities8 within the periods provided in Article 125 of the RPC, otherwise, the public official or employee could be held liable for the failure to deliver except if grounded on reasonable and allowable delays. Article 125 of the RPC is intended to prevent any abuse resulting from confining a person without informing him of his offense and without allowing him to post bail. It punishes public officials or employees who shall detain any person for some legal ground but fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the periods prescribed by law. In case the detention is without legal ground, the person arrested can charge the arresting officer with arbitrary detention under Article 124 of the RPC. This is without prejudice to the possible filing of an action for damages under Article 32 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines. 

Article 125 of the RPC, however, can be waived if the detainee who was validly arrested without a warrant opts for the conduct of preliminary investigation.The question to be addressed here, therefore, is whether such waiver gives the State the right to detain a person indefinitely.

 The Court answers in the negative. 

The waiver of Article 125 of the RPC does not vest upon the DOJ, PPO, BJMP, and PNP the unbridled right to indefinitely incarcerate an arrested person and subject him to the whims and caprices of the reviewing prosecutor of the DOJ. The waiver of Article 125 must coincide with the prescribed period for preliminary investigation as mandated by Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Detention beyond this period violates the accused's constitutional right to liberty.

 Stated differently, the waiver of the effects of Article 125 of the RPC is not a license to detain a person ad infinitum. Waiver of a detainee's right to be delivered to proper judicial authorities as prescribed by Article 125 of the RPC does not trump his constitutional right in cases where probable cause was initially found wanting by reason of the dismissal of the complaint filed before the prosecutor's office even if such dismissal is on appeal, reconsideration, reinvestigation or on automatic review. Every person's basic right to liberty is not to be construed as waived by mere operation of Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. The fundamental law provides limits and this must be all the more followed especially so that detention is proscribed absent probable cause.

 Accordingly, the Court rules that a detainee under such circumstances must be promptly released to avoid violation of the constitutional right to liberty, despite a waiver of Article 125, if the 15-day period (or the thirty 30- day period in cases of violation of R.A. No. 91659 ) for the conduct of the preliminary investigation lapses.

This rule also applies in cases where the investigating prosecutor resolves to dismiss the case, even if such dismissal was appealed to the DOJ or made the subject of a motion for reconsideration, reinvestigation or automatic review.

The reason is that such dismissal automatically results in a prima facie finding of lack of probable cause to file an information in court and to detain a person.

 The Court is aware that this decision may raise discomfort to some, especially at this time when the present administration aggressively wages its "indisputably popular war on illegal drugs."

As Justice Diosdado Peralta puts it, that the security of the public and the interest of the State would be jeopardized is not a justification to trample upon the constitutional rights of the detainees against deprivation of liberty without due process of law, to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved and to a speedy disposition of the case.

 WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared, and ruled, that all detainees whose pending cases have gone beyond the mandated periods for the conduct of preliminary investigation, or whose cases have already been dismissed on inquest or preliminary investigation, despite pending appeal, reconsideration, reinvestigation or automatic review by the Secretary of Justice, are entitled to be released pursuant to their constitutional right to liberty and their constitutional right against unreasonable seizures, unless detained for some other lawful cause.

 SO ORDERED." 

Read:

 Supreme Court En Banc Decision.

 G.R. No. 232413, July 25, 2017. IN

THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WITH PETITION FOR RELIEF INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES PANGASINAN LEGAL AID and JAY-AR R. SENIN, Petitioners. vs. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, BUREAU OF JAIL MANAGEMENT AND PENOLOGY, and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.

 Notes:

 Section 125, Revised Penal Code:

 "Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. - The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of; twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes, or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent."

 Section, Rule 112, Rules of Criminal Procedure:

 "Section 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. - When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant involving an offense which requires a preliminary investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a prosecutor without need of such investigation provided an inquest has been conducted in accordance with existing rules. In the absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the offended party or a peace officer directly with the proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person. Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the presence of his counsel.

Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.

 After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary investigation, the accused may, within five (5) days from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his defense as provided in this Rule."

 Section 90, R.A. 9165, "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002":

 Republic Act No. 9165, Section 90. Jurisdiction. - The Supreme Court shall designate special courts from among the existing Regional Trial Courts in each judicial region to exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of this Act. The number of courts designated in each judicial region shall be based on the population and the number of cases pending in their respective jurisdiction. The DOJ shall designate special prosecutors to exclusively handle cases involving violations of this Act.

 The preliminary investigation of cases filed under this Act shall be terminated within a period of thirty (30) days from the date of their filing. When the preliminary investigation is conducted by a public prosecutor and a probable cause is established, the corresponding information shall be filed in court within twenty-four (24) hours from the termination of the investigation. If the preliminary investigation is conducted by a judge and a probable cause is found to exist, the corresponding information shall be filed by the proper prosecutor within forty-eight (48) hours from the date of receipt of the records of the case. 

Trial of the case under this Section shall be finished by the court not later than sixty (60) days from the date of the filing of the information.

Decision on said cases shall be rendered within a period of fifteen (15) days from the date of submission of the case for resolution.

 The Implementing Rules and Regulations of the law further states:

 Section 90. Jurisdiction. - The Supreme Court shall designate special courts from among the existing Regional Trial Courts in each judicial region to exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of the Act. The number of courts designated in each judicial region shall be based on the population and the number of cases pending in their respective jurisdiction. The DOJ, through its provincial/city prosecution offices, shall designate special prosecutors to exclusively handle cases involving violations of the Act.

 The preliminary investigation of cases filed under the Act shall be terminated within a period of thirty (30) days from the date of their filing. When the preliminary investigation is conducted by a public prosecutor and a probable cause is established, the corresponding information shall be filed in court within twenty-four (24) hours from the termination of the investigation. If the preliminary investigation is conducted by a judge and a probable cause is found to exist, the corresponding information shall be filed by the proper prosecutor within forty-eight (48) hours from the date of receipt of the records of the case. 

However, when the prosecutor disagrees with the finding of the Municipal Trial Court and he/she finds the need to conduct a formal reinvestigation of the case to clarify issues, or to afford either party the opportunity to be heard to avoid miscarriage of justice, the prosecutor has to terminate the reinvestigation within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the records, and if probable cause exists, to file the corresponding information in court within forty-eight (48) hours from termination of the reinvestigation.

