Tuesday, June 9, 2020
Free speech, free press, freedom of assembly - "The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled. Attempted terrorization of public opinion on the part of the judiciary would be tyranny of the basest sort. "
See - https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1918/mar1918/gr_l-12592_1918.html
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12592
March 8, 1918
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FELIPE BUSTOS, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
"x x x.
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Completely liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and the dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course, criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as the individual is less than the State, so must expected criticism be born for the common good. Rising superior to any official or set of officials, to the Chief of Executive, to the Legislature, to the Judiciary — to any or all the agencies of Government — public opinion should be the constant source of liberty and democracy. (See the well considered cases of Wason vs. Walter, 4 L. R. 4 Q. B., 73; Seymour vs. Butterworth, 3F. and F., 372; The Queen vs. Sir R. Carden, 5 Q. B. D., 1)
The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled. Attempted terrorization of public opinion on the part of the judiciary would be tyranny of the basest sort. The sword of Damocles in the hands of a judge does not hang suspended over the individual who dares to assert his prerogative as a citizen and to stand up bravely before any official. On the contrary, it is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them. In the words of Mr. Justice Gayner, who contributed so largely to the law of libel. "The people are not obliged to speak of the conduct of their officials in whispers or with bated breath in a free government, but only in a despotism." (Howarth vs. Barlow [1906], 113 App. Div., N. Y., 510.)
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the complement of the part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the charges made.
Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege.
The doctrine of privileged communications rests upon public policy, 'which looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice, though, as an incidental result, it may in some instances afford an immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer.' (Abbott vs. National Bank of Commerce, Tacoma [1899], 175 U. S., 409, 411.)
Privilege is classified as either absolute or qualified. With the first, we are not concerned. As to qualified privilege, it is as the words suggest a prima facie privilege which may be lost by proof of malice. The rule is thus stated by Lord Campbell, C. J.
A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contained criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable. (Harrison vs. Bush, 5 E. and B., 344; 1 Jur.[N. S.], 846; 25 L. J. Q. B., 25; 3 W. R., 474; 85 E. C. L., 344.)
A pertinent illustration of the application of qualified privilege is a complaint made in good faith and without malice in regard to the character or conduct of a public official when addressed to an officer or a board having some interest or duty in the matter. Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual. But the statements must be made under an honest sense of duty; a self-seeking motive is destructive. Personal injury is not necessary. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. The privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the communication is made in intemperate terms. A further element of the law of privilege concerns the person to whom the complaint should be made. The rule is that if a party applies to the wrong person through some natural and honest mistake as to the respective functions of various officials such unintentional error will not take the case out of the privilege.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroy that presumption. The onus of proving malice then lies on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct. Falsehood and the absence of probable cause will amount to proof of malice. (See White vs. Nicholls [1845], 3 How., 266.)
A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged communications. The ultimate test is that of bona fides. (See White vs. Nicholls [1845], 3 How., 266; Bradley vs. Heath [1831], 12 Pick. [Mass.], 163; Kent vs. Bongartz [1885], 15 R. I., 72; Street Foundations of Legal Liability, vol. 1, pp. 308, 309; Newell, Slander and Libel, various citations; 25 Cyc. pages 385 et seq.)
Having ascertained the attitude which should be assumed relative to the basic rights of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition, having emphasized the point that our Libel Law as a statute must be construed with reference to the guaranties of our Organic Law, and having sketched the doctrine of privilege, we are in a position to test the facts of this case with these principles.
It is true that the particular words set out in the information, if said of a private person, might well be considered libelous per se. The charges might also under certain conceivable conditions convict one of a libel of a government official. As a general rule words imputing to a judge or a justice of the peace dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or misconduct touching him in his office are actionable. But as suggested in the beginning we do not have present a simple case of direct and vicious accusations published in the press, but of charges predicated on affidavits made to the proper official and thus qualifiedly privileged. Express malice has not been proved by the prosecution. Further, although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens— to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be venal — were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege. These respectable citizens did not eagerly seize on a frivolous matter but on instances which not only seemed to them of a grave character, but which were sufficient in an investigation by a judge of first instance to convince him of their seriousness. No undue publicity was given to the petition. The manner of commenting on the conduct of the justice of the peace was proper. And finally the charges and the petition were submitted through reputable attorneys to the proper functionary, the Executive Secretary. In this connection it is sufficient to note that justices of the peace are appointed by the Governor-General, that they may be removed by the Governor-General upon the recommendation of a Judge of First Instance, or on the Governor-General's own motion, and that at the time this action took place the Executive Bureau was the office through which the Governor-General acted in such matter. (See Administrative Code of 1917, secs. 203 and 229, in connection with the cases of U. S. vs. Galesa [1915], 31 Phil., 365, and of Harrison vs. Bush, 5 E. and B., 344, holding that where defendant was subject to removal by the sovereign, a communication to the Secretary of State was privileged.)
The present facts are further essentially different from those established in other cases in which private individuals have been convicted of libels of public officials. Malice, traduction, falsehood, calumny, against the man and not the officer, have been the causes of the verdict of guilty. (See U. S. vs. Senado [1909], 14 Phil., 338, 339; U. S. vs. Contreras [1912], 23 Phil., 513; U. S. vs. Montalvo [1915], 29 Phil., 595.)
The Attorney-General bases his recommendation for confirmation on the case of the United States vs. Julio Bustos ([1909], 13 Phil., 690). The Julio Bustos case, the Attorney-General says, is identical with the Felipe Bustos case, with the exception that there has been more publicity in the present instance and that the person to whom the charge was made had less jurisdiction than had the Secretary of Justice in the Julio Bustos case. Publicity is immaterial if the charge against Punsalan is in fact a privileged communication. Moreover, in the Julio Bustos case we find wild statements, with no basis in fact, made against reputable members of the judiciary, "to persons who could not furnish protection." Malicious and untrue communications are not privileged. A later case and one more directly in point to which we invite especial attention is United States vs. Galeza ([1915], 31 Phil., 365). (Note also Yancey vs. Commonwealth [1909], 122 So. W., 123.)
We find the defendants and appellants entitled to the protection of the rules concerning qualified privilege, growing out of constitutional guaranties in our bill of rights. Instead of punishing citizens for an honest endeavor to improve the public service, we should rather commend them for their good citizenship. The defendants and appellants are acquitted with the costs de officio. So ordered.
x x x."
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FELIPE BUSTOS, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
"x x x.
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Completely liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and the dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course, criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as the individual is less than the State, so must expected criticism be born for the common good. Rising superior to any official or set of officials, to the Chief of Executive, to the Legislature, to the Judiciary — to any or all the agencies of Government — public opinion should be the constant source of liberty and democracy. (See the well considered cases of Wason vs. Walter, 4 L. R. 4 Q. B., 73; Seymour vs. Butterworth, 3F. and F., 372; The Queen vs. Sir R. Carden, 5 Q. B. D., 1)
The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled. Attempted terrorization of public opinion on the part of the judiciary would be tyranny of the basest sort. The sword of Damocles in the hands of a judge does not hang suspended over the individual who dares to assert his prerogative as a citizen and to stand up bravely before any official. On the contrary, it is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them. In the words of Mr. Justice Gayner, who contributed so largely to the law of libel. "The people are not obliged to speak of the conduct of their officials in whispers or with bated breath in a free government, but only in a despotism." (Howarth vs. Barlow [1906], 113 App. Div., N. Y., 510.)
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the complement of the part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the charges made.
Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege.
The doctrine of privileged communications rests upon public policy, 'which looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice, though, as an incidental result, it may in some instances afford an immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer.' (Abbott vs. National Bank of Commerce, Tacoma [1899], 175 U. S., 409, 411.)
Privilege is classified as either absolute or qualified. With the first, we are not concerned. As to qualified privilege, it is as the words suggest a prima facie privilege which may be lost by proof of malice. The rule is thus stated by Lord Campbell, C. J.
A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contained criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable. (Harrison vs. Bush, 5 E. and B., 344; 1 Jur.[N. S.], 846; 25 L. J. Q. B., 25; 3 W. R., 474; 85 E. C. L., 344.)
A pertinent illustration of the application of qualified privilege is a complaint made in good faith and without malice in regard to the character or conduct of a public official when addressed to an officer or a board having some interest or duty in the matter. Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual. But the statements must be made under an honest sense of duty; a self-seeking motive is destructive. Personal injury is not necessary. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. The privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the communication is made in intemperate terms. A further element of the law of privilege concerns the person to whom the complaint should be made. The rule is that if a party applies to the wrong person through some natural and honest mistake as to the respective functions of various officials such unintentional error will not take the case out of the privilege.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroy that presumption. The onus of proving malice then lies on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct. Falsehood and the absence of probable cause will amount to proof of malice. (See White vs. Nicholls [1845], 3 How., 266.)