 Trial of the case under this Section shall be finished by the court not later than sixty (60) days from the date of the filing of the information. Decision on said cases shall be rendered within a period of fifteen (15) days from the date of submission of the case for resolution."

REPUBLIC ACT No. 11332 - "Mandatory Reporting of Notifiable Diseases and Health Events of Public Health Concern Act".

REPUBLIC ACT No. 11332

An Act Providing Policies and Prescribing Procedures on Surveillance and Response to Notifiable Diseases, Epidemics, and Health Events of Public Health Concern, and Appropriating Funds Therefor, Repealing for the Purpose Act No. 3573, Otherwise Known as the "Law on Reporting of Communicable Diseases"
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippine Congress assembled:

Section 1. Short Title. -This Act shall be known as the "Mandatory Reporting of Notifiable Diseases and Health Events of Public Health Concern Act".
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. -It is hereby declared the policy of the State to protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them. It shall endeavor to protect the people from public health threats through the efficient and effective disease surveillance of notifiable diseases including emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases, diseases for elimination and eradication, epidemics, and health events including chemical, radio-nuclear and environmental agents of public health concern and provide an effective response system in compliance with the 2005 International Health Regulations (IHR) of the World Health Organization (WHO). The State recognizes epidemics and other public health emergencies as threats to public health and national security, which can undermine the social, economic, and political functions of the State.

The State also recognizes disease surveillance and response systems of the Department of Health (DOH) and its local counterparts, as the first line of defense to epidemics and health events of public health concern that pose risk to public health and security.

Section 3. Definition of Terms. -As used in this Act:

(a) Disease refers to an illness due to a specific toxic substance, occupational exposure or infectious agent, which affects a susceptible individual, either directly or indirectly, as from an infected animal or person, or indirectly through an intermediate host, vector, or the environment;

(b) Disease control refers to the reduction of disease incidence, prevalence, morbidity or mortality to a locally acceptable level as a result of deliberate efforts and continued intervention measures to maintain the reduction:

(c) Disease surveillance refers to the ongoing systematic collection, analysis, interpretation, and dissemination of outcome-specific data for use in the planning, implementation, and evaluation of public health practice. A disease surveillance system includes the functional capacity for data analysis as well as the timely dissemination of these data to persons who can undertake effective prevention and control activities;

(d) Emerging or re-emerging infectious diseases refer to diseases that: (1) have not occurred in humans before; (2) have occurred previously but affected only small numbers of people in isolated areas; (3) have occurred throughout human history but have only recently been recognized as a distant disease due to an infectious agent; (4) are caused by previously undetected or unknown infectious agents; (5) are due to mutant or resistant strains of a causative organism; and (6) once were major health problems in the country, and then declined dramatically, but are again becoming health problems for a significant proportion of the population:

(e) Epidemic/outbreak refers to an occurrence of more cases of disease than normally expected within a specific place or group of people over a given period of time;

(f) Epidemiologic investigation refers to an inquiry to the incidence, prevalence, extent, source, mode of transmission, causation of, and other information pertinent to a disease occurrence;

(g) Health event of public health concern refers to either a public health emergency or a public health threat due to biological, chemical, radio-nuclear and environmental agents;

(h) Infectious disease refers to a clinically manifested disease of humans or animals resulting from an infection;

(i) Mandatory reporting refers to the obligatory reporting of a condition to local or state health authorities, as required for notifiable diseases, epidemics or public health events of public health concern;

(j) Notifiable disease refers to a disease that, by legal requirements, must be reported to the public health authorities;

(k) Public health authority refers to the DOH (specifically the Epidemiology Bureau, Disease Prevention and Control Bureau, Bureau of Quarantine and International Health Surveillance, Health Emergency Management Bureau, Food and Drug Administration, government hospitals. Research Institute of Tropical Medicine and other National Reference Laboratories, and DOH Regional Offices), the local health office (provincial, city or municipality), or any person directly authorized to act on behalf of the DOH or the local health office;

(l) Public health emergency refers to an occurrence or imminent threat of an illness or health condition that:

(1) Is caused by any of the following:

(i) Bio terrorism;

(ii) Appearance of a novel or previously controlled or eradicated infectious agent or biological toxin;

(iii) A natural disaster;

(iv) A chemical attack or accidental release;

(v) A nuclear attack or accident; or

(vi) An attack or accidental release of radioactive materials; and

(2) Poses a high probability of any of the following:

(i) A large number of deaths in the affected population;

(ii) A large number of serious injuries or long-term disabilities in the affected population;

(iii) Widespread exposure to an infectious or toxic agent that poses a significant risk of substantial harm to a large number of people in the affected population;

(iv) International exposure to an infectious or toxic agent that poses a significant risk to the health of citizens of other countries; or

(v) Trade and travel restrictions;

(m) Public health threat refers to any situation or factor that may represent a danger to the health of the people; and

(n) Response refers to the implementation of specific activities to control further spread of infection, outbreaks or epidemics and prevent re-occurrence. It includes verification, contact tracing, rapid risk assessment, case measures, treatment of patients, risk communication, conduct of prevention activities, and rehabilitation.