A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged communications. The ultimate test is that of bona fides. (See White vs. Nicholls [1845], 3 How., 266; Bradley vs. Heath [1831], 12 Pick. [Mass.], 163; Kent vs. Bongartz [1885], 15 R. I., 72; Street Foundations of Legal Liability, vol. 1, pp. 308, 309; Newell, Slander and Libel, various citations; 25 Cyc. pages 385 et seq.)
Having ascertained the attitude which should be assumed relative to the basic rights of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition, having emphasized the point that our Libel Law as a statute must be construed with reference to the guaranties of our Organic Law, and having sketched the doctrine of privilege, we are in a position to test the facts of this case with these principles.
It is true that the particular words set out in the information, if said of a private person, might well be considered libelous per se. The charges might also under certain conceivable conditions convict one of a libel of a government official. As a general rule words imputing to a judge or a justice of the peace dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or misconduct touching him in his office are actionable. But as suggested in the beginning we do not have present a simple case of direct and vicious accusations published in the press, but of charges predicated on affidavits made to the proper official and thus qualifiedly privileged. Express malice has not been proved by the prosecution. Further, although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens— to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be venal — were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege. These respectable citizens did not eagerly seize on a frivolous matter but on instances which not only seemed to them of a grave character, but which were sufficient in an investigation by a judge of first instance to convince him of their seriousness. No undue publicity was given to the petition. The manner of commenting on the conduct of the justice of the peace was proper. And finally the charges and the petition were submitted through reputable attorneys to the proper functionary, the Executive Secretary. In this connection it is sufficient to note that justices of the peace are appointed by the Governor-General, that they may be removed by the Governor-General upon the recommendation of a Judge of First Instance, or on the Governor-General's own motion, and that at the time this action took place the Executive Bureau was the office through which the Governor-General acted in such matter. (See Administrative Code of 1917, secs. 203 and 229, in connection with the cases of U. S. vs. Galesa [1915], 31 Phil., 365, and of Harrison vs. Bush, 5 E. and B., 344, holding that where defendant was subject to removal by the sovereign, a communication to the Secretary of State was privileged.)
The present facts are further essentially different from those established in other cases in which private individuals have been convicted of libels of public officials. Malice, traduction, falsehood, calumny, against the man and not the officer, have been the causes of the verdict of guilty. (See U. S. vs. Senado [1909], 14 Phil., 338, 339; U. S. vs. Contreras [1912], 23 Phil., 513; U. S. vs. Montalvo [1915], 29 Phil., 595.)
The Attorney-General bases his recommendation for confirmation on the case of the United States vs. Julio Bustos ([1909], 13 Phil., 690). The Julio Bustos case, the Attorney-General says, is identical with the Felipe Bustos case, with the exception that there has been more publicity in the present instance and that the person to whom the charge was made had less jurisdiction than had the Secretary of Justice in the Julio Bustos case. Publicity is immaterial if the charge against Punsalan is in fact a privileged communication. Moreover, in the Julio Bustos case we find wild statements, with no basis in fact, made against reputable members of the judiciary, "to persons who could not furnish protection." Malicious and untrue communications are not privileged. A later case and one more directly in point to which we invite especial attention is United States vs. Galeza ([1915], 31 Phil., 365). (Note also Yancey vs. Commonwealth [1909], 122 So. W., 123.)
We find the defendants and appellants entitled to the protection of the rules concerning qualified privilege, growing out of constitutional guaranties in our bill of rights. Instead of punishing citizens for an honest endeavor to improve the public service, we should rather commend them for their good citizenship. The defendants and appellants are acquitted with the costs de officio. So ordered.
x x x."
Public officials. - "A public official, more especially an elected one, should not be onion skinned. Strict personal discipline is expected of an occupant of a public office because a public official is a property of the public. He is looked upon to set the example how public officials should correctly conduct themselves even in the face of extreme provocation. Always he is expected to act and serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain accountable for his conduct to the people."
See - https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/jun1994/gr_111304_1994.html
EN BANC
G.R. No. 111304 June 17, 1994
NEMESIO ARTURO S. YABUT and RICARDO M. TAMARGO, petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and DR. PAUL DORAN, respondents.
"x x x.
The incident of 16 February 1993 was most unfortunate. The attendant circumstances, it might be said, could have well caused tempers to rise and patience to break; nevertheless, they served no excuse for the mauling and shooting incidents that followed. While we certainly would not condone the act of provocation made by Doran, which in the words of petitioners was no less than "an act of spite, degradation and mockery," it did not, however, justify an equally abhorrent reaction from them. Petitioners were public officers; Doran was not. We second the Solicitor General in this observation:
A public official, more especially an elected one, should not be onion skinned. Strict personal discipline is expected of an occupant of a public office because a public official is a property of the public. He is looked upon to set the example how public officials should correctly conduct themselves even in the face of extreme provocation. Always he is expected to act and serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain accountable for his conduct to the people.
x x x."
On putang ina mo. - "The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of the words, "Agustin, putang ina mo". This is a common enough expression in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a mother. In the instant case, it should be viewed as part of the threats voiced by appellant against Agustin Hallare, evidently to make the same more emphatic."
See - https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1969/mar1969/gr_l-21528-29_1969.html
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-21528 and L-21529
March 28, 1969
ROSAURO REYES, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
"x x x.
The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of the words, "Agustin, putang ina mo". This is a common enough expression in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a mother. In the instant case, it should be viewed as part of the threats voiced by appellant against Agustin Hallare, evidently to make the same more emphatic. In the case of Yebra, G.R. No. L-14348, Sept. 30, 1960, this Court said:
The letter containing the allegedly libelous remarks is more threatening than libelous and the intent to threaten is the principal aim and object to the letter. The libelous remarks contained in the letter, if so they be considered, are merely preparatory remarks culminating in the final threat. In other words, the libelous remarks express the beat of passion which engulfs the writer of the letter, which heat of passion in the latter part of the letter culminates into a threat. This is the more important and serious offense committed by the accused. Under the circumstances the Court believes, after the study of the whole letter, that the offense committed therein is clearly and principally that of threats and that the statements therein derogatory to the person named do not constitute an independent crime of libel, for which the writer maybe prosecuted separately from the threats and which should be considered as part of the more important offense of threats.
x x x."
ROSAURO REYES, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
"x x x.
The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of the words, "Agustin, putang ina mo". This is a common enough expression in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a mother. In the instant case, it should be viewed as part of the threats voiced by appellant against Agustin Hallare, evidently to make the same more emphatic. In the case of Yebra, G.R. No. L-14348, Sept. 30, 1960, this Court said:
The letter containing the allegedly libelous remarks is more threatening than libelous and the intent to threaten is the principal aim and object to the letter. The libelous remarks contained in the letter, if so they be considered, are merely preparatory remarks culminating in the final threat. In other words, the libelous remarks express the beat of passion which engulfs the writer of the letter, which heat of passion in the latter part of the letter culminates into a threat. This is the more important and serious offense committed by the accused. Under the circumstances the Court believes, after the study of the whole letter, that the offense committed therein is clearly and principally that of threats and that the statements therein derogatory to the person named do not constitute an independent crime of libel, for which the writer maybe prosecuted separately from the threats and which should be considered as part of the more important offense of threats.
x x x."
When "putang ina mo" is righteous anger.
When "putang ina mo" is righteous anger.
"The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of the words, "Agustin, putang ina mo". This is a common enough expression in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a mother. xxx."
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-21528 and L-21529 March 28, 1969
ROSAURO REYES, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
"The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of the words, "Agustin, putang ina mo". This is a common enough expression in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a mother. xxx."
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-21528 and L-21529 March 28, 1969
ROSAURO REYES, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
The fruit of the poisonous interview - rappler.com
See - https://www.rappler.com/thought-leaders/261095-fruit-of-the-poisonous-interview-ronnel-mas?utm_medium=Social&utm_campaign=Echobox&utm_source=Facebook&fbclid=IwAR0AvBsScdgP_vOs7heTtXEfhG4fGJY9ErkkbdF2pEdFCGZhDfLPy52zWHE#Echobox=1589615718
"The fruit of the poisonous interview
In 3 cases, the Supreme Court has ruled on the admissibility of uncounseled media interviews of suspects. The Court applied the general principle that the protection of the Bill of Rights does not cover relations between private individuals, as it governs the relations between a private individual and the State[1]. For this reason, the constitutional guarantee of protection to suspects during custodial investigations contained in Article III, sec. 12 [2] in relation to Article III, sec. 17 [3] cannot be invoked against acts of private individuals.