Section 4. Objectives. -This Act shall have the following objectives:

(a) To continuously develop and upgrade the list of nationally notifiable diseases and health events of public health concern with their corresponding case definitions and laboratory confirmation;

(b) To ensure the establishment and maintenance of relevant, efficient and effective disease surveillance and response system at the national and local levels;

(c) To expand collaborations beyond traditional public health partners to include others who may be involved in the disease surveillance and response, such as agricultural agencies, veterinarians, environmental agencies, law enforcement entities, and transportation and communication agencies, among others;

(d) To provide accurate and timely health information about notifiable diseases, and health-related events and conditions to citizens and health providers as an integral part of response to public health emergencies;

(e) To establish effective mechanisms for strong collaboration with national and local government health agencies to ensure proper procedures are in place to promptly respond to reports of notifiable diseases and health events of public health concern, including case investigations, treatment, and control and containment, including follow-up activities;

(f) To ensure that public health authorities have the statutory and regulatory authority to ensure the following:

(1) Mandatory reporting of reportable diseases and health events of public health concern;

(2) Epidemic/outbreaks and/or epidemiologic investigation, case investigations, patient interviews, review of medical records, contact tracing, specimen collection and testing, risk assessments, laboratory investigation, population surveys, and environmental investigation;

(3) Quarantine and isolation; and

(4) Rapid containment and implementation of measures for disease prevention and control;

(g) To provide sufficient funding to support operations needed to establish and maintain epidemiology and surveillance units at the DOH, health facilities and local government units (LGUs); efficiently and effectively investigate outbreaks and health events of public health concern; validate, collect, analyze and disseminate disease surveillance information to relevant agencies or organizations; and implement appropriate response;

(h) To require public and private physicians, allied medical personnel, professional societies, hospitals, clinics, health facilities, laboratories, pharmaceutical companies, private companies and institutions, workplaces, schools, prisons, ports, airports, establishments, communities, other government agencies, and nongovernment organizations (NGOs) to actively participate in disease surveillance and response; and

(i) To respect to the fullest extent possible, the rights of people to liberty, bodily integrity, and privacy while maintaining and preserving public health and security.

Section 5. Notifiable Diseases and Health Events of Public Health Concern. -The Epidemiology Bureau under the DOH shall regularly update and issue a list of nationally notifiable diseases and health events of public health concern with their corresponding case definitions.1âшphi1 The selection and the deletion of diseases and health events of public health concern shall be based on criteria established by the DOH.

Section 6. Mandatory Reporting of Notifiable Diseases and Health Events of Public Concern. -The DOH, through the Epidemiology Bureau, shall issue the official list of institutionalized public health information system, disease surveillance and response systems for mandatory reporting of notifiable diseases and health events of public concern provided in Section 5 of this Act.. This official list shall include the Field Health Service Information System (FHSIS), the Philippine Integrated Disease Surveillance Response (PIDSR) System with its Case-based Surveillance and Event-based Surveillance, and other duly institutionalized public health disease surveillance and response systems of the DOH.

Under this Act:

(a) The DOH and its local counterparts are mandated to implement the mandatory reporting of notifiable diseases and health events of public health concern;

(b) The DOH and its local counterparts shall establish and maintain functional disease surveillance and response systems, which include coordination mechanisms, implementation protocols for reporting and response, measures for data security and confidentiality, and procedures and provision to ensure safety of personnel conducting disease surveillance and response activities;

(c) All public and private physicians, allied medical personnel, professional societies, hospitals, clinics, health facilities, laboratories, institutions, workplaces, schools, prisons, ports, airports, establishments, communities, other government agencies, and NGOs are required to accurately and immediately report notifiable diseases and health events of public health concern as issued by the DOH;

(d) Data collection, analysis, and the dissemination of information from official disease surveillance and response systems can only be done by authorized personnel from the DOH and its local counterparts and may only be used for public health concern purposes only; thus, should be exempted in the provision of Data Privacy Act on accessibility of data;

(e) To perform their disease surveillance and response functions, authorized health personnel from the DOH and its local counterparts have the statutory and regulatory authority to enforce the following:

(1) Establishment of public health information system disease surveillance and response systems in private and public facilities deemed necessary to protect the health of the population in coordination with the DOH-Epidemiology Bureau;

(2) Mandatory reporting of notifiable diseases and health events of public health concern;

(3) Conduct of epidemic/outbreak and epidemiologic investigations, case investigations, patient interviews, review of medical records, contact tracing, collection, storage, transport and testing of samples and specimen, risk assessments, laboratory investigation, population surveys, and environmental investigation;

(4) Rapid containment, quarantine and isolation, disease prevention and control measures, and product recall;

(5) Response activities for events of public health concern;

(f) The DOH and its local counterparts shall ensure that all surveillance and response officers have adequate capacity for mandatory reporting of notifiable diseases, risk assessment, epidemiology, disease surveillance, and response to epidemics and health events of public health concern. It shall also ensure that the safety and protection of all personnel directly involved in surveillance and response activities are upheld; and

(g) All personnel of the DOH and its local counterparts, and all other individuals or entities involved in conducting disease surveillance and response activities shall respect, to the fullest extent possible, the rights of people to liberty, bodily integrity, and privacy while maintaining and preserving public health and security.

Section 7. Declaration of Epidemic or Public Health Emergency. -The Secretary of Health shall have the authority to declare epidemics of national and/or international concerns except when the same threatens national security. In which case, the President of the Republic of the Philippines shall declare a State of Public Health Emergency and mobilize governmental and nongovernmental agencies to respond to the threat.

Provincial, city or municipal health offices may only declare a disease outbreak within their respective localities provided the declaration, is supported by, sufficient scientific evidence based on disease surveillance/data, epidemiologic investigation, environmental investigation, and laboratory investigation.

Section 8. Establishment of Epidemiology and. Surveillance Units. -The DOH, in coordination with the LGUs, shall ensure that the Epidemiology and Surveillance Units (ESUs) are established and functional in all levels of the DOH and its local counterparts, and in public and private health facilities and laboratories, as well as ports and airports in ah provinces, cities and municipalities throughout the country. The ESU shall capture and verify all reported notifiable diseases and health events of public health concern; provide timely, accurate, and reliable epidemiologic information to appropriate agencies; conduct disease surveillance and response activities; coordinate needed response; and facilitate capacity building in the field of epidemiology, disease surveillance and response at the Epidemiology Bureau.

All ESUs shall have trained required human resource complement and provision of adequate resources, including equipment, logistics, communication, transportation, laboratory supplies and reagents, personal protective equipment and health insurance, to effectively perform their disease surveillance and response functions.

Section 9. Prohibited Acts. -The following shall be prohibited under this Act:

(a) Unauthorized disclosure of private and confidential information pertaining to a patient’s medical condition or treatment;

(b) Tampering of records or intentionally providing misinformation;

(c) Non-operation of the disease surveillance and response systems;

(d) Non-cooperation of persons and entities that should report and/or respond to notifiable diseases or health events of public concern; and

(e) Non-cooperation of the person or entities identified as having the notifiable disease, or affected by the health event of public concern.