In People v. Andan [4], the Court ruled that:
"...(V)erbal confessions to...newsmen (sic) are not covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents.”
The Court would repeat this ruling in People v. Domantay[5]. The Andan and Domantay confessions were held to be admissible primarily because the Court appreciated the atmosphere to be free of coercion. But the Andan ruling itself is not without limitations.
The ponente of Domantay himself would later clarify in People v. Morada [6] that the Andan ruling “does not…authorize the police to obtain confessions they cannot otherwise obtain through media reporters who are actually acting for the police.” The Court in Domantay reminded that the Andan ruling is qualified by the following factors: (a) freedom from undue influence from police; (b) media were acting as media, not as agents of law enforcement under the direction and control of the latter; (c) media did not force the suspect to grant an interview.
These rulings must be weighed against the 54-year-old chestnut called Miranda v. Arizona [7], where the US Supreme Court set forth what is now called the "Miranda Warnings." The extensive discussion of custodial investigation and the inherently coercive atmosphere of the environment at the police station are instructive. The coercive atmosphere per se was key to SCOTUS' formulation of the warnings as a preemptive measure to precisely such confessions. In the words of the Supreme Court of the United States in Miranda.
“From these representative samples of interrogation techniques, the setting prescribed by the manuals and observed in practice becomes clear. In essence, it is this: To be alone with the subject is essential to prevent distraction and to deprive him of any outside support. The aura of confidence in his guilt undermines his will to resist. He merely confirms the preconceived story the police seek to have him describe. Patience and persistence, at times relentless questioning are employed. To obtain a confession, the interrogator must “patiently maneuver himself or his quarry into position from which the desired objective may be attained.” When normal procedures fail to produce the needed result, the police may resort to deceptive stratagems such as giving false legal advise. It is important to keep the subject off balance by trading on his insecurity about himself or his surroundings. ***Even without employing brutality, the “third degree” or the specific stratagems described above, the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals.” [8]
“…In each of these cases (Miranda, et al.), the defendant was thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and run through menacing police interrogation procedures. [9] ***It isobvious that such an interrogation environment is created for no purpose other than to subjugate the will of the individual to the will of his examiner.” [10]
The environment of the in-precinct custodial investigation was clearly the basis for what would later become famous as the “Miranda warnings.”
It is that environment that was considered in Morada when the Court did not allow the uncounseled extrajudicial confession because it did not appear to be voluntary. The Court, in Morada, reminded that Andan was not license for “the police to obtain confessions they cannot otherwise obtain through media reporters who are actually acting for the police.”
The DOJ’s invocation of Mr Ras’ admission as the basis for the charge it recommended to be filed brings to the fore a dilemma for media covering the “presentation of suspects” (in American slang, a “perp walk”) – a practice that itself ought to be stopped.
With the knowledge that law enforcement cannot legally question a suspect without affording the rights to counsel, a “perp walk” might be a strategy to obtain an extrajudicial confession without counsel, which law enforcement would otherwise not be able to obtain – which the Court in Morada warned about.
Dangerous syllogism
This being said, the alleged "voluntariness" and consequent admissibility of an uncounselled extrajudicial admission to media while captive have no effect on a clearly unwarranted warrantless arrest.
Such an admission cannot "cure" a defective warrantless arrest.
This language tracks the thinking of the Court in the Marcos-vintage Ilagan v. Ponce Enrile, where the Court considered a petition for habeas corpus for the three lawyers detained by virtue of an executive warrant of arrest mooted because of the issuance by a court of a warrant of arrest. The “curative” nature of the warrant of arrest in Ilagan was in relation to the legality of the detention being questioned by the habeas corpus petition because Rule 102, sec. 4 expressly provided that a detention by reason of a judicial order is beyond the purview of habeas corpus.
In Mr Mas’s case. the arrest remains defective and cannot be cured by an admission. This syllogism is dangerous not only because it islegally a non sequitur but also because it effectively clears the arresting officers of liability because of the supposedly curative nature of the uncounseled extrajudicial confession.
Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code makes any public officer who, without legal grounds, detains a person criminally liable. The penalties imposable vary in duration depending on the length of detention of the person illegally arrested.
Notably, the finding of the prosecutor that the arrest was unreasonable for lack of grounds under Rule 113, section 5 may be considered a violation of the suspect’s constitutional rights under Article III, section 2 – where an arrest is considered presumptively unreasonable unless done with a warrant. The Supreme Court has ruled, in Gumabon v. Director of Prisonsand other subsequent cases, that "(o)nce a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction."
Perhaps, the DOJ ought not to have proceeded further at inquest than the unwarranted warrantless arrest. – Rappler.com
[1] People v. Marti, G.R. No. 81561. January 18, 1991.
[2] Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
In 3 cases, the Supreme Court has ruled on the admissibility of uncounseled media interviews of suspects. The Court applied the general principle that the protection of the Bill of Rights does not cover relations between private individuals, as it governs the relations between a private individual and the State[1]. For this reason, the constitutional guarantee of protection to suspects during custodial investigations contained in Article III, sec. 12 [2] in relation to Article III, sec. 17 [3] cannot be invoked against acts of private individuals.
In People v. Andan [4], the Court ruled that:
"...(V)erbal confessions to...newsmen (sic) are not covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents.”
The Court would repeat this ruling in People v. Domantay[5]. The Andan and Domantay confessions were held to be admissible primarily because the Court appreciated the atmosphere to be free of coercion. But the Andan ruling itself is not without limitations.
The ponente of Domantay himself would later clarify in People v. Morada [6] that the Andan ruling “does not…authorize the police to obtain confessions they cannot otherwise obtain through media reporters who are actually acting for the police.” The Court in Domantay reminded that the Andan ruling is qualified by the following factors: (a) freedom from undue influence from police; (b) media were acting as media, not as agents of law enforcement under the direction and control of the latter; (c) media did not force the suspect to grant an interview.
These rulings must be weighed against the 54-year-old chestnut called Miranda v. Arizona [7], where the US Supreme Court set forth what is now called the "Miranda Warnings." The extensive discussion of custodial investigation and the inherently coercive atmosphere of the environment at the police station are instructive. The coercive atmosphere per se was key to SCOTUS' formulation of the warnings as a preemptive measure to precisely such confessions. In the words of the Supreme Court of the United States in Miranda.
“From these representative samples of interrogation techniques, the setting prescribed by the manuals and observed in practice becomes clear. In essence, it is this: To be alone with the subject is essential to prevent distraction and to deprive him of any outside support. The aura of confidence in his guilt undermines his will to resist. He merely confirms the preconceived story the police seek to have him describe. Patience and persistence, at times relentless questioning are employed. To obtain a confession, the interrogator must “patiently maneuver himself or his quarry into position from which the desired objective may be attained.” When normal procedures fail to produce the needed result, the police may resort to deceptive stratagems such as giving false legal advise. It is important to keep the subject off balance by trading on his insecurity about himself or his surroundings. ***Even without employing brutality, the “third degree” or the specific stratagems described above, the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals.” [8]
“…In each of these cases (Miranda, et al.), the defendant was thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and run through menacing police interrogation procedures. [9] ***It isobvious that such an interrogation environment is created for no purpose other than to subjugate the will of the individual to the will of his examiner.” [10]
The environment of the in-precinct custodial investigation was clearly the basis for what would later become famous as the “Miranda warnings.”
It is that environment that was considered in Morada when the Court did not allow the uncounseled extrajudicial confession because it did not appear to be voluntary. The Court, in Morada, reminded that Andan was not license for “the police to obtain confessions they cannot otherwise obtain through media reporters who are actually acting for the police.”
The DOJ’s invocation of Mr Ras’ admission as the basis for the charge it recommended to be filed brings to the fore a dilemma for media covering the “presentation of suspects” (in American slang, a “perp walk”) – a practice that itself ought to be stopped.
With the knowledge that law enforcement cannot legally question a suspect without affording the rights to counsel, a “perp walk” might be a strategy to obtain an extrajudicial confession without counsel, which law enforcement would otherwise not be able to obtain – which the Court in Morada warned about.
Dangerous syllogism
This being said, the alleged "voluntariness" and consequent admissibility of an uncounselled extrajudicial admission to media while captive have no effect on a clearly unwarranted warrantless arrest.
Such an admission cannot "cure" a defective warrantless arrest.
This language tracks the thinking of the Court in the Marcos-vintage Ilagan v. Ponce Enrile, where the Court considered a petition for habeas corpus for the three lawyers detained by virtue of an executive warrant of arrest mooted because of the issuance by a court of a warrant of arrest. The “curative” nature of the warrant of arrest in Ilagan was in relation to the legality of the detention being questioned by the habeas corpus petition because Rule 102, sec. 4 expressly provided that a detention by reason of a judicial order is beyond the purview of habeas corpus.
In Mr Mas’s case. the arrest remains defective and cannot be cured by an admission. This syllogism is dangerous not only because it islegally a non sequitur but also because it effectively clears the arresting officers of liability because of the supposedly curative nature of the uncounseled extrajudicial confession.
Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code makes any public officer who, without legal grounds, detains a person criminally liable. The penalties imposable vary in duration depending on the length of detention of the person illegally arrested.
Notably, the finding of the prosecutor that the arrest was unreasonable for lack of grounds under Rule 113, section 5 may be considered a violation of the suspect’s constitutional rights under Article III, section 2 – where an arrest is considered presumptively unreasonable unless done with a warrant. The Supreme Court has ruled, in Gumabon v. Director of Prisonsand other subsequent cases, that "(o)nce a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction."
Perhaps, the DOJ ought not to have proceeded further at inquest than the unwarranted warrantless arrest. – Rappler.com
[1] People v. Marti, G.R. No. 81561. January 18, 1991.
[2] Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
[3] Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
[4] G.R. No. 116437, March 3, 1997.
[5] G.R. No. 130612. May 11, 1999.
[6] G.R. No. 129723, May 19, 1999.
[7] 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
[8] 384 U.S. at 455.
[9] Id. at 457.
[4] G.R. No. 116437, March 3, 1997.
[5] G.R. No. 130612. May 11, 1999.
[6] G.R. No. 129723, May 19, 1999.
[7] 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
[8] 384 U.S. at 455.
[9] Id. at 457.
Does an "ADMISSION OF A FACT" (AS DISTINGUISHED FROM A "CONFESSION OF GUILT") during a media interview CURE THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECT OF A WARRANTLESS ARREST of a suspect?
Does an "ADMISSION OF A FACT" (AS DISTINGUISHED FROM A "CONFESSION OF GUILT") during a media interview CURE THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECT OF A WARRANTLESS ARREST of a suspect?
The DOJ investigating fiscal answers in the affirmative but she did not cite any relevant jurisprudence that directly supports her theory.
Meanwhile, the suspect has to undergo the rigors, pain, trauma and expense of full-blown criminal litigation and appeals.
"Opinion (Atty. Theodor Te via Rappler):
"The fruit of the poisonous interview
In 3 cases, the Supreme Court has ruled on the admissibility of uncounseled media interviews of suspects. The Court applied the general principle that the protection of the Bill of Rights does not cover relations between private individuals, as it governs the relations between a private individual and the State[1]. For this reason, the constitutional guarantee of protection to suspects during custodial investigations contained in Article III, sec. 12 [2] in relation to Article III, sec. 17 [3] cannot be invoked against acts of private individuals.
In People v. Andan [4], the Court ruled that:
"...(V)erbal confessions to...newsmen (sic) are not covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents.”
The Court would repeat this ruling in People v. Domantay[5]. The Andan and Domantay confessions were held to be admissible primarily because the Court appreciated the atmosphere to be free of coercion. But the Andan ruling itself is not without limitations.
The ponente of Domantay himself would later clarify in People v. Morada [6] that the Andan ruling “does not…authorize the police to obtain confessions they cannot otherwise obtain through media reporters who are actually acting for the police.” The Court in Domantay reminded that the Andan ruling is qualified by the following factors: (a) freedom from undue influence from police; (b) media were acting as media, not as agents of law enforcement under the direction and control of the latter; (c) media did not force the suspect to grant an interview.
These rulings must be weighed against the 54-year-old chestnut called Miranda v. Arizona [7], where the US Supreme Court set forth what is now called the "Miranda Warnings." The extensive discussion of custodial investigation and the inherently coercive atmosphere of the environment at the police station are instructive. The coercive atmosphere per se was key to SCOTUS' formulation of the warnings as a preemptive measure to precisely such confessions. In the words of the Supreme Court of the United States in Miranda.
“From these representative samples of interrogation techniques, the setting prescribed by the manuals and observed in practice becomes clear. In essence, it is this: To be alone with the subject is essential to prevent distraction and to deprive him of any outside support. The aura of confidence in his guilt undermines his will to resist. He merely confirms the preconceived story the police seek to have him describe. Patience and persistence, at times relentless questioning are employed. To obtain a confession, the interrogator must “patiently maneuver himself or his quarry into position from which the desired objective may be attained.” When normal procedures fail to produce the needed result, the police may resort to deceptive stratagems such as giving false legal advise. It is important to keep the subject off balance by trading on his insecurity about himself or his surroundings. ***Even without employing brutality, the “third degree” or the specific stratagems described above, the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals.” [8]
“…In each of these cases (Miranda, et al.), the defendant was thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and run through menacing police interrogation procedures. [9] ***It isobvious that such an interrogation environment is created for no purpose other than to subjugate the will of the individual to the will of his examiner.” [10]
The environment of the in-precinct custodial investigation was clearly the basis for what would later become famous as the “Miranda warnings.”
It is that environment that was considered in Morada when the Court did not allow the uncounseled extrajudicial confession because it did not appear to be voluntary. The Court, in Morada, reminded that Andan was not license for “the police to obtain confessions they cannot otherwise obtain through media reporters who are actually acting for the police.”
The DOJ’s invocation of Mr Ras’ admission as the basis for the charge it recommended to be filed brings to the fore a dilemma for media covering the “presentation of suspects” (in American slang, a “perp walk”) – a practice that itself ought to be stopped.
With the knowledge that law enforcement cannot legally question a suspect without affording the rights to counsel, a “perp walk” might be a strategy to obtain an extrajudicial confession without counsel, which law enforcement would otherwise not be able to obtain – which the Court in Morada warned about.
Dangerous syllogism
This being said, the alleged "voluntariness" and consequent admissibility of an uncounselled extrajudicial admission to media while captive have no effect on a clearly unwarranted warrantless arrest.
Such an admission cannot "cure" a defective warrantless arrest.
This language tracks the thinking of the Court in the Marcos-vintage Ilagan v. Ponce Enrile, where the Court considered a petition for habeas corpus for the three lawyers detained by virtue of an executive warrant of arrest mooted because of the issuance by a court of a warrant of arrest. The “curative” nature of the warrant of arrest in Ilagan was in relation to the legality of the detention being questioned by the habeas corpus petition because Rule 102, sec. 4 expressly provided that a detention by reason of a judicial order is beyond the purview of habeas corpus.
In Mr Mas’s case. the arrest remains defective and cannot be cured by an admission. This syllogism is dangerous not only because it islegally a non sequitur but also because it effectively clears the arresting officers of liability because of the supposedly curative nature of the uncounseled extrajudicial confession.
Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code makes any public officer who, without legal grounds, detains a person criminally liable. The penalties imposable vary in duration depending on the length of detention of the person illegally arrested.
Notably, the finding of the prosecutor that the arrest was unreasonable for lack of grounds under Rule 113, section 5 may be considered a violation of the suspect’s constitutional rights under Article III, section 2 – where an arrest is considered presumptively unreasonable unless done with a warrant. The Supreme Court has ruled, in Gumabon v. Director of Prisonsand other subsequent cases, that "(o)nce a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction."
Perhaps, the DOJ ought not to have proceeded further at inquest than the unwarranted warrantless arrest.
– Rappler.com."
[1] People v. Marti, G.R. No. 81561. January 18, 1991.
[2] Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
[3] Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
[4] G.R. No. 116437, March 3, 1997.
[5] G.R. No. 130612. May 11, 1999.
[6] G.R. No. 129723, May 19, 1999.
[7] 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
[8] 384 U.S. at 455.
[9] Id. at 457."