Disclosure of confidential information will not be considered violation of this Act under this section if the disclosure was made to comply with a legal order issued by a court of law with competent jurisdiction.

Section 10. Penalties. -Any person or entity found to have violated Section 9 of this Act shall be penalized with a fine of not less than Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) but not more than Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) or imprisonment of not less than one (1) month but not more than six (6) months, or both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the proper court.

The Professional Regulation Commission shall have the authority to suspend or revoke the license to practice of any medical professional for any violation of this Act.

The Civil Service Commission shall have the authority to suspend or revoke the civil service eligibility of a public servant who is in violation of this Act.

If the offense is committed by a public or private health facility, institution, agency, corporation, school, or other juridical entity duly organized in accordance with law, the chief executive officer, president, general manager, or such other officer in charge shall be held liable. In addition, the business permit and license to operate of the concerned facility, institution, agency, corporation, school, or legal entity shall be cancelled.

Section 11. Appropriations. -The amount needed for the initial implementation of this Act shall be charged against the current year’s appropriations of the DOH. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the continued implementation of this Act shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.

Section 12. Implementing Rules and Regulations. -The DOH shall issue the implementing rules and regulations for this Act within one hundred twenty (120) days after the approval of this Act.

Section 13. Separability Clause. -If any part, section or provision of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, other provisions not affected thereby shall remain in full force and effect. /

Section 14. Repealing Clause. -Act No. 3573, otherwise known as the "Law on Reporting of Communicable Diseases", is hereby repealed. All laws, decrees, orders, issuances and rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 15. Effectivity. -This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.

Approved,

(Sgd) VICENTE C. SOTTO III
President of the Senate

(Sgd) GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
Speaker of the House of Representatives

This Act was passed by the Senate of the Philippines as Senate Bill No. 2186 on February 4, 2019 and adopted by the House of Representatives as an amendment to House Bill No. 7134 on February 8, 2019.

(Sgd) MYRA MARIE D. VILLARICA
Secretary of the Senate

(Sgd) DANTE ROBERTO P. MALING
Acting Secretary General
House of Representatives

(Sgd) RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE
President of the Philippines

Approved: April 26, 2019.

Arrests during community quarantine period.

Article 151 ("RESISTANCE" and "DISOBEDIENCE" to a person in authority or the agents of such person) of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who not being included in the provisions of the preceding articles "shall RESIST or SERIOUSLY DISOBEY any person in authority, or the agents of such person, WHILE ENGAGED IN THE PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTIES."

"Resistance" and "serious disobedience" are essential elements of the felony.

Further, such acts must be committed against a person in authority or his agent "while engaged in the performance of official duties".

All things being equal, an ordinary citizen who violates a community QUARANTINE without performing acts of "resistance" and "serious disobedience" against a person in authority or his agent "while performing official duties" may not be indicted and convicted for violation of Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code.

Further, it should be stressed that Section 4 (i) of R.A. No. 11332, otherwise known as the "Mandatory Reporting of Notifiable Diseases and Health Events of Public Health Concern Act", commands the authorities "to respect to the fullest extent possible, the RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE TO LIBERTY, BODILY INTEGRITY, and PRIVACY while maintaining and preserving public health and security."

Section 6 (h) of RA 11332, which repeats the foregoing Section 4 (i) of the law, likewise provides that "all personnel of the DOH and its local counterparts, and all other individuals or entities involved in conducting disease surveillance and response activities SHALL RESPECT, TO THE FULLEST EXTENT POSSIBLE, THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE TO LIBERTY, BODILY INTEGEOTT AND PRIVACY while maintaining and preserving public health and security."

Under Section 9 (d) and (e) of RA 11332, among other things, the following are declared as "prohibited acts":

"(d) NON-COOPERATION of persons and entities THAT SHOULD REPORT AND/OR RESPOND to notifiable diseases or health events of public concern; and

(e) NON-COOPERATION of the person or entities IDENTIFIED AS HAVING THE NOTIFIABLE DISEASE, or AFFECTED BY THE HEALTH EVENT of public concern."

"Notifiable disease" is defined by Section 3 (j) of RA 11332 as
"a disease that, by legal requirements, must be reported to the public health authorities".

"Health event of public concern" is defined in Section 3 (g) of RA 11332 as "either a public health emergency or a public health threat due to biological, chemical, radio-nuclear and environmental agents."

Under Section 4 (h) of RA 11332 the Department of Health (DOH) may require the following parties and entiies "to actively participate in disease surveillance and response", namely: ".. public and private physicians, allied medical personnel, professional societies, hospitals, clinics, health facilities, laboratories, pharmaceutical companies, private companies and institutions, workplaces, schools, prisons, ports, airports, establishments, communities, other government agencies, and nongovernment organizations (NGOs)..."

The foregoing enumeration of parties and entities does not include ordinary citizens.

Section 10 (Penalties) of RA 11332, among other things, provides that "any person or entity found to have violated Section 9 of this Act shall be penalized with a fine of not less than Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) but not more than Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) or imprisonment of not less than one (1) month but not more than six (6) months, or both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the proper court."

It is noteworthy to state that Sections 9 (prohibited acts) and 10 (penalties) of RA 11332 do not contain an express provison specifically penalizing a simple violation of a community QUARANTINE by an ordinary citizen who does not have or is NOT infected by a "notifiable disease" or who is NOT "affected by a health event of publci concern."

Read RA 11332 - https://lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2019/ra_11332_2019.html.

RA 11469 - CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 (COVID-19)

See - https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2020/03/24/republic-act-no-11469/


Download.

[REPUBLIC ACT NO. 11469]

AN ACT DECLARING THE EXISTENCE OF A NATIONAL EMERGENCY ARISING FROM THE CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 (COVID-19) SITUATION AND A NATIONAL POLICY IN CONNECTION THEREWITH, AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR A LIMITED PERIOD AND SUBJECT TO RESTRICTIONS, TO EXERCISE POWERS NECESSARY AND PROPER TO CARRY OUT THE DECLARED NATIONAL POLICY AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Appeals in civil service cases; rule of procedural liberality applied. - When substantial justice dictates it, procedural rules may be relaxed in order to arrive at a just disposition of a case. The purpose behind limiting the period of appeal is to avoid unreasonable delay in the administration of justice and to put an end to controversies. A one-day delay as in this case, does not justify denial of the appeal where there is absolutely no indication of intent to delay as in this case, does not justify denial of the appeal where there is absolutely no indication of intent to delay justice on the part of Paler and the pleading is meritorious on its face.