Source:
Extrajudicial confession given by accused to barangay captain was inadmissible. - "Clearly, appellant's confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue influence from the police authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters when they reported when they interviewed appellant. They were not acting under the direction and control of the police. They were to check appellant's confession to the mayor. They did not force appellant to grant them an interview and reenact the commission of the crime. In fact, they asked his permission before interviewing him . . . . 27 In the case at bar, it is doubtful whether, as Manimbao claimed, accused-appellant's confession was given divorced from the police interrogation. In his testimony, SPO3 Gomez stated: We conducted [oral] interrogation to the suspect. During our [oral] interrogation with the help of Bgy. Captain [Edgardo Manimbao], the suspect admitted to us that he's the one who hacked Jonalyn Navidad. Although we do not reduced [sic] it into writing because of the absen[ce] of [a] lawyer. 28."
See - https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1999/may1999/gr_129723_1999.html
G.R. No. 129723 May 19, 1999, En Banc.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANILO MORADA y TUMLOD, accused-appellant.
"x x x.
The question in this case is whether the circumstances from which the trial court drew its conclusion have been duly proven by the prosecution and, if so, whether, taken together, they support a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. If some of the circumstances have not been duly established, the further question is whether the remaining ones are nevertheless sufficient to produce such conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
First is accused-appellant's alleged confession to Barangay Captain Edgardo Manimbao. Manimbao testified that, after coming from the hospital to see the victim, he returned to the police station and there was told by SPO3 Gomez that accused-appellant wanted to talk to him. Accordingly, he said, he went to see accused-appellant who was then in jail. Accused-appellant allegedly admitted that he had killed the victim. Apparently, the purpose is to show that accused-appellant spontaneously made the confession, that is, not in the course of interrogation by the police. In fact, Manimbao claimed accused-appellant sought him out for a meeting. 25
In People v. Andan, 26 this Court held that the constitutional guarantees during custodial investigation do not apply to spontaneous statements not elicited through questioning by the authorities and given during ordinary conversation or during media interviews, whereby the suspect orally admits the commission of the crime. Our ruling in that case does not, however, authorize the police to obtain confessions they cannot otherwise obtain through media reporters who are acting for the police. The holding in Andan is qualified by the following:
Clearly, appellant's confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue influence from the police authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters when they reported when they interviewed appellant. They were not acting under the direction and control of the police. They were to check appellant's confession to the mayor. They did not force appellant to grant them an interview and reenact the commission of the crime. In fact, they asked his permission before interviewing him . . . . 27
In the case at bar, it is doubtful whether, as Manimbao claimed, accused-appellant's confession was given divorced from the police interrogation. In his testimony, SPO3 Gomez stated:
We conducted [oral] interrogation to the suspect. During our [oral] interrogation with the help of Bgy. Captain [Edgardo Manimbao], the suspect admitted to us that he's the one who hacked Jonalyn Navidad. Although we do not reduced [sic] it into writing because of the absen[ce] of [a] lawyer. 28
It would thus appear that Manimbao's conversation with accused-appellant was part of the then ongoing police investigation. In fact, he said it as SPO3 Gomez who told him about the alleged desire of accused-appellant to see him (Manimbao). Since the confession was admittedly given without the safeguards in Art. III, § 12 29 and the additional ones provided in R.A. No. 7438, particularly the requirement that the confession be in writing and duly signed by the suspect in the presence of counsel, we hold that accused-appellant's confession is inadmissible, and it was error for the trial court to use it in convicting accused-appellant.
Moreover, Edgardo Manimbao's testimony as to the circumstances surrounding the confession allegedly given to him is in itself improbable.
First of all, Manimbao did not give a plausible reason why accused-appellant would want to talk to him. He testified that accused-appellant want[ed] to get out of jail. 30 If that were the case, it was very unlikely that accused-appellant would admit his guilt.
Another reason which makes Edgardo Manimbao's account unlikely is his claim that after accused-appellant had confessed to the crime, Manimbao asked the prison guard if accused-appellant had told him (the prison guard) why he killed the victim. 31 Manimbao himself could have asked accused-appellant the question if accused-appellant had really admitted to him the crime. Indeed, if one were to believe the prosecution evidence, it would seem that accused-appellant confessed to the crime to almost everyone: to SPO3 Gomez, to Barangay Captain Manimbao, and to the prison guard. How then could accused-appellant hope to be freed? Manimbao's claim is not only patently improbable; it is even hearsay as far as the alleged information given to him by the prison guard is concerned.
x x x."
Circumstantial evidence not appreciated by the Court- "The question in this case is whether the circumstances from which the trial court drew its conclusion have been duly proven by the prosecution and, if so, whether, taken together, they support a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. If some of the circumstances have not been duly established, the further question is whether the remaining ones are nevertheless sufficient to produce such conviction beyond reasonable doubt."
See - https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1999/may1999/gr_129723_1999.html
G.R. No. 129723 May 19, 1999, En Banc.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANILO MORADA y TUMLOD, accused-appellant.
"x x x.
In convicting accused-appellant, the trial court relied on the following circumstances as constituting an unbroken chain leading to the conclusion that accused-appellant was the author of the crime:
1. In the scene of the crime the accused's pair of slippers with thumbtacks on them was found. This was positively identified as belonging to the accused by Eric Navidad, a younger brother of the victim and the first person who discovered the victim's body. Alejandro Dela Cruz, likewise, identified the same subject slippers having seen them during a hide-and-seek game in the wake of his dead father while Joel Avenda, accused's half brother, also identified the accused as the owner of the same pair of slippers.
2. Accused was seen by Christopher Saliva coming from the scene of the crime carrying with him a bolo and reacted as if he saw a ghost and turned pale when he saw Saliva. Accused was then wearing a polo shirt with striped design of blue and yellow which matched the blood-stained shirt recovered from a tree beside the nipa house of the accused.
3. From the premises of the accused were recovered a blood-stained yellow and gray striped T-shirt hanging on a tree and one (1) blood-stained bolo about a meter away from the side of the nipa house of the accused. Further, Morada's wife identified the blood-stained T-shirt as belonging to her husband DaniloMorada.
4. The NBI Forensic Chemistry Division laboratory examinations of the blood-stained yellow and gray striped T-shirt and bolo recovered at Danilo Morada's place both gave positive results for human blood.
5. At the police headquarters, accused admitted before barangay captain Edgardo Manimbao that the pair of slippers was actually his and that he was really the one who hacked Jonalyn Navidad because Jonalyn Navidad, according to the jail guard when asked by Manimbao, was very angry at him (Morada) up to the point that she spat on his face.
6. Eric Navidad revealed that Danilo Morada had intimated to him that he (Morada) had an affection for his elder sister when she was still alive even though Morada was a married man. 24
Rule 133, §4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inference are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The question in this case is whether the circumstances from which the trial court drew its conclusion have been duly proven by the prosecution and, if so, whether, taken together, they support a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. If some of the circumstances have not been duly established, the further question is whether the remaining ones are nevertheless sufficient to produce such conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
First is accused-appellant's alleged confession to Barangay Captain Edgardo Manimbao. Manimbao testified that, after coming from the hospital to see the victim, he returned to the police station and there was told by SPO3 Gomez that accused-appellant wanted to talk to him. Accordingly, he said, he went to see accused-appellant who was then in jail. Accused-appellant allegedly admitted that he had killed the victim. Apparently, the purpose is to show that accused-appellant spontaneously made the confession, that is, not in the course of interrogation by the police. In fact, Manimbao claimed accused-appellant sought him out for a meeting. 25
In People v. Andan, 26 this Court held that the constitutional guarantees during custodial investigation do not apply to spontaneous statements not elicited through questioning by the authorities and given during ordinary conversation or during media interviews, whereby the suspect orally admits the commission of the crime. Our ruling in that case does not, however, authorize the police to obtain confessions they cannot otherwise obtain through media reporters who are acting for the police. The holding in Andan is qualified by the following:
Clearly, appellant's confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue influence from the police authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters when they reported when they interviewed appellant. They were not acting under the direction and control of the police. They were to check appellant's confession to the mayor. They did not force appellant to grant them an interview and reenact the commission of the crime. In fact, they asked his permission before interviewing him . . . . 27
In the case at bar, it is doubtful whether, as Manimbao claimed, accused-appellant's confession was given divorced from the police interrogation. In his testimony, SPO3 Gomez stated:
We conducted [oral] interrogation to the suspect. During our [oral] interrogation with the help of Bgy. Captain [Edgardo Manimbao], the suspect admitted to us that he's the one who hacked Jonalyn Navidad. Although we do not reduced [sic] it into writing because of the absen[ce] of [a] lawyer. 28
It would thus appear that Manimbao's conversation with accused-appellant was part of the then ongoing police investigation. In fact, he said it as SPO3 Gomez who told him about the alleged desire of accused-appellant to see him (Manimbao). Since the confession was admittedly given without the safeguards in Art. III, § 12 29 and the additional ones provided in R.A. No. 7438, particularly the requirement that the confession be in writing and duly signed by the suspect in the presence of counsel, we hold that accused-appellant's confession is inadmissible, and it was error for the trial court to use it in convicting accused-appellant.
Moreover, Edgardo Manimbao's testimony as to the circumstances surrounding the confession allegedly given to him is in itself improbable.
First of all, Manimbao did not give a plausible reason why accused-appellant would want to talk to him. He testified that accused-appellant want[ed] to get out of jail. 30 If that were the case, it was very unlikely that accused-appellant would admit his guilt.
Another reason which makes Edgardo Manimbao's account unlikely is his claim that after accused-appellant had confessed to the crime, Manimbao asked the prison guard if accused-appellant had told him (the prison guard) why he killed the victim. 31 Manimbao himself could have asked accused-appellant the question if accused-appellant had really admitted to him the crime. Indeed, if one were to believe the prosecution evidence, it would seem that accused-appellant confessed to the crime to almost everyone: to SPO3 Gomez, to Barangay Captain Manimbao, and to the prison guard. How then could accused-appellant hope to be freed? Manimbao's claim is not only patently improbable; it is even hearsay as far as the alleged information given to him by the prison guard is concerned.
As for the T-shirt and the bolo which SPO3 Gomez and Barangay Captain Edgardo Manimbao said they found near accused-appellant's nipa hut with bloodstains on them, the evidence is doubtful. Accused-appellant admits that the shirt and the bolo are his, but he denies that when they were taken from him on April 13, 1995 they were bloodstained. Indeed, in his testimony in court, Christopher Saliva did not say he saw bloodstains on the shirt which accused-appellant was wearing and the bolo he was carrying. It is improbable that these incriminating pieces of evidence would be left in the premises of accused-appellant's house within public view: the T-shirt, bloodstained, hanging from a tree, and the bolo, also bloodstained, in the yard. The articles in question could only have been left outside the house because, as accused-appellant contends, they had no bloodstains.
Moreover, even if the shirt and the bolo were bloodstained when found by SPO3 Gomez and Barangay Captain Manimbao, it has not been shown that the blood matched the blood type of the victim. As held in People v. Padilla, 32 unless shown that bloodstains on alleged instruments of crime match the blood type of the victim the same cannot sustain conviction of the accused.
The question now is whether, without accused-appellant's alleged confession and the bloodstains on the T-shirt and bolo which were admittedly taken from accused-appellant, there is enough circumstantial evidence to convict him of the killing of Jonalyn Navidad. The remaining evidence consists of circumstances which, according to the trial court, were duly proven, to wit: (1) that accused-appellant was seen near the scene of the crime between 10 and 11 in the morning of the day in question wearing the T-shirt and carrying the bolo which the prosecution presented in evidence and (2) that a pair of slippers was found near the place where the body of the victim was retrieved and the slippers belonged to accused-appellant.
The claim that accused-appellant was near the scene of the crime between 10 and 11 in the morning comes from the testimony of Christopher Saliva. His testimony would be uncorroborated if he did not describe what he allegedly saw accused-appellant wearing and the bolo the latter was supposedly carrying at the time. This part of Saliva's testimony is critical to his claim that he saw accused-appellant because it coincides with the description of the T-shirt 33 and the bolo taken by SPO3 Gomez and Barangay Captain Manimbao from accused-appellant. It appears, however, that Saliva was simply made to say that accused-appellant was wearing the T-shirt and carrying the bolo in question after these articles had been taken from accused-appellant not so much to corroborate Gomez and Manimbao's claim (because after all accused-appellant admits that the articles belonged to him) but rather to give verisimilitude to Saliva's own claim that he had seen accused-appellant near the scene of the crime. Note that Saliva gave his statement to the police only on April 16, 1995, after Gomez and Manimbao had executed a joint statement that they had taken a T-shirt and a bolo, both allegedly bloodstained, from accused-appellant. Saliva said that around 11 in the morning of April 13, 1995 (which means shortly after he had allegedly seen accused-appellant near the scene of the crime), he was told by his cousin, Allan Saquilayan, that Jonalyn Navidad had been killed. Yet, judging by the delay in giving his sworn statement to the police, it appears that it did not immediately occur to him that accused-appellant might have something to do with the killing. This is strange since according to this witness, accused-appellant had a bolo which was bloodstained and turned pale as though surprised while committing something wrong. There is, therefore, doubt whether Christopher Saliva really saw accused-appellant near the scene of the crime at about the time the crime was committed.
It would thus appear that Saliva did not mention in hos sworn statement (Exh. D) that when-accused appellant saw him on April 13, 1995 the latter turned pale and appeared surprised because it is not true Saliva saw accused-appellant, in the same way that Saliva did not mention in his testimony in court that he saw accused-appellant with bloodstained shirt and bloodstained bolo because he really did not see accused-appellant on that day, much less the bloodstain on the shirt and the bolo.
The last piece of evidence mentioned by the trial court constituting a link in a chain of circumstances are the slippers are the slippers (Exhs. B and B-2) which SPO3 Gomez, Barangay Captain Manimbao, and an onlooker, Alejandro de la Cruz, said they found near the place where Jonalyn Navidad was found. These slippers were identified to be those of accused-appellant by Eric Navidad, younger brother of the victim, and Alejandro de la Cruz. Both witnesses said they recognized the slippers because of thumbtacks (Exhs. B-1 and B-3) placed in the middle of the insteps. Actually, the slippers are rubber sandals with Japanese-style straps designed for beachwalk. It is inconceivable why the owner should place thumbtacks in the insteps of his sandals. The thumbtacks could not have been used to hold the straps or fasten them to the sandals because the fact is that the straps had not given way. On the other hand, as accused-appellant pointed out, he would not place the thumbtacks there because they could injure him.
Eric said he saw accused-appellant wearing these sandals while playing basketball and on the occasions he passed by accused-appellant's house. Accuse-appellant would take off his sandals and leave them at the foot of the stairs, and this was how Eric noticed the thumbtacks. Eric Navidad was interviewed at the police station in connection with the killing of his sister. Yet, it does not appear he ever told the police that he recognized the sandals because of the thumbtacks embedded in their insteps. He made this claim only on February 14, 1996 when he testified in court.
On the other hand, Alejandro de la Cruz had an ingenious explanation why he recognized the slippers to be those of accused-appellant because of the thumbtacks embedded in their insteps. He said accused-appellant went to his (Alejandro de la Cruz's) father's wake in January 1995 and, while there, accused-appellant dozed off. In the course of a game, Alejandro de la Cruz said he and his companions hid accused-appellant's sandals. In doing so, he noticed the thumbtacks in question. The story sounds artificial. Alejandro de la Cruz was 33 years old at the time. To drive away boredom would he have played "hide and seek" with other people attending the wake? And did he think it proper to do this (play "hide and seek") even when it was the wake for his own father? The attempt at ingeniousness can only create doubt in his story of how he allegedly came to see thumbtacks embedded in the insteps of accused-appellant's sandals that would later give him away as the author of the crime. Alejandro de la Cruz must be very observant to notice something in otherwise nondescript sandals.
There may indeed be suspicion that accused-appellant is the author of the crime. But our legal culture demands proof beyond reasonable doubt to be established according to law before any person may be deprived of his life, liberty, or even property. We cannot render judgment on the basis of mere guesses, surmises, or suspicion. It is not sufficient for a conviction that the evidence establishes a strong suspicion or a probability of guilt. Before an accused can be convicted, the hypothesis of his guilt must flow naturally from the facts proved and must be consistent with all of them.
x x x."
In convicting accused-appellant, the trial court relied on the following circumstances as constituting an unbroken chain leading to the conclusion that accused-appellant was the author of the crime:
1. In the scene of the crime the accused's pair of slippers with thumbtacks on them was found. This was positively identified as belonging to the accused by Eric Navidad, a younger brother of the victim and the first person who discovered the victim's body. Alejandro Dela Cruz, likewise, identified the same subject slippers having seen them during a hide-and-seek game in the wake of his dead father while Joel Avenda, accused's half brother, also identified the accused as the owner of the same pair of slippers.
2. Accused was seen by Christopher Saliva coming from the scene of the crime carrying with him a bolo and reacted as if he saw a ghost and turned pale when he saw Saliva. Accused was then wearing a polo shirt with striped design of blue and yellow which matched the blood-stained shirt recovered from a tree beside the nipa house of the accused.