DAVAO CITY WATER DISTRICT REPRESENTED BY ITS GENERAL MANAGER, RODORA N. GAMBOA, Petitioner, vs. RODRIGO L. ARANJUEZ, et al., Respondents. EN BANC, G.R. No. 194192, June 16, 2015. 


"Though the appeal before the CSC lacked a notice of appeal as required by CSC Resolution No. 991936 or the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS),27 the Consolidated Memorandum filed by the private respondents was enough to be considered as a sufficient compliance with the rules. The Memorandum delineates the errors asserted against DCWD and the discussions supporting their arguments. We find merit in the sufficiency of the Memorandum rather than strict compliance in view of the constitutional right of every employee to security of tenure. A more relevant consideration of public interest is accorded whenever the merits of a case collide with rigid application of the rules.28

Further, we find that the Civil Service Commission, the agency directly concerned, the ruling of which was upheld by the Court of Appeals on review, correctly exercised jurisdiction over respondent’s appeal from the decision of petitioner DCWD, thereby ruling against, if sub silentio, the argument of petitioner that the appeal should be dismissed for lack of proof of payment of appeal. The Civil Service Commission and the Court of Appeals considered the procedural issue raised by petitioner as a surmountable bar to the resolution of the main issue of respondents’ constitutional right to free expression29 as amplified with specificity by their guaranteed right as workers to peaceful concerted activity and their entitlement to security of tenure.30 The decisions of the Civil Service Commission and the Court of Appeals are squarely supported by Adalim v. Taniñas31 stating that:

In a number of cases, we upheld the CSC’s decision relaxing its procedural rules to render substantial justice. The Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service themselves provide that administrative investigations shall be conducted without strict recourse to the technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial proceedings. The case before the CSC involves the security of tenure of public employees protected by the Constitution. Public interest requires a resolution of the merits of the appeal instead of dismissing the same based on a rigid application of the CSC Rules of Procedure. Accordingly, both the CSC and the CA properly allowed respondent employees’ appeal despite procedural lapses to resolve the issue on the merits.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,32 this Court pronounced that technical rules of procedure are not ends in themselves but primarily devised and designed to help in the proper and expedient dispensation of justice. In appropriate cases, therefore, the rules may have to be so construed liberally as to meet and advance the cause of substantial justice. While it is desirable that the rules of procedure are faithfully and even meticulously observed, courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper administration of justice. If the rules are intended to ensure the orderly conduct of litigation, it is because of the higher objective they seek which is the protection of substantive rights of the parties.33 Substantial justice, in other words must prevail. In Paler,34 We said:

When substantial justice dictates it, procedural rules may be relaxed in order to arrive at a just disposition of a case. The purpose behind limiting the period of appeal is to avoid unreasonable delay in the administration of justice and to put an end to controversies. A one-day delay as in this case, does not justify denial of the appeal where there is absolutely no indication of intent to delay as in this case, does not justify denial of the appeal where there is absolutely no indication of intent to delay justice on the part of Paler and the pleading is meritorious on its face.

We rule in favor of the allowance of respondents’ appeal because:

Law and jurisprudence grant to courts the prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to put an end to litigation speedily and the parties’ right to an opportunity to be heard.35(Emphasis supplied)

Quoting again the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,36we pointed out that this Court can temper rigid rules in favor of substantial justice. We find that pronouncement apt and fit to this case. Thereby we are not detained by the omissions of the respondents in their resort to the CSC, and we thus proceed to the merits of the petitioners’ submissions.

Lastly, on the form, we find no merit in the contention that Aranjuez was not authorized to sign on behalf of the other petitioners. Pursuant to Union Resolution No. 015-200837attached as Annex A to the Appellants’ 015-2008 Consolidated Memorandum dated 26 March 2008, the officers and members of NAMDACWAD gave Aranjuez a general authority to represent the organization in all legal matters to be filed for whatever purpose it may serve. From the general and broad grant of authority, Aranjuez possessed the specific authority to sign in behalf of his principal the verification and certification against non-forum shopping required of the petition."

Freedom of expression of government workers. - Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much right as any person in the land to voice out their protests against what they believe to be a violation of their rights and interests. Civil Service does not deprive them of their freedom of expression. It would be unfair to hold that by joining the government service, the members thereof have renounced or waived this basic liberty. This freedom can be reasonably regulated only but can never be taken away.

DAVAO CITY WATER DISTRICT REPRESENTED BY ITS GENERAL MANAGER, RODORA N. GAMBOA, Petitioner, vs. RODRIGO L. ARANJUEZ, et al., Respondents. EN BANC, G.R. No. 194192, June 16, 2015.


"It is correct to conclude that those who enter government service are subjected to a different degree of limitation on their freedom to speak their mind; however, it is not tantamount to the relinquishment of their constitutional right of expression otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of their employment. [Rene B. Gorospe, Constitutional Law, Volume 1, 2006 ed. citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents of University of State of New York, 385 US 589, 605-606, 1967].

Unarguably, a citizen who accepts public employment "must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom." But there are some rights and freedoms so fundamental to liberty that they cannot be bargained away in a contract for public employment. It is the Court’s responsibility to ensure that citizens are not deprived of these fundamental rights by virtue of working for the government. [Borough of Duryea, Pennsylvania v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488; 180 L. Ed. 2d 408; 2011 U.S. LEXIS 4564; 79 U.S.L.W. 4538; 32 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 481; 190 L.R.R.M. 3217; 22 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 1176, 20 June 2011 citing Connick, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 75 L. Ed. 2d 708, Keyishianv. Board of Regents of University of State of New York, 385 U.S. 589, 605-606, 87 S. Ct. 675, 17 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1967) and Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 164 L. Ed. 2d 689 (2006)].