3. From the premises of the accused were recovered a blood-stained yellow and gray striped T-shirt hanging on a tree and one (1) blood-stained bolo about a meter away from the side of the nipa house of the accused. Further, Morada's wife identified the blood-stained T-shirt as belonging to her husband DaniloMorada.
4. The NBI Forensic Chemistry Division laboratory examinations of the blood-stained yellow and gray striped T-shirt and bolo recovered at Danilo Morada's place both gave positive results for human blood.
5. At the police headquarters, accused admitted before barangay captain Edgardo Manimbao that the pair of slippers was actually his and that he was really the one who hacked Jonalyn Navidad because Jonalyn Navidad, according to the jail guard when asked by Manimbao, was very angry at him (Morada) up to the point that she spat on his face.
6. Eric Navidad revealed that Danilo Morada had intimated to him that he (Morada) had an affection for his elder sister when she was still alive even though Morada was a married man. 24
Rule 133, §4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inference are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The question in this case is whether the circumstances from which the trial court drew its conclusion have been duly proven by the prosecution and, if so, whether, taken together, they support a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. If some of the circumstances have not been duly established, the further question is whether the remaining ones are nevertheless sufficient to produce such conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
First is accused-appellant's alleged confession to Barangay Captain Edgardo Manimbao. Manimbao testified that, after coming from the hospital to see the victim, he returned to the police station and there was told by SPO3 Gomez that accused-appellant wanted to talk to him. Accordingly, he said, he went to see accused-appellant who was then in jail. Accused-appellant allegedly admitted that he had killed the victim. Apparently, the purpose is to show that accused-appellant spontaneously made the confession, that is, not in the course of interrogation by the police. In fact, Manimbao claimed accused-appellant sought him out for a meeting. 25
In People v. Andan, 26 this Court held that the constitutional guarantees during custodial investigation do not apply to spontaneous statements not elicited through questioning by the authorities and given during ordinary conversation or during media interviews, whereby the suspect orally admits the commission of the crime. Our ruling in that case does not, however, authorize the police to obtain confessions they cannot otherwise obtain through media reporters who are acting for the police. The holding in Andan is qualified by the following:
Clearly, appellant's confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue influence from the police authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters when they reported when they interviewed appellant. They were not acting under the direction and control of the police. They were to check appellant's confession to the mayor. They did not force appellant to grant them an interview and reenact the commission of the crime. In fact, they asked his permission before interviewing him . . . . 27
In the case at bar, it is doubtful whether, as Manimbao claimed, accused-appellant's confession was given divorced from the police interrogation. In his testimony, SPO3 Gomez stated:
We conducted [oral] interrogation to the suspect. During our [oral] interrogation with the help of Bgy. Captain [Edgardo Manimbao], the suspect admitted to us that he's the one who hacked Jonalyn Navidad. Although we do not reduced [sic] it into writing because of the absen[ce] of [a] lawyer. 28
It would thus appear that Manimbao's conversation with accused-appellant was part of the then ongoing police investigation. In fact, he said it as SPO3 Gomez who told him about the alleged desire of accused-appellant to see him (Manimbao). Since the confession was admittedly given without the safeguards in Art. III, § 12 29 and the additional ones provided in R.A. No. 7438, particularly the requirement that the confession be in writing and duly signed by the suspect in the presence of counsel, we hold that accused-appellant's confession is inadmissible, and it was error for the trial court to use it in convicting accused-appellant.
Moreover, Edgardo Manimbao's testimony as to the circumstances surrounding the confession allegedly given to him is in itself improbable.
First of all, Manimbao did not give a plausible reason why accused-appellant would want to talk to him. He testified that accused-appellant want[ed] to get out of jail. 30 If that were the case, it was very unlikely that accused-appellant would admit his guilt.
Another reason which makes Edgardo Manimbao's account unlikely is his claim that after accused-appellant had confessed to the crime, Manimbao asked the prison guard if accused-appellant had told him (the prison guard) why he killed the victim. 31 Manimbao himself could have asked accused-appellant the question if accused-appellant had really admitted to him the crime. Indeed, if one were to believe the prosecution evidence, it would seem that accused-appellant confessed to the crime to almost everyone: to SPO3 Gomez, to Barangay Captain Manimbao, and to the prison guard. How then could accused-appellant hope to be freed? Manimbao's claim is not only patently improbable; it is even hearsay as far as the alleged information given to him by the prison guard is concerned.
As for the T-shirt and the bolo which SPO3 Gomez and Barangay Captain Edgardo Manimbao said they found near accused-appellant's nipa hut with bloodstains on them, the evidence is doubtful. Accused-appellant admits that the shirt and the bolo are his, but he denies that when they were taken from him on April 13, 1995 they were bloodstained. Indeed, in his testimony in court, Christopher Saliva did not say he saw bloodstains on the shirt which accused-appellant was wearing and the bolo he was carrying. It is improbable that these incriminating pieces of evidence would be left in the premises of accused-appellant's house within public view: the T-shirt, bloodstained, hanging from a tree, and the bolo, also bloodstained, in the yard. The articles in question could only have been left outside the house because, as accused-appellant contends, they had no bloodstains.
Moreover, even if the shirt and the bolo were bloodstained when found by SPO3 Gomez and Barangay Captain Manimbao, it has not been shown that the blood matched the blood type of the victim. As held in People v. Padilla, 32 unless shown that bloodstains on alleged instruments of crime match the blood type of the victim the same cannot sustain conviction of the accused.
The question now is whether, without accused-appellant's alleged confession and the bloodstains on the T-shirt and bolo which were admittedly taken from accused-appellant, there is enough circumstantial evidence to convict him of the killing of Jonalyn Navidad. The remaining evidence consists of circumstances which, according to the trial court, were duly proven, to wit: (1) that accused-appellant was seen near the scene of the crime between 10 and 11 in the morning of the day in question wearing the T-shirt and carrying the bolo which the prosecution presented in evidence and (2) that a pair of slippers was found near the place where the body of the victim was retrieved and the slippers belonged to accused-appellant.
The claim that accused-appellant was near the scene of the crime between 10 and 11 in the morning comes from the testimony of Christopher Saliva. His testimony would be uncorroborated if he did not describe what he allegedly saw accused-appellant wearing and the bolo the latter was supposedly carrying at the time. This part of Saliva's testimony is critical to his claim that he saw accused-appellant because it coincides with the description of the T-shirt 33 and the bolo taken by SPO3 Gomez and Barangay Captain Manimbao from accused-appellant. It appears, however, that Saliva was simply made to say that accused-appellant was wearing the T-shirt and carrying the bolo in question after these articles had been taken from accused-appellant not so much to corroborate Gomez and Manimbao's claim (because after all accused-appellant admits that the articles belonged to him) but rather to give verisimilitude to Saliva's own claim that he had seen accused-appellant near the scene of the crime. Note that Saliva gave his statement to the police only on April 16, 1995, after Gomez and Manimbao had executed a joint statement that they had taken a T-shirt and a bolo, both allegedly bloodstained, from accused-appellant. Saliva said that around 11 in the morning of April 13, 1995 (which means shortly after he had allegedly seen accused-appellant near the scene of the crime), he was told by his cousin, Allan Saquilayan, that Jonalyn Navidad had been killed. Yet, judging by the delay in giving his sworn statement to the police, it appears that it did not immediately occur to him that accused-appellant might have something to do with the killing. This is strange since according to this witness, accused-appellant had a bolo which was bloodstained and turned pale as though surprised while committing something wrong. There is, therefore, doubt whether Christopher Saliva really saw accused-appellant near the scene of the crime at about the time the crime was committed.
It would thus appear that Saliva did not mention in hos sworn statement (Exh. D) that when-accused appellant saw him on April 13, 1995 the latter turned pale and appeared surprised because it is not true Saliva saw accused-appellant, in the same way that Saliva did not mention in his testimony in court that he saw accused-appellant with bloodstained shirt and bloodstained bolo because he really did not see accused-appellant on that day, much less the bloodstain on the shirt and the bolo.
The last piece of evidence mentioned by the trial court constituting a link in a chain of circumstances are the slippers are the slippers (Exhs. B and B-2) which SPO3 Gomez, Barangay Captain Manimbao, and an onlooker, Alejandro de la Cruz, said they found near the place where Jonalyn Navidad was found. These slippers were identified to be those of accused-appellant by Eric Navidad, younger brother of the victim, and Alejandro de la Cruz. Both witnesses said they recognized the slippers because of thumbtacks (Exhs. B-1 and B-3) placed in the middle of the insteps. Actually, the slippers are rubber sandals with Japanese-style straps designed for beachwalk. It is inconceivable why the owner should place thumbtacks in the insteps of his sandals. The thumbtacks could not have been used to hold the straps or fasten them to the sandals because the fact is that the straps had not given way. On the other hand, as accused-appellant pointed out, he would not place the thumbtacks there because they could injure him.
Eric said he saw accused-appellant wearing these sandals while playing basketball and on the occasions he passed by accused-appellant's house. Accuse-appellant would take off his sandals and leave them at the foot of the stairs, and this was how Eric noticed the thumbtacks. Eric Navidad was interviewed at the police station in connection with the killing of his sister. Yet, it does not appear he ever told the police that he recognized the sandals because of the thumbtacks embedded in their insteps. He made this claim only on February 14, 1996 when he testified in court.
On the other hand, Alejandro de la Cruz had an ingenious explanation why he recognized the slippers to be those of accused-appellant because of the thumbtacks embedded in their insteps. He said accused-appellant went to his (Alejandro de la Cruz's) father's wake in January 1995 and, while there, accused-appellant dozed off. In the course of a game, Alejandro de la Cruz said he and his companions hid accused-appellant's sandals. In doing so, he noticed the thumbtacks in question. The story sounds artificial. Alejandro de la Cruz was 33 years old at the time. To drive away boredom would he have played "hide and seek" with other people attending the wake? And did he think it proper to do this (play "hide and seek") even when it was the wake for his own father? The attempt at ingeniousness can only create doubt in his story of how he allegedly came to see thumbtacks embedded in the insteps of accused-appellant's sandals that would later give him away as the author of the crime. Alejandro de la Cruz must be very observant to notice something in otherwise nondescript sandals.
There may indeed be suspicion that accused-appellant is the author of the crime. But our legal culture demands proof beyond reasonable doubt to be established according to law before any person may be deprived of his life, liberty, or even property. We cannot render judgment on the basis of mere guesses, surmises, or suspicion. It is not sufficient for a conviction that the evidence establishes a strong suspicion or a probability of guilt. Before an accused can be convicted, the hypothesis of his guilt must flow naturally from the facts proved and must be consistent with all of them.
x x x."
Admissibility of extrajudicial confession given by accused to reporters. - "Accused-appellant claims, however, that the atmosphere in the jail when he was interviewed was "tense and intimidating" and was similar to that which prevails in a custodial investigation. 42 We are not persuaded. Accused-appellant was interviewed while he was inside his cell. The interviewer stayed outside the cell and the only person besides him was an uncle of the victim. Accused-appellant could have refused to be interviewed, but instead, he agreed. He answered questions freely and spontaneously. According to Celso Manuel, he said he was willing to accept the consequences of his act. Celso Manuel admitted that there were indeed some police officers around because about two to three meters from the jail were the police station and the radio room. 43 We do not think the presence of the police officers exerted any undue pressure or influence on accused-appellant and coerced him into giving his confession. Accused-appellant contends that "it is . . . not altogether improbable for the police investigators to ask the police reporter (Manuel) to try to elicit some incriminating information from the accused." 44 This is pure conjecture. Although he testified that he had interviewed inmates before, there is no evidence to show that Celso was a police beat reporter. Even assuming that he was, it has not been shown that, in conducting the interview in question, his purpose was to elicit incriminating information from accused-appellant. To the contrary, the media are known to take an opposite stance against the government by exposing official wrongdoings. Indeed, there is no showing that the radio reporter was acting for the police or that the interview was conducted under circumstances where it is apparent that accused-appellant confessed to the killing our of fear. As already stated, the interview was conducted on October 23, 1996, 6 days after accused-appellant had already confessed to the killing to the police."
See - https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1999/may1999/gr_130612_1999.html
G.R. No. 130612 May 11, 1999, En Banc.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BERNARDINO DOMANTAY, @ "JUNIOR OTOT," accused-appellant.
"x x x.
First. Accused-appellant contends that his alleged confessions to SPO1 Antonio Espinoza and Celso Manuel are inadmissible in evidence because they had been obtained in violation of Art. III, § 12(1) of the Constitution and that, with these vital pieces of evidence excluded, the remaining proof of his alleged guilt, consisting of circumstantial evidence, is inadequate to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 33
Art. III, § 12 of the Constitution in part provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this section or section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence.
This provision applies to the stage of custodial investigation, that is, "when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect." 34 R.A. No. 7438 has extended the constitutional guarantee to situations in which an individual has not been formally arrested but has merely been "invited" for questioning. 35
Decisions 36 of this Court hold that for an extrajudicial confession to be admissible, it must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.
In the case at bar, when accused-appellant was brought to the Malasiqui police station in the evening of October 17, 1996, 37 he was already a suspect, in fact the only one, in the brutal slaying of Jennifer Domantay. He was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed in Art. III, § 12(1) of the Constitution applied to him. SPO1 Espinoza narrated what transpired during accused-appellant's interrogation: 38
[I] interrogated Bernardino Domantay, prior to the interrogation conducted to him, I informed him of his constitutional right as follows; that he has the right to remain silent; that he has the right to a competent lawyer of his own choice and if he can not afford [a counsel] then he will be provided with one, and further informed [him] that all he will say will be reduced into writing and will be used the same in the proceedings of the case, but he told me that he will cooperate even in the absence of his counsel; that he admitted to me that he killed Jennifer Domantay, and he revealed also the weapon used [and] where he gave [it] to.
But though he waived the assistance of counsel, the waiver was neither put in writing nor made in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the waiver is invalid and his confession is inadmissible. SPO1 Espinoza's testimony on the alleged confession of accused-appellant should have been excluded by the trial court. So is the bayonet inadmissible in evidence, being, as it were, the "fruit of the poisonous tree." As explained in People v. Alicando: 39
. . . According to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegal obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained.
We agree with the Solicitor General, however, that accused-appellant's confession to the radio reporter, Celso Manuel, is admissible. In People v. Andan, 40 the accused in a rape with homicide case confessed to the crime during interviews with the media. In holding the confession admissible, despite the fact that the accused gave his answers without the assistance of counsel, this Court said: 41
[A]ppellant's [oral] confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents.
Accused-appellant claims, however, that the atmosphere in the jail when he was interviewed was "tense and intimidating" and was similar to that which prevails in a custodial investigation. 42 We are not persuaded. Accused-appellant was interviewed while he was inside his cell. The interviewer stayed outside the cell and the only person besides him was an uncle of the victim. Accused-appellant could have refused to be interviewed, but instead, he agreed. He answered questions freely and spontaneously. According to Celso Manuel, he said he was willing to accept the consequences of his act.
Celso Manuel admitted that there were indeed some police officers around because about two to three meters from the jail were the police station and the radio room. 43 We do not think the presence of the police officers exerted any undue pressure or influence on accused-appellant and coerced him into giving his confession.
Accused-appellant contends that "it is . . . not altogether improbable for the police investigators to ask the police reporter (Manuel) to try to elicit some incriminating information from the accused." 44 This is pure conjecture. Although he testified that he had interviewed inmates before, there is no evidence to show that Celso was a police beat reporter. Even assuming that he was, it has not been shown that, in conducting the interview in question, his purpose was to elicit incriminating information from accused-appellant. To the contrary, the media are known to take an opposite stance against the government by exposing official wrongdoings.
Indeed, there is no showing that the radio reporter was acting for the police or that the interview was conducted under circumstances where it is apparent that accused-appellant confessed to the killing our of fear. As already stated, the interview was conducted on October 23, 1996, 6 days after accused-appellant had already confessed to the killing to the police.
Accused-appellant's extrajudicial confession is corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti, namely, the fact of death of Jennifer Domantay. In addition, the circumstantial evidence furnished by the other prosecution witnesses dovetails in material points with his confession. He was seen walking toward the bamboo grove, followed by the victim. Later, he was seen standing near the bamboo grove where the child's body was found. Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
§3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction. — An extrajudicial confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.
§4. Evidence necessary in treason cases. — No person charged with treason shall be convicted unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.
Accused-appellant argues that it was improbable for a brutal killing to have been committed without the children who were playing about eight to ten meters from Amparo Domantay's grove, where the crime took place, having heard any commotion. 45 The contention has no merit. Accused-appellant could have covered the young child's mouth to prevent her from making any sound. In fact, Dr. Bandonill noted a five by two inch (5" x 2") contusion on the left side of the victim's forehead, which he said could have been caused by a hard blunt instrument or by impact as her head hit the ground. 46 The blow could have rendered her unconscious, thus precluding her from shouting or crying.
x x x."
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