The GSIS case pronounced:

Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much right as any person in the land to voice out their protests against what they believe to be a violation of their rights and interests. Civil Service does not deprive them of their freedom of expression. It would be unfair to hold that by joining the government service, the members thereof have renounced or waived this basic liberty. This freedom can be reasonably regulated only but can never be taken away.
[GSIS v. Villaviza, 640 Phil. 18 (2010)].

In simple paraphrase we say, regulation of the freedom of expression is not removal of the constitutional right."

Civil service cases; effect of failure of respondent government worker to file his Answer to the Complaint. - The failure of a respondent to file an answer merely translates to a waiver of "his right to file an answer." There is nothing in the rule that says that the charges are deemed admitted. It has not done away with the burden of the complainant to prove the charges with clear and convincing evidence.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), et al, Petitioners,
vs. DINNAH VILLAVIZA, et al, Respondents. EN BANC, G.R. No. 180291, July 27, 2010.


"X x x. The petitioners argue that there being no answers, the allegations in the formal charges that they filed should have been deemed admitted pursuant to Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court which provides:

SECTION 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted.- Material averment in the complaint, other than those as to the amount of liquidated damages, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. Allegations of usury in a complaint to recover usurious interest are deemed admitted if not denied specifically and under oath.

According to the petitioners, this rule is applicable to the case at bench pursuant to Rule 1, Section 4 of the Rules of Court which reads:

SECTION 4. In what cases not applicable. - These Rules shall not apply to election cases, land registration, cadastral, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.(underscoring supplied)

The Court does not subscribe to the argument of the petitioners. Petitioners' own rules, Rule XI, Section 4 of the GSIS' Amended Policy and Procedural Guidelines No. 178-04, specifically provides:

If the respondent fails to file his Answer within five (5) working days from receipt of the Formal Charge for the supporting evidence, when requested, he shall be considered to have waived his right to file an answer and the PGM or the Board of Trustees, in proper cases, shall render judgment, as may be warranted by the facts and evidence submitted by the prosecution.

A perusal of said section readily discloses that the failure of a respondent to file an answer merely translates to a waiver of "his right to file an answer." There is nothing in the rule that says that the charges are deemed admitted. It has not done away with the burden of the complainant to prove the charges with clear and convincing evidence.

It is true that Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules can be applied in a "suppletory character." Suppletory is defined as "supplying deficiencies." (Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 10th Edition, p. 1184). It means that the provisions in the Rules of Court will be made to apply only where there is an insufficiency in the applicable rule. There is, however, no such deficiency as the rules of the GSIS are explicit in case of failure to file the required answer. What is clearly stated there is that GSIS may "render judgment as may be warranted by the facts and evidence submitted by the prosecution."

Even granting that Rule 8, Section 11 of the Rules of Court finds application in this case, petitioners must remember that there remain averments that are not deemed admitted by the failure to deny the same. Among them are immaterial allegations and incorrect conclusions drawn from facts set out in the complaint. [Herrera, Remedial Law, Vol. I, p. 548 (2000 ed.)]. Thus, even if respondents failed to file their answer, it does not mean that all averments found in the complaint will be considered as true and correct in their entirety, and that the forthcoming decision will be rendered in favor of the petitioners. We must not forget that even in administrative proceedings, it is still the complainant, or in this case the petitioners, who have the burden of proving, with substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint or in the formal charges. [First United Construction Corporation v. Valdez, G.R. No. 154108, December 10, 2008, 573 SCRA 391, 399]."

Freedom of expression, speech and assembly of government workers. - Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much right as any person in the land to voice out their protests against what they believe to be a violation of their rights and interests. Civil Service does not deprive them of their freedom of expression. It would be unfair to hold that by joining the government service, the members thereof have renounced or waived this basic liberty. This freedom can be reasonably regulated only but can never be taken away.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), et al, Petitioners, vs.
DINNAH VILLAVIZA, et al, Respondents. EN BANC, G.R. No. 180291, July 27, 2010

"On the merits, what needs to be resolved in the case at bench is the question of whether or not there was a violation of Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316. Stated differently, whether or not respondents' actions on May 27, 2005 amounted to a "prohibited concerted activity or mass action." Pertinently, the said provision states:

Section 5. As used in this Omnibus Rules, the phrase ''prohibited concerted activity or mass action'' shall be understood to refer to any collective activity undertaken by government employees, by themselves or through their employees organizations, with intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruptionin order to realize their demands of force concession, economic or otherwise, from their respective agencies or the government. It shall include mass leaves, walkouts, pickets and acts of similar nature. (underscoring supplied)

In this case, CSC found that the acts of respondents in going to the GSIS-IU office wearing red shirts to witness a public hearing do not amount to a concerted activity or mass action proscribed above. CSC even added that their actuations can be deemed an exercise of their constitutional right to freedom of expression. The CA found no cogent reason to deviate therefrom.

As defined in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316 which serves to regulate the political rights of those in the government service, the concerted activity or mass action proscribed must be coupled with the "intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their demands of force concession." Wearing similarly colored shirts, attending a public hearing at the GSIS-IU office, bringing with them recording gadgets, clenching their fists, some even badmouthing the guards and PGM Garcia, are acts not constitutive of an (i) intent to effect work stoppage or service disruption and (ii) for the purpose of realizing their demands of force concession.

Precisely, the limitations or qualifications found in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316 are there to temper and focus the application of such prohibition. Not all collective activity or mass undertaking of government employees is prohibited. Otherwise, we would be totally depriving our brothers and sisters in the government service of their constitutional right to freedom of expression.

Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much right as any person in the land to voice out their protests against what they believe to be a violation of their rights and interests. Civil Service does not deprive them of their freedom of expression. It would be unfair to hold that by joining the government service, the members thereof have renounced or waived this basic liberty. This freedom can be reasonably regulated only but can never be taken away.

X x x.

In the recent case of GSIS v. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS [GSIS v. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS, G.R. No. 170132, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 622], the Court upheld the position of petitioner GSIS because its employees, numbering between 300 and 800 each day, staged a walkout and participated in a mass protest or demonstration outside the GSIS for four straight days. We cannot say the same for the 20 or so employees in this case. To equate their wearing of red shirts and going to the GSIS-IU office for just over an hour with that four-day mass action in Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS case and to punish them in the same manner would most certainly be unfair and unjust.

Recent analogous decisions in the United States, while recognizing the government's right as an employer to lay down certain standards of conduct, tend to lean towards a broad definition of "public concern speech" which is protected by their First Amendment. One such case is that of Scott v. Meters [Scott v. Meyers, 191 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1999)]. In said case, the New York Transit Authority (NYTA), responsible for operation of New York City's mass transit service, issued a rule prohibiting employees from wearing badges or buttons on their uniforms. A number of union members wore union buttons promoting their opposition to a collective bargaining agreement. Consequently, the NYTA tried to enforce its rule and threatened to subject these union members to discipline. The court, though recognizing the government's right to impose reasonable restrictions, held that the NYTA's rule was "unconstitutionally overboard."

In another case, Communication Workers of America v. Ector County Hospital District [Communication Workers of America v. Ector County Hospital District, 392 F.3d 733, 176 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2155, 60 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 107 (5th Cir. 2004)], it was held that,

A county hospital employee's wearing of a "Union Yes" lapel pin during a union organization drive constituted speech on a matter of public concern, and the county's proffered interest in enforcing the anti-adornment provision of its dress code was outweighed by the employee's interest in exercising his First Amendment speech and associational rights by wearing a pro-union lapel button. (id.).

Thus, respondents' freedom of speech and of expression remains intact, and CSC's Resolution No. 02-1316 defining what a prohibited concerted activity or mass action has only tempered or regulated these rights. Measured against that definition, respondents' actuations did not amount to a prohibited concerted activity or mass action. The CSC and the CA were both correct in arriving at said conclusion.

x x x."

Explained: life sentence, reclusion perpetua, parole, probation, pardon, amnesty,

See - https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/fast-facts/218269-things-to-know-commonly-confused-legal-terms


"x x x.

Life imprisonment vs reclusion perpetua

Life imprisonment and reclusion perpetua are often treated as interchangeable or a translation of the other, even by trial judges. In 1992, the confusion prompted former Chief Justice Andres Narvasa to issue Administrative Circular No. 6-92 where he clarified that “both are different and distinct penalties.”

The same clarification was emphasized by then-Supreme Court spokesperson Theodore Te when reports used the terms interchangeably after Janet Lim-Napoles was sentenced with reclusion perpetua in 2015.

Reclusion perpetua falls under the list of penalties given for crimes prescribed in the Revised Penal Code. It entails imprisonment of at least 20 years and one day to a maximum of 40 years, after which the convicted would be eligible for parole* unless otherwise specified. (READ: Plunder cases in the Philippines: Was anyone punished?)

Life imprisonment, as the name suggests, does not have a definite duration for imprisonment. It is a sentence given under special law, and does not carry accessory penalties (unlike reclusion perpetua), which include:

Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification
Perpetual or temporary special disqualification
Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the profession or calling
Civil interdiction
Indemnification
Forfeiture or confiscation of instruments and proceeds of the offense; and
Payment of costs

Life imprisonment also does not have any specific provision on the possibility of parole*.

Amnesty vs pardon
In September this year, the revocation of Senator Antonio Trillanes IV’s amnesty as ordered by President Rodrigo Duterte sparked interest in what distinguishes amnesty from pardon. While both administered under the president’s powers, the two have major differences. (READ: TIMELINE: Trillanes, from mutiny to amnesty)

On the one hand, amnesty is a public act by the president that should have the concurrence of Congress, while pardon is "pleaded and proved” privately by the person involved.

Amnesty may be "granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction." Meanwhile, pardon may be granted to a person after conviction. (READ: FAST FACT: Presidential pardons)

Amnesty also "looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself,” while pardon only absolves the convicted of the consequences of the offense. It does not automatically restore one's political rights (unless restored by the terms of pardon) and does not absolve the person from paying civil indemnity.

Parole vs probation

Parole and probation are more related to one another in that they are often seen as “alternatives” to imprisonment. In both cases, people charged are supervised by correction officers, and are required to follow a set of rules – otherwise, the grant will be nullified.

But one significant difference between the two is entitlement. A convict who has been sentenced to less than 6 years imprisonment without recourse to an appeal may apply for probation. On the other hand, parole may be applied for only after a person has served the minimum of the imposed prison sentence (i.e., the lower range of any sentence). For instance, if sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the convict may start applying for parole only after serving 20 years and one day.

Republic Act 4103 or the Indeterminate Sentence Law defines parole as the “conditional release of a prisoner from correctional institution after serving the minimum period of prison sentence.” It acts as temporary liberty, still holding the person under continuous custody of the state.

Probation, on the other hand, is a privilege of remaining in the community instead of going to prison after conviction. Convicted persons under probation are still subject to regulations they have to strictly follow for a certain period.

Probation can be awarded to first-time offenders, while parole is allowed for individuals who have had previous, but no pending, criminal cases. (READ: Philippine detention centers and the price of criminal justice)

In both cases when conditions are violated, the parolee or probationer may face imprisonment and serve the original sentence imposed. 

– with a report from Michael Bueza and Vernise Tantuco/Rappler.com."

Self-defense - Unlawful aggression refers to an assault to attack, or threat in an imminent and immediate manner, which places the defendant’s life in actual peril. Mere threatening or intimidating attitude will not suffice. There must be actual physical force or actual use of weapon.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. BAYANI DE LEON, ANTONIO DE LEON, DANILO DE LEON and YOYONG DE LEON, Accused-Appellants. G.R. No. 197546, March 23, 2015.


"X x x.

Before us is a reversed trial. As one of the accused-appellants, Antonio, pleaded self-defense, he admitted authorship of the crime. At this juncture, the burden of proof is upon the accused-appellants to prove with clear and convincing evidence the elements of self-defense: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the attack; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself, which the defense failed to discharge. [People v. Placer, G.R. No. 181753, 9 October 2013, 707 SCRA 199, 207].

Unlawful Aggression

Unlawful aggression refers to an assault to attack, or threat in an imminent and immediate manner, which places the defendant’s life in actual peril. Mere threatening or intimidating attitude will not suffice. There must be actual physical force or actual use of weapon. [People v. Nugas, G.R. No. 172606, 23 November 2011, 661 SCRA 159, 167-168].

Applying the aforesaid legal precept, Emilio’s act of pulling "something" out from his jacket while he was three (3) to four (4) meters away from accused-appellant Antonio cannot amount to unlawful aggression. Neither can the act of pulling "something" out amount to physical force or actual use of weapon, or even threat or intimidating attitude. Even if accused-appellant Antonio’s account of the incident is truthful, that Emilio had motive to kill accused-appellant Antonio, giving accused-appellant reasonable grounds to believe that his life and limb was in danger, and that the "something" was indeed a "sumpak", it can hardly be recognized as unlawful aggression to justify self-defense. [People v. Bayocot, 256 Phil. 27, 34-35 (1989)]. There is no showing that accused-appellant Antonio’s life was in peril by the act of pulling "something" out. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, "it must be noted that appellant never said that Emilio aimed or pointed the "sumpak" at him or at least made an attempt to shoot him". The threat on accused-appellant Antonio’s life is more imagined than real. As we already held in a catena of cases, the act of pulling "something" out cannot constitute unlawful aggression. [People v. Anies, 203 Phil. 332, 351 (1982)]. Accused-appellant Antonio cannot allege that it was Emilio who instigated the incident; that Emilio’s fate was brought about by his own actuations. There is no sufficient provocation, nay, provocation at all in the act of pulling "something" out.

X x x."

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Read also:

1] Guevarra, et al. v. People, 726 Phil. 183, 194 (2014); People v. Fontanilla, 680 Phil. 155, 165 (2012).

[2] Dela Cruz v. People, et al., 747 Phil. 176, 384-385 (2014).

[3] Oriente v. People, 542 Phil. 335, 347 (2007).

[4] People v. Enrique Reyes (G.R. No. 224498, January 11, 2018).

[5] People v. Enrique Reyes (G.R. No. 224498, January 11, 2018).

[6] People v. Enrique Reyes (G.R. No. 224498, January 11, 2018).

REDUCED BAIL, RECOGNIZANCE DURING CORONA VIRUS QUARANTINE PERIOD.

ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 38 – 2020, April 30, 2020.
REDUCED BAIL, RECOGNIZANCE DURING CORONA VIRUS QUARANTINE PERIOD.


"In view of the foregoing, and upon consultation with the Members of the

Court, considering the urgent need to further decongest our detention facilities,

especially during this time of public health emergency, to promote social and

restorative justice, bail and recognizance for indigent Persons Deprived of

Liberty (PDLs) shall be granted as follows, pending the continuation of the

criminal proceedings and resolution of cases against them:



1. For those charged with a crime punishable with the maximum period

of reclusion temporal or twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years,

the bail shall be computed by getting the medium period multiplied by Three

Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) for every year of imprisonment;



2. For those charged with a crime punishable with the maximum period

of prision mayor or six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, the bail

shall be computed by getting the medium period multiplied by Two Thousand

Pesos (P2,000.00) for every year of imprisonment;



3. For those charged with a crime punishable with the maximum period

of prision correccional or six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, the

bail shall be computed by getting the medium period multiplied by One

Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) for every year of imprisonment;



4. For those charged with a crime punishable by arresto mayor or one (1)

month and one (1) day to six (6) months, and arresto menor or one (1) day to

thirty (30) days, they may be released on their own recognizance;


Any violation of the undertaking or conditions imposed on the bail or

recognizance shall be a ground for the cancellation of the said bail or

recognizance which will justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the

accused."

Perjury; venue - Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code

"X x x. To reiterate for the guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury committed through the making of a false affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When the crime is committed through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement is submitted, venue may either be at the place where the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the oath and the submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases, determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the crime committed.

X x x."

UNION BANK OF THE, PHILIPPINES and DESI TOMAS, Petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. EN BANC, G.R. No. 192565, February 28, 2012.

Execution - Effect of reversal of executed judgment. – Where the executed judgment is reversed totally or partially, or annulled, on appeal or otherwise, the trial court may, on motion, issue such orders of restitution or reparation of damages as equity and justice may warrant under the circumstances.

SPS. DAVID ESERJOSE and ZENAIDA ESERJOSE, Petitioners, vs. ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION and PACITA UY, Respondents. G.R. No. 180105, April 23, 2014.


“x x x.

This case is about the effect of a reduction in the course of appeal of the judgment amount after the execution sale of the defendant's properties to satisfy the trial court's judgment had already taken place.

X x x.

Contrary to the Eserjoses’ argument, the CA did not alter the RTC Decision of January 31, 2003 in their favor as modified by this Court’s Resolution of March 19, 2005. Notably, neither the RTC nor this Court awarded legal interest on the amounts due. Consequently, the RTC exceeded its jurisdiction when, in executing the judgment, it added interest on the damages it awarded, raising the total award to over P5,000,000.00. The Eserjoses are entitled to only P4,000,000.00 in damages and P50,000.00 in attorney’s fees.

When this Court substantially reduced the amounts of damages that the RTC awarded the Eserjoses, it in effect partially reversed the executed judgment issued in the case. Section 5, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure applies to such a situation. It provides:

SEC. 5. Effect of reversal of executed judgment. – Where the executed judgment is reversed totally or partially, or annulled, on appeal or otherwise, the trial court may, on motion, issue such orders of restitution or reparation of damages as equity and justice may warrant under the circumstances.

Here, the RTC executed on a judgment debt of P8,050,000 when what was later determined to be due was only P4,050,000. Clearly, the trial court had the discretion to order restitution and reparation of damages. Its exercise of that discretion must, however, be fair to all the parties concerned.

The CA was right in holding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in not allowing for the restitution of the properties improperly auctioned for substantially wrong amounts considering that the registration of titles in the names of the Eserjoses and the turnover of possession of such properties to them had not yet taken place. There is no legal impediment to ABC and Uy being allowed to pay the judgment debt in cash, the preferred mode of satisfaction of money judgment.

X x x.